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ABSTRACT
This thesis studies the step-by-step process of foreign policy making within the British 
Government from 1931 to 1939. It aims to pin-point the origin, evolution and nature 
of appeasement, the principal policy-makers’ viewpoints and activities in policy 
formulating and their responsibility for encouraging the aggressive powers. In the 
Introduction, the subjective and objective roots of appeasement are explored, and the 
Author examines the reasons why it was pursued for nine years without change. 
Highlighting the shortcomings in the past and current research on the subject, a 
summary of the approaches used in the thesis is given. The First Chapter surveys 
policy-making during the Manchurian crisis of 1931, not only a starting point for 
appeasement, but also to a large extent the main reason for the European 
appeasement. The Second Chapter shows how the British Government appeased 
Mussolini in the Italo-Abyssinian conflict of 1935-36, and how appeasement in the 
Far East started to cause appeasement in Europe. Chapters Three, Four and Five 
indicate the development of appeasement policy towards Germany during 1936 - 
1939, namely, how it was hatched during the Rhineland crisis of 1936, and how it 
was, through the Anschluss, brought to a climax at Munich in 1938. Chapter Six 
analyses the policy of the guarantee to Poland and of the Three Power conversations 
in 1939 with the observation that these represented the Chamberlain Government’s 
efforts to change their policy within the scope of appeasement, but that appeasement 
led to their failure. In the Conclusion, the various arguments in favour of 
appeasement are criticised and lessons drawn from that disastrous age.
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INTRODUCTION
The Second World War was in a real sense partly a resumption of the First World 
War. Although it restored the balance of power for the time being, the Versailles 
Treaty did not remove but only temporarily froze the problems in the modern world. 
Within the Versailles Settlement there were three series of contradictions: 
contradiction between imperial powers (aggressive powers and Western powers), 
contradiction between the aggressive powers and weak powers (victim nations and 
colonies), and contradiction between Western powers and weak powers. In the 
1930s, the aggressors’ ambitions and expansion not only threatened the survival of 
victim nations, but they also challenged Western powers, which finally intensified 
contradictions between the aggressors and the rest of the world, and led to the 
Second World War.
Versailles itself was ambivalent. On the one hand, it was a product of power 
politics: five victor powers (Britain, France, America, Italy and Japan) carved up the 
world at the Paris Peace Conference and utilised the Treaty to legalise their captured 
interests. However, afi;er four years’ bloody struggle, all the powers were exhausted 
and needed peace no matter what their motives were. The Treaty, on the other hand, 
therefore, created both the principle and mechanism — the Covenant and the League— 
to maintain world peace. Recognising the victor powers as masters of the world, the 
League was also a deterrent against the fiiture invasion of victim nations and colonies, 
which had progressive significance in history. However, given its ambivalence, 
power politics were the dominant aspect. Placing their own national interests above 
the League, the Great Powers consistently decided international affairs during the 
inter-war period, ignoring the rights of victim nations. They would follow the 
Covenant only when it was in accordance with their desire. This was the basic reason 
why the League did not work when it faced any challenge.
In the history of the inter-war period, “the German problem” was the core. As a 
defeated imperial power but not a victim nation, Germany was greatly weakened by 
her former European partners. The Versailles Treaty deprived Germany of all her 
colonies. In Europe, Germany’s eastern borders were pushed back, and the 
Rhineland was occupied by the Allied Army for fifteen years, becoming a
demilitarised zone. German-Austrian union was permanently forbidden. According 
to the Treaty, she had to pay a large sum of reparation and her army was reduced to 
100,000. In addition, she was morally charged of “War-Guilt”. However, Germany 
had not been deprived of the military and economic potential of a great power; their 
army maintained a military backbone; the Ruhr, the industrial centre, was still in their 
hands, and the reparation had never been fully paid. Although they were forced to 
sign the Treaty, the Germans still resented the perceived injustice of their loss of 
Empire, and wished to recover it.
On the other hand, of the great powers, there were two countries whose 
territorial demands had not been completely satisfied at the Paris Conference — Italy 
and Japan  ^ — and these naturally took the German side due to their aggressive 
ambitions with regard to future adventures. These three were sometimes called the 
“have-not” powers.
By contrast, the Western Powers, in particular the British and French Empires, 
which had grabbed vast colonial interest by invasion and expansion in the past few 
centuries, reached their fullest extents by taking over German and Turkish colonies 
after the First World War. Chatfteld, British First Sea Lord, said in 1934, “We have 
got most of the world already, or the best parts of it, and we only want to keep what 
we have got and prevent others from taking it away from us.”^
For the Western Powers, the most serious threat came from their “have-not”
partners. An historian analysed this from an economic point of view:
Much of the economic argument of the “have-not” powers was 
understood in the west. ... There was an underlying assumption that 
Germany and Japan did have real economic claims which had to be 
respected, and that economic concessions in these areas would go far 
to eliminating the evident sense of grievance that both powers 
harboured towards the west.^
In general, due to their limited strength, it was not easy for the Western Powers to
defend their world-wide interests, which was a little too much to handle. Vansittart,
the Permanent Under Secretary, wrote in the F.O. memo on June 8, 1935:
I have long thought the distribution of this limited globe quite 
untenable, and quite unjustifiable. Like fools we made it far worse at 
Versailles. What has happened in regard to Japan; what is happening in 
regard to Italy; and what is about to happen in regard to Germany, 
should surely confirm this view to anyone with political antennae.'^
Therefore, British policy-makers were ready to sacrifice weak powers or even some
of their own secondary interests to satisfy aggressors as long as the latter did not
jeopardise their vital interests. Chamberlain, the Prime Minister, expressed this view
fully on November 26, 1937:
I don’t see why we shouldn’t say to Germany ‘Give us satisfactory 
assurances that you won’t use force to deal with the Austrians and 
Czechoslovakians and we will give you similar assurances that we 
won’t use force to prevent the changes you want, if you can get them 
by peaceful means.... ’ ^
As the representatives of an imperial power, top British leaders inherently
understood and justified the ambitions and expansion of the present aggressors.
Chamberlain thought that
they (the Germans - Author) want to dominate Eastern Europe; they 
want as close a union with Austria as they can get, without 
incorporating her in the Reich, and they want much the same thing for 
the Sudeten Deutsch as we did for the Uitlanders in the Transvaal.*’
Hoare, the Foreign Secretary, during the Abyssinian crisis, publicly declared that the 
British Government sympathised with Italy’s expansion in Abyssinia.  ^ The senior 
officer in the F. O. found it difficult to persuade the Japanese not to increase military 
forces in Shanghai in 1932 because the British had done a similar thing in 1927.^
How could they possibly oppose the Japanese invasion of Manchuria when they 
themselves had cut Hong Kong off fi om China by force?
With no legs to stand on against the aggressors. Cabinet members and senior
officers in the F. O , in spite of different personalities, took the aggressors’ side with
few exceptions when they fonnulated foreign policy during crises in the 1930s. In the
Autunm of 1937, Henderson, the British Ambassador in Berlin, suggested to Halifax,
who was to visit Hitler in November, that Britain should somehow meet German
demands in Austria and Czechoslovakia:
Morally even we cannot deny the right of Germans living in large 
blocks on the German fi-ontier to decide their own fate. ... We should, 
even if we don’t like it, sympathise with German aspirations for unity, 
provided all change be based on the clearly established principle of self- 
determination.^
During his visit to Germany, Halifax told Hitler that England would not stop 
Germany from altering the map of Eastern Europe, for example, Danzig, Austria, 
Czechoslovakia, as long as this was achieved by peaceful means/*  ^ This accorded 
with Chamberlain’s own line of thinking, as he made clear, “What I wanted to do was 
to convince Hitler of our sincerity and to ascertain what objectives he had in 
mind....”^^ Eden greatly admired Halifax’s visit too. He himself put forward a 
proposal to the Cabinet on January 1, 1938 that the British Government should offer 
Germany the colonies and search in return for a general settlement. Like his 
colleagues, he in fact prevented Britain from being involved in a quarrel with 
Germany over Central and Eastern Europe by declaring that Britain was interested in 
that region without undertaking any military commitment. He believed that what a 
taxi driver said about the German occupation of the Rhineland represented public 
opinion, namely, that the Germans only went into their back garden. He also had 
sympathy with the Sudeten Germans.
Among the staff of the P.O., there was a strong tendency that was prepared to 
come to terms with Germany, allowing her to expand in Central and Eastern Europe. 
Vansittart, who was known for his anti-German standpoint, advocated this policy and 
proposed that they should “come to terms with Germany at a price”. H i s  successor, 
Cadogan, offered the same recipe for Government policy-making although his 
personal relations with Van. was at odds. It was, despite a little exaggeration, 
described thus:
Almost everyone. Conservatives, Liberals and Labour alike, regarded 
the French notion of keeping Germany permanently as a second-class 
power as absurd, and agreed that the Versailles Treaty must be revised 
in Germany’s favour.
On the contrary, British policy-makers had no syjD^ pathy with victim nations. 
Simon, Foreign Secretary 1931 - 1935, often used t]be words “wretched” or “foolish” 
to describe the Chinese.^*’ He blamed China for denying the Japanese interests in 
Manchuria, which provoked Japanese invasion. Hoare took the Abyssinians as “bad: 
neighbours”. Henderson called the Czechs “a pig-headed race”, who, Chamberlain 
thought, “were, in fact, themselves responsible for most of the trouble” during the 
Munich per iod . I t  is apparent that due to her similar aggressive experience, Britain 
had inherently an intimate relationship with the aggressive powers, which made it
impossible for her sincerely to take the victims’ side, and help them in their struggle 
against invasion.
In addition, as leaders of a declining empire which had suffered a great sacrifice 
during the First World War, the three prime ministers in the 1930s had a fear of war 
without exception. All of them believed that Britain was not in a position 
financially, economically, or militarily to fight. War would destroy British interests or 
even the British Empire. In MacDonald’s eyes, war with Japan over Manchuria “was 
unthinkable” and even “a strong protest might lead to war.”^^  Simon did not like the 
idea of a “war to end war”. This argument was best explained by Lord Grey, one of 
the vice-presidents of the League of Nations Union during the Manchurian crisis, “I 
do not like the idea of resorting to war to prevent war. ... It is too much like lighting 
a large fire in order to prevent a smaller one.”^^  The crucial point of policy-making in 
Baldwin’s Government was to exclude the country from any danger of war. Baldwin 
often repeated that Britain was not ready for war and he would not allow the country 
to be involved in a war if there was “even one chance in a hundred”. War to him was 
“the most fearful terror and prostitution of man’s knowledge that ever was known.”
It “could leave nothing in Europe at last but anarchy...Chamberlain was more 
afraid of war than anyone else, saying that war “wins nothing, cures nothing, ends 
nothing”, and in the last war there were “7 million ... young men who were cut off in 
their prime, the 13 million who were maimed and mutilated, the misery and the 
sufferings of the mothers or the fathers ... in war there are no winners, but all are 
losers”.T herefore, the top British leaders completely ruled out any possibility of 
checking aggressors by force.
In brief, due to her imperial nature and fear of war, Britain was more likely to 
take a standpoint closer to the aggressive powers rather than the victim nations 
during the inter-war crises. This could be said to constitute the subjective root of 
appeasement.
On the other hand, the international and domestic situation after the First World 
War offered the background for appeasement. Although Wilson, the American 
President, was the principal founder of the League, the United States refused 
membership owing to their policy of isolationism. Without American participation, 
the security of world peace was greatly weakened. Russia, however, was completely
excluded from the Settlement until 1934 when she was allowed to join the League. 
But even after that, her desire to cooperate in collective security was always 
misinterpreted and rejected by the Western world, particularly by the British 
Government.
It was apparent that Britain and France were the only Great Powers who were in 
a leading position in the League to maintain the Versailles Settlement. However, in 
spite of being a dominant power in the European Continent, France had become 
politically weak during the inter-war period because of internal confusion. She 
generally followed the British lead in diplomacy in the 1930s. The situation on the 
British side was not promising either. After the First World War, Britain was 
completely exhausted. The victory of the four year war had cost Britain her previous 
supremacy. During the War, total British casualties were 2,445,000, leaving 
1,200,000 disabled afterwards.^  ^ The war cost £10,000 million, and the National 
Debt mounted from £650 million (March 1914) to £7,434 million (March 1919).^ ^^  
What is more, this island Empire, whose life largely relied on overseas trade, lost a 
great part of her international market. Her Dominions became more and more 
independent, and would not offer open markets for her any more and supply her with 
raw materials as easily as before. Not only were British products challenged by those 
of Japan and America, but her naval supremacy no longer existed after the 
Washington Treaty of 1922, by which America got an equal footing with Britain.^^
In comparison with Japan and America, British industrial production lagged far 
behind and had not recovered to the 1913 level by 1927.^ *^  But only two years later, 
Britain dropped into the abyss of the 1929-32 depression. During the inter-war 
period, the British Government were so preoccupied with the problems of a capitalist 
system — slums, strikes, unemployment and party struggle etc. — that they had first to 
consider domestic issues instead of external ones, even though these were graver.
In 1931 Japan invaded Manchuria, becoming the source of war in the world. In 
1933 after he came to power in Germany, Hitler immediately announced that Germany 
withdrew from the Disarmament Conference as well as from the League. In 1935, he 
openly violated the terms of Versailles by declaring conscription. In 1936, he sent 
troops to the Rhineland, and in the same year, Italy conquered Abyssinia. Soon the 
three aggressors came to conclude their Axis according to their unanimous ambitions.
The shift of the balance of power not only threatened world peace, but also 
challenged the British Empire which had owned vast overseas trade and global 
colonial interests. However, with her decline, Britain considered only Western 
Europe as the vital interest that she had to insure. In the face of the disturbance in 
the Far East, the Mediterranean and Europe, the policy-makers would rather make 
concessions by sacrificing victim nations in order to seek a new settlement with the 
aggressors. Appeasement was the veiy policy emerging to meet this requirement.
A brief review of history is always helpful. At the time that the Japanese invaded 
Manchui'ia, Britain was suffering from the abandonment of the Gold Standard. The 
Labour Government had resigned and the National Government had been recently 
formed under the premiership of MacDonald. His defence theory was “that arms 
gave only a false security, that the surest guarantee against aggression was the force 
of world opinion, that Government should stop woriying about the risks of war and 
start running risks for peace.”^^  Now the Chiefs of Staff, due to the Far Eastern 
crisis, warned the Government that “The Ten Year Rule”^^  was too optimistic and 
ignored the danger of the situation. With support from the F.O., they suggested that 
rearmament should be put on the agenda. However, when the Cabinet considered 
their reports. Ministers argued that “acceptance of the Chiefs of Staff report must not 
be taken to justify increased expenditure on defence without regard to the very 
serious financial and economic situation.”^^  Until early 1934, MacDonald still wanted 
to keep his policy of disarmament although he had reluctantly come to the conclusion 
that rearmament might be necessary.
Realising that German rearmament was a threat to British as well as European
peace, Chamberlain, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, initiated the first expansion of
the Air Force in 1934. However, in June he reduced expenditure over five years from
76 million, suggested by Defence Requirements Committee, to 50 million pounds
because he “was merely advocating the cheapest way of defence, instead of the best”
as he explained later:
If we were now to follow Winston’s advice and sacrifice our commerce 
to the manufacture of arms, we should inflict a certain injury on our 
trade from which it would take generations to recover, we should 
destroy the confidence which now happily exists, and we should cripple 
the revenue.
MacDonald fully supported his Chancellor to cut down defence expenditure as 
minuted:
He was in entire agreement with the Chancellor of the Exchequer from 
the financial point of view ... The whole question had to be considered 
in the light of the national income and the commitments which would 
have to be faced ... The Service Departments must understand that it 
was not possible to contemplate the bill in full which the General Staff 
put forward. It was the duty of the General Staff to inform the Cabinet 
as to the maximum risk and it was the Cabinet’s duty to reduce the 
expenditure involved in accordance with the political situation; and it 
was the duty of the Chancellor and the Treasury to incur no 
expenditure which could not reasonably or even possibly be met.^^
During the election of 1935, Baldwin, the Prime Minister, declared, “I give you 
my word that there will be no great armaments.”^^  Until the spring of 1938, the 
British policy on rearmament still was “business as usual”, meaning that rearmament 
had to give way to normal industry and trade. It was not strange therefore that the 
British rearmament in 1930s was left far behind Germany’s.
Due to military weakness caused by the Government’s defence policy, Chiefs of 
Staff, when asked by the Cabinet about the risk of war, consistently warned that 
Britain was not ready to be involved in war. (What else could they possibly say!) 
These warnings were used in reverse by the Government as evidence to support and 
justify their concession to the dictators. The appeasers repeated that they had to 
appease the aggressors because Chiefs of Staff warned that Britain’s military force 
was too weak to fight. In the face of the grave situation created by their own policy, 
British policy-makers came to a strategic conclusion: Britain could not fight against 
Germany, Italy and Japan simultaneously with Germany being the principal enemy.^ '^  
On the other hand, the Government never made any real effort to cooperate with her 
potential allies. For instance, she never frilly backed up France when the latter was 
prepared to resist German expansion. Because of her strategic position, France 
placed more emphasis on her allies in Eastern Europe, and would fight for them if she 
could rely on British assistance, whereas Britain did not consider Central and Eastern 
Europe as her vital interests and hesitated to undertake any new commitments. 
Moreover, the British Government was afraid that France might go too far and spoil 
the hope of a settlement with Germany. Nor did they whole-heartedly seek co­
operation with the United States as both sides were reluctant to take responsibility in
an arrangement against aggression. The British Government particularly feared that
co-operation with America would offend Japan and “cut across” their efforts to
improve relations with Italy and Germany. Nor did they sincerely win over assistance
from Russia, due to their underestimation of Soviet forces, and a hatred and fear of
Communism.^  ^ In fact, they perhaps hated Communism even more than Nazism.
Baldwin told the Cabinet after Hitler’s re-occupation of the Rhineland that the French
“might succeed in crushing Germany with the aid of Russia, but it would probably
only result in Germany going Bolshevik.”^^  “If there is any fighting to be done,” he
said to Churchill, “I should like to see the Bolsheviks and the Nazis doing it.”^^
Chamberlain shared the same attitude, as his Private Secretary Douglas-Home
reviewed in 1962:
Chamberlain, like many others, saw Communism as the major long­
term danger. He hated Hitler and German Fascism, but he felt that 
Europe in general and Britain in particular were in even greater danger 
from Communism.^^
Being on her guard against the Soviets, Britain was not able to take a firm stand 
against Germany. Without Russian back-up, small countries in Central and Eastern 
Europe, which had been restored or newly created by the Treaty, were wide open to 
German invasion. Above all, Britain never organised collective security in the League 
against aggressions, because she was afraid that it would be provocative to the 
aggressors, who would damage British interests all over the world, interests that 
Britain had no power to defend. All this further weakened Britain herself and her 
potential allies, while Germany, Italy and Japan strengthened their Axis.
Under these circumstances, the British Government turned to a conciliatory policy 
— appeasement — to avoid the challenge. Based on their own assumption which had 
never been proved by any substantial evidence, the appeasers believed that the 
aggressors’ ambitions were limited. After the Rhineland crisis, the Cabinet 
maintained their decision that they would search for a settlement with Germany as 
soon as possible by making concessions. If this settlement could be reached, 
diplomacy would remove the heavy burden from national finance and even 
disarmament could be expected.^  ^ Therefore, in the Government’s view, 
appeasement would not only save money, but also save Britain from being 
challenged.
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However, it is a misunderstanding to claim that rearmament was in any case 
contradictory to appeasement. As a policy which in theory was one of concession but 
not surrender, appeasement required rearmament to a certain extent for support. 
Being closely inter-related, appeasement and rearmament offered a premise to each 
other; appeasement could reduce the financial burden of rearmament, and a limited 
rearmament was supposed to enforce the position when concessions were sought. 
Chamberlain told the Cabinet, “In our foreign policy we were doing our best to drive 
two horses abreast, conciliation and rearmament. It was a very nice art to keep these 
two steeds in step.”'^® It explained why, while expenditure on rearmament continued 
to increase slowly from 1934 to 1939, appeasement was a parallel policy which was 
brought to a climax.
In short, Britain’s economic, political and military decline gave her no confidence 
in facing the challenge from the “have-not” powers. She would rather calm them 
down by paying them a price than check them by coercive means. This could be 
described as the objective root of appeasement.
In spite of these subjective and objective factors, appeasement was not inevitable 
because there were practical alternatives, proposed by the opposition, which were 
open to the Government. In the 1930s, the opposition in the House consisted of the 
Labour Paity, Liberal Party and some Conservative dissidents such as Churchill, Eden 
(after his resignation), Amery and Cecil (Leader of League of Nations Union). 
However, opposition to the Government did not necessarily mean opposition to 
appeasement. For instance, although they sometimes delivered mild criticism, Amery 
and Eden were generally in agreement with the Government foreign policy, and the 
latter, in particular, supported the Munich business.'^^
In other opposition quarters, the Labour party advocated the policy of supporting 
the League and using coercive measures — economic sanctions backed up by military 
force — against the aggressor. They voted for armament for “collective security” 
though they opposed increasing expenditure for national defence."^  ^ The Liberals held 
a similar ground. They, in fact, cooperated with Labour over most issues of foreign 
affairs.The League and collective security were also emphasised by Cecil, who was 
one of the founders of the League. He had seriously criticised the Government’s 
concession to the aggressors since 1931 ; however, he did not give very much thought
11
to the alternative course perhaps because he “did not, indeed, foresee what a terrible 
price” they had to pay for appeasement/"^ The most outstanding anti-appeaser in 
Parliament, however, was Winston Churchill, who proposed both rearmament and 
collective security action under the League. In November 1936, he appealed for 
Britain and France, due to their military inferiority to Germany to “gather round them 
all the elements of collective security or, ... combined defensive strength against 
aggression” under the League . In  1938, he went further to put forward his proposal 
of “Grand Alliance” as a deterrent against German invasion of Czechoslovakia. 
Despite his anti-Communist standpoint, he emphasised the importance of an alliance 
with Russia.
The weakness of the opposition fell into two aspects: firstly, there were some 
flaws in their own proposals. For example. Labour and the Liberals oppqsed 
rearmament and they did not press the Government to take action during the 
Rhineland crisis although Attlee warned, “No sympathy for the injustices inflicted on 
the German people by the Versailles Treaty should blind us to the true nature of the 
act of the German Govermnent.”"^  ^ Attlee also supported Chamberlain’s going to 
Munich on the condition that “every member of this House is desirous of neglecting 
no chance of preserving the peace without sacrificing principles.Secondly, 
although they were loosely connected, the opposition did not form a solid coalition, 
and sometimes failed to act jointly in imposing pressure on the Government.In 
addition, there existed serious divergence between them over some issues. For 
example, in 1934, the Liberal Leader, Herbert Samuel, sharply criticised Churchill’s 
proposal of increasing Air Force as “the language of a Malay mnning amok ... the 
language of blind and causeless panic”. T h i s  further weakened their own position.
Among the public, there was a loud support for taking a firm stand against the 
aggressor during the Manchurian crisis. In the Peace Ballot of 1935 there were five 
questions about peace and war. The result of the total votes (11,559,165) showed 
that the majority of the people preferred checking aggression by military and non­
military measures.Shortly before the Anschluss, three polls were organised by the 
British Institute of Public Opinion to test the public’s attitude towards the 
Government’s foreign policy. Replies to the question, “do you favour Mr 
Chamberlain’s foreign policy?” were recorded: Yes: 26%, No: 58%, No opinion
12
16%/^ During the Munich period, Halifax realised, when he telegraphed 
Chamberlain at Godesberg on September 23, that “the great mass of opinion seems to 
be hardening in sense of feeling that we have gone to the limit of concession,”^^  After 
Munich, only 28% in an opinion poll of February 1939 considered that Chamberlain’s 
policy would work/^ On the other hand, there was a phenomenon in favour of 
appeasement in the 1930s. However, this phenomenon has been unduly exaggerated 
in the past because, according to substantial evidence, it was, to a great extent, 
created by the Government, using various means.
Generally speaking, public opinion in the 1930s was varied and because of this, 
it did not form a pressure great enough to alter the conciliatory course that the British 
Government adopted. However, the blame should not be put on the public because 
policy-making was the Government’s job. Although the proposals of the opposition 
were not perfect, their direction was right. If the policy-makers had listened to and 
taken the correct points from them, British foreign policy might have pursued the 
better course. In other words, if the Government had fiilly co-operated with France, 
America and Russia, and effectively organised a collective security under the League, 
Britain would have been stronger than her enemies in spite of her military weakness. 
The aggressors could have been checked one by one, which would have ruled out the 
risk of facing three enemies simultaneously. Or if the Government had speeded up 
rearmament as quickly as possible with the sacrifice of some economic benefit, Britain 
would not have suffered so greatly at the first stage of War even if the aggressors had 
not been checked.
However, all this pressure and criticism had little influence on policy-making.
The top British leaders chose appeasement and insisted on it for almost ten years even 
though their policy had been set back time after time. Apart from the roots of 
appeasement that have been discussed above, the explanation can be found in the 
following observations:
Firstly, the policy-makers had never really listened to the opposite views. 
MacDonald disliked “admitting his ignorance of a problem even to the expert.” 
Baldwin, seeming to rely largely on experts, “was in reality a dictator. His personality 
was very strong and almost irresistible.” ®^ Chamberlain was unfortunately more 
stubborn and of a closed mind. He said, “I am completely convinced that the course I
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am taking is right and therefore cannot be influenced by the attack of my critics.”®^
He always felt his superiority to others although he knew very little about foreign 
policy. He liked a “yes-men” Cabinet and got it after the resignations of Eden and 
Cooper. Under his long premiership, he and his closest Ministers formed the Inner 
Cabinet and the Foreign Policy Committee to determine policy. This small circle of 
politicians turned a deaf ear to any criticism and suggestions from Churchill, the 
Labour Leaders and other critics. They even treated the information fi-om secret 
sources in the same way/^ Not only did Chamberlain refuse any criticism from 
outsiders, but he also rejected different views from other ministers. If any or most 
Cabinet members did not agree with him, Chamberlain would, as he did during 
Munich, insist on his own course without consulting the others. His colleagues, 
including Halifax and Hoare, did not insist on their different opinion to the extent of 
resignation because they agreed in principle with appeasement. Any divergence 
between them and their Prime Minister was only technical. They themselves, like 
Chamberlain, preferred to listen to what they liked to hear no matter whether it was 
correct or not. Therefore, Henderson’s advice, in spite of misleading the 
Government, was generally welcome, and Wilson, who knew nothing about 
diplomacy, became Chamberlain’s confidential adviser (Halifax also found him 
useful). As a part of the policy-making mechanism, the F.O. usually formulated 
several different proposals for Cabinet needs, among which only those along the line 
of appeasement would be chosen. As for the proposals which might not meet with the 
Cabinet approval, they would be suppressed or abandoned at the early stage of 
policy-making within the F.O. In addition, the F.O. was only able to advise the 
course, but they had no rights to push the Cabinet to accept what they recommended. 
After all, most senior officers were quite happy with a policy of coming to terms with 
the aggressors although sometimes they felt their superiors had gone too far. The 
position of the Chiefs of Staff, however, was worse than the F.O. because they could 
not be sure how much of their advice would be taken into account during policy­
making. Their duty, as MacDonald stipulated, was “to inform the Cabinet as to the 
maximum risk”.^  ^ In other words, policy-making was not their business. Strictly 
guided by the instructions of the Cabinet, they had to investigate the situation from 
the angle that ministers required. Their advice, therefore, generally met their
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superiors’ desire. For example, based on the Government’s policy of slow 
rearmament, they could only advise that Britain was not ready to fight. If they raised 
a different voice (sometimes they did) — they suggested accelerating rearmament, and 
warned about the deterrent value of the Rhineland and the importance of an alliance 
with Russia — their proposals would be put aside or revised according to the Cabinet 
will. Under these circumstances, it was impossible for the appeasers to change their 
way of thinking.
Secondly, there was not a single anti-appeaser in the Cabinet in the 1930s. Eden 
and Duff Cooper were supposed to be anti-appeasers.®° However, from the 
Government’s documents, it can be clearly shown that Eden was not an anti- 
appeaser. On the contrary, he was one of most important founders of appeasement 
towards Germany because it was he who formulated the basis for appeasement during 
the Rhineland crisis while Baldwin was not very interested in diplomacy. Although 
disagreement with Chamberlain over Italy led to his resignation, Eden shared 
completely the Prime Minister’s views on Germany. Cooper resigned because of 
mobilisation on the eve of Munich, but he had gone along all the way to Munich with 
the Prime Minister although he had sometimes voiced different views. While Halifax 
and Hoare also sometimes told Chamberlain of their divergence, they co-operated 
with the Prime Minister quite happily in spite of their differences of opinion, and all 
the decisions were made with complete agreement from them.®^  Therefore, the 
divergence between Chamberlain and the principal Ministers was between appeasers 
and not between appeasers and anti-appeaser s. It was impossible for a Cabinet 
composed of appeasers to abandon their own policy.
Thirdly, involvement in the process of pursuing appeasement was a vicious circle:
1) leaving Japan unchecked in the Far East made it difficult for Britain to concentrate 
on Europe, which was one of the reasons leading to European appeasement. On the 
other hand, in order to come to terms with Germany and Italy, they had to appease 
Japan further, which, in return, required them to make more concessions in Europe.
2) Policy-makers, against advice from the Chiefs of Staff about the deterrent value of 
the Rhineland, acquiesced in Hitler’s re-occupation of the Rhineland, and then found 
that there was nothing they could do to prevent the Anschluss because the deterrence 
had been taken away. However, due to their failure to act during the Anschluss they
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put themselves in a more embarrassing position when they faced the possible German 
invasion in Czechoslovakia because Germany, after her successful annexation of 
Austria, had surrounded Czechoslovakia on three sides. Because of this, appeasers 
could more easily justify that they should and had to meet Hitler’s demands at 
Munich. 3) Appeasement was based on the idea that Britain was militarily and 
economically weak and she should not undertake any new commitment. However, 
this policy caused dissension and discord between Britain and her potential allies: 
America became more isolated because she felt Britain let her down in the 
Manchurian crisis. Russia was finally disappointed by Britain and signed the Soviet- 
German Pact in 1939 for her own safety. Belgium broke away from Locarno system. 
As for the Central and East European countries, some of them had been sold by 
Britain, some of them had become Germany’s satellite states. This left Britain and 
France no reliable ally in the East except Poland, which was crushed immediately by 
Hitler’s lightning war. The result of appeasement was not to strengthen Britain but to 
make her weaker, which convinced the appeasers that further concessions were the 
only possible way to hold the situation. 4) Appeasement aimed to reduce the 
rearmament burden fi-om national finance. However, the graver situation required 
increasing expenditure on defence. Slowly-increased rearmament was not able to 
meet the fast increasing challenge. In order to minimise the danger, the appeasers 
would be in a greater hurry to turn to appeasement. Being caught in this vicious 
circle, the Government followed the road of appeasement further and further until 
War broke out.
In addition, the top British leaders were unaware of the nature of the German
Nazi, Italian fascist and Japanese militarist, who were a new phenomenon in modern
history. As Thome put it,
Few of the leading appeasers spoke German or had much knowledge of 
European history. Few — even Halifax who had at least read History at 
Oxford — had studied Mein Kampf. Many in Britain found it hard to 
credit that Nazism could be quite as appalling as its enemies declared it 
to be; it was a movement quite beyond the comprehension of men like 
Baldwin or Halifax, or those who, ... were experienced in 
Commonwealth spheres rather than nearer home.®^
Baldwin confessed that he felt it very difficult to judge Hitler. “We none of us know 
what is going on in that strange man’s mind.” “He had never been able to find
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anyone who could give him really reliable information about Hitler’s character and 
designs.”®^ Chamberlain never believed that Hitler would fight for that 10% if he 
could be offered 90% of what he wanted. All this blinded the appeasers when they 
were figuring out the policy.
*  *  *  *
Appeasement is one of the most controversial subjects in the study of history and 
international relations. According to the dictionary, it means “A policy of making 
concessions to a potential aggressor in order preserve peace, spec, a policy pursued 
by Britain towards Germany prior to the outbreak of war in 1939.”®"^ Most Western 
historians believe that appeasement started either in 1933 when Hitler came to power 
or in 1937 when Chamberlain took over.®® Some of them trace its roots back to the 
years of the First World War, or even earlier to 1854-56 during the Crimean War. 
Whereas at that time, “the term ‘appeasement’, a good honest word which made its 
way into modem English from the old French, means the act of soothing or 
satisfying.” It is said that this positive meaning was kept until the end of 1938.®® 
Many politicians and scholars are critical of this policy because it encouraged the 
aggressors in their adventure, which finally led to the Second World War.®^  Since 
“Munich” in 1938 represented a climax of “appeasement”, these two terms often 
replace each other in criticism. Churchill, as a principal anti-appeaser in the 1930s, 
pointed out, “‘Appeasement’ in all its forms only encouraged their aggression and 
gave the Dictators more power”. “One of the unhappy consequences of our 
appeasement policy... had been to convince him (Hitler — Author) that neither we nor 
France were capable of fighting a war.”®^ Attlee, Leader of the Labour Party, 
condemned appeasement in 1937 when he said that “the policy of this Government 
throughout, right on from 1931, had always been to tiy and appease the aggressor by 
the sacrifice of weaker states, but the more you yield to the aggressor the greater his 
appetite.”®^ Many historians considered “appeasement” and “Munich” as “pejorative 
words”, referring to a policy of “feckless, cowardly, and counterproductive 
yielding”. Namier condemns, “At several junctures it could have been stopped 
without excessive effort or sacrifice, but... appeasers aided Hitler’s work.”^^  
Denunciation from Margaret George is also very sharp:
In even the Tory view of the matter there is broad consensus that
British foreign policy in the 1930’s was an unqualified disaster. Led by
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the government of Stanley Baldwin and Neville Chamberlain, the 
British nation pursued the will-o’-the-wisp of peace with Fascism, 
peace at any price, peace — as one Conservative put it — “at any cost in 
humiliation”. ... Britain had lost not only the great goal of peace but in 
judgement of the world, and in the shamed awareness of her own 
citizens, she had lost an incalculable amount of prestige and respect.
Appeasement was not only criticised by Western scholars but also by historians of 
the former Soviet Union and of China. Apart from general criticism, the Soviets 
thought that the appeasers deliberately led Germany to go east, invading the 
U.S.S.R.^  ^ Chinese scholars try to find out how a weak power can prevent her own 
interests from being betrayed by Great Powers who adopted appeasement. One of 
their observations is that a weak power, if she decided to defend her independence, 
should rely on her own people. Winning over possible aid from Western Powers, she 
must not put her destiny into their hands.
Another school of commentators hold a quite mild attitude, thinking that
appeasement was wrong and ineffective on one hand, and searching for justification
for it on the other. Parker analysed,
Chamberlainite appeasement, it is true, was not a feeble policy of 
surrender and unlimited retreat. ... His policy meant intervention in 
continental Europe to induce Hitler’s Gennany to insist only on 
expansion so limited that it would not threaten the safety or 
independence of the United Kingdom. In retrospect this appears a bold, 
venturesome policy, certain, given the ambitions of Hitler, to lead to an 
Anglo-German war.
He, however, concludes,
the balance of evidence points to counter-revisionist interpretations.
Led by Chamberlain, the government rejected effective deterrence. 
Chamberlain’s powerful, obstinate personality and his skill in debate 
probably stifled serious chances of preventing the Second World War.^ "^
Keith Middlemas, the author of Diplomacy o f Illusion, gives his idea that 
appeasement is “the policy of meeting German demands and grievances without 
asking for firm reciprocal advantages; asking instead only for fixture ‘mutual 
understanding’ ”. He thinks that this policy is generally accepted as “the nadir of 
British weakness,” and as “an inevitable consequence of the British predicament, a 
realistic attempt to hold the dictators at bay in Europe.” ®^
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However, appeasers and their supporters, sparing no effort, defend the policy, as
Sir Samuel Hoare said,
Appeasement did not mean surrender, nor was it a policy only to be 
used towards the dictators. To Chamberlain it meant the methodical 
removal of the principal causes of friction in the world. The policy 
seemed so reasonable that he could not believe that even Hitler would 
repudiate it.
Appeasement was not his personal policy. Not only was it supported 
by his colleagues; it expressed the general desire of the British people.
This is a fondamental consideration in judging his action.^ ®
Foiling, the author of Chamberlain’s biography, commented with sympathy that
the Munich policy was based on the Prime Minister’s genuine hope for peace.
A.J.P. Taylor goes as far as to admire Munich;
The settlement at Munich was a triumph for British policy, which had 
worked precisely to this end; not a triumph for Hitler, ... Nor was it 
merely a triumph for selfish or cynical British statesman, ... It was a 
triumph for all that was best and most enlightened in British life; a 
triumph for those who had preached equal justice between peoples; a 
triumph for those who had courageously denounced the harshness and 
short-sightedness of Versailles.^ ®
Certainly, debates will continue. (Further discussion will be seen in the 
Conclusion.)
Although a huge number of books have been published on the subject in the past 
few decades, research on appeasement is far from complete. The main shortcoming is 
twofold: firstly. Western scholars have a tendency to consider appeasement only as a 
policy in Europe rather than a global one. In their studies, few have linked British Far 
Eastern policy with general appeasement. Since British foreign policy towards 
Germany, Italy and Japan was an organic whole, neglect of Far Eastern policy in the 
study of general appeasement results in a one-sided understanding, which makes it 
impossible to see the whole picture of appeasement. Secondly, the previous studies 
focus mainly on what appeasement is, and when and why it happened. Few describe 
how it was made. The Author of this thesis believes that without thorough survey of 
policy-making process, the nature and development of appeasement cannot be folly 
explored.
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In this thesis, the study first examines the Manchurian crisis, which, in the 
Author’s opinion, was the starting point of appeasement on the grounds that 1) 
British foreign policy towards the Far East and Europe was an organic whole; as 
Eden said, “I did not regard Europe and the Far East as separate problems.”^^  Far 
Eastern appeasement was in fact one of fundamental reasons for European 
appeasement. 2) Japan was the first to become the aggressor in the Far East, and her 
ambition was nursed by this conciliatory policy. From Manchuria to the outbreak of 
war, British policy-making followed the same line. There was no fondamental 
difference between the underlying assumptions of policy towards Japan and that 
towards European aggressors. 3) The Japanese invasion of China set up an example 
for Mussolini and Hitler. The 1931 crisis was the beginning of the collapse of the 
League and the prologue to the Second World War.
Based largely on published and unpublished documents, which are quoted 
verbatim, this thesis concentrates on the main process of appeasement-making within 
the Government from 1931 to 39, namely, a survey of step-by-step policy formation 
in the F.O. and policy decision-making in the Cabinet with the purpose of pin­
pointing the origin, evolution and nature of appeasement, and the principal policy­
makers’ viewpoints and activities in policy-formulating and their responsibility for 
encouraging the aggressive powers and making World War II inevitable.
The thesis also studies the relations between Britain and other related countries 
such as France, America and the Soviet Union so as to explore why their co­
operation against aggression resulted in failure.
In addition, the study of public opinion aims at investigating how the Government 
misled the public and put fetters on the media in order to create a favourable 
atmosphere for pursuing appeasement. It also points out that there was a big gap 
between public opinion and policy-making because throughout the F.O. and Cabinet 
documents, there is little evidence to suggest that Ministers seriously considered 
outside opinion. It is understood that the policy was decided by a small political 
circle, which was almost isolated from public opinion, and in particular from those 
views which were opposite to the Government’s.
According to research done in this thesis, appeasement was an imperial policy for 
re-settling the world between imperial powers. It was aimed at insuring British vital
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interests, while the British Empire was declining, by sacrificing victim nations, 
acquiescing in invasion or bargaining with aggressive powers so as to reach 
settlement. Based on imperialist moral standards and political thoughts, it employed 
the rule of “fair play”, equality and justice to Germany and other “have-not” powers, 
but this rule was not applicable to victim nations and colonies just as freedom in the 
ancient Roman Empire was the prerogative of its citizens but not of its slaves. 
Although this policy was, in the appeasers’ eyes, very realistic and reasonable, 
appeasement failed to achieve any of its aims: settlement with the aggressors, 
avoidance of war, and separation of Japan, Italy and Germany.
The appeasers must be held partly responsible for the Second World War because 
their policy encouraged and strengthened the aggressive powers. Although the 
aggressors’ ambitions and expansion were the factors that led the war, these factors 
could not function without certain conditions. Hitler could not strike before 1935 
because German rearmament had only just started. He would not consider taking risk 
of war with the Western Powers during the period of the Rhineland either on the 
grounds that Germany was not strong enough to contend with Britain and France. If 
he were to start war in unfavourable conditions then, he would sooner and more 
easily be beaten. In other words, without the favourable conditions that were created 
by appeasement. Hitler might not or could not have successfully launched the war. It 
was appeasement that offered the aggressors this desirable condition. It is, therefore, 
not exaggerated to say that the aggressors’ ambitions and expansion with the help of 
appeasement made the Second World War inevitable.
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CHAPTER 1 Challenge From The Far East
I. THE MANCHURIAN INCIDENT
Japan’s ambition in China could be traced back to the beginning of this century. 
After she beat Russia in the Russo-Japanese war of 1904 - 1905, she replaced 
Russia’s dominant role in Manchuria. On January 1, 1915, the Japanese envoy 
delivered to Yuan Shi-kai, the Chinese President, “twenty-one demands”, which 
attempted to build up their supremacy in the whole of China. After the mid-1920s, 
key military ofRcers such as Ishiwara, Nagata, Itagaki and Imamura frequently 
exchanged views on friture territorial design in Manchuria. By the autumn of 1930, 
the Japanese Chiefs of Staff had worked out three alternatives for their Manchurian 
adventure; 1) to press the local authority headed by Chang Hsueh-Iiang to concede 
more right to Japan; 2) if this failed, the replacement of Chang by a pro-Japanese 
regime was to be arranged; 3) the final resort was to occupy Manchuria by military 
operation. The Kwantung army took the liberty of carrying out their third plan in 
September 1931 although the Tokyo Government decided to act in 1932.^
On the night of September 18, 1931 Japanese troops guarding the South 
Manchurian Railway suddenly attacked Mukden according to “a carefully prepared 
plan”, using as an excuse the blowing up of a section of the railway, an incident which 
was believed to be created by themselves.^ Three days later, China appealed to the 
League Council under Article 11 of the Covenant. Having discussed the appeal, the 
Council took a decision on September 30 that requested both Japanese and Chinese 
“to do all in their power to hasten restoration of normal relations between them.”^
On one hand, Japan declared that she had no territorial ambition in China and would 
withdraw her troops into the railway zone as soon as possible; but one the other hand, 
she hastened the military operation and occupied the whole of Manchuria by the 
beginning of 1932. Moreover, on January 28, Japanese forces attacked Shanghai; but 
this time they did not achieve their aim because of the 19th Chinese army's 
determined resistance.
From the incident of September 18, 1939 to Tang Ku Armistice of May 1933, the 
Manchurian crisis lasted a year and a half, during which Britain looked for a policy
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trying to solve the dilemma that she faced between offending Japan and sacrificing the 
Covenant.
II. THE IMPORTANT POLICY-MAKERS IN MACDONALD’S 
GOVERNMENT
In the First National Government formed in 1931, MacDonald, as “a bookish 
Premier”, was aloof from his colleagues, “sensitive to unfriendly critics” and “shrank 
from exposing his whole mind”. His arrogance was such that he “disliked admitting 
his ignorance of a problem even to the expert.” Being realistic too, he “only wanted 
to achieve what was practical.”'^  In the Cabinet, he inspired loyalty from his 
colleagues although he, with his suspicious nature, never had complete trust in them.  ^
He relied heavily on Baldwin  ^“to deal with the economic crisis” and the latter, being 
in accord with MacDonald on foreign affairs, once said to Thomas Jones  ^ that “he 
dislikes the Chinese.”®
Drawing on his considerable knowledge and skills in foreign affairs, the Prime 
Minister usually “used his prerogative of diplomatic intervention freely”. As for the 
Far Eastern crisis, he thought it was “unthinkable” to have a war against Japan, and 
approved of Anglo-Japanese rapprochement though he laid a stress on Anglo- 
American relations.^
However, his third primiership since 1931 had been “a sad diminuendo of failing 
powers, ebbing authority and gathering derision” partly because of decline in his 
health. “He was already a tired man” with a worsening eye problem which 
accelerated his failure. At the beginning of the crisis, he gave hardly any precise 
instructions to the British Delegates to the League so that they did not know what 
line should be adopted to handle the matter. When the Japanese created the 
Shanghai incident in early 1932, MacDonald’s eye operation kept him away from his 
office for six weeks although he still supervised foreign policy.
His appointment of Simon as the Foreign Secretary surprised many because 
Simon’s “contacts hitherto had been mostly with the domestic side of the policy”. 
The decision was made due to “party exigencies’’.^  ^ Through the Cabinet minutes, it 
seems that he usually took his Foreign Secretary's advice although there had been 
“fierce disagreements” between them in earlier years.
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Simon was “a shy man” with hesitating characteristics, which made it difficult for
him to be popular. He showed great intelligence when he analysed complicated
problems, but he lacked a decisive manner in handling them. Chamberlain and Eden
made similar comments on his personality and capability as the former said, Simon
“can always make an admirable speech in the House, to a brief, bu t... the fact is that
his manner inspires no confidence, and that he seems temperamentally unable to make
up his mind to action when a difficult situation arises. Although he was not highly
admired by his colleagues, Simon never criticised them in his memoirs. Perhaps
because of his tact, he got along very well with three prime ministers in the 1930s,
and after 1935 when he was not in charge of the F.O., he continued to exert his
influence on diplomacy, as one of the “Big Four” in the Cabinet, who were dominant
in foreign policy making in late 1930s. During the Manchurian crisis, Simon played a
very important part in shaping foreign policy. Like many of his colleagues, he
disliked the Chinese, often referring them as being “wretched” or “foolish”. H e
clearly showed his standpoint towards the Sino-Japanese dispute:
although Japan has undoubtedly acted in a way contrary to the 
principles of the Covenant... This is not a case in which the armed 
forces of one country have crossed the frontiers of another in 
circumstances where they had no previous right to be on the other’s 
soil.'®
In the Foreign Office, Vansittart, the Permanent Under Secretary, was one of the 
most important members whom Simon generally relied on.'^ His role in policy 
making will be continuously explored in the following chapters. In regard to the Far 
Eastern crisis, Van. thought that “the Chinese had been asking for trouble, and they 
got it.” ®^ In his opinion, Britain was “incapable of checking the Japanese in any way” 
unless the United States were “eventually prepared to use force.” '^ As a senior 
member of the Defence Requirements Committee, he was in a key position to 
formulate the basis for the Government’s policy of accommodation with Japan.
In addition, other members such as Wellesley, the Deputy Under-Secretary, Mr 
Pratt, the Chief Adviser to the Far Eastern Department and Mr Orde, Head of the Far 
Eastern Department, also played an important role in policy-making.^  ^ All of them 
justified the Japanese aggression. In the words of Pratt:
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In Manchuria the Japanese as regards the fundamental issues at stake 
had a great deal of right on their side. The Chinese were almost 
entirely in the wrong,^^
Wellesley expressed it in more detail,
It may be difficult to justify on legal grounds the present developments 
of Japan’s treaty rights in Manchuria; but on moral and material 
grounds I am inclined to question whether,... a country of the size and 
wealth of China is justified in obstructing the economic development of 
her more active and enterprising neighbour to the general detriment of 
world interests. '^'
A major postulate of that policy and of the safeguarding of those 
interest is the maintenance of really cordial relations with Japan,... His 
Majesty's interest in the territorial status of Manchuria is infinitely less 
than their interest in maintaining cordial relations with Japan.
Like the officers above, Orde disliked pressurising measures such as excluding 
Japan from the League or withdrawing the Ambassador from Tokyo on the grounds 
“that the only kind of pressure which will do anything but harm is the unspoken kind 
which may in time strengthen the influence of the moderate thinkers in Japan.” 
Therefore, the imposition of sanctions or any other pressure on Japan were not at all 
favoured by him.^ ^
Apart from the staff above, some influence on policy-making came from 
diplomats such as Lord Cecil, the Chief British Delegate to the Council of the 
League; Mr A. Cadogan, Adviser on League of Nations Affairs; Drummond, 
Secretary-General of the League; Lindley, the British Ambassador in Tokyo; 
Lampson, Minister in Peking; and Lindsay, the British Ambassador in Washington. 
They reported first-hand information together with their advice to the F. O. and put 
the instructions from the Government into action.
In general, British foreign policy was usually set out by the F.O. and decided by 
the Cabinet in the early 1930s. During the Manchurian crisis, the Cabinet made its 
decisions generally based on the suggestions from the F. O. since it was distracted by 
domestic problems. The F. O , therefore, was the key formulator of Government 
policy in the Far East.
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m. THE FmST PHASE OF THE CRISIS: September 1931 - January 1932
1. British Policy-making
When the incident occurred, Britain was deep in 1929 - 32 depression. She was
forced off the Gold Standard, and the number of unemployed was increasing: 2.5
million by the end of 1930, 2.7 million by the middle of 1931, and growing to 3
million in early 1933. Both richer and poorer classes were not very much concerned
about the Far Eastern crisis.^  ^ Although the Press revealed some conflicting views,
the issue attracted more attention, only after the General Election in November, from
the editorial comment of the principal newspapers such as the Times, XhQ Manchester
Guardian, the Daily Herald, the Daily Express, the News Chronicle and so on. In
the House, debates in the full sense on the subject did not take place until late March
1932.^ ® Ml". Thorne observed,
Neither the Labour nor the Liberal members of the Government were 
to display any strong predilection for China’s cause as opposed to that 
of Japan; few of the Tories were to be uncritically pro-Japanese; over 
the decisive matter of Britain’s interests and resources in the area, there 
was to be unanimity.^^
MacDonald's First National Government, which had come to power a month 
before, was so preoccupied with domestic problems that the Far Eastern crisis did not 
attract the Government’s full attention. Only mentioning the Manchurian crisis briefly, 
the Ministers did not discuss the Sino-Japanese dispute until November 11 
Meanwhile, due to “some disquieting news from Geneva”, MacDonald requested 
Lord Reading, the Foreign Secretary at the time, to attend the Council meeting on 
October 14 in order to handle the problem. “We ought to be in a position at the 
Council to take a leading part on a well thought out policy”, he said to Reading. '^
But as a matter of fact, neither the Cabinet nor the F. O. had any ready-made policy 
to cope with the situation.^^
Lindley from Tokyo sent back his point of view:
In considering Chinese appeal His Majesty’s Government will no doubt 
give due weight both to fact that Chinese have followed most 
exasperating policy in Manchuria where they have straightforwardly 
[consistently] attempted to undermine Japanese position which after all 
rests largely on treaty rights; and to the obvious probability that 
Japanese action in Manchuria will react favourably on British interests 
in Manchuria [China].
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He was sure that the League would run “a grave risk” if it interfered in the Sino- 
Japanese dispute because the Japanese would not yield. '^' He further persuaded Lord 
Reading to press the Chinese for moderation rather than to press the Japanese/^ but 
his suggestion was opposed by Lampson in Peking because to counsel the Chinese to 
be moderate was, in his words, “like counselling moderation to the hare with the 
hounds already close on his heels Lampson explicitly regarded the Japanese 
action as “an instance of brutal application of ruthless force against a weaker 
neighbour” and it might ruin the League.^  ^ He urged Reading that Britain should take 
some action.^ ® At Geneva, Cecil suggested that the Council should demand the 
withdrawal of Japanese troops with a view to negotiations. In view of the fact that 
the French Ambassador in Tokyo, instructed by his Government, was to make a 
protest against the Japanese Government for their deteriorating the Manchurian 
situation, he urged that the Foreign Secretary should instruct Lindley to work on 
similar lines.®^
Within the F. O., most staff shared Lindley’s opinion that they would rather
ignore the spirit of the Covenant than offend Japan.''® Pratt doubted,
whether the strict and academic application of League principles is the 
best method of dealing with such a situation.'"
But Cadogan took the opposite view, and he retorted,
Is it quite fair to talk of “academic” application? Is it possible for the League 
not to maintain the great principle (no settlement by force) of the Covenant 
and of the Kellogg Pact? ... can she do less than uphold this fundamental 
principle? ... If she willingly abandons it, she has ceased from that moment to 
exist.
As head of the F.O. Reading confessed reluctantly that
it is difficult for the Council to abandon the principle that disputes may only be 
settled by peaceful means, and it would seem difficult for the signatories of the 
Pact of Paris to look on while Japan ignores Article II of that instrument.
The problem was, as he said, “whether anything can be done in the meanwhile to save 
the Council from being faced with a deadlock.”''^  The instructions that he gave 
Lindley and Lampson were to pacify both the Chinese and Japanese Governments,'''' 
and to take a similar course of action as their French colleagues.''  ^ Apart from this, 
Reading enquired of the governments at Washington, Berlin, Rome, Paiis and Madrid
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through diplomatic channels whether they would take similar action/'^ The answers 
to his enquiry were positive/^
In mid-October, at Geneva some delegates including Cecil discussed methods of
pressure (for example, withdrawal of diplomatic representatives and economic
sanctions), which might be used by the Council if the Japanese should finally refuse to
evacuate Manchuria. When he heard about this, Reading was agitated and begged
Cecil “to take no further action of that kind.”''® However, he thought that the
problem was “a tougher nut to crack” than he had anticipated,''^ and something must
be done. He wrote to Van. :
A failure by the League to find some way round the difficulty would be 
nothing short of a calamity at the present juncture and might imperil 
any hopes we may have of making progress towards a solution in the 
more immediate field of Europe in which we are so much concerned.
There is no question but that we cannot now delay any longer and that 
the affair must be brought to a head.^ ®
But HOW?
The Council adopted a Resolution on October 24 that reaffirmed the resolution of 
September 30 which had fixed November 16 as the date of Japanese withdrawal.^' 
Diummond believed that Japan would withdrew her troops soon.^  ^Japan, instead, 
extended her military operation in Manchuria, and this made the deadlock more 
serious.
The crucial point was, as Mr. Mackillop, member of the Far Eastern Department, 
said, “whether the first step to be taken is the evacuation of the territory, occupied 
outside the treaty zone (the Chinese thesis) or whether normal conditions should be 
re-established, or be on the way to re-establishment, before evacuation takes place.” 
He proposed to advise the Chinese to negotiate with the Japanese at once.^^
Lindley’s proposal was that the League should “send a commission to Manchuria in 
order to arrange and supervise the evacuation of the Japanese troops and, at the same 
time, call upon the Cliinese Government to enter into negotiation with the Japanese 
without waiting for the evacuation to begin.
Both Orde and Pratt thought that Japan considered her position in Manchuria 
more important than her relations with the League. The former did not believe that by
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the deadline the Japanese would carry out the Council’s resolution. He advised that, 
if so, the alternative outcomes would be:
(1) Action leading up to sanctions under Article 16 of the covenant.
(2) A confession of helplessness, and
(3) A compromise which can take various forms: negotiations between 
China and Japan before complete evacuation; the same with neutral 
assistance; an International Conference on Manchuria; and perhaps 
others.
The conclusion seems to be that we should work for an ultimate 
compromise or at least do nothing to prejudice the chances of aniving 
at one.^ ^
Finally, Reading formulated the proposal on October 29 for the League,
if Japanese and Chinese representatives could be got together to 
discuss evacuation as foreseen in Council resolution, [the] two 
Governments might be advised ...to begin discussion of the point 
regarding treaty rights. Japan might then be able to effect and excuse 
complete evacuation by telling her people that she had secured the 
point about direct negotiation on treaty rights and thus save her face.
I would not minimise the difficulty of ultimately finding a solution of 
this point, but if in the meanwhile evacuation could be secured, a great 
deal would have been done.^ *’
On November 9, Sir John Simon took his seat at the F.O. succeeding Reading. 
The immediate problem he faced was that there was little hope of the Japanese 
withdrawing their troops by the deadline. Like liis colleagues, he believed at that 
moment that the Japanese “had no territorial designs,” but vital political and 
economic interests in Manchuria. He told his colleagues that one of the causes of the 
dispute was that the Chinese had not recognised the Japanese interests in Manchuria, 
but at Geneva the Japanese delegate “had not put his country's case very well.” The 
Council's decision to make November 16 the deadline was “a serious step”, because 
“the League had no means to make the resolution effective.” In addition, if the 
Chinese shifted their appeal from Art. 11 to Art. 16, sanctions of various kinds such 
as restrictions on trade, the withdrawal of the Ambassador and despatch of an 
international force to Manchuria might be suggested, none of which, in his opinion, 
was practicable. Based on his suggestion, the Ministers agreed on a line that the 
British delegates should pursue; “the League of Nations should be upheld,” but 
“Article XVI of the Covenant was not suitable and could not in practice be applied in
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the present case.” They instructed Simon that he must try every effort to stop the 
Chinese from shifting the appeal to Art. 16. As to Japan, Simon should continue to 
persuade her to withdraw her troops before negotiations took place or arrange for 
discussions on the Treaty situation together with the question of troop withdrawal.
In brief, the British policy “should be one of conciliation, with an avoidance of 
implied threats.”^^
The Council meeting of November did not please Simon at all. A series of private
meetings “led to nothing” but undermined “the moral authority of the League”.^ ® He
realised that before she established her dominate position in Manchuria Japan would
not agree to withdraw any of her t roops.Ceci l  suggested in a private meeting that
the Council should not be excessively accommodating to Japan and that “no pressure
would be put upon China to accept what in effect the Council had always condemned
as being unjustifiable.” ®^ But Simon was inclined to give up rather than to check the
Japanese, as he wrote to MacDonald,
the League cannot as a League confirm the continuance of Japanese 
troops on Chinese territory and regrets that it is not possible owing to 
Japanese opposition to reach a unanimous and effective conclusion.
This is not satisfactory but if all efforts at adjournment fail it is better 
than pretending (what nobody believes) that the League is really in a 
position to control the situation.^'
As soon as he came back to London, Simon prepared a memo for the Cabinet
meeting of November 25, in which he reported that the League had proposed to
appoint a Commission of Enquiry, which could not report until it had finished its
investigation in eight or nine months. Meanwhile, “there was no assurance that the
Japanese would evacuate the territory.” The Council, therefore, “would have failed
in its immediate objective of putting an end to the Japanese occupation of Chinese
territory, and would have to look on while its own summons was ignored. It would
have to realise that it had failed to enforce the fundamental principle that a State
might not, without prior recourse to the recognised means of peaceful settlement,
take the law into its own hands.” He consulted his colleagues as to whether the
British delegate should take the lead;
Here we have got to weigh the disadvantages against each other. On 
the one hand the immediate disadvantage to ourselves in losing favour 
with Japan; and on the other hand the general risk, in which we share, 
is that the League, in refusing to reaffirm its true function, will lose so
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much respect as may yet be accorded to it in the face of its failure to 
enforce its demands upon the parties.
He suggested that “the Council could do no more than it did on October 24th,
namely, to reaffirm its resolution of September 30th” and “place again on formal
record its views as to the obligations of both parties.” This, however, “would be a
confession of complete failure, not veiled in by the despatch of a Commission of
Enquiry to the Far East,” but he disapproved of the application of Article 15 on the
grounds that it introduced a more menacing atmosphere. He thought that it was
necessary to “give a respite of six to nine months during which passions may cool.”
After a short discussion, Thomas, the Dominions Secretary, asked him to pay
attention to the attitude of the Dominions and then the Ministers came to a
conclusion,^  ^which was immediately communicated to Cecil:
Cabinet is opposed to British Representative taking up a special and 
separate attitude in public session on the ground that it would not be 
effective and would only cause further heartburnings.^^
Around the end of the first phase, it was not merely Simon who did not know
what steps to take next; nor did the other staff in the F.O. Wellesley told his
colleagues, “I feel very certain that no permanent solution of the problem is to be
found on a purely juridical basis.”®'' From the League, Drummond, who had had a
discussion with Simon, thought that since Britain was not prepared to impose any
sanctions against Japan, there was “a very severe limitation” on what the League
could do.®® Cecil even told Simon of his anxiety that a possible Chinese declaration
of war on Japan would put Britain into “an extremely difficult and dangerous
position”, and he suggested that at the moment “it would seem best to hold our
hands”, with which Simon wholeheartedly agreed.®®
Orde summed up the situation as follows,
It is hard to see what further action can be taken... For the rest, it 
would seem that all we can do is to await the report of the Commission 
ofEnquiiy.®^
2. Anglo-American Cooperation
British policy-making got entangled with the issue of Anglo-American 
cooperation from the very beginning. Since the Japanese invasion of China violated 
the Covenant as well as the Nine-Power Treaty and the Kellogg Pact, the Chinese
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appealed to Washington when they put their case before the League. It was believed 
that cooperation between Britain and America was essential to a solution of the Far 
Eastern crisis. Both British and American statesmen emphasised the importance of it 
during the crisis but criticised each other afterwards for failure to cooperate.
Soon after the incident of September 18, Pratt suggested a possible basis for
Anglo-American cooperation:
America was willing to co-operate with the League because the kind of 
action which she could take under Article 2 of the Pact of Paris was 
similar to that which the League could take under Article 11 of the 
covenant.... This however would cease to the case immediately the 
League contemplated sanctions — either economic or military...
America could never in any circumstances contemplate using other 
methods than those of moral suasion and the force of public opinion.
it is neither possible nor desirable for the League to attempt to proceed 
to apply sanctions against Japan... co-operation of America with the 
League should be sought on the basis of the Pact of Paris and Article 
XI of the Covenant and that any proposal to move away from Article 
XI and apply the sanctions of Article XVI will be rejected by His 
Majesty's Government.®®
On the American side, early in October 1931 Stimson, Secretary of State, 
suggested to President Hoover two alternative courses America could pursue: one 
was for “some form of collective economic sanctions against Japan”, the other was to 
try diplomatic pressure and the power of world public opinion. Hoover approved of 
the second but rejected the first because of the risk of war it would lead to.®^  He 
spoke to the Cabinet, “we will not go along on war or any of sanctions either 
economic or military for those are the roads to war.” ®^
The American statesmen had some arguments to justify their Far Eastern policy : 
as a single non-member of the League, the United States would meet with a lot of 
difficulty in imposing sanctions on Japan because, unlike the Covenant of the League, 
both treaties — the Nine Power Treaty and the Kellogg Pact — included no executive 
body which could carry out sanctions. The American general line was, as Stimson 
said, “the League had already taken jurisdiction,” America’s “most useful function 
would be to furnish independent support to the League rather than to play a role of 
leadership. ...We must make it clear from the beginning that our ultimate action must 
always be the result of our own independent judgement.” '^
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The Americans differed from the British policy-makers in the fact that Stimson 
did not consider a Japanese-American relationship more important than that between 
America and China, and preferred not to appease the Japanese by ignoring the Pact of 
Paris and the Nine Power T r e a t y O n  September 22, Reading requested Lindsay in 
Washington to give details about the American reaction to the Manchurian crisis.
The answer came back that the American Government “had already twice urged 
moderation” on both conflicting sides.^  ^ In view of the Japanese bombing of 
Chinchow, Stimson delivered the note to the Governments of both disputants on 
October 10, followed by a strong-worded memo to the Japanese Government only on 
the nth.'"'
Moreover, Stimson took the initiative in despatching a direct message to the 
Secretary-General of the League on October 9 to show the American desire for 
collaboration.^® This message drew so much attention at the Council meeting that on 
October 15 all members of the Council except Japan voted for the proposal to invite 
the American delegate to the Council meeting.'^ ® This participation of the American 
representative in meetings meant that a pattern had been set up for cooperation 
between the United States, Britain and the League.
But it was too optimistic to imagine that there would be no problem in their 
cooperation. Stimson told Lindsay his two-fold difficulty, namely, “the tendency in 
America to revolt against too close cooperation with League of Nations and fear of 
exasperating sentiment in Japan between whom and the United States feeling is never 
too cordial.” Therefore, he had to be able to represent at home that his cooperation 
was not so much with the League.^^
For Britain, the most troublesome and sensitive question was sanctions. Simon 
was even afraid of mentioning the subject openly. On November 10, he instructed 
Lindsay,
We have no thought of sanctions ourselves, but I shall be glad if you 
can find means without raising any alarm of ascertaining feeling of 
United States Government as regards their use by United States or by 
others,^ ®
But Lindsay answered, the “subject of sanctions has never arisen in my conversation 
at State Department,”^^  and he tried to elicit the American Under Secretary's view as 
to sanctions in general but he found the latter “was completely non-committal.”®®
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On the American side, in spite of excluding sanctions, a series of diplomatic 
activities had taken place to support the League. On November 5, the American 
Government delivered a note to the Japanese Government, reinforcing the position 
taken by the League.®' Stimson instructed Forbe, the American Ambassador in 
Tokyo,
I do not intend to remain inactive and aloof, leaving to the others the 
whole burden of action. The implication of silence on the part of the 
United States would be that we were taking sides with Japan...
He even warned the Japanese Ambassador on November 19 that he would publish all 
the documents on the Manchurian crisis between Japan and the United States, which 
would embarrass the Japanese Government.®^
While the British policy-makers did not know what to do next, Stimson issued his 
famous Note of January 7, 1932, in which he declared that the United Sates could not 
admit “the legality of any situation de facto f  that she did not intend to recognise any 
treaty or agreement between China and Japan which might impair the United States 
treaty rights, including those relating to Chinese sovereignty and the open-door 
policy; and that she did not intend to recognise any situation, treaty, or agreement 
brought about contrary to the Kellogg Pact.®®
Before despatching the Note, he informed Lindsay that he had strong hopes that 
the British Government would take similar action.®'' But when the French 
Ambassador in London asked Wellesley for the British attitude towards the American 
Note, Wellesley told him that this action was “premature” and might cause 
“considerable irritation quite unnecessarily”. Mr. Orde took a similar view.®® As for 
Simon, the only thing that he was concerned about was how to give a satisfactory 
answer in the House and how to deal with the American request.®® Following this 
line, Wellesley prepared information to the Press, which was published three days 
later and it reads;
Since... the Japanese representative at the Council... stated on October 
13 th that Japan was the champion in Manchuria of the principle of 
equal opportunity and the "open door" for the economic activities of all 
nations. ...
In view of this statement H. M. G. have not considered it necessary to 
address any formal note to the Japanese Government on the lines of the 
American Government's note, but the Japanese Ambassador has been
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requested to obtain confirmation of this assurance from his 
government.®^
The Americans could not veil their disappointment when they learned of Britain's 
reaction.®® The Japanese responded to the Note with an “ironical tone”,®^ and they, at 
the same time, “highly appreciated fi*iendly attitude of His Majesty's Government” 
that Britain had not followed the example of the United States in addressing a formal 
note to Japan.^ ®
IV. THE SECOND PHASE OF THE CRISIS: January - September 1932
1. The Shanghai Incident
1) British Policy-making
During the first three weeks of January, the situation in Shanghai became very 
tense. On the 18th, five Japanese were injured in a local clash between some Chinese 
and Japanese. Although the Mayor of Shanghai had accepted all demands by 
Japanese Consul-General, who regarded the reply as satisfactory, Japanese forces 
suddenly attacked Chapei without any warning on the night of the 28th, which 
brought the Far Eastern crisis to another climax. On the 29th, China evoked Art. 10 
and Art. 15 of the Covenant.
The Shanghai incident drew much attention in Britain. There was controversy
between the newspapers: one side held the view that if, at the beginning, greater
understanding had been given to the Japanese, and a more flexible attitude adopted, a
hopeful result might have been obtained. While the other side, represented by the
Manchester Guardian, insisted that if “firm action” had been taken against Japan at
the outset, the crisis might have been successfully resolved. Its editorial comment on
February 1, 1932 says:
it was of vital importance to this country that we should not connive at 
Japanese aggression, for peace is the first object of British policy 
abroad, and the League of Nations, acting through the Covenant, is the 
only instrument through which we can hope to make a peace policy 
effective. It was for their apparent inability to realise the importance of 
the dispute fi-om this point of view, in its early stages, that Sir John 
Simon and the representatives of the other Powers on the League of 
Nations Council were chiefly to blame. Had they then made it clear 
that they intended, come what might, to stand by the Covenant it is 
probable that the dispute could have been settled quietly by diplomatic 
means. '^
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In the House, some MPs such as Mr Mander and Mr Cocks were persistent in 
urging the Government, following the American example, to send a Note to China 
and Japan. However, the question was cleverly evaded by the Government.^^ The 
policy-makers did not at all want to put any pressure on the aggressor. Two days 
before the Japanese attacked Shanghai, turning a cold shoulder to the American 
application for joint action,^ ® the F. O. was busy finding a way of cooperating with 
Japan without rebuffing America. Pratt suggested that Britain should point out to the 
United States that they could not stop Japan fi-om acting in a similar way to the way 
they did in 1927, and what the Western Powers could do was to press the Chinese to 
meet Japanese demands with regard to suppression of the boycott. Orde, however, 
wanted to tell the Chinese that they “ought not to subsidise the anti-Japanese 
societies.” '^*
It was the incident of January 28 that caused a certain psychological change in the 
F.O. because Britain had much more interest in Shanghai than in Manchuria. Simon 
said, “the first step taken by Japan in Shanghai ought to be called a wrong step.” ®^ 
Orde drew his colleagues' attention to the fact that “Japanese action in all its violence 
cannot be justified.” ®^ Pratt was in accord and he even went further by agreeing that 
the Chinese boycott, which he had condemned before, was the only weapon that 
China possessed which was “the natural and inevitable reaction to Japan’s forcible 
action in Manchuria.” He warned his colleagues in his memoranda dated Januaiy 31 
and February 1 :
unless we were prepared to withdraw altogether from the Far East it 
might be difficult to escape eventually being drawn into war. ... if we 
try to avoid this fatal path by protesting and doing nothing more the 
consequences may yet be much the same.
There is of course the possibility of the economic collapse of Japan 
under the combined effect of the Chinese boycott and the Anglo- 
American severance of relations. ... but it must remain a matter for 
speculation whether the collapse would be so immediate or so complete 
as to avert the dangers referred to above.^^
These memoranda won the general agreement in the F. O. Van. agreed with 
Pratt's estimate of the danger that if Japan continued unchecked, the British position 
and its vast interests in the Far East would “never recover”. However, he did not
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think that there was anything they were able to do to check Japan and protect British
interest unless “the United States were eventually prepared to use force”, which was
not impossible because America might be pulled in by Japan as she was by Germany
in the First World War. But before that moment came, Britain “must eventually
swallow any and every humiliation in the Far East.” Therefore he strongly
recommended to Simon:
We can have no longrange, or even shortrange, policy in the Far East.
We must live from hand to mouth — an humiliating process — unless we 
have made up, or cleared, our minds upon the answer (i.e. the U.S. has 
been pulled in — the Author).^®
Wellesley was also in accord with Pratt, but he attempted to find an argument to
support this shape of policy:
the success of our Far Eastern policy and the prosperity of our 
economic interests are largely dependent on Japanese good will.
If, however, the present position succeeds in recovering some degree of 
equilibrium, without ourselves being compelled by unforeseen 
circumstances to assume a very definite attitude for or against Japan, 
we may regard what has happened with comparative equanimity.
But he did not forget to warn his superiors in rank of the seriousness that the crisis 
would lead to:
the development of this very dangerous situation may force our hand.
... we may be dragged by events along a path which may end in war 
with her.
But I maintain that from a material point of view we have nothing to 
gain and much to lose by antagonising Japan; and to associate ourselves 
in pressure from America would definitely have this effect. ... which 
might well prove disastrous to our interest in the Far East.
The danger, as I see it, lies in a definite Anglo-American anti-Japanese 
attitude... ^
His memo as well as Pratfs was recommended to the Cabinet for consideration.'®®
In fact, the top British leaders were hesitating to take any decision at that moment
because Lindley from Tokyo warned on February 3:
The position is now so delicate that a single false step may precipitate 
catastrophe. I trust therefore that no further action be taken at Geneva 
or elsewhere...'®'
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The telegrams which the Ambassador sent to Simon certainly discouraged the F. O
from contemplating any strong measures.'®  ^ He even went further by wishing to
disregard China as an ordinary member of the League and blame the League for its
ignorance of his warning.'®®
Naturally, his point of view met with bitter criticism from Lord Cecil. This British
Delegate in Geneva perceived that although the League had done everything to “save
Japanese susceptibilities”, “they tried one thing and then another to see how far they
could go and when they found that in fact there was no strong disposition to stop
them they went further and further.” He also warned Simon seriously:
If we do not take a vigorous line I am confident that the Japanese will 
establish themselves as the dominating power in China, and through 
China in the whole of Asia, with consequences to British interests, the 
League and world peace which may be of most extreme seriousness.
the Government must take a definite decision now on the policy which 
they are going to pursue. If they adopt Sir Francis Lindley's advice 
their only useful course is to cease trying to restrain the Japanese in any 
way and let them do exactly as they like. ... If, on the other hand, they 
think it desirable to make a real effort to save China, then I think they 
must make it perfectly clear that that is their intention to the Japanese, 
and take economic action, with all its consequences, to coerce the 
Japanese.'®''
He sent Simon his proposal for sanctions including withdrawal of all diplomatic
representatives in Tokyo and blocking all exports from Japan. But when Simon
consulted Wellesley and Van., neither of them wanted to adopt any coercive
measures. Van. said, “the less we hear of economic blockades and Art 16 just now,
the better.” He had no doubt that Simon was in accord with him.'®®
In fact, Simon, like most of the staff in the F.O., was now very clear that Japan
was pursuing “an ambitious plan” just as she had been in Manchuria. What
particularly disturbed him was the problem of cooperation with the United States. He
told MacDonald and other Cabinet members that if Britain did not act with America,
the latter would be rebuffed, but if she did, America would leave Britain with “the
brunt of the work and of the blame.” “But we cannot afford to upset the United
States of America over this,” he explained, adding “I do not mean to do so.” His
estimate of the situation was as pessimistic as Van.'s and Pratfs:
We are in grave danger of falling between two stools — offending Japan 
without completely satisfying America.
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I am afraid that I am not hopeful that we can restrain Japan 106
During this period, MacDonald frequently discussed the emergency situation with
Baldwin, Simon, and the Ministers at the head of the three Service Departments, all
of whom later made up the Far Eastern Committee with another three Cabinet
members under the leadership of the Prime Minister.'®'' It was evident that in Cabinet
Pratt and Wellesley's proposals as well as Lindley's warning were taken seriously but
Cecil's suggestion was not welcomed.'®®
On February 17, a Cabinet meeting relating to Shanghai affairs was held at 10
Downing Street. The key topic was the problem that the United States requested
British to take joint action in invoking the Nine Power Treaty. In addition, Simon
drew attention to the point that since it was impossible for Britain alone to assume the
burden of Japanese resentment he wanted to show Japan that the appeal of February
16 from the League was not minatory in intention. The appeal reads,
British Government are wholly opposed to the Council pronouncing 
judgement in a matter which is not completely before them... It is 
contrary to the first principles of jurisprudence that judgement should 
be pronounced before the case of the parties has been fully heard.
Japan has not yet delivered a statement of her case...
Apart from this, he consulted his colleagues as to how to answer Mr Mander's 
question in the House regarding the Government's attitude to the application of Art 
16. He suggested hinting that the Government “had no intention of resorting to 
sanctions.”
In the course of discussion, the Cabinet instructed Samuel, the Home Secretary, 
to “do his best to induce Mr Mander to withdraw” his question. If this failed, Simon's 
reply “should not be limited to a negative response but should explain that the 
question had been referred to the Assembly, that neither side had yet put in its case; 
and that any action pre-judging the issue was to be deprecated.”'®^
Meanwhile, the situation at Shanghai seemed to offer Britain an opportunity to 
shape her policy because the stubborn resistance of the Chinese forces marked “the 
beginning of a new era in the Far East” according to Pratt."® He intelligently 
analysed in his memo dated February 21 that if Japan controlled Shanghai with a 
quick and easy victory as she had done in Manchuria, it might well prove difficult for
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British enterprise in China. If the Chinese were successful in their defiance of Japan,
all other foreign privileges would be swept away. But the present fighting would lead
to a consequence that the Japanese would win with difficulty, which would avert both
dangers above. He concluded:
It is then that the opportunity may occur for the League, under British 
leadership, to help Japan out of her difficulties and help to build up a 
new and more stable system of international relationships in the Far 
East. In order to be ready to play our part when the time comes it 
seems necessary that we should avoid any definite breach between 
ourselves and Japan while at the same time we keep up our wicket and 
refuse to allow our rights or our established position to go by default.
His view was generally shared by Orde, Wellesley and Van.'"
When he received this memo in Geneva, Simon found that both the Chinese and 
Japanese were in the mood to welcome intervention. He reported to the Cabinet that 
Britain had taken the chance and put forward her plan for the re-establishment of 
peaceful conditions in Shanghai. Tins “silenced the critics”, who complained that 
Britain was either “working behind the back of the League”, or failing to show herself 
“as vigorous as the United States” were prepared to be. Considering that a 
suspension of hostilities in Shanghai might be arranged, he had appointed Lampson to 
Shanghai, whom he thought was “the best man” to deal with the possible 
negotiations."^
At the end of February, Britain, France, Italy as well as the United States agreed 
on a joint offer of good offices to end hostilities and the setting up of a conference in 
Shanghai."® As a result, with the intervention of the Western Powers, Sino-Japanese 
negotiations started on February 28.
2) Anglo-American Cooperation
A few days before the outbreak of the Shanghai incident, Stimson sent for 
Lindsay and told him that he was contemplating supporting the Chinese in some way 
because if the Japanese conquered China it would mean disaster for the trade of other 
powers, especially of Britain and the United States. He suggested (1) a formal and 
strongly worded intimation to Japan that nothing could justify the entry of any 
Japanese forces into the International Settlement (2) reinforcing Anglo-American 
military forces in Shanghai. He told Lindsay that he was very anxious to have the 
cooperation of the British Government in both these contemplated measures."'* But
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when his proposal was discussed at the F. O. it was immediately ridiculed. Pratt,
Orde and Wellesley wrote down their agreed minutes:
The picture which Mr. Stimson has in his mind of the situation in 
Shanghai is almost entirely an imaginary one, and he has done his 
utmost to rush us into hasty and ill considered action which would have 
gravely aggravated the situation in the Far East and would have 
produced consequences disastrous not only to China and Japan but to 
local British and American interests as well."®
Simon instructed the British Ambassador in Washington to inform Stimson of the 
British proposal: Britain and the United States should press the Chinese Government 
into suppressing “mob violence” and restraining “boycott activities” on one hand, and 
remind the Japanese of “the vast concentration of foreign interests in Shanghai and 
the Yangtsee valley” on the other."® A sudden attack by the Japanese on Shanghai 
had Simon mnning around in circles: he instructed Lindley to ask the Japanese 
Government why Chapei was attacked after the Chinese acceptance of Japanese 
demands and to state that the British Government could not agree to the International 
Settlement being used as a military base;'" on the other hand, he urged Lindsay to 
ask the American Government if they would take similar action and informed them 
that Britain had sent the gun cruiser “Kent” to Shanghai as reinforcement acting upon 
the second point in Stimson's suggestion."® On top of this, he had to explain to the 
Cabinet why, according to The Times, there had been a delay in communicating with 
America."®
On the American side, Stimson declared that the United States could not act 
under Art 15 as a member of the League but she would collaborate with the members 
of the League concerned under the Nine Power Treaty and the Kellogg Treaty.'^®
On January 30, he took the initiative to telephone MacDonald and convey the 
suggestion by Hoover for a direct appeal to the Japanese Emperor from the American 
President and the King of the United Kingdom for a cessation of hostilities and the 
beginning of negotiations for a settlement. He told MacDonald, “it would have a 
good deal of force. We would endeavor to put the appeal in such shape that it would 
be difficult for them to refuse.” He stressed that the United States would not do it 
unless Britain could join. This suggestion was “a very sudden proposal” to 
MacDonald and took him “unprepared”. However, he agreed to consider it.'^'
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Nevertheless, the F. O. had a quite different idea about the appeal. They thought 
that the situation had materially changed since that telephone conversation and the 
appeal should concentrate on Shanghai and exclude Manchuria. The next day, 
MacDonald answered Stimson by telephone that the British appeal could be sent only 
by the Prime Minister to the Japanese Prime Minister. In view of this, Stimson 
decided “the project should be postponed.”
On the 31st, the Japanese, due to an unexpected counter-attack by the Chinese 
army, turned to the Western Powers to use their good offices. Stimson put 
forward his five-point proposal for a cessation to the conflict, which was generally 
agreed by Britain, France and Italy. On February 2, the Four Powers despatched 
the proposal to the Japanese Government. But Japan refused it on the grounds that 
although the first four were acceptable, the fifth, which connected the Shanghai affair 
with Manchurian crisis, was unacceptable.
On the British side, Bindley thought, “acceptance of four points would be most 
valuable in any case.”^^  ^ Simon even said, “If we can get any practical results on one, 
two, three or four it will be a very good thing.” Two days later he discussed with 
Atherton, the American Charge d' Affaires in Great Britain, a new proposal by 
Britain, which omitted Manchuria firom any forthcoming representation to Tokyo in 
order to continue the good offices. But Stimson did not want to give up the fifth 
point because in his opinion it was essential that there should be a complete cessation 
of hostilities in China. He frankly told Simon of his disagreement to the British 
proposal by telephone and then said, “I don't think it is dignified to go on negotiating 
with Japan after she has refused the essence of our proposal.
On February 9, Stimson sent for Lindsay and told him that he was contemplating 
an invocation of the Nine Power Treaty for making a statement about this attack on 
Chinese sovereignty and independence. He hoped that British Government would 
take joint action. Two days later, in a telephone conversation with Simon at 
Geneva, he was told, “you will find,... that the British Government will be glad to 
stand side by side with you. Our interests are essentially the same.” But first of all, 
Simon had to consult London. In fact, neither he, nor Van. thought that the 
moment was ripe and that time should be allowed to see whether Lampson could 
achieve anything at Shanghai.
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In the following days, there were several phone calls between Stimson and Simon.
The difference between the two sides became more and more obvious. On the 15th,
stressing that Britain was a member of the League, Simon was inclined to try dealing
with the problem in connection with the League and preferred to separate the
Shanghai affair from the Manchurian crisis, while Stimson emphasised the importance
of joint action by Britain and the United States and of the fifth point. He persuaded i
Simon that Britain could join in two separate actions taken by both Nine Power
Treaty signatories and the League at the same time. Simon seemed quite inclined to
follow this argument but he said he had to consult his colleagues first.
Immediately after that, a meeting was held to discuss the measure in MacDonald’s
Nursing Home attended by MacDonald, Simon, Chamberlain, Thomas, Lord
Hailsham (War Minister) and Sir Eyres-Monsell (Admiralty). The conclusion was
the best course would be for the Council of the League to make some 
measured appeal to Japan, on lines similar to those proposed by Mr 
Stimson, and to make an effort to synchronise the two.
As a result of the meeting a message was sent to Geneva suggesting the lines of an 
appeal to Japan by the League.
But “to make an effort to synchronise the two” was conditional according to 
Atherton's understanding; if the United States got “all the signatories of the Nine 
Power Treaty to agree to the draft of the Nine Power proclamation”, Britain would 
join in, otherwise she would “content herself with participation in the League appeal” 
and leave the Americans to take independent action on the Nine Power Treaty.
In the evening, Simon telephoned Stimson and turned down the latter’s proposal 
by saying, “I am not decided whether we can actually join in you on the same piece of 
paper or not”.^ '^ ” On the 16th, Van. submitted to Atherton a memo which states, “It 
is thoroughly understood that the question whether other Powers could join in the 
American document is still in suspense.”
When Atherton told Stimson about Britain's decision to not go ahead by 
telephone, the latter could not help saying, “She has let us down.” '^^  ^ Since the 
American Government feared acting alone, Stimson instructed Atherton to inform the 
F. O. that “there may be no American note.” '^^ ^
Late in February, the Japanese gave a very strong hint that “they wished that they 
were well out of the Shanghai a f f a i r . S i mon  felt it was time for successfiil
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intervention. With a new proposal for extension of good offices, he asked Wilson,
the American delegate at Geneva, whether the United States could join the
negotiation following cessation of Chinese-Japanese hostilities at Shanghai. Being
discouraged by his earlier experience, Stimson instructed Wilson to cooperate but at
the same time “to go a little slow.” '^*^
2. A Policy of Caution during the Waiting Period
Negotiations between the Chinese and Japanese led to the Armistice Agreement
on May 5, which gradually relieved the tense situation at Shanghai. Meanwhile, the
Japanese created their puppet state “Manchukuo”, and there was a continuance of the
deadlock on the Manchurian crisis. The period from March to September could be
called a waiting period for the Report from the Lytton Commission, which was sent
to China for investigation by the League.
In order to avert the risk of invoking Art 16, the Far Eastern Department
prepared a memo for the Cabinet Committee. On March 8, the F. O. officials
suggested two alternatives: “either to put pressure on Japan, which seemed both
useless and dangerous,” or to adopt the argument that the questions with which “the
Conference was to deal must be investigated by the Lytton Commission.” So the
outcome would be:
A decision to await a report by the Lytton Commission should, 
therefore, have the effect of preventing the Assembly from proceeding 
immediately to draw up a report under Article 15, paragraph 4, and this 
should render it more difficult for an attempt to be made to press for 
the immediate application of Article 16.
Orde emphasised in the minute, “No further action is required on the memo”, 
“sanctions are out of the question...
On the same day, the Far Eastern Committee instructed Simon to limit any 
Resolution by the League “to a reaffirmation of the principles of the Covenant” and 
he should avoid aggravation of Japan and should not go beyond some such 
expression as “strong regrets”.
The next day, the conclusions of the Far Eastern Committee were considered by 
the Ministers. It was generally recognised that the prestige of the League had been 
greatly damaged by the Shanghai incident. It would only make things worse if 
sanctions were applied because the League could not make it effective without joint
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action from America. A report by the Chiefs of Staff was circulated at the meeting 
showing that the application of sanctions would lead to “even graver developments in 
the Far East.” The Cabinet agreed that the strongest weapon which the League could 
bring to bear”, was the mobilisation of world opinion in addition to a reaffirmation of 
the principles of the Covenant. They instructed Simon to avoid adopting an attitude 
of condemnation towards either of the disputants.
Simon followed exactly the same method when he drafted the League Resolution 
of March 11. He cleverly adopted Stimson's non-recognition as the League principles 
without directly declaring a violation of the covenant or condemning Japan. The 
resolution emphasised the continuance of mediatory action under paragraph 3 of Art 
15, which therefore satisfied both America and Japan. Pratt considered this as so- 
far-so good and regarded the Resolution as “a happy conclusion”. U n t i l  September 
the British Far Eastern policy could be summed up by Simon's words, “we must await 
the Lytton Report before doing anything”.
In this period of time, both American and British Governments were in complete 
agreement that anything in the nature of an economic blockade would necessarily 
entail a war, which was certainly not approved of. Stimson told Simon that the 
United States recognised that nothing beyond protest could be done.^ ^^
Early in September, the American Senator, Reed, who was in Stimson’s 
confidence, paid Simon a visit at 10 Downing Street. Simon gained the impression 
fi-om Mm that Stimson was not really “so eager for vehement denunciations” as he 
had been.^ '^^  In fact, awaiting the Lytton Report, Stimson “wanted to avoid appearing 
either butting in or holding back.”^^^
V. THE THIRD PHASE OF THE CRISIS: September 1932 - May 1933
1. The Lytton Report and Policy-making
On the eve of publication of the Lytton Report, Simon requested Ms subordinates 
to use the waiting interval for reflection. Based on information from Lindley,^^  ^
Orde suggested that Britain “should not take the lead against Japan” and should use 
its influence “in favour of a moderate and digmfied expression of sorrow rather than a 
strong reproof or demands” wMch Japan could not accept. He was afraid that the
48
League would collapse if Japan left, being followed by Germany and Italy in the 
future:
the question seems to be one between preservation of an existing 
League, with the possibility of its adaptation to realities through the 
progressive education of its members, and the virtual collapse of the 
present League,... the greater risk of chaos will be run by driving Japan 
out of the League than by retaining her at the cost of some compromise 
of the principle of the sanctity of treaties.
His suggestion was approved of by other inner members of the F .O. In accordance 
with it Simon summed up four points as the “immediate policy":
(1) be faithful to the League and act with the main body if possible
(2) do not take the lead in an attitude which, while necessarily futile, 
will antagonise Japan seriously
(3) be fair to both China and Japan
(4) work to keep Japan in the League.
When the Lytton Report was published on October 1, public opinion generally
made a positive comment on it. Attlee, the Labour leader, remarked that this
document would create “a great opportunity to vindicate the authority of the League
of Nations”. He, however, deprecated that the Foreign Secretary had encouraged the
Japanese militarists by saying that “he would not take sides.” The Labour Opposition
demanded that the Government should make every effort to support the principles of
the Covenant. The Daily Herald and the Daily Express regarded the Report as a
judgement against the Japanese, and the former’s editorial, under the heading
“Guilty!”, declared that Japan had been found guilty of a series of aggressive
actions. At Geneva, Mr Koo, the Chinese representative, appealed to Cecil that the
League should impose some special moral pressure on Japan, such as excluding her
from the League or withdrawing Ambassadors. However, the policy-makers shut the
door on public opinion. Pratt minuted.
Moral pressure of the kind advocated by Mr Koo would do infinite 
harm. It would prevent the growth of those influences in Japan which 
will eventually take the power out of the hands of the younger hotheads 
now in control and agree to a reasonable settlement of the dispute with 
China.
This minute met with general agreement fi*om his colleagues including Van. and 
Orde.'""
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On October 10, Pratt summarised the main points of the Report and advised that 
the document
could easily be taken as a severe condemnation of Japan, but... if one 
looks to the substance below the surface, the balance of right inclines to 
her side.
It is a fair deduction from the Report that while both parties are to 
blame, China's failure to set her house in order is the root cause of the 
present difficulties ... that no solution is possible until she has made at 
any rate a genuine start with the task of national reconstruction ... The 
initiative in short now rests with China.
In these circumstances the policy to be adopted by His Majesty's 
Government would seem to be ... that an effective beginning should be 
made with the reconstruction of China and that the two parties should 
be persuaded to meet in friendly negotiation...
The Lytton Report... should, however, greatly ease the strain of the 
present situation, for there will no longer be any excuse for treating 
Japan as the criminal in the dock, and there can be no question of 
sanctions or of driving her from the League.
This “admirable review”, Simon found, was very helpfiil in clearing his own mind.'"' 
After reading it, Orde did not wish to add anything except that he wondered if Japan 
would accept the solution.'"^
Orde's anxiety was not unwarranted. According to Lindley's observation, the 
Report would most probably be rejected by Japan on the grounds that it assured that 
(1) the military operation of Japanese troops on September 18 could not be regarded 
as self-defence (2) “Manchukuo” could not be considered to have been called into 
existence by a genuine and spontaneous independent movement.'"^ At Geneva, 
Drummond, Secretary-General of the League, presumed that unless Japan accepted 
the Report, the Council could do no more than pass the Report on to the Committee 
of 19 and the Assembly. Then the problem was what the Committee of 19 should 
propose to the Assembly which would make a report under Art. 15. In these 
circumstances, he put forward two possible proposals: (1) the Assembly would 
exhaust its duties under Art. 15 by adopting the Lytton Report, declaring against any 
recognition of “Manchukuo”, and recommending China and Japan to negotiate on the 
lines indicated in the Report. Then as an additional measure, the Assembly might 
send the report to the Members of the Nine Power Treaty and the Kellogg Pact; (2)
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the Assembly would adopt the Report up to Chapter 8 which described the 
Manchurian incident. As to Chapters 9 and 10 which referred to principles and to the 
suggestions for settlement, the Assembly could first consult the Members of the Nine 
Power Treaty plus the Soviets for the result of their examination, and then it might 
formulate its final conclusions based on all points of view. He analysed that the first 
proposal implied that the League had failed to settle the problem. So he preferred the 
second one because, despite showing the League's weakness, it had certain clear 
advantages, that for example it would force the Americans and Soviets “to bear their 
responsibilities,” gain time and leave the League “with the last word”.'"''
Simon wanted his subordinates to be free to give their opinions on these 
proposals. Being in accord as usual, Pratt and Orde agreed to an extent with the 
second one, but drew attention to three difficulties such as the question of recognition 
of Manchukuo, the impossibility of further delay and difficulty in inviting Soviets. 
Orde suggested that the Manchukuo Foreign Minister should be sounded as to the 
possibility of a declaration accepting Chinese sovereignty. While Mr. Carr, Assistant 
Adviser on League of Nations Affairs, was full in accord with Drummond and did not 
think those three difficulties were so serious. Wellesley and Van, came to a 
conclusion as the former minuted;
We are all agreed on the following points:
1. That Sir E. Drummond's second proposal should be taken as the 
basis for our proposals.
2. That Russia should be added to the nine Powers.
3. But Mr. Orde's proposal for a further enquiry into the state of feeling 
in Manchuria would worth supporting if the Japanese can be 
induced to put it forward.
But Van. did not consider Orde's suggestion workable.'""
After two revisions considering various opinions fi-om his colleagues, Drummond 
submitted his final proposal in early November which included the following steps:
(1) adoption of the first eight chapters of the Report; (2) declaration of non­
recognition of and non-cooperation with Manchukuo; (3) the Powers of the Kellogg 
Pact and of the Nine Power Treaty including the Soviets should be invited to hold a 
conference to examine proposals made in chapters 9 and 10 and to endeavour to 
reach a settlement and inform the Assembly of the result; (4) as soon as the result was 
known, the Assembly could declare under Art. 15 that in view of the difficulties
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experienced by the Chinese Government in its work of reconstruction, which had
been increased by the incident of September 18, 1931, the League would take a
decision affording China technical assistance.'""
In late November, the Cabinet twice discussed the policy that Britain should
pursue in the League. Simon reported to his colleagues Drummond's proposal which
he would take on the grounds that “the League can do nothing directly.” But he was
afraid that “the United States would much prefer to disclaim responsibility by leaving
the League of Nations to grasp the nettle itself.”'"^  Since the Lytton Report had
denied the creation of Manchukuo as the result of “spontaneous action of
Manchurian inhabitants”, he did not see how the Council could be expected to do
other than pronounce a condemnation of Japan, which might lead to the possibility of
Japan leaving the League.'"^ Racking his brains in scheming, Simon found the
opportunity to help both Japan and the League to get rid of the embarrassment. He
had noticed that “the Lytton Commission did not recommend the League to do
anything in particular.” “Most of their recommendations were addressed to China or
Japan”, which was the point that he might be able to make some use of'"^ He was
prepared to “ward off” the conclusions unfavourable to Japan by quoting a certain
paragraph in Chapter 9 of the Report which brought out the complexity of the
dispute. He promised his colleagues that the British delegate would neither take a
lead nor commit Britain never to recognise Manchukuo.'^"
Without much discussion, the Cabinet agreed with Simon's conclusion:
We ought to act as a loyal member of the League ... the course we take 
is pro League and not anti Japan. ... we must strive to be fair to both 
sides. But we must not involve ourselves in trouble with Japan.
They noticed that the stress was laid on the last sentence.'^'
2. Policy of ” A Loyal Member of the League”
In late November and early December, the Council organised a general debate on
the Manchurian crisis based on the Lytton Report .Giving a speech on December
7, Simon mentioned nothing about the two important conclusions of the Report
concerning the Japanese invasion but drew attention to his two observations: the first
was a quotation of a passage from Chapter 9 :
the issues involved in this conflict are not as simple as they are often 
represented to be. They are, on the contrary, exceedingly complicated, 
and only an intimate knowledge of all the facts, as well as of their
'if.
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historical background, should entitle anyone to express a definite 
opinion upon them. This is not a case in which one country has 
declared war on another country without previously exhausting the 
opportunities for conciliation provided in the Covenant of the League 
of Nations. Neither is it a simple case of the violation of the frontier of 
one country by the armed forces of a neighbouring country, because in 
Manchuria there are many features without an exact parallel in other 
parts of the world.
The second was the weak points in the Chinese case such as the existence of an anti- 
foreign feeling and anti-foreign b o y c o t t . H e  thought that the other speakers 
neglected these factors'^'' and it could not be fairly judged “unless proper emphasis 
was laid on those passages in the Report which criticised China. What he took 
from the Report as the resolution was “A mere restoration of the status quo ante 
would be no solution.”'^ "
After listening to his speech, the Japanese Delegate Matsuoka remarked that “Sir 
John Simon had said in half an hour, in a few well-chosen phrases, what he — Mr 
Matsuoka — had been trying to say in his bad English for the last ten days.”'^  ^
However, the British attitude was not only resented by the Chinese on the grounds 
that Britain even did not support them on a moral issue, but it was also suspected by 
other Powers including the United States that Britain had “supported and encouraged 
the Japanese adventures in Manchuria” because the British selfish interest lay in not 
offending Japan.
On the 22nd, the Japanese Government informed the Committee of Nineteen that
they had rejected the Committee’s Resolution of January 18th.'^  ^ In fact, well before
that, they had turned down all suggestions for compromise. In order to avoid
sanctions and Art. 16, winch might be executed by the League, Japan put foiward
new proposals on January 20th, 1933, aiming to play for time.'^" The situation was so
delicate that it seemed beyond Simon's capability to handle.'*'
In these circumstances, Pratt warned on December 23, 1932,
A false step now, or even the appearance of any hesitation, might 
arouse the abiding hostility of the Chinese and seriously compromise 
our position both with the League and in America. The good-will of 
Japan — even if we are able to retain it — would hardly suffice to save 
our extensive interests in China.
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He went on to point out that both Britain and the League had gone to the extreme
limit of concession to Japan and had met with “a blank refusal”. In doing so, Britain
ran a great danger of antagonising China. But now when conciliation had broken
down, the British role “must be that of a strong and loyal upholder of League
principles.”'*^  This meant, as he explained in his memo of January 5, that Britain had
to join in a League condemnation of Japan and run an equal danger of antagonising
Japan. He did not know how to avoid the dilemma but he opposed sacrifice of
League principles for the concession on the grounds that:
It is better that the League should become a League even of European 
States alone rather than that, in the attempt to become universal, it 
should become a League to which nobody would think it worth their 
while to belong.'*^
He suggested.
If Japan retires fi om the League dignity will be preserved on both 
sides...
We shall only be able effectively to head off a demand for the expulsion 
of Japan by showing that we are prepared to join in a dignified but 
quite unequivocal condemnation of her actions. ... antagonising Japan 
in this way and to this extent... would probably not result in any very 
great damage to our material interests, whereas if we do not go at least 
thus far our moral prestige which is the real basis of our position in 
China would be destroyed... Moreover unless we take the bold and 
simple course of condemning Japan we shall run the far graver risks of 
weakening the League and alienating America.'*''
He urged informing the Japanese Government of the possible course of action taken
by Britain after the League’s judgement had been given and explaining to them the
reasons which made that action inevitable. At the same time, the British Government
should immediately ask America, France, Italy and Germany to take a similar line.'*"
But not fearing the result of plain speech to Japan, Cadogan pointed out that
the loss of Japan would be great blow to the League... But it would be 
far better that she should go than that the League should swallow its 
pride and its principles to keep her. I don't see why the League should 
not continue to exist usefially without Japan — I am not quite sure that a 
“régionalisation” of the League is not a necessary reform of the future.
He also preferred letting Japan leave to expelling her, but he reminded the F. O. of 
two possible problems: (1) in that way, Japan was still under the obligations by the
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treaty in two years to set everything straight, which he did not believe she would 
fulfil; (2) it was very difficult to resist a demand to expel Japan.'*"
In the exchange of views between inner members of the F. O., Pratt’s proposals 
met with general agreement. However, Simon and Van., in spite of being generally in 
accordance with Pratt, thought the weak point in Pratt’s proposals was that it would 
be regarded as taking the lead and urging the other Powers to follow.'*^
Later Simon reported to the Cabinet that Britain would continue not to recognise 
the existing regime in Manchuria for some time because the League had adopted non­
recognition as the principles. But as soon as the moment came — if Manchukuo really 
established itself as an independent entity or if “an important foreign Government” i.e. 
America had recognised Manchukuo — Britain would at once reconsider revising her 
own position. He hoped that the Cabinet could consider; (1) rejecting any resort to 
economic or other sanctions under Art. 16. (2) the use of modified pressure: the 
members of the League could declare that Japan had broken the rules of the League. 
The question of an arms embargo could only be considered — but it was still very 
difficult to decide upon and must be handled with great caution even — on the 
condition that all other countries including America did the same.'**
At Geneva the Resolution for adoption of the Assembly on February 21, 1933 
was under preparation based on the Lytton Report. Eden and Pratt took part in 
drafting it.'*  ^ Simon instructed Eden to shape the document following the policy 
above so that it did not prevent Britain from revising her position as a result of her 
own interests in the future. The resolution included condemnation of Japanese 
violation of the mles of the League and non-recognition of Manchukuo, which was 
accepted by the Assembly on the 24th but rejected by Japan.'^'
On the 27th, the British Government declared that Britain was unilaterally placing 
an arms embargo on both China and Japan on the grounds that “supplies to China 
alone would only tempt the Japanese navy to capture them.” The purpose of the 
embargo was, as Simon explained, that by showing Britain as a loyal supporter of the 
League's judgement, Britain was now entitled to enquire what other nations, 
particularly America, were prepared to do.'^  ^ In fact, the Cabinet had decided 
beforehand that the embargo would last only a fortnight and even Simon knew clearly 
that a fortnight was such a short time that it was impossible to regard it as sufficient
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either to allow an international agreement to be reached or to check arms export to 
the disputants.'"^
“This bold lead” was fully understood by Japan,'"'' but met with criticism from 
other quarters, both at home and abroad. In the House, Mr Cock asked Simon why 
supplies of arms could not be sent to China by other ways than by the sea.'""
Negative comments also came from the other Powers.'"" The American Government 
thought that to embargo China was worse than doing nothing.'"^ On March 14th, the 
British embargo — it was believed to favour Japan rather than check her'"* — was 
lifted on the grounds that it had not evoked any corresponding action in any other
199powers.
3. Anglo-American Cooperation
After the publication of the Lytton Report, Stimson told Simon through the 
American Ambassador Mellon that America's first concern was that the authority of 
the Nine Power Treaty and Kellogg Pact must be firmly defended. Towards this aim, 
the United States were prepared to cooperate with other powers concerned, 
particularly with Britain. He pushed Britain to take a lead since she was a member of 
the League as well as one of signatories of the Nine Power Treaty.^"" But from 
Mellon, he learned that the British were “a little too lukewarm to take a vigorous 
lead” though MacDonald, Simon and Van. seemed more disposed than ever to stand 
with the Americans.^"'
On the other hand, the British tried to find out how far the Americans were 
prepared to go with the League. On October 26, Simon invited Davis, American 
Delegate to the Disarmament Conference, and Atherton to the meeting at the F. O. 
with Eden, Orde, Pratt, Lytton and himself. When Lytton asked Davis what action 
under the Nine Power Treaty was contemplated by the United States Government, 
the latter said that they had not thought out any plan and they wanted the League to 
handle the matter. They were ready to cooperate with the League and would let it 
know if they could join after it had made the decision.^"^
Feeling Simon's speech of December 7 “particularly disconcerting”, Stimson 
warned his British partners that any indication of weakness or too conciliatory an 
attitude by Britain would encourage Japan. Failure to reaffirm the principle of non­
recognition would amount to an acknowledgement of Japan's contention that the
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Covenant and the treaties presented no real obstacles to Japan's proceeding as she
might choose. He went on to point out seriously,
if the British Government shows itself willing neither as a government 
nor as a member of the League to take a stand on behalf of principles, 
and if the League, in consequence, dodges the issues and pretends to 
believe that a committee or commission of conciliation can, 
unsupported by a foundation of principles... I cannot but doubt whether 
any useful purpose would be served by our appointing a representative, 
if asked so to do, to work with such a commission.^"^
He considered adoption of the Lytton Report and non-recognition as a precondition
to American participation in the work of a committee of conciliation.^"'' Since he was
wholly dissatisfied with the draft resolution of December 16 due to its unprincipled
character, Stimson instructed Wilson,
you will not help that breaking of the ice by any sign of weakness. Not 
a bit. Just the reverse.^""
He wanted Wilson to bear in mind that he must make it very clear he would take a 
decision of cooperation on the basis of whether the League had acted in the nature of 
an affirmation of findings of principle, i.e. whether the League Resolution was in 
accord with American principles.^""
In mid-January, when the effort made by the League to find a basis for 
conciliation came to nothing, Simon sought further American support; but his 
reluctance to mention the next step left Stimson with the impression that there was no 
change in future British policy. Stimson would rather push the British Government 
into the line backed up firmly by the non-recognition than go along with Britain and 
the League and make any unprincipled accommodation to Japan. In his opinion, the 
League should soon declare the judgement of non-recognition.^"^ As to participation 
in the Advisory Committee for conciliation, the American Government, despite 
acceptance of the invitation, emphasised that their representative should work in the 
Committee without a right to vote, which did not commit America to anything.^"*
On March 27, Japan gave preliminary notice of her withdrawal firom the League 
and the Manchurian crisis was settled by leaving it unsettled although later the Sino- 
Japanese Armistice at Tang Ku was signed on May 31.
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VI. AFTERMATH: FAR EASTERN APPEASEMENT AND THE EUROPEAN
ISSUE
The Manchurian episode was only the first step of Japanese establishment of “the
Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere”. After the Tang Ku Armistice, a new plot
was devised. Ishihara, chief of the operations section of the general staff, made it
clear in June 1933:
War will come when our national policy of establishing an East Asian 
league is obstructed by an enemy. Whether the enemy be America,
Russia or Britain, the war will be a protracted one. We must, 
therefore, expect to encounter their combined military force as well as 
China’s resistance. The only way to carry out our national defence plan 
is therefore to establish control over Cliina proper as speedily and 
skilfully as possible, create a self-sufficient economic bloc 
encompassing Japan, China and Manchukuo, protect our position in the 
East Asian league by force against the land force of the Soviet Union 
and the Naval force of the United States and Britain, and then to devise 
ways to bring the enemy to his knees, thus opening the way to victory.
209
This was an exclusive strategy, which would inevitably result in war with the Western 
Powers.
When Japan had realised that the conflict of interest between herself and the
Western Powers was fundamentally unresolvable, British policy-makers tried to draw
some lessons from the previous crisis. On November 9, the Committee of Imperial
Defence considered the Annual Review by Chiefs of Staff, which listed three major
commitments: the Far East, Europe and India, repeating the previous view that the
Far East “remains the greatest and most immediate of our commitments”.
Chamberlain, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, thought “it was a mistake” to give
priority to the Far East instead of Europe. This “had gradually poisoned our relations
with Japan,” he said:
If it were possible to improve our relations with Japan the whole 
problem in the Far East would be much simplified, and it even might be 
possible to reduce the Far East in the order of priority. This was one of 
the reasons which led him to suggest that it might perhaps be unwise to 
commit ourselves too definitely to an order of priority.
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MacDonald and Simon agreed with the view of the Chiefs of Staff while they also 
thought Chamberlain’s proposal necessary. In the end, the Committee appointed the 
Defence Requirements Committee, which was composed of Hankey, a secretary of 
the Cabinet (Chair), Fisher, Permanent Under Secretary at the Treasury, Vansittart 
and three Chiefs of Staff, to investigate the situation. '^"
The DRC started their first meeting on November 14 and continued to work on 
their Report in the following months. Meanwhile, the Navy Staff warned them that 
without a strength of two power standard (a navy large enough to fight Japan in the 
Far East while leaving in home waters sufficient force to contend with the strongest 
European power), the Navy could no longer afford war in the Far East and in Europe 
at the same time.^" The officials in the F.O. also put forward a number of 
memoranda to discuss the Far East situation from various angles. Having been 
circulated in the F.O., this collection of papers was sent to the Cabinet and other 
departments with Van’s covering letter, in which he summed up the conclusion for 
the basis of future Far Eastern policy:
(1) It would be inadvisable to tie our Far Eastern policy to either Japan 
or to the United States, since the former have fundamental aims to 
which we cannot give support, while the latter are an entirely uncertain 
factor.
(2) It is a major British interest not to antagonise Japan, and still more 
not to be made the spear-head of opposition to her arms.
Differing from Hankey and the Chiefs of Staff, both of whom stressed Far Eastern
danger. Van advised the Cabinet around the beginning of December:
The order of priorities which put Japan first pre-supposed that Japan 
would attack us after we had got into difficulties elsewhere.
‘Elsewhere’ therefore came first, not second; and elsewhere could only 
mean Europe, and Europe could only mean Germany ... Our resources 
were not sufficient to meet a menace from both Japan and Germany, 
and ... of the two Geimany was the greater menace.
Fisher shared his view completely and went fiirther to argue that Britain should be 
prepared to re-establish Anglo-Japanese friendship even at a cost of Anglo-American 
relations, including preparations for hostilities against Amer ica .His  pro-Japanese 
view was supported by his superior, Chamberlain, who told his colleagues that the 
United States “will give us no understanding to resist by force any action by
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Japan.” '^'' However, the DRC, as a whole did not accept such an extreme view, but
they did urge the importance of achieving a rapprochement with Japan. '^" In their
discussion, the DRC realised that due to the financial situation, it was impossible to
maintain a two-power standard Navy. Great Britain was, therefore, not able to fight
a two-front war both in the Far East and in Europe at the same time. Their
conclusion was that if a détente in Anglo-Japanese relations could be achieved, it
would allow the British Navy sufficient force to concentrate on European and
Mediterranean waters.^'"
In their first Report of February 28, 1934, DRC advised that
advantage should be taken of any opportunity to improve our relations 
with Japan ... We cannot overstate the importance we attach to getting 
back, not to an alliance (since that would not be practical politics) but 
at least to our old terms of cordiality and mutual respect with Japan ... 
there is already some speculation as to the future extent of Japan’s 
relations with Germany.
They observed that while some improvement of Britain’s defence in the Far
East had to be made vis-à-vis Japan, Germany should be designated as “the
ultimate potential enemy against whom our Tong range’ defence policy has to
be decided.” In the face of the possibility that Britain might be involved in war
simultaneously in the Far East and in Europe, a détente with Japan would allow
Britain to concentrate on Germany. However, a policy of accommodation with
Japan should be backed up by a British reinforced military position in the Far
East, “showing a tooth”. The Report went further to calculate that the
expenditure on three services would be £82 million, of which £71 million was to
be spent in the next five year s.
On March 14, the Cabinet considered the Report for the first time. Chamberlain
“warmly supported” the DRC policy of accommodation with Japan. He hoped to tell
Japan that “we had not linked ourselves with America. If this were done Japan
would be free from the fear that we might be united with America against her.” He
went on to suggest that
there should be a Pact of Non-Aggression with Japan for a term of 
years. This might have to be subject to certain assurances, for example, 
as to Japan’s attitude on China. If we could get a satisfactory bilateral 
pact it might have a beneficial effect on our relations which would 
enable us to concentrate on the serious situation that was developing 
nearer home.
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The Report also obtained ample support from some other Ministers, However, 
Simon showed some doubt about whether the attempt to restore friendship would be 
successful due to a number of difficulties such as the issue of Manchukuo, Anglo- 
American relations and the forthcoming Naval Conference. In particular, he had tried 
his best to appease Japan during the recent crisis, but in vain. He, however, agreed 
with Chamberlain’s suggestion of a non-aggression pact.
MacDonald held some reservations on this policy because he thought that “it 
would be regarded in America as an Alliance”. But he did not at all oppose the pro- 
Japanese course as he said that “all were agreed that something would have to be 
done to improve relations with Japan and get on more confidential terms.” 
Technically, he instructed that “the more quietly we could improve our relations with 
Japan the better for the present.” In the end, the Cabinet asked the F.O. and the 
Admiralty to give further definition for improving relations with Japan. '^*
According to Cabinet instructions, Simon dictated the first draft of the memo with 
the help of Orde and then Van revised it extensively before submission. After 
analysing the “pros and cons” of a pact with Japan, the memo found that “on the 
whole, the balance seems to incline on the side of the ‘cons’” due to various 
disadvantages such as the record of Japanese violation of the Kellogg Pact, the issue 
of Manchukuo, the possible negative attitude of America, Russia and China, and in 
particular, the League of Nations. After discussing it on the 19th, the Cabinet 
decided that the proposal for a non-aggression pact with Japan should receive further 
consideration.^'"
On May 2, the Cabinet decided to refer the DRC Report to the Ministerial 
Committee on Disarmament, which, after some discussion, asked Chamberlain to re- 
estimate the costs of the whole rearmament programme suggested by the DRC.^^" 
Despite supporting the Report, the Chancellor was not happy with the expensive 
programme. Following the view of the DRC, he argued that the expenditure of £67 
million suggested by the DRC for shipbuilding was based on one-power standard on 
the assumption of fighting only against Japan, but not a two-front war both in the Far 
East and in Europe; since the DRC also concluded that Germany was the ultimate 
enemy, the logical view should be that Great Britain must prepare for war against her 
major enemy -  Germany -  rather than war in the Far East. His conclusion was that if
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they made military preparations for confronting the European menace, they must give
up any hope of preparing for war against Japan, as he explained in his letter to his
sister on July 28,
if we are to take the necessary measures of defence against her 
(Germany -  Author) we certainly can’t afford at the same time to 
rebuild our battle-fleet. Therefore we ought to be making eyes at 
Japan.^ '^
Late in June, he successfully convinced the Ministerial Committee to decide on a 
very limited naval programme. The total costs of rearmament for the next five years 
had been cut by a third.^ ^  ^ This decision was fatal to the British rearmament in the 
1930s and started the process of her military weakness. The DRC policy of restoring 
a détente in Anglo-Japanese relations by a method of “showing a tooth” then became 
a policy of appeasing the aggressor with no tooth to show.
Early in July, Clive, the new British Ambassador in Toyko, reported that Mr 
Mirota, the Japanese Foreign Minister, told him that Japan was ready to sign “non­
aggression pacts with England and America”.^ *^ The Ambassador’s report received 
intensive consideration both from the F.O. and the Cabinet. Although they agreed to 
improve Anglo-Japanese relations in principle,^ '^' a majority of senior members in the 
F.O. including Van, Orde, Mounsey (an Assistant Under-Secretary) disliked the 
Japanese idea. Apart from the “cons” that they had explored in their previous 
proposal,^^" Orde analysed that if, as a result of a pact, the Government were “to 
encourage Japan to fight Russia, we should see the Russian counterpoise to Germany 
seriously weakened.” Simon, however, showed a great interest in the Japanese 
approach, and said, “why not"}... It may be a valuable buffer against Japanese naval 
liberty.”^
Chamberlain (Acting Prime Minister August 8 - September 22, 1934) admired the 
idea too as he wrote to Simon on September 1 : although there were various 
inconveniences to signing a pact with Japan, they should give priority to British 
interests;
it is at least arguable that the Manchukuo affair, except insofar as it 
served to discredit the League, has not hitherto harmed us and, so long 
as the open door is maintained, is actually likely to benefit British 
exporters.
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However, he agreed with Simon’s suggestion of enquiring what was Japan’s idea 
about a Pact.^ ^^
At the Cabinet meeting of the 25th, according to Chamberlain’s suggestion, the
Ministers instructed him and Simon to make a joint questionnaire?^* On the same
day, the Foreign Secretary asked Clive to find out
What exactly have the Japanese in mind in making this suggestion? ... 
are the Japanese really so desirous of such a pact that they would be 
prepared to pay a reasonable price for it? And if so, how much?^^"
Their joint memo of October 16 for the Cabinet embodied most points in
Chamberlain’s letter of September 1. As for the question of Manchukuo, they looked
for a sort of resolution like Munich of 1938:
The stoiy of Manchukuo ... is largely past history, and the important 
thing, both for China and for ourselves, is that Japanese aggression and 
penetration should not pass the Great Wall and invade or monopolise 
China proper. ... If, indeed, Japan were prepared to enter into a new 
and specific assurance which would guarantee the integrity of China 
proper, without prejudice to the position on either side as regards 
Manchukuo, this might provide in the eyes of China something of real 
value in a special Anglo-Japanese arrangement which otherwise it 
would be impossible to justify. While it would be difficult to fi-ame the 
guarantee in such a way as not to amount to a recognition of 
Manchukuo and an abandonment of the line hitherto taken by the 
League of Nations...
However, it was so delicate and so serious that the Cabinet were not able to come 
to a decision due to divergence within the Government. On October 24, they decided 
to postpone the consideration of it “until further progress had been made in the 
Anglo-Japanese Naval discussion. Although the desirability of a non-aggression 
pact was frustrated because of the breakdown of the London Naval Conference and 
the Japanese launching of total war on China on July 7, 1937, the policy of 
accommodation with Japan had remained unchanged well through the period of 
Europe crises.^ ^^
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Vn. COMMENT
The Manchurian crisis was the first fundamental challenge to the Versailles 
Settlement, the first major test of the League of Nations and the first step taken by the 
British Government to cany out appeasement during the inter-war period. It was in a 
broad sense the prologue to the Second World War.
Although there has been considerable study done on this subject, the nature of the 
British Far Eastern policy has not yet been fully explored. Attention should be drawn 
to the following arguments: the first one was that the British Far Eastern policy was 
not appeasement on the grounds that Great Britain “made no ‘Munich agreement’ in 
the Far East”, buying off an aggressor “at the sacrifice of principle”. Their policy was 
that “Japan somehow had to be accommodated, but at the same time stopped.”^^  ^ In 
the second argument, some historians deny there exists a fundamental relationship 
between Far Eastern and European crises because they think that the Manchurian 
crisis did not “cause” Mussolini’s conquest of Abyssinia and Hlter’s adventures in 
Europe. The Manchurian episode was “far away”, it “did not endanger the peace of 
Europe.”^^ '' “Clearly there were links between the situation in Europe and that in the 
Far East”, A.J.P. Taylor says and then asks, “but what were they?”^^ " These two 
arguments are in fact related to each other: neglect of appeasement in Far East easily 
leads to the conclusion that there was no fundamental relationship between Far 
Eastern crisis and that in Europe. On the other hand, a failure to find the underlying 
relationship between the two supports the argument of denying Far Eastern 
appeasement.
The substantial evidence in this chapter has proved that the above arguments are 
incorrect. During and after the Manchurian crisis, the British Government made 
every effort to buy off the Japanese aggressor by helping the latter “ward off’ the 
charge of their aggression. Despite being a leading power in the League, they 
sacrificed the principle of the Covenant by misinterpreting it, namely, they emphasised 
the complexity and particularity in the Manchurian case as an excuse for not 
employing the principles and the methods of the League. They attempted to find a 
way round the conflict between the League and Japan rather than to take a firm stand 
to defend the Covenant. Pretending to be fair and impartial to both sides, they tried
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to argue in favour of the aggressor by implying that China's failure to set her house in
order provoked the Japanese invasion. The resolution to the crisis, in their opinion,
was not to take any anti-aggressive measure but to “promote conciliation”.^ *" Instead
of stopping Japan, they tried to restore Anglo-Japanese friendship which was, in their
view, the only assurance to British interest in the Far East. Baldwin said to Thomas
Jones during the Shanghai incident.
The veiy people like Bob Cecil... are now urging us foiward to take 
action. But where will action lead us to? If we withdraw Ambassadors 
that's only the first step. What's the next? and the next? If you enforce 
an economic boycott you'll have war declared by Japan and she will 
seize Singapore and Hongkong and we can't, as we are placed, stop 
her.:^ ''
After they revised the DRC policy in May - June 1934, the Ministers completely 
ruled out defending the Pacific by force and decided to accommodate Japan without 
setting any limits. Chamberlain and Simon went fiirther to devise a proposal of the 
Munich-like resolution in the Far East on October 16, 1934, in which they considered 
that by keeping the status quo in Manchuria, they could invite Japan to enter into “a 
new and specific assurance which would guarantee the integrity of China proper” 
within the Great Wall.^ **
The British policy-makers did not succeed in selling China physically to Japan as 
they sold Czechoslovakia to Hitler because the situation did not allow them. Apart 
from various difficulties that the F.O. had realised, the Japanese, unlike Hitler, seized 
Manchuria in 1931 and launched a total war on China in 1937 without consulting the 
Western Powers beforehand. In other words, Japan did not give Britain the necessary 
time and opportunity to arrange any selling. What they did was similar to Hitler’s 
annexation of Czechoslovakia in March 1939, leaving Britain nothing to sell. On the 
other hand, China, unlike Czechoslovakia, did not accept any arrangement of selling 
herself, and she resisted Japanese invasion even with little help from the Western 
Powers rather than surrender. All this had spoiled their Munich-like proposal in the 
Far East, but it did not change the nature of Far Eastern appeasement. If British 
Manchurian policy had not opted for appeasement in its buying off the aggressor at 
the sacrifice of principle, there would have been no appeasement existing in the 1930s 
except Munich. For example, although the Hoare-Laval plan proposed selling
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Abyssinia to Mussolini, it was after all not carried out. Great Britain did not pay 
Hitler anything during the Rhineland crisis since the zone belonged to Germany. 
Despite acquiescence in the face of the Anschluss, the Western Powers did not buy 
off Hitler by offering Austria physically. After Munich, Hitler seized the rest of 
Czechoslovakia in March 1939 without consulting the British Government. 
Following this logic, appeasement would only mean an incident -  Munich -  rather 
than a policy which lasted for almost ten years. Certainly, few would agree this. 
However, the difference between British Manchurian policy and Munich agreement 
was, if there was any, that the former was a starting point of appeasement and the 
latter was its climax.
There were various reasons that led Great Britain to the road of 
appeasement during the Manchurian crisis. Apart from the subjective and 
objective roots of this policy which have been discussed in the Introduction, the 
following points were important: firstly, despite discrediting the League,
Japanese invasion of Manchuria had not yet jeopardised British interests in the 
Far East. In order to save British strategic and economic interests in the Far 
East without any risk of starting a war, the policy-makers thought that the best 
and perhaps the only way was to reach a settlement with the Japanese by 
sacrificing the Covenant. Wellesley summarised, “the success of our Far 
Eastern policy and the prosperity of our economic interests are largely 
dependent on Japanese good will.”
Secondly, concerning the German menace in the future, the British leaders 
decided to accommodate with Japan in Far East so as to concentrate on Europe 
because they did not want to spend enough money on rearmament. The result 
was, as Chamberlain said in 1932, “we are no more in a position financially and 
economically to engage in a major war in the Far East than we are militarily.” *^"
The Cabinet accepted that Britain was not able to afford to run even the 
slightest risk of war since it was impossible to count on her sea-power to 
defend her own interest in the Far East according to the report by the Chiefs of 
Staff .However,  leaving Japan unchecked in the Far East made it impossible 
for Great Britain to concentrate on Europe later. Whenever they considered 
the possibility of taking a firm stand against aggressors in Europe, the appeasers
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worried that Japan would strike in the Far East if Britain was involved in war in 
the Mediterranean and in Europe. This was one of the most fiindamental 
factors to lead to European appeasement.^'"
To summarise the replay to the arguments, the British Far Eastern policy was one 
hundred per cent appeasement, which, to a great extent, caused European 
appeasement. The Japanese example in Manchuria not only encouraged Germany and 
Italy to put into practice their ambitious plans, but also made a Tokyo-Berlin axis 
possible. '^'  ^ Although the Manchurian crisis itself did not “cause” Mussolini and 
Hitler’s invasion, European appeasement led by Far Eastern appeasement offered 
favourable conditions which, to large extent, caused European aggressors’ success as 
appeasement had contributed to the Japanese success in the Far East.
In policy-making. Sir John Simon was a key person because he was in a position 
to sum up the proposals of his subordinates and report the conclusion to his 
colleagues as the basis for shaping policy, which was generally taken by the Cabinet. 
Hesitation in his personality increased the powerlessness that was characteristic of the 
British foreign policy of this period. MacDonald’s decline both in his political career 
and in health was coincidentally in accordance with the decline of Great Britain. The 
impact of the appeasers’ personality on policy making was negative and passive.
Public opinion in the early 1930s seemed overall pro-League, and Simon was 
generally criticised for having “let down the League”.^ ''* However, the public had no 
way of influencing policy making. The appeasers turned a deaf ear to the voice that 
advocated taking a firm line against aggression, and they evaded or suppressed the 
questions, which would embarrass them in the House. Within the Government, they 
also turned down Cecil’s different views. With a great intelligence to deceive the 
public, they insisted on this powerless policy. As a result, they lost the first chance to 
stop aggression.
In 1931, the anti-fascist powers were in a favourable position to stop the Japanese 
aggression. Danger from Germany was still remote and Mussolini probably had not 
even thought about his adventure in Abyssinia. '^" Had Japan been checked in time, it 
would have discouraged the other aggressors; and enabled Britain to gain relief from 
being confronted with a double and even triple danger both in the Far East and 
Europe later. In fact, according to Lampson's estimate (which even the Japanese
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Minister admitted), Japan had lost 38% of her trade due to the Chinese boycott and it 
might well have brought industrial trouble upon her more quickly than she 
anticipated. '^'" If Britain had taken a vigorous line, it would have been effective even 
without the imposition of a direct blockade or other military measures. '^'" By 
comparison with the consequences of the Second World War to British interests in 
the Far East, this risk — if there was any — was worth taking. In fact, even without 
running any risk of war, Japan might have been checked or at least not have won so 
easily as long as Britain had taken a firm stand against aggression and put moral and 
diplomatic pressure on Japan. For instance, although it was far from satisfactoiy, 
Britain adopted a much more severe line and cooperated a little more closely with 
America and other Western Powers regarding the Shanghai incident than she had 
done in the Manchurian crisis. This joint pressure of the Western Powers was one of 
the reasons that Japanese forces withdrew from Shanghai.
The British policy-makers usually emphasised that Britain could not check Japan 
unless America used force. Since it was not certain that the Americans would use 
force, they would not check Japan in any way. Both Britain and the United States 
were half-hearted towards their collaboration. The British Government were afraid 
that America would leave them with “the brunt of the work and of the blame”, while 
the latter feared that “we might go along with the British for a certain distance and 
they would then leave us holding the bag.” '^'^  Neither Britain nor America was 
prepared to take lead. However, it was Britain, not America who should be blamed 
more for weakening the Anglo-American cooperation by her hesitation in joining the 
United States action under the Nine Power Treaty and her too conciliatory and 
unprincipled attitude towards Japan. Although she did not completely fulfil her treaty 
obligations, America at least tried to put moral and diplomatic pressure on Japan. In 
comparison, Britain did her utmost to escape from the responsibility bound by the 
Covenant and to ingratiate herself with the aggressor.
British Far Eastern policy during the Manchurian crisis was a failure not only 
because it was not able to check Japan, but also because it aggravated the situation in 
the Far East: 1) Japan was appeased but not completely satisfied by appeasement 
which nourished her ambition to such an extent that nothing could satisfy her until she 
had got whatever she wanted. She formed a source of war in the world, which made
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war in the Far East inevitable and world war possible. 2) The British interest in the 
Far East and the League was not saved either. Failure to settle the Manchurian crisis 
in accordance with the principles of the Covenant foreshadowed both the collapse of 
the League and the hopeless future of the Disarmament Conference, British 
withdrawal from the Far East became almost certain. 3) The failure of Anglo- 
American cooperation discouraged America so that she showed a more isolated 
attitude towards the later crises. '^'*
All this increased difficulties in organising the struggle against the aggression in 
the friture, and discouraged the appeasers from formulating any vigorous line. From 
then on, British foreign policy making was based on appeasement, which was not only 
used to deal with the Japanese, but also with Mussolini and Hitler.
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Chapter 2 THE FATE OF ABYSSINIA
I. THE ITALO-ABYSSINIAN DISPUTE
No sooner had the smoke of gunpowder in Manchuria died away than the curtain 
on the Italo-Abyssinian dispute was raised by the shots at Walwal.
Walwal belonged to Abyssinia but had been poached by Italian forces in the late 
1920s. From 1931, Haile Selassie, the Abyssinian Emperor, intended to re-control 
the zone because of the importance of the wells, which were a source of life there. In 
November 1934, when an Abyssinian escort went to guard the wells, military 
confrontations occurred between the Abyssinian and Italian forces. After December 
5th, these escalated into general fighting. On January 3, 1935 the Abyssinians 
invoked Art. 11 of the Covenant, and the League Council, with the participation of 
the British and French delegates, arranged direct negotiation between both 
disputants. Although the agreement about the establishment of a neutral zone had 
been reached late in February, deadlock persisted due to the uncompromising 
attitude of both sides. For example, the Abyssinians declared that since Walwal was 
within their territory, they had the right to defend it even by using force. They 
insisted that the dispute should be arbitrated by the League, but the Italians 
considered that the Walwal incident was evidence of Abyssinian aggression, and they 
refused to lay the case down for arbitration. In the meantime, they increase their 
military force in their East African colonies.^
On September 3 the Conciliation Committee decided unanimously that neither 
Italy nor Abyssinia could be held responsible for the Walwal incident.^ The 
Committee of Five worked out a plan on the 18th whereby the independence and 
territorial integrity of Abyssinia would be respected and the administrative 
reorganisation should be put into force; “a special Italian interest” in the economic 
development of Abyssinia should be recognised. In addition, the British and French 
Governments had intimated that they were prepared to facilitate, by common 
sacrifices, “territorial adjustments” between Italy and Abyssinia.  ^ This plan was 
accepted by Abyssinia but rejected by Italy.
On October 3, Italy, after long-term preparations, went to war against Abyssinia. 
A few days later the Council Committee drew the conclusion that the Italian military
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operation constituted an act of aggression, and that economic sanctions should be 
imposed on Italy. Ignoring the League resolution, the Italians accelerated their 
military expansion. After they had occupied Abyssinia's capital Addis Ababa on May 
5, 1936, they declared the annexation of the country.
n . THE IMPORTANT POLICY-MAKERS IN BALDWIN’S 
GOVERNMENT
During the early stages of the Abyssinian crisis, MacDonald was still Prime 
Minister, but his “mental and physical powers were clearly on the wane”, and he 
himself was contemplating an exchange of posts with Baldwin."^  In June 1935, 
Baldwin succeeded him as Prime Minister following Sir Samuel Hoare's succession 
to Simon as Foreign Secretary.
Baldwin was easy-going and humble with a nature of “shrewdness, kindness and 
decisiveness”. “He was slow to move and act,” being criticised for his appetite of 
leisure, and lack of clear instructions on foreign policy which he was not interested 
in. Like his predecessor, he had a fear of war and declining health. However, Hoare 
commented, “Baldwin, in fact, was exactly the man for keeping together a Three- 
Party Government.”^
As soon as he took over, Baldwin realised that, since his “first duty” was “to 
groom the Party for an election, any Minister who had erred would have to be asked 
to go.”  ^ Due to the Peace Ballot of 1935, which showed that the majority of people 
held an affirmative attitude towards standing by the Covenant and countering 
aggressions by military and non-military means, ^  he gathered many votes from the 
electorate in his campaign by declaring the Government’s manifesto was that “the 
League of Nations will remain as heretofore the keystone of British foreign policy.”  ^
However, he did not really want to fight for the Covenant. During the Abyssinian 
crisis, his repeated and emphasised underlying assumption of foreign policy making 
was to keep Britain out of war. Since he thought sanctions might lead to war, he told 
the House, “the moment you are up against sanctions you are up against war.”^
In the Cabinet, Mr Neville Chamberlain, Chancellor of the Exchequer, had a 
stronger and stronger influence on foreign policy after 1933. Regarding the 
Abyssinian problem, he wrote in his diary of July 5, 1935,
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If we and France together determined that we would take any measures 
necessary to stop him [Mussolini], we could do so, and quite easily.
We could e.g. stop the passage of his supplies through the Suez Canal.
... If the French would not play,... we should not attempt to take on our 
shoulders the whole burden of keeping the peace.
He was one of the advocates, who “nailed the British flag to collective security”, but 
he was also the first minister openly appealing for this policy to be abandoned. He 
supported the appointment by the Prime Minister of Hoare as Foreign Secretary and 
Eden as Minister for League of Nations Affairs with a seat in the Cabinet, because he 
believed that this partnership would make “a powerful structure”.
As the Foreign Secretary, Hoare was “a shrewd and tough politician” with “a 
somewhat prim personality”, which “was combined with an intense and often all-too 
obvious ambition.” He admired Baldwin’s leadership generally and enjoyed the 
closest relationship with Chamberlain, with whom he shared more common tastes 
and mutual understanding. However, he and his partner, Eden, “were by no means 
ideally suited in temperament and experience for a close ministerial relationship.” 
Although Hoare desired some help from the young minister, Eden thought, as he 
reflected years later, that the appointment of two heads in the F.O. was a mistake. 
Due to Baldwin’s lack interest in foreign policy, Hoare took full responsibility in the 
conduct of policy making. His resignation due to the Hoare-Laval Plan showed 
that he was a person who would sacrifice himself rather than betray his colleagues. 
Perhaps because of this and his determination for appeasement as well as his genuine 
relations with Chamberlain, he continued to make an impact on foreign policy as one 
of Big Four, when he was appointed as Home Secretary in Chamberlain’s Cabinet in 
late 1930s. As for the Abyssinian crisis, Hoare thought the course that Britain 
should pursue should be the double policy of “negotiation with Italy and respect for 
our collective obligations under the Covenant, based on Anglo-French co­
operation.”^^  He disliked the Abyssinians,^  ^but sympathised with Italian expansion, 
and rejected coercive measures such as oil sanctions on the grounds that it might 
drive Mussolini to desperate acts or at least make him “more, rather than less, 
intransigent.” '^^  He believed that Britain could make Italy face up to reality by 
putting pressure on Anglo-Italian friendship, and through fomenting suspicion 
between Italy and Germany.
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Eden’s general policy was little different from the new Foreign Minister’s/^ 
However, weighing the League with the peace of Europe on the one hand and 
Anglo-Italian friendship on the other, he favoured the former/^ In theory, he laid 
stress on British international obligations and firm measures such as the imposition 
of an oil embargo on Italy, by which, he believed, Mussolini would be brought to 
heel/^ In practice, although he advocated a policy of pro-League in Geneva to a 
certain extent, he went along with appeasement making. He was one of the creators 
of the Zeila Offer, and after he replaced Hoare as Foreign Secretary, he hesitated to 
impose the oil embargo on Italy too.
As to Van., his role in policy making was more important than that which he had 
played in the Manchurian crisis since he was one of the principal creators of the Zeila 
Offer as well as the Hoare-Laval Plan.^  ^ The key point that he always bore in mind 
was, as he said.
My real trouble was that we should all choose between Austria and 
Abyssinia,...
I was already resigned to choosing Austria ... because it was the first of 
Hitler's expansion ... °^
He was in favour of making “some extensive concession” to Italy in Abyssinia as 
a solution of the dispute,^  ^and he could usually get Hoare “under the influence of his 
singleness of purpose.”^^  However, his relationship with Eden was not cordial.
Apart from them, there were other members of the F. O. who also played a part 
in policy-shaping such as R. I. Campbell, Head of the Egyptian Department; Maurice 
Peterson, Head of the Abyssinian Department, which was newly formed in August, 
1935, dealing with the Abyssinian problem; G. Thompson, Expert on Abyssinian 
affairs; Drummond, the British Ambassador in Rome; and Barton, the British 
Ambassador in Addis Ababa.
m . SIMON’S MEASURES: DECEMBER 1934 - JUNE 1935
Being called “the acid test” of the League, the Abyssinian case had a more 
significant impact on British opinion than did the Manchurian crisis on the grounds 
that it was related to the Anti-German front in Europe. In any case Italy was, after 
all, a European power, and Britain had long-standing interests in both the Middle
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East and East Africa. The tendency of the Press, represented by The Times, the 
Manchester Guardian and thQ Morning Post, was to appeal to both disputants to 
moderate their positions because war, though it was quite unlikely at that time, 
would do no good to either side.^ '^  In the House, the Labour leader Attlee believed 
that “there is ... a great opportunity in this incident for re-establishing the authority 
of the League and the rule of law in Europe.” The Opposition demanded that in the 
face of Mussolini’s unreasonable ambitions, the Government should “up-hold the 
Covenant against an aggressor State, ... it is a matter that affects our honour and our 
vital interest.”^^
Like the Manchurian crisis, the Italo-Abyssinian dispute drove the British 
Government into a dilemma; the obligation to the Covenant of the League on one 
side and the friendship with Italy on the other. Simon, who was still in the seat of 
the F. O. at the time, denied in the House on February 19, 1935 that the Government 
had put pressure on Abyssinia “in the direction of conceding to the Italian 
d e m a nd s . O n  the other hand, he was actively pursuing an all-purpose course, 
which would “satisfy the due discharge of the duty of the United Kingdom as a 
member of the Council without impairing in the least degree the friendly co­
operation between the United Kingdom and Italy in all matters.
At the beginning of the Walwal incident, the British Government played the role 
of mediator, but the Italian attitude remained so “inelastic” that Simon soon agreed 
that “the disputes will go to the League.
To cope with the problem, various proposals were contemplated. Thompson, in
spite of sympathy for the Abyssinians, advised on December 12:
...on the general political grounds it is essential for us to avoid a 
squabble with the Italians over the boundaries of Ethiopia,... we have 
two objectives, namely (1) to safeguard the watering and grazing right 
of our tribes in what is admittedly an Italian zone of influence, and (2) 
to bring about a détente between Italy and Ethiopia without allowing 
our existing relations with either countiy to be affected....
Van. emphasised in late December:
Apart altogether from the desirability of easing the situation as soon as 
possible on colonial grounds, it is very essential that it should not be 
allowed at the present critical juncture to react in any way upon the 
relations between Italy and the League and thereby to affect the 
European question. ... The question must be seen as a whole.
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He told Drummond who shared his idea,
the last thing we, the Foreign Office generally, and I in particular, 
desire is to have any bickering with Italy over Ethiopia or colonial 
matters.
With a little goodwill there would be plenty of ways out and a détente 
could, I am sure, be secured by mutual expressions of regret and a 
demarcation which might give substantial satisfaction to the Italians in 
the long mn.^^
He suggested to Simon that “an amicable settlement out of court at Geneva” was not 
only “the best solution available” but one that “should be easily possible”, which, 
without the Council intervening, would have the great advantage of “face-saving 
potentialities for both sides”. B u t  Eden reported from Geneva on the 16th that 
Mussolini's attitude had made a fiirther attempt for direct settlement out of court 
“unavailing”.^ '* The F. O. realised their mediation was “at an end”.^ ^
In late February, it was almost certain that Mussolini would continue the 
adventure in Abyssinia. In his memorandum dated the 25th, Van. expounded the 
course that Britain should take:
(1) We should endeavour to dissuade Italy from going the frill length, 
firstly because it can hardly suit her, when she ought to have her hands 
free for graver matters in Europe; secondly because of the frirther, and 
perhaps deadly, blow that this must deal the League;...thirdly on 
account of the consequent reaction on a large section of public opinion
(2) But all this must be done in the quietest, most friendly way. We 
must not be manoeuvred into playing an isolated and futile role of 
opposition. Both those epithets are now certain, seeing the attitude of 
France. ... we cannot afford to quarrel with Italy and drive her back 
into German embraces.
He asked Simon to explain these points particularly the second one to the 
Ministers.^^
Eden also set down his opinion in a memorandum to the Foreign Secretary, in
which he raised “in an acute form the responsibility of H.M. Government as a
member of the League, and more particularly of the Council, in respect of recent
developments in the Italian-Ethiopian dispute.” He wrote:
Italy aims at no less than the absorption of Ethiopia morsel by morsel.
... unless some hint, and a pretty strong hint, is given to the Italians that 
we should not view with indifference the dismemberment of Ethiopia,
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then this dismemberment will take place. ... a clear indication from 
ourselves and from France ... might effectively discourage Italy from 
the more ambitious of her plans.^^
The Egyptian Department under Campbell’s instruction suggested taking the
standpoint that was in accordance with Eden’s.^ **
On the 26th, Van., Eden and Campbell jointly drafted telegrams to Rome and
Paris — an urgent attempt to persuade Italy to use moderation and honour her
understanding to the Council — which were based on Eden's paper but represented
the common views.^  ^ Simon fully approved of their proposals, and reported this to
the Cabinet the next day.'***
In April, Britain, France and Italy held the Stresa Conference aiming to
consolidate their Anti-German front so that the Abyssinian problem was deliberately
“excluded from the formal agenda”.'** The British and French statesmen completely
agreed with Mussolini's expression that the maintaining of peace meant “the peace of
Europe”.'*^ Informal conversations about the Italo-Abyssinian dispute, however,
showed that the gap between Britain and Italy was far ft om bridged.'*  ^ When
Thompson told the Italian official Guarnaschelli that he hoped that the rumour of an
Italian attack on Abyssinia was without foundation and warned that British public
opinion would not tolerate any Italian aggression, his Italian colleague replied that
“the possibility of an offensive could not be entirely dismissed”, and he went on to
say ironically that British public opinion
had not taken very kindly to Japan's policy in Manchuria, but that this would 
doubtless not prevent the eventual recognition by His Majesty's Government 
of the existence of the new State of Manchukuo.'*'*
It was very clear that Italy was contemplating large-scale military operations in
Abyssinia as soon as the rainy season ceased and that the Italians would not accept
the resolution from the Council as Japan had done in Manchuria. Facing this grave
situation, Simon completed a memo, with Thompson’s assistance, for the Cabinet on
May 11, weighing the dilemma:
If they support against Italy a practical application of League principles, 
their action is bound greatly to compromise Anglo-Italian relations and 
perhaps even to break the close association at present existing between 
France, Italy and the United Kingdom. ... the European situation would 
be most seriously affected, and it would... be more welcome to 
Germany. On the other hand, if the United Kingdom acquiesce in what
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would be a misuse of the League machinery by acting in a manner 
acceptable to Italy, ... His Majesty's Government will undoubtedly lay 
themselves open to grave public criticism. ... the League itself seems 
bound to lose,... [having] before it the example of Japan...
Considering his memo on May 15, the Ministers concluded:
His Majesty's Government could not acquiesce in a procedure which must 
result, not only in nothing being done before September to prevent hostilities, 
but which gave no opportunity for anything to be done.
They thought that Mr. Eden should be allowed to use his discretion “as to the best 
course to be taken in his endeavours to secure this aim” and should discuss the 
question with the representatives of other countries “especially from the point of 
view of the risks to the League” at Geneva.'*^
IV. HOARE’S DOUBLE POLICY: JUNE - DECEMBER 1935 
1, Public Opinion and Appeasers
During the period that Baldwin took his seat in the Cabinet, public opinion had
been generally hardening against Mussolini. The newspapers such as the Daily Mail
and the Manchester Guardian showed more and more sympathy with Abyssinia and
support for an economic embargo against Italy. Churchill told Grandi, Italian
Ambassador in London in September:
since Parliament rose, there had been a strong development of public 
opinion. England, and indeed the British Empire, could act unitedly on 
the basis of the League of Nations, and all parties thought that that 
instruction was the most powerful protection against future dangers 
wherever they might arise.'*'
A most significant development in public opinion was that the League of Nations 
Union organised the Peace Ballot with the purpose of investigating public opinion 
about the issue of peace or war. The Ballot started from November 12, 1934 
onwards, and its results, announced by Lord Cecil, the President of the Union, on 
June 27 of the following year revealed that the British public was strongly pro- 
League and intended to take firm action including economic sanctions and military 
means to defeat aggression.'*  ^ No matter what comments might come from different 
quarters, the Ballot was, after all, the voice of eleven million people. Therefore, the 
Government could not afford to blind themselves to this, particularly in the period of
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campaign. Baldwin please his electorate by declaring that Great Britain would firmly
support the League in the struggle against aggression:
Judgement may lead to action, cautionary action, restraining action, at the 
extreme to coercive action. We mean nothing by the League if we are not 
prepared, after trial, to take action to enforce its judgement.'*^
But privately he “had always thought the ballot misleading, the questions tendentious 
and over-simplified, and the picture of collective security divorced fi*om reality.” *^*
He and Hoare, new Foreign Secretary, repeated in the House that Britain would 
stand by the League and prepared to fulfil her obligation bound by the Covenant.
But at the same time, they declared, “We are not unsympathetic to the Italian need 
for expansion, and our actions since the War show that our sympathy is more than a 
sympathy of idle words.” *^ Hoare simply turned down the suggestion, put forward 
by Lord Cecil, that Britain should vote for a general withdrawal of ambassadors 
from Italy if Abyssinia was attacked. In his telegraphy of August 24, 1935 to 
Clerk, the British Ambassador in Paris, he confessed that “most people are still 
convinced that if we stick to the Covenant and apply collective sanctions, Italy must 
give in and there will be no war.” However, he thought that “the world will have to 
face the fact that sanctions are impractical.” But he instructed the Ambassador that 
“we must, however, on no account assume the impracticability of sanctions ... and 
the British Government must on no account lay itself open to the charge that we 
have not done our utmost to make them practical.”^^
The method that policy-makers used to cope with the public was that they 
pretended to uphold the slogan of the League in order to obtain the support from the 
electorate during the campaign on the one hand, and fixed the dice in secret to buy 
the aggressor off on the other. For example, the Zeila Offer, which ceded part of 
British Somaliland to Abyssinia in order to entitle the latter to make territorial 
concessions to Italy, had not been given to the House for consultation before it was 
produced. '^* While the Peterson-Quentin proposal was being hatched in the Autumn 
of 1935, Clerk told Laval^  ^ that however the elections in Britain might go, “the 
public opinion at home was such that no British Government could contemplate a 
solution” like that.^ ® In these circumstances, the F. O. decided that “as soon as the 
elections in this country were over a new approach should be made to the French 
Government.”^^  The Government believed that public opinion could be “moulded”.
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Shortly before the Hoare-Lavel conversation, the F.O. advised that “it would take 
three weeks to prepare the public mind for a negotiated settlement instead of 
sanctions.
2. The Zeila Offer
When Sir Samuel Hoai'e replaced Simon as Foreign Secretary, he found that the 
measures of his predecessor had not been successfiil in making the Italians face 
reality.Being confronted with the grave likelihood that Italy would attack 
Abyssinia soon, the British Government had to clarify two important points in order 
to form their policy: 1) Mussolini's price for peace*’* 2) the French attitude towards 
the dispute, which had not been clear since the Franco-Italian agreement signed on 
January 7.***
Regarding Mussolini's price, Drummond told the P.O. of his hypothesis in his 
despatch of June 1 that Mussolini might consider several alternatives: a) some form 
of mandate; b) some scheme under which Italy should play the part in Abyssinia that 
Great Britain played in Egypt; c) some kind of protectorate; and d) outright 
annexation. He presumed that Britain would have to envisage a) and b) if she would 
not (he was pretty sure that she would not) take coercive measures. He suggested 
that if the British Government could show the Italians that “within certain limits”, 
they were prepared to help the latter “both at Geneva and Addis Ababa”, the 
likelihood of any forthcoming recourse to armed conflict would be greatly reduced 
although he knew that his proposal was nothing but choosing the lesser of two 
evils.^ ^
The intensive minutes showed that the F.O. had given his proposal serious
consideration*’^  but finally rejected it on the grounds, as Van. said, that none of the
four alternatives would work. '^* However, they inspired him with the idea that
if therefore we cannot satisfy Italy at Abyssinia's expense, we are, as before, 
confronted with the choice of satisfying her at our own, (plus some eventual 
Abyssinian frontier rectification) or letting things drift on their present 
disastrous course.^^
At this time the new Secretary often held long conversations with Van. alone, 
and sometimes with Eden in attendance, as to what measures they would take.®^  
Their discussion focused on the following problems, which in fact stemmed, to a
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great extent, from the Government’s Far Eastern appeasement and rearmament 
policy;
First, Hitler's strength was becoming daily more formidable, and his 
intentions more unabashed. Secondly, Japanese aggression threatened 
us with war in the Far East when we were not strong enough to resist 
Hitler in Europe and at the same time fight in the Pacific. Thirdly, it 
was essential to British security to have a friendly Italy in the 
Mediterranean that would both guarantee our lines of communication 
to the Far East and make it unnecessary for the French to keep an army 
on the Italian frontier. Fourthly, and as a favourable pointer towards 
the maintenance of Anglo-Italian co-operation, Mussolini was at the 
time on very bad terms with Hitler.
Van. analysed that Britain had been “over-landed” by comparison with Japan,
Italy and Germany since Versailles, and British Somaliland was a real debit.
Although he opposed trading Abyssinia, he opted for paying the price with British
Somaliland rather than seeing “a disastrous explosion” that would wreck the League
and very possibly His Majesty's Government too, given that an election was
imminent at home. He said,
I should like to see the question of Somaliland considered at least, 
while we can still get something for less than nothing.**^
His proposition above was supposed to be the origin of "the Zeila Offer".
On June 16 when Hoare, Eden and Van. spent the weekend together at Trent, all 
three “agreed on the offer” after discussion of Van.'s proposal.^ ** Immediately, Van. 
drafted a note accounting for the Zeila Offer and its basic ground rules. Its essential 
contents included that the British Government should cede to Abyssinia the port of 
Zeila and a corridor, and in return be entitled to insist that Abyssinia should cede 
territory to Italy in the Ogaden country.^* At the same time, they consulted 
Drummond about the proposal, and the latter’s answer being favourable on the 
grounds that even though he could not foresee whether Mussolini would or would 
not accept it, it was “worth trying”.
On the 19th, based on Van.'s note, Hoare reported to his colleagues the Zeila 
Offer in de ta ils .A t the beginning, the plan being supported only by M.
MacDonald, the Secretary of the Colonies, the Cabinet were “reluctant to take a 
decision” due to the suddenness of the move. However, they came to realise that 
“the only chance of persuading M. Mussolini to desist from military operations was
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to take action at once” and in the end they approved of both the plan and Eden's 
mission to Rome to explain it/'*
Five days later, Eden had an interview with Mussolini in which he outlined the 
Zeila Offer. The Duce refiised the proposal on the grounds that it would strengthen 
and encourage the Abyssinians. Furthermore, he made Eden understand that he 
wanted all four sides of Abyssinia leaving the central region intact but under Italian 
control; otherwise, he would take the whole country by force.Mussolini's 
insistence on his demand resulted in the failure of the Zeila Offer. Eden regarded 
this as “an end” of the Anglo-Italian conversation for peace term s,but Van. and 
Hoare were unwilling to give up.^  ^ “Fed by Vansittart with fears of Germany, and 
warned by the Admiralty of the dangers of an unfriendly Mediterranean in the face of 
a threat from Japan, Hoare (as he told the American Ambassador on 9 July) was 
determined to make every possible effort to bring about a negotiated settlement.” *^*
3. French Uncertainty
Since the Franco-Italian Agreement included a secret agreement relating to 
Abyssinia, the British Government had felt uncertain as to whether Britain could rely 
on French support if conflict occurred between Italy and Britain over the Abyssinian 
problem.
On January 12, Laval told Simon that the Agreement was aimed at guarding 
against Germany, particularly her Austria policy. It would not prejudice British 
rights in East Africa under the Treaty of 1906.^  ^ As to the secret agreement on 
Abyssinia, it implied that France would “not seek to develop any new concession or 
economic interest in Ethiopia” and both the French and Italian Governments agreed 
“to give effect to the policy of friendly co-operation” which they were following 
“with regard to territories adjacent to their African possessions”.®** Athough Laval 
explained that he had mentioned “a free hand” to the Italians applying only to the 
economic sphere,®* he had used this expression without any qualification.®  ^ In fact 
the Quai d’Orsay had been ready not only to give Italy a free hand in the major part 
of Abyssinia, but to concede part of the French colonies in East Africa before the 
Franco-Italian agreement.®  ^ Therefore, Laval left Mussolini the impression, if not in 
black and white, that Italy could have a completely free hand in Abyssinia since 
France had disinterested herself there.®'*
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In June, Laval made another agreement with Italy ™ a secret Franco-Italian
military understanding signed by General Gamelin and General Badoglio — by which
these two countries would become a military alliance in the possible war against
Germany. He said,
This Treaty was of paramount importance; as long as Italy was France's ally 
we had a bridge leading to all those countries of Western and Eastern Europe 
which were then our allies. We could therefore not only benefit by whatever 
militaiy strength Italy represented, but also by the added strength of 
Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Rumania.®^
Bound by a series of agreements with Italy, he was in a “somewhat delicate” 
position regarding Italian policy in Abyssinia,®*^  so that he did not know how to 
choose “either horn of the dilemma” — the collapse of the League or the end of 
Franco-Italian co-operation against Germany.®^
On the 27th, in his conversation with Eden who had stopped briefly in Paris after 
his Rome mission, Laval complained that Britain had nearly played a trick on France 
by keeping the Zeila Offer secret from him. He told Eden that “French policy was to 
refrain from doing anything which would disturb or make less intimate existing 
Franco-Italian relations.” He would not go further than “promote a settlement by 
arbitration and conciliation.” “The best solution,” according to him, might be “the 
maintenance of Abyssinian integrity under Italian suzerainty”.®®
4. Three Power Conference
In view of the fact that the gap between the Italian minimum demand and the 
Abyssinian maximum concession was too wide to be bridged, Mr Barton suggested 
to Hoare on July 1 that the only means which could be used were to hold an Aiglo- 
French-Italian discussion under the agreement of 1906.®^  Meanwhile, the Italian 
Ambassador in London had made a similar suggestion.^ ** On the 10th, Hoare 
reported those suggestions to the other Ministers and they came to conclusion that, 
pending the reply of the French Government to the suggestion, it was impossible to 
decide on an immediate policy.^ *
On the French side, Laval agreed to the suggestion with some hesitation and he 
insisted that it should be made clear what the exact object of the meeting would be; 
the meeting would be held in “a realist spirit” and should search for “possibilities of 
compromise”. What is worse, Mussolini's attitude was so changeable that he at
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first was favourable to the meeting but later showed signs of opposition^  ^ on the 
grounds that the three power conference would get nowhere because he knew that it 
was impossible for Britain to support his desire to gain protectorate or at least 
tutelage over the whole of Abyssinia. '^* Not until late in July did he give any 
assurance to the condition for the three power conference that Italian representatives 
should go to Geneva and state their case there/^
On the 22nd and 24th, the Cabinet held meetings to discuss the problem. Hoare 
told his colleagues that if nothing came out of the three power meeting, he was 
averse to Britain being drawn into a blind alley. He felt that “the only card” in his 
hands was “the deterrent” — “publicity and conversations with the French in order to 
get them to put pressure on Italy before the Geneva discussions.”**^ His aim was to 
avoid “crude questions” between Britain and France being put by either side to the 
other as to “whether they were prepared to carry out their obligations under the 
Covenant.” “The underlying assumption would be that both Powers realised their 
obligations and were therefore jointly interested in finding a way out of the 
difficulty” — a settlement acceptable to Abyssinia and within the general framework 
of the League. Athough not optimistic at the time he analysed that the difficulty 
that Italy was confronted with might bring her to face reality.
His line was generally agreed by his colleagues and he was instructed to continue 
his efforts so as to induce the French Government to combine with the British 
Government in putting pressure on the Italian Government to modify their attitude.**^  
Two weeks before the three power conference, the French Delegate at Geneva 
suggested to Eden that the British Government “should make clear to the Italian 
Government the limits within which they were prepared to work” ®^ but the F.O. was 
not in favour of the suggestion. Campbell said, “If we did so earlier, M. Mussolini 
might make our statement an excuse for getting out of the discussion.” Mounsey, 
Assistant Under Secretary, feared that the French advice seemed to aim at thrusting 
Britain “into the forefront of discussion with Italy ... in order to enable the French 
Govet. to keep in the back-ground and play as anodyne a part as possible.” Hoare, 
Van. and Eden all came to the same view.^  ^ On August 6, Ministers held a meeting 
to decide the line that Eden would pursue in the three power meeting. After 
discussion, they concluded that in close co-operation with France Eden should lay
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before the Italian the alternatives; either acceptance from Abyssinia of certain 
concessions within the framework of the League or the carrying out by the League 
of the procedure laid down in the Covenant. But in reference to the latter aspect, 
“any detailed discussion of sanctions should be avoided”.*****
Amost at the same time. Van. received a letter from Chatfield, the First Sea
Lord, which revealed the unhappy consequence of the Government’s limited naval
programme of June 1934.**** The First Sea Lord wrote that according to the Report
of Chiefs of Staff,
The Naval situation is bad enough,... everything possible should be 
done to avoid precipitated hostilities with Italy until we are more ready.
... It would be a dangerous prospect for us to go to war with Italy with 
the British Fleet unmobilised and the Home Fleet on leave and 
scattered.***^
In the light of these events. Van. told Hoare of his pessimistic estimate of the
result before he accompanied Eden to the conference,
I am therefore leaving for Paris with little hope,... I consider that we 
should be very cautious as to how far and in what manner we force the 
pace in Paris, with an unreliable France and an unready England.
Hoare minuted on the document, “Many thanks for this letter. I entirely agree with 
you.”***'
The Three Power Conference was held on August 16 but broke down within two 
days on the grounds that there was no common basis between Britain, France and 
Italy.***"
5, Collective Security and Economic Sanctions
The Cabinet held an emergency meeting on the 22nd to consider the situation 
arising out of the failure of the Three Power Conference. In the course of 
discussion, many references were made with regard to the grave effects of present 
British military weakness on diplomacy. Being anxious to avoid a war with Italy, 
Ministers agreed that they “should keep in step with the policy of the French 
Government, particularly in the matter of sanctions.” Aso they should carefrilly 
refrain from “trying to force other nations to go further than they were willing, and 
should generally make it clear that the question of sanctions was one which the 
members of the League had to examine in co-operation, and with a view to 
collective action.”***^ This policy was later known as “collective security” described
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in Hoare’s speech of September 11 at Geneva/**** having been drafted with the help
of Chamberlain, Eden and Van./**^  and which Baldwin “endorsed fiiUy”/**®
If the burden is to be borne, it must be borne collectively. If risks for peace 
are to be run, they must be run by all. The security of the many cannot be 
ensured solely by the efforts of a few, however powerful they may be. On 
behalf of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom I can say that in 
spite of these difficulties they will be second to none in their intention to fulfil 
within the measure of their capacity, the obligations which the Covenant lays 
upon them.***^
Being broadly supported by many important statesmen such as A. Chamberlain, 
Lansbury, Lloyd George and Churchill/*** this policy, as Hoare explained, had a 
two-fold purpose: one was a warning to Germany as well as to Italy,*** the other 
was that by stressing collective action particularly Anglo-French co-operation, and 
collective responsibilities, Britain could avoid the risk of taking the lead in pressing 
the French to go further than they were really willing and then finding herself in an 
isolated position, facing the conflict with Italy. **^
In their conversation in Geneva, both Hoare and Laval came to the same 
conclusion that war with Italy was “too dangerous and double-edged for the future 
of Europe”. Both agreed that they would try to “avoid provoking Mussolini into 
open hostility”; any economic pressure on Italy should be collectively decided and 
applied cautiously in stages, with full account of non-members of the League.**'
On October 3, the Italo-Abyssinian war began. A few days later, the Council 
decided to impose economic sanctions including an arms embargo on Italy but 
excluding oil and other key commodities. After all Italy was able to get whatever 
she needed as long as she paid cash in gold.**" Nevertheless, Van. still insisted that 
Britain should “not proceed at all with sanctions” until she got from France all­
aspect assurances, particularly military support.**  ^ Hoare agreed**  ^ and told Eden 
that many Ministers had “a considerable feeling that he had taken the initiative too 
much at Geneva”, and he should “go as slow as possible” until the French attitude 
had been cleared up.**^  But it was too late because Eden had already declared in 
favour of imposition of economic sanctions on Italy in Geneva.**® Under these 
circumstances, Eden suggested pressing the French Government both in London and 
in Paris to offer the assurances.**  ^ Due to this constant pressure from the British 
Government, “Laval came reluctantly to heel.”*^** He replied, if Britain was attacked
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by Italy because of the former’s collaboration with the League, the French militaiy 
support of Britain was “assured fully and in advance.”*^*
In late November, the Council stated that an oil embargo would be considered 
soon.*^  ^ Van. believed, what he had gathered from Grandi, the Italian Ambassador 
in London and Clerk, the British Ambassador in Paris, that if an oil embargo was 
provoked, Mussolini would make war on Britain. He warned Hoare and Eden that 
the British Government should not proceed, or allow others to proceed at Geneva 
with an oil embargo until they were sure of the adequacy of their own measures of 
defence and supplies of munitions, and that they were sure, in practice, of support 
from France as well as from other Mediterranean countries. Hoare agreed with his 
opinion. Meanwhile, Van. called back the Oil Paper for the Cabinet and modified it 
to this end after discussion between the three. The Cabinet received the Oil Paper 
on November 29 but decided to postpone discussion on it until the meeting of 
December 2.* '^
6. The Hoare-Laval Plan
No sooner had the Zeila Offer failed than Van. said on June 24, 1935, “we must 
have a further shot at this;... the issues are infinitely too great to take a first no, 
however uncompromising, for a final one.” This comment met with an immediate 
agreement from Hoare.
At Geneva in September, Laval told Hoare and Eden that there was some room 
for further discussion since Mussolini had “a secret desire to avoid war”.*^  ^ He 
suggested that the Zeila Offer might be recast with “something new to it” — France 
“could cede a strip of territory alongside the British strip”. Hoare thought it would 
be valuable if the experts could meet to work out a new proposal which satisfied 
Italy without striking at Abyssinia’s sovereignty.*^ **
On the 24th, taking Mussolini's demand into account, the F. O. produced a new 
proposal of cession of territory to Italy. *^  ^ Before their discussing it with Eden, Van. 
pointed out to Hoare that in view of “a strong and aggressive Germany and a weak 
England”,
it is not to our interest either to force this burning question anywhere 
near a conflagration, if it can be by any means avoided. ... the Council 
must make a further and enlarged effort for peace,... and that the form 
of the enlargement, or extra inducement, must be the change of
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territorial satisfaction which we have propounded. That is, Bale instead 
of Ogaden, plus some additional satisfaction as to advisers.
He thought that Bale, unlike Ogaden, was a fertile zone that could be given to satisfy 
Mussolini.*^ ®
Based on the proposal and discussion above, he drafted a revised plan, which, 
after Hoare had initialled it, was sent to Eden in Geneva with the request that he 
should consult Laval. But Eden's reaction was totally negative on the grounds 
that it was hard to believe that “the offer of one additional province to Mussolini 
even associated with a promise of a number of other benefits would be likely to 
secure cessation of hostilities and negotiation of a peaceful settlement with 
Abyssinia.” With the dispute “at a most critical stage” and the whole world watching 
to see “how the League would acquit itself in its duty”, this proposal would “arouse 
suspicion” as to the integrity of the British policy. Nor did Eden agree to inform 
Laval because the latter, as he said, “would be only too glad of a hint from us ... He 
will jump at any chance to delay the functioning of the League machinery and if we 
give him any excuse to do so we may have reason to be sorry for it.”*'** He told 
Hoare that Laval had already put forward a plan that included giving Italy a mandate 
for large portions of Abyssinia.*'* In their communication with Eden, both Hoare 
and Van. thought the French plan “impossible” and insisted that their foregoing 
proposal was “possible” and had “a double purpose”; first, “to divert M. Laval from 
the unacceptable proposal”; second, and more importantly, to make “a final attempt 
at peace”. They instructed Eden that the British proposal might be “either for 
immediate or eventual use” in due course.*'^
Meanwhile, the British Government learnt through the French that Mussolini’s 
peace terms included the Italian mandate over Abyssinia territories to cede to 
Italy,*" In the F. O. there was a lot of discussion and suggestion on the Italian 
peace terms taking place. Van. thought that the Italian terms were “a distinct step in 
advance” and they should be given an answer in “an encouraging tone”. Peterson 
held a similar stand-point.*'" Thompson suggested: (1) Mussolini's terms should be 
discussed with the French on the basis of the British line as soon as possible and (2) 
unless and until the British Government had reached agreement with the French and 
Italians as to the terms of settlement, they should not themselves suggest that they
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should be given a mandate to discuss outside Geneva. Peterson added two further 
points: (3) the reply referred to in (1) should, when agreed with the French, be made 
to Mussolini, (4) the Italian peace terms*'  ^ were impossible to accept on the 
grounds that they were not even accompanied by any promise to suspend hostilities 
in Abyssinia. Van. agreed with the substance of these suggestions and urged Hoare 
and Eden to give them an immediate consideration.*'^ Being instructed by the 
Cabinet that he “should receive any Italian overtures for negotiations for a settlement 
outside the League of Nations very coolly” and “treat them with caution”,*'^  Hoare 
had a discussion on the subject with Van., Peterson and Oliphant, Peterson then 
being sent to Paris on October 23 “to explore the situation with the French 
Government”.*'®
Two days later, Peterson reported that he had successfrilly persuaded his French 
partner, St. Quentin, to accept his idea and drafted a proposal for the basis of a 
settlement which included,
(a) In the outlying zone (non-Amharic), territories under Italian 
mandate or any form of Italian administration.
(b) Appropriate involvement of Italy in the collective assistance 
system regarding the core zone (Amharic countiy).
(a) and (b) A specific regime must be provided for the outlying 
provinces with non-Amharic inhabitants in which population 
decreased as a consequence of war, slavery and famine etc. ... 139
But this draft of the Peterson-Quentin proposal was rejected by the F. O. on the
grounds that it would be impossible to accept it either at Geneva or Addis Ababa.
“The right and least complicated road to a solution” should be, in Hoare’s opinion,
“by a simple exchange of territory... rather than by any more complicated and
probably unacceptable devices such as a) and b).”*"** But Peterson held his ground
and explained that in drawing up terms of settlement,
there are two main points of departure — viz. the exchange of territory 
and Italian participation in the League plan of assistance. ... I still think, 
rightly... the best line of approach to a settlement was from the second 
point of departure rather than the first, from the point, that is, of Italian 
participation in the League scheme of assistance rather than from that 
of exchange of territory.*"*
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Laval also told the British Government of his fear that a simple exchange of territoiy
would not satisfy I t a l y T h i s  was scorned by Van.,
M. Laval does not like our suggestion, but can suggest nothing better.
He does not really know the subject. The Italians are now ready for the 
exchange of territory via Zeila, which they originally rejected. ...the 
Italians wd. now get more than Ogaden & Danakil...^ "^ ^
Since they were afraid that before the Election public opinion would not support 
the Government who proposed such a plan,^ "^ "^  the F. O. decided that they would 
discuss “a new approach” with the French Government as soon as the Election was 
over/'^  ^ The Government won the Election on November 14 and Peterson was sent 
back to Paris again a week later with “more precise instructions”. A  new 
“Peterson Proposal” was soon created. This time, it was accepted in principle by 
the F. O. including Eden,^ '^  ^ and with a little revision by Thompson under Vaii.'s 
instruction. It turned out as follows:
(a) a League plan of assistance for Ethiopia, subject to (b) and (c);
(b) exchange of Adowa, Adigrat, Danakil (not including Aussa) and 
most of the Ogaden against a port and corridor;
(c) the endorsement by H.M. Government of some such formula as 
the following:
'H.M. Government undertake to use their influence in order to 
secure for Italy the fullest possible facilities of economic development 
and settlement of such areas in Southern Abyssinia as may be suitable 
for these purposes and as may hereafter be determined. The realisation 
of this programme must be effected within the framework of the plan of 
assistance formulated by the Committee of Five, it being understood (a) 
that Ethiopian sovereignty over the regions affected will be maintained 
intact, (b) that the League of Nations shall be accepted by both Italy 
and Abyssinia as arbitrator in all cases of dispute.
Towards the end of November, Laval told Clerk that he hoped to have a meeting 
with Hoare as soon as possible and an appointment was made for December 7 when 
Hoare would have a stop in Paris for a few hours on his way to Switzerland for a 
holiday.
Meanwhile, some information from the Italian side attracted the attention of the 
British Government. On November 2, the Italian delegate Baron Aloisis said and 
repeated to Hoare in Geneva that if Britain and France considered an outlet at Assab 
inadequate, they “would go back to the Zeila proposal”: Hoare felt it a very 
important suggestion. Shortly before the Hoare-Laval conversation. Van.
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interviewed first the Italian General Garibaldi and then the Italian Ambassador in 
London, Grandi, from whom he gathered the latest Italian peace terms;
(1) The Bale-Ogaden, cession.
(2) The Adowa-Adigrat essions.
(3) A corridor only in the Banakil
and in Harrar province In exchange Ethiopian
designed to take the desired for access to
railway. the sea
(4) the economic monopoly 
between 37 and 40 as 
suggested.
In the Cabinet meeting of December 2nd — the last meeting before his departure 
for Paris — Hoare reported to his colleagues all of the above. He pointed out that a 
possible oil embargo at Geneva against Italy might raise the risk of Mussolini's “mad 
dog” act — a plan of Italian attack on the British interest in the Mediterranean, “but 
there was no reason to get in a panic about it.”^^  ^ As to the oil embargo, he said that 
“The various countries concerned had provided a more solid front than we had 
reason to expect” and the United States had shown a co-operative attitude. It was 
almost impossible to say that the oil embargo would not be collective and effective; 
in the other words, Britain had no excuse of escaping from taking a part. Since the 
Government fought the Election on the basis of supporting the League, any other 
course of action would be “disastrous and indefensible”. Therefore, he consulted his 
colleagues as to “whether sanctions ought to be brought in at once” when the 
League Committee met on December 12, or whether to give the peace discussions 
“a better chance” by postponing the date of sanction until later. He personally 
proposed that “on the whole the issue depended on the prospect of the peace talks in 
Paris” with an oil embargo kept hanging over Mussolini's head as a pressure to bring 
about concessions. He told them that Peterson had been in Paris engaged in 
discussions but that satisfactory progress had not been made. He himself would see 
Laval on his journey, and he would “try and press on peace talks” with Laval and at 
the same time find out what the French attitude was towards Anglo-French military 
co-operation against possible attack from Italy.
In the course of discussion, Baldwin invited the opinion of every Cabinet 
member. Lord Monsell, the Admiralty, and Lord Swinton, the Air Minister gave
96
ministers the military experts’ view. They emphasised that the grave situation in the
Far East did not enable the British forces to concentrate in the Mediterranean:
The defences of Singapore were still incomplete, and our position in the 
Far East depended on the British Navy. So long as the Fleet was tied 
up the Mediterranean the position would be difficult. ... if we suffered 
losses, whether in the Fleet or the Royal Air Force, we should lower 
the datum point from which the expansion of our forces (as dealt with 
in the Report of the Defence Requirements Committee) would start.
Therefore, military deficiency caused by the Government’s policy required
appeasement in the Mediterranean, as they said:
our defence forces and defences in the Mediterranean were not in a 
proper condition for war, and from this point of view it was urged that 
an effort should be made to obtain peace, holding the threat of the oil 
sanction over Italy,...
Some Ministers worried that from the point of view of British trade
sanctions were involving very serious loss,... Sanctions I, II and III had 
been agreed to because they would put pressure on Italy with the least 
possible cost to trade, the proposed Sanction IV (the oil embargo) was 
leading us further down the path. It was impossible to turn back but 
the proposed oil embargo made the position very serious.
They pointed out that if the oil embargo irritated Mussolini and provoked a “mad 
dog” act, he would fail and “disappear from Italian politics and there might be a 
Communist Government in Italy and a complete alteration in the whole European 
situation.” They were afraid that “the position would be worse in the future if, 
having attempted sanctions, sanction failed.” Only Eden and Duff Cooper, War 
Minister, seemed to express some different viewpoints. The former warned his 
colleagues that postponement of an oil embargo would result in breaking the 
common front at Geneva, and the latter thought that the importance of the shortage 
of anti-aircraft ammunition had been exaggerated and postponement of an oil 
embargo for a few weeks or a month “was not going to make much difference” in 
military preparedness. However, toward the end of the meeting. Ministers generally 
supported Hoare's proposal on the grounds that “the object of oil sanctions was to 
stop war. If the war could be stopped by making peace that would be better.” 
Baldwin said that “on broad lines there was general agreement, as proved by the 
discussion.” The Cabinet realised that there was only a short time for both the peace
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and military conversations with France but they hoped that the issues would have
been cleared up before the next League Committee meeting on December 12.
Therefore, Hoare should press on by “every usefiil means” in discussions with
France, with a view to peaceful settlement, and if the basis for settlement was found
before December 12, the date of the oil sanction should be postponed. Hoare was
also instructed to bring questions back to the Cabinet only in the circumstances that
either “the peace talks did not offer any reasonable prospect of a settlement” or
“France was not willing to co-operate effectively.”^^'*
It was apparent when they gave their Foreign Secretary discretion to search for a
basis for settlement along the broad lines, the Cabinet did not classify the terms
“eveiy useful means” or “basis for settlement”. Nor did Hoare ask how far he could
go with Laval because he did not think it necessary. He once complained to
Chamberlain, “As you may imagine I have received little or no help from other
quarters. Stanley would think about nothing but his holiday and the necessity of
keeping out of the whole business almost at any cost.” This time he did not obtain
much help from his colleagues either. Before his journey to Paris, he discussed the
matter with Baldwin. Busy with the problems facing the new Government, the
Prime Minister had little time to give him more “implications” for Paris
conversations, and only said, “Have a good leave, and get your health back,... push
Laval as far as you can, but on no account get this country into war.”*^^
However, Hoare foresaw the importance of Paris trip. After making “all
arrangements for the conduct of business” in his absence, he wrote to His Majesty
on December 2, asking for leave. It reads,
As my visit to M. Laval on Saturday may be very important, I am 
proposing to take Vansittart with me. If, as I hope, M. Laval and I 
agree upon a basis for a peace negotiation, Vansittart will stop on in 
Paris for a day or two in order to clinch the details. ... In the normal 
course the Secretary of State and the Permanent Under Secretary are 
never absent from London at the same time, the special importance, 
however, of this meeting makes, I suggest, it necessary for me to take 
him.*^^
This letter kept in the F.O. file was not intended to be a secret to his colleagues.
The Paris meeting was held on the afternoon of the 7th once Hoare had 
arrived. In the conversation, he was terribly misled by Laval as Peterson reported
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to the Cabinet on December 10 that Hoare had been pleased at Laval’s reception of
his proposal for joint Staff discussions though he was “unaware that those
discussions would made what appeared to have been an inauspicious start.” He “had
been satisfied with Laval’s promise that France would fulfil her engagements”.
However, he doubted whether Laval could carry French public opinion with him;
This uncertainty as to the French attitude had perhaps been a factor in 
the discussion of the French proposals for a settlement. It was possible 
that the French might have been induced to offer terms that were less 
favourable to Italy, but in that event the French could not have 
guaranteed that they had a reasonable prospect of success. The French 
had seemed rather confident regarding the present proposals, which 
gave the impression that they might have taken “soundings” in Italy.
Finally, both sides came to an agreement that they must press on with the 
negotiations. Were an embargo to be postponed, there would have to be a good 
hope of a successful outcome in the negotiations. Hoare insisted that the proposals 
must be kept within the framework of the report of the Committee of Five and that a 
mandate must be excluded.*^ ** Having discussed at length, they set up the basis of 
the proposals as follows,
(1) an outlet to the sea for Abyssinia,
(2) in exchange for the outlet the cession of some of the occupied 
territory in Tigre to Italy and a frontier rectification in the east and 
south-east,
(3) a large zone in the south and south-west in which Italy acting 
under the League will have the monopoly of economic 
developments.**’*
Afl;er the meeting, Hoare sent the report to the F.O., where it arrived on the 
following day.*^ ^
On the 8th, Sunday, the Hoare-Laval Plan, which was a synthesis of the Peterson 
proposal and the Italian peace terms, *^  ^ was “knocked into final shape”, and both 
Hoare and Van. were “well satisfied” with the work.*®'* Laval kept in daily telephone 
communication with Mussolini during the Paris peace talks*®® but insisted that the 
Abyssinian Emperor should not be given the proposals.*®® Before he left Paris,
Hoare told the Press that the British Government had not yet been informed of the 
Plan.*®"
That night Peterson brought it back to London with the note by Hoare, which 
urged the Cabinet to accept the Plan.*®* On the Monday morning, Eden was the first
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Cabinet member to read the documents, since Peterson went to him directly after
arriving. He was shocked at these proposals with their “signs of hasty drafting” and
without English translation, which in his opinion went far beyond the resolution of
the Committee of Five or the guide-lines previously established by the F. O..*®^
On the very same day, the Cabinet held a special meeting to consider the Plan.
While supporting it, Eden felt bound to warn his colleagues that “the new proposals
went in some respects a good deal further than the earlier proposals of the
Committee of Five.” Some features of the Plan were unlikely to be favoured by the
League. He suggested that the Abyssinian Emperor should be informed, and that the
meeting of the Committee of 18 on December 12 should take place as arranged both
the British and French delegates stating the Plan at the meeting. In the course of
discussion, there emerged a sharp criticism that Italy's aggression had gained her
more than she could have obtained othemise. It was recognised that it would cause
difficulty if any of the three sides — Italy, Abyssinia and the League — rejected the
Plan, particularly if Italy and the League accepted but Abyssinia refiised. However,
if Italy accepted it while the League and Abyssinia rejected, the first thing they had
to do in this event would be “to tiy and negotiate a more acceptable basis.”*"® In
spite of criticism of the Plan, no-one censured Hoare for exceeding his authority, and
no-one denied that this was a possible basis for settlement either.*"*
The Cabinet finally agreed to Eden’s proposal that
peace terms ought to be communicated to Abyssinia at the same time 
as to Italy, and that the Emperor should be strongly pressed to accept 
them as a basis for discussion, or at least not to reject them.*"^
On the following day. Ministers continued the discussion. They realised that
“the political difficulties which were likely to confront the Cabinet on this issue all
arose from the fact that Abyssinia was likely to reject the proposals”, which “might
involve the Government in a difficult situation.” It was certain that
France would not agree to any new sanctions or to be implicated if new 
sanctions resulted in military consequences. In that event, in 
accordance with the Cabinet decisions, this country also would not be 
willing to involve itself in any new sanctions liable to provoke extreme 
action by Italy.
Chamberlain suggested that
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If Italy accepts and Abyssinia refuses, His Majesty's Government would 
neither propose nor support the imposition of further sanctions...
This suggestion met with the general approval of the Cabinet.
In addition, the Prime Minister had received a question from Mr. Attlee, asking 
that the House be informed of “the nature of the proposals”. The Press also asked 
for guidance, and particularly wished to know “whether His Majesty’s Government 
had agreed to any proposals.” The policy-makers decided that the answer was that 
“no suggested basis has at present been submitted for the views of either Italy or 
Abyssinia and it would clearly be premature to make a statement on the subject at 
present.” At the same time, they endeavoured to avoid arranging debates before 
December 17.*"^
At the Cabinet meeting of December 11, disagreement and criticism of the Plan
became stronger, Eden clearly showed his disagreement by pointing out that
a good many members of the League would dislike the proposals.
Some would not be willing to interfere with the United Kingdom and 
France if they thought that peace would come of it.
He hoped that
he would not be expected to champion the proposals made to Italy and 
Abyssinia in detail at Geneva. He was not likely to be successful if he 
made the attempt...
On the other hand, an oil embargo was not favoured by many Ministers.
Baldwin emphasised that the embargo would not be effective without American co­
operation. He said, “Until we knew what America was going to do we should hold 
our hand.” They instructed Eden that he
must not say that we would in no circumstances agree to the imposition 
of an oil sanction at some future date, or that recent events had 
removed sanctions altogether from the field of action.
They learned that there was strong reaction of public opinion because “a good 
many people had pictured an end of the dispute in which the aggressor would have 
lost considerably both in material and prestige.” The result of the Plan “would come 
as a shock to public opinion.” As to this, Ministers agreed that “public opinion 
ought to be gradually prepared for a different result to what it had expected.” In
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spite of abandoning the Plan, they decided not to show any definite attitude — either 
positive or negative — towards it in the House.*"'*
Meanwhile, leaks from Paris stirred up public opinion.*"® In Geneva, the Hoare-
Laval Plan met with serious criticism from various quarters.*"® The Abyssinian
Emperor was “bewildered” by what Britain had done.*"" In Britain, almost all
newspapers, such as The Times, the Daily Telegraph, the Herald, the Manchester
Guardian, the Daily Mail and the Daily Express unusually took the same line this
time in criticising Government.*"* The Spectator, a weekly paper, commented
shaiply against the Plan for giving
Italy as a reward for her aggression, or as a bribe to buy her off, far 
more than she could have got from an award of just arbitrators before 
the war began. By even countenancing such a deal, let alone accepting 
responsibility for it, the Foreign Secretary has jettisoned in a day both 
his own personal reputation and his country’s.
The Press published a great many anti-Hoare-Laval letters received from various 
quarters. Geoffrey Dawson, the editor of The Times,^^  ^had “sketched out a leader 
trying to show the Government the strength of public feeling”.
The pressure groups also lost no time to act. The League of Nations Union 
reached a resolution on December 12, urging the Government “to support no 
settlement of the Abyssinian dispute which fails to make it clear that aggression does 
not pay”. Its Executive Committee sent a wire to Eden to ask the Prime Minister to 
receive a deputation from the Union. Miss Freda White, a staff of its Information 
Department, quoted the words of a Tory member, “The whole gang must go. 
Baldwin and Hoare and all of them. It’s a national disgrace!” In addition, the 
National Council of Labour pronounced an “emphatic protest” against the Hoare- 
Laval Plan. At the meeting of Manchester University, a resolution calling on the 
Government to withdraw its support from the Plan was passed by 234 votes against 
2 i m
The pressure from Parliament shook the Government more heavily. Thousands
of critical letters poured in to MPs. Harold Nicolson, National Labour member for
West Leicester, wrote in his Diaries of December 10 and 11,
Find the House seething because of the Abyssinian proposals. They 
have appeared in the Press, and Baldwin, when questioned by Attlee, 
made the mistake of saying that there had been a “leakage” in Paris, 
thus implying that the press reports were true in substance.
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The feeling in the House is still enraged against the Laval agreement.
He said that “Sam Hoare has completely and absolutely let us down. I feel very 
deeply about it and shall certainly not vote with the Government unless I am 
convinced that they have not done what they seem to have done. But I believe they 
have.”***
Moreover, many Conservative members were aware that they had been betrayed
by their leaders as quoted by Attlee from one of their letters:
As a lifelong Conservative I write to you to say that I consider the 
difference between the Paris peace plan and the pre-Election pledges of 
the Government so great, that I am bitterly ashamed of having 
supported the Government at the last Election. **^
On December 17, the Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee held a meeting with 
some 50 government members present. Most of them were in opposition to the 
Plan. They asked their Chairman Sir Austen Chamberlain to see the Prime Minister 
and convey the Committee’s unfavourable view.*** The climax was the debates in 
the House on December 19, Attlee insisted that the resignation of the Foreign 
Secretary was not enough, and the Government should resign unless they gave a 
satisfactoiy explanation.**'*
However, according to Peterson's understanding, the Government still stood by
the Plan on December 14.**® In fact, until the 17th when they met, the Cabinet
agreed that no decision could be taken in Hoare's absence. Whereas, at that meeting,
Ministers were more and more afraid of “the present excited state of public opinion
on the subject”. Chamberlain conveyed the message to the Cabinet from Hoare, in
which the Foreign Secretary said,
the public were thinking of peace terms which could only be obtained 
as the result of far greater pressure on Italy than it had as yet been 
possible to apply. In these circumstances the Foreign Secretary took 
the view that the League of Nations ought to be faced up to the reality 
of the situation.
Although some Ministers did not agree with Hoare and suggested the Plan be 
dropped, Chamberlain took Hoare’s side. In the end, the Cabinet generally approved 
of the line, suggested by Chamberlain, of “boldly defending, not so much the Paris 
proposals themselves, as the principles on which they had been based.” They
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instmcted Eden to make a statement in Geneva that the British Government was no
longer pressing acceptance of the Plan. The Prime Minister would see Hoare after
the meeting to “clear up the position”.**® That day, Baldwin, Chamberlain and Eden
went to see Hoare, who had returned the day before but was kept in bed, having
broken his nose. Baldwin said to him, “We all stand together.”**"
The funeral bell for the Plan rang on December 18 when the Cabinet met again to
discuss the broad lines that could be adopted for the House Debate the following
day. Baldwin confessed that “though he was not rattled, it was a worse situation in
the House of Commons than he had ever known.” He had been informed that
Austen Chamberlain “intended to lead the onslaught, which would then be
irresistible”. It was true as Churchill described later.
This crisis nearly cost Mr. Baldwin his political life. It shook 
Parliament and the nation to its base. Mr. Baldwin fell almost 
overnight from his pinnacle of acclaimed national leadership to a depth 
where he was derided and despised. His position in the House during 
these days was pitiful.***
In the course of discussion. Ministers tried to find the outcome of the Cabinet
crisis. Chamberlain said that due to the strength of public opinion, “the Government
could not adhere to the Plan”. He suggested some pretext that Hoare could use to
ward off responsibility: e.g. his “tiredness” prevented him from making a reasonable
judgement, or he had been “greatly misled by his staff’. But Mr O. Stanley, the
President of the Board of Education feared that the effect of such a speech would be
disastrous to the future of the Government, because of the public, who “had been let
in for this issue at the Election without being told what the real position was.” Simon
quoted the Motion on the Order Paper,
That the terms put fomard by His Majesty’s Government as a basis for 
an Italo-Abyssinian settlement reward the declared aggressor at the 
expense of the victim, destroy collective security, and conflict with the 
expressed will of the country and with the Covenant of the League of 
Nations, to the support of which the honour of Great Britain is 
pledged; this House, therefore, demands that these terms be 
immediately repudiated.
He sought to influence his colleagues by saying:
The public were under the impression the Foreign Secretary had gone 
out to Paris with instructions from the Cabinet to negotiate a peace.
This was not the case. The position would be improved if the
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Secretary of State were to say that he went to Paris not with 
instructions to negotiate, but that things developed in this way and that 
he had then sent the proposals home.
Cunliffe-Lister, the Air Minister suggested that
The Government were bound to admit that they regarded the Paris 
proposals as dead. They would never have approved negotiations on 
those lines if they had been asked to do so before the Foreign Secretary 
went to Paris; nor could they ever agree in the Paris Communiqué 
expressing satisfaction with the terms.
Although Baldwin had not made up his mind as to whether Hoare should resign
or not, Ministers generally agreed, as Halifax, the Lord Privy Seal, said, that “while
it was possible to make a case against the worst attacks, this could not be done
without admitting a mistake.” In this event, "Hhe Foreign Secretary ought to
resign!" This seemed the best method to save the Cabinet from crisis.**^  Knowing
that it would be “something he had hardly ever done before”, Chamberlain went to
Hoare after the meeting and gave him an account of the Cabinet decision. Hoare
was determined to defend the Plan and in consequence to resign.*®®
In his speech of resignation on December 19, Hoare told the House that his
reason to resign was that
I feel that I have not got the confidence of the great body of opinion in 
the country, and I feel that it is essential for the Foreign Secretary, 
more than any other Minister in the Government, to have behind him 
the general approval of his fellow countrymen. I have not got that 
general approval behind me to-day, and as soon as I realised that fact,
... without any suggestion from any one (bold — Author), I asked the 
Prime Minister to accept my resignation.*®*
The real reason for his resignation still remains unknown because no-one knew what 
Chamberlain had told him that day.*®^  However, one thing is clear and that is that 
the Foreign Minister was made a scapegoat, partly due to being misled by Laval, 
partly due to a misunderstanding between him and his colleagues, and partly due to 
abandonment from his friends.*®*
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V. EDEN’S ATTEMPTS: DECEMBER 1935 - MAY 1936
As Hoare's successor,*®'* Eden's line, as he explained to Sir Barton, differed little
from the double policy, being “two-fold”:
While the Members of the League continue to apply such measures of 
economic and financial pressure ... the League must neglect no 
opportunity of trying to find a settlement of the dispute by agreement 
between the parties.*®®
Having been terribly delayed by the Hoare Plan, the oil sanction was now put on
the agenda of the League again,*®® which would be still effective.*®" However, in
their exchange of views. Van., concerned about the imminence of an oil embargo,
told Eden that he did not think the British delegate should in any case “propose” but
only “support” the enquiry. Taking his suggestion into account, Eden reported to
the Cabinet on January 9 that the British delegate at Geneva “should not oppose, but
should support, though, if possible, not himself proposing, that the committee should
consider probable effectiveness of oil embargo.”*®*
Meanwhile, the Japanese had continuously pin-pricked British interests in the Far
East, and the Chief of the Imperial General Staff warned the Cabinet on the 17th that
With a hostile Italy, ... our Lines of Communication through the 
Mediterranean would, in time of war, become precarious if not 
impossible. ... It seems unlikely, in the present unsettled and 
inflammable state of affairs in Europe, that any British Government 
would allow the fleet to get so far away from the vital area in Europe.
Their conclusion was that
So long as affairs in Europe remain unsettled, our interests in the Far 
East, ... are at the mercy of the Japanese. It would seem a reasonable 
precaution, therefore, to try, by every means and even at some cost, to 
safeguard, by an amicable agreement with Japan, interests which we are 
unable to protect by military measures.
Although they knew that there were some major obstacles, for example, the issue of
Manchukuo, the attitude of the League and America etc., they argued that
In view, however, of our extremely weak military situation in the Far 
East, it is felt to be essential on strategical grounds that every possible 
effort should be made to overcome these political difficulties.
As for Italy, they estimated,
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it is probable that after the present crisis is over, Italy will find it 
convenient for financial or other reasons to abandon her hostile attitude 
towards us.*®®
When the Cabinet considered this memo together with the F.O. comment on it 
on the 29th, a Minister (perhaps Chamberlain) suggested some possibility of carrying 
out the suggestions of the Chiefs of Staff. However, Eden, representing the view of 
the F.O., pointed out that “it was easier to desire them, however, than to find in 
current events a good opportunity for promoting them in the general interests.” The 
Government, he said, had in fact done “their best in recent years to cultivate 
friendship with Japan, stopping only where the price has been too high.” Based on 
these debates, the Cabinet instmcted the Chiefs of Staff and the F.O. to have further 
discussion on “whether better opportunities could not be found”."®®
The Italian trouble was thus tangled with the Japanese disturbance. The British 
policy-makers, while they had to appease Japan further, found that it was more 
difficult for them to take a firm line towards Italy. Having favoured the oil embargo 
in the past, Eden now became very hesitant to take action due to the following 
factors; an omen of Abyssinian military collapse was in sight;"®* the Hoare Plan had 
damaged world opinion, particularly the good will of America to cooperate with the 
oil embargo,"®" and the French showed more unwillingness in co-operation over 
extending sanctions after the failure of the attempt at buying peace."®* He was quite 
uncertain as to whether the oil embargo was too late to be effective and to what line 
Britain would adopt in the League meeting of March 2."®'* He first agreed that if the 
oil embargo “was deemed ineffective”, the League should pass “a resolution re­
affirming its willingness to apply an oil sanction”, but with a report referring to the 
fact that the United States would probably take umbrage at it."®® However, a few 
days later when he interviewed the French Ambassador in London, he abandoned 
this idea, saying “it would be very difficult for us all to meet in Geneva to take note 
of the fact that we could not expect United States co-operation in the oil sanction, 
say therefore we would not apply that sanction, and all come home again.”"®®
Having set forth the pros and cons, he suggested in the Cabinet meeting of Febmary 
26 that the League ought to impose the oil sanction. In the discussion, all arguments 
were considered. Opinions against were based on the grounds that the principal 
burden of sanctions would fall upon Britain, owing to her vast trade. By contrast.
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the main arguments in favour of the sanction stressed that imposition of the oil 
embargo would save the League's face and the Government's reputation. Convinced 
by the second opinion, Baldwin shifted to the side in favour of the sanction. In the 
end, it was decided that Britain should support the imposition of the oil embargo on 
the basis of the co-operation of other members of the League (essential in the case of 
the French). Eden was instructed however not to take the lead."®"
During the Council meeting in early March, Eden had several conversations with 
M. Flandin who succeeded Laval as Foreign Minister on January 24 to seek French 
support on the subject. But there was “marked uneasiness” during the course of the 
conversation and Flandin seemed to be “little if at all better than M. Laval.”"®*
Instead of accepting Eden's idea that the oil embargo might work and save the 
League's face, M. Flandin insisted that it would probably be ineffective, and its result 
would be to cause Italy to withdraw from the League, thus making it weaker. He 
was also very worried that the extension of sanctions would lead to war or to an 
Italian denouncement of the military agreement with France and rapprochement with 
Germany when the German threat was approaching."®® Owing to the fact that 
Flandin was very keen on making an attempt at conciliation between Italy and 
Abyssinia before taking a decision on the oil embargo, Eden thought it “best to 
acquiesce” though he did not presume that it would be hopeful. He reported to his 
colleagues that if the policy of conciliation were tried out, Flandin would probably 
agree to the imposition of the oil embargo."*®
In view of the fact that the appeal for negotiation was accepted both by Italy and 
Abyssinia, the Committee of 13 decided to postpone its assembly until March 23.
In early April, after considering the situation, the Cabinet agreed that if no 
success in direct negotiations was achieved by April 8, Britain was “prepared to take 
part in any extension of sanctions which other nations were jointly prepared to 
apply.”"** As expected, the direct negotiations led nowhere. However, the French 
attitude towards the oil embargo had shifted from hesitation to opposition on the 
grounds that due to German re-occupation of the Rhineland on March 7, prospects 
of further Gennan action in Europe were now so near and so menacing that the 
Abyssinian question must at all costs be dropped."*"
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The best part of April elapsed with endless discussion between the British and 
French Governments focusing on whether negotiations on conciliation should 
continue and whether the oil embargo should be imposed."** The French inactivity 
barred the Council from taking any decision on the imposition of the oil embargo."*'* 
During the period of this delay, the Italians had won their major battles and 
controlled Addis Ababa on May 5. Instead of destroying the aggressor, the oil 
embargo was itself killed by Anglo-French “co-operation”.
VI. COMMENT
The policy of appeasing Italy was an important component part of general
appeasement in the 1930s. It is unanimously agreed, as Thome and Carr comment,
that “the Abyssinian affair was to provide a final, major test” to the League, and “the
Italian victory was a grave blow to the League”."*® Some historians consider it as
“the first great act of appeasement “ and “a turning-point on the road to war.”"*®
However, as for the Hoare-Laval Plan which was criticised as a diplomatic scandal at
that time, A. J. P. Taylor argues that
this was a perfectly sensible plan, in line with the League’s previous 
acts of conciliation from Corfu to Manchuria. It would have ended the 
war; satisfied Italy; and left Abyssinia with a more workable, national 
territory.
He implies that failure of the plan resulted in the breakdown of the Stresa Front that 
was a deterrence to Hitler’s expansion."*" Eubank also justifies Britain’s 
acquiescence in Italian invasion on the grounds that “Had British soldiers battled 
Italian armies in Africa in 1935, Hitler would have been fi ee to move troops into 
Central Europe”."**
Taylor and Eubank’s arguments show that they have not learned from the 
Second World War the basic lesson that the aggressors’ ambitions were unlimited, 
and they still believe that it was wise for the appeasers to use one aggressor as a 
deterrent against another without organising anti-aggressive struggle under the 
League. Suppose that the Hoare-Laval Plan had been carried out, would it satisfy 
Italy completely and keep her as a deterrent to German expansion? It was highly 
unlikely. The Plan might satisfy Mussolini temporarily. However, nobody could 
guarantee that he would not go on to take over the remaining part of Abyssinia as
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Hitler did to Czechoslovakia in March 1939. In fact, although the plan did not come 
into being, Britain and France had provided him with the most favourable situation, 
which allowed him to succeed in his conquest of Abyssinia. Had the Plan been 
carried out, the result would have been much the same. However, Mussolini was 
not satisfied and went on to inteiwene in the Spanish Civil War and to invade 
Albania. Italy broke away from Stresa because her ambitions were similar to 
Germany’s in that both planned expansion by aggression, and because the conflict of 
interests between herself and her Stresa partners was, in the long run, fundamentally 
unresolvable. Indeed, as early as the Stresa Conference in April 1935 that was more 
than half a year before the Hoare-Laval Plan, Mussolini had realised that he had to 
abandon Austria in order to concentrate on Abyssinia."*® Therefore, it was an 
illusion for the appeasers to think that they could keep Italy on their side by offering 
her a deal, as later experience proved. For example, in April 1938, by signing the 
Anglo-Italian agreement. Great Britain agreed to recognise Italy’s sovereignty over 
Abyssinia, and in return, Italy would withdraw her troops from Spain. However, 
after putting his signature to the agreement, the Duce sent another 4,000 volunteers 
to Spain. Therefore, the Hoare-Laval Plan could not have made Italy an anti­
aggressor even if it had been carried out, although its failure resulted in the 
breakdown of the Stresa. (In fact, Italy never declared her breaking off officially. 
Until the Anschluss, she was still considered as a Stresa power.)
In addition, there is little evidence to support the argument that if Britain was 
involved in a war with Italy in 1935, Hitler would send troops into Central and 
Eastern Europe. Attention should be drawn to the following: Hitler declared 
conscription in May, and his task was to build up an army of 600,000 in 1936. 
During the Rhineland episode, he could only send 20,000 troops to the zone. In 
1935, the second phase of German rearmament under the Second Four Year Plan 
had not yet started. The German army’s equipment was not up-to-date either in 
quality or quantity. The second service had the more doubtfol value.""® Under these 
circumstances, it was impossible for Germany to break the military resistance of 
countries in Central and Eastern Europe (even the latter did not rely on French 
assistance). On the contrary, it was ironic that Britain was not involved in any war 
after mid-1930s, but it did not form a deterrent to Germany’s expansion in Central
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and Eastern Europe. Therefore, it was Britain’s inactiveness and not her 
involvement in war that made Hitler believe that his adventure would not be 
hindered by the Western Powers.""*
Just as during the Manchurian crisis, British foreign policy 1935 -36 was a 
failure. However, it differed slightly from the former in the fact that in the 1935 
crisis, the British Government showed a tendency to take a more severe stand-point 
than they had in 1931 because this crisis was closer to Europe. The double policy 
included a strong and active aspect, i.e. to bring Italy to conciliation by using 
pressure. Had the oil embargo been imposed and had a closure of the Suez Canal 
been put into force, Italy would have been easily beaten.""" Mussolini's “mad dog” 
action was unlikely to have been carried out since it would have meant nothing but 
suicide. In other words, Britain had a greater opportunity of winning this time. But 
instead of experimenting with pressurising measures, she in practice took the line of 
rewarding the aggressor — from the Zeila Offer to the Hoare-Laval Plan — with a 
higher and higher price. The reasons for this contradiction between theory and 
practice can be found in the following factors:
Firstly, the consequence of Far Eastern appeasement led to appeasement towards 
Italy. When they faced the Italo-Abyssinian dispute, the appeasers found that they 
could not afford to offend Italy because Japan was left unchecked in the Far East. If 
Britain was involved in trouble in the Mediterranean, Japan would seize the 
opportunity to jeopardise British interests in the Far East. On the other hand, 
encouraged by the Japanese success, the Italians used Manchuria to justify their 
adventure in Abyssinia. Aloisi, the Italian delegate in Geneva asked Eden straight- 
out, “We had swallowed la couleuvre of Manchuria; why was Abyssinia creating 
such difficulties?”""* The Japanese, however, showed Mussolini their full sympathy 
and understanding. In addition, being neutral, Hitler implied that he did not mind if 
Italy wanted to “swallow” up Abyssinia. In return, Mussolini stood with folded arms 
when Germany reoccupied the Rhineland.""'*
Secondly, being confronted with an imminent German threat, the British policy 
makers were under the illusion that they could keep Italy on an Anti-German front. 
They failed to see through the aggressive nature of Italy just as they failed to 
perceive the unlimited ambitions of German and Japanese. Historical fact has proved
I l l
that sacrificing Abyssinia did not prevent Italy fi'om approaching Germany; nor did it 
make the British policy-makers concentrate on checking German expansion in 
Central Europe.
Thirdly, French unwillingness to become involved destroyed every possibility of 
executing vigorous action. Concerned about the emergence of a dangerous 
Germany, France was not willing to defend Abyssinia as well as the League, at the 
cost of losing its Italian ally. She helped the aggressor much more than she 
supported Britain. The French Government made use of every possible excuse and 
did their utmost to bar the League from taking any fatal decision. Although she 
never supported France in the latter’s struggle against Germany, Britain whole­
heartedly followed France in pursuing joint appeasement this time. Therefore, their 
co-operation achieved nothing but British diplomatic failure and Italian military 
victory.
During the Abyssinian crisis, public opinion showed an unprecedentedly strong 
tendency to be pro-League and anti-aggression, which put a great pressure on the 
Government. Although they were not prepared to take any coercive action to check 
Italy, the British leaders deceived the electorate by declaring their support for the 
Covenant, aiming to gain the vote. On the other hand, they secretly devised a plot to 
sell Abyssinia at the cost of sacrificing the principles of the League, and carried this 
out as soon as they had won the election. The public was misled and misinformed 
until the leakage of the Hoare-Laval Plan. In the face of fiirious public opinion 
stirred up by this diplomatic scandal, Baldwin and his colleagues cleverly shuffled off 
responsibility upon the Foreign Secretary so as to save the Cabinet. After they had 
passed through the Cabinet crisis, Baldwin invited Hoare back into the Cabinet a few 
months later. Hoare, as one of the Big Four, was still in a position to decide policy. 
Therefore, the public was able to prevent the Government from carrying out a 
particular step of appeasement such as the Hoare-Laval Plan, but could not prevent 
it from formulating and pursuing the course of appeasement.
Among the British policy-makers Hoare should certainly bear more blame for the 
diplomatic failure than anyone else. In spite of being a scapegoat, he himself insisted 
on the Hoare-Laval Plan due to his toughness. Baldwin’s responsibility was not less 
than Hoare’s on the grounds that although he was not interested in foreign policy, he
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laid the basis of the policy that the Foreign Secretary must keep the country out of 
war. In addition, his brief and ill-defined instructions to Hoare resulted in 
misunderstanding and confusion in policy making. As a ministerial partner, Eden 
was well known for his anti-Italian and pro-League attitude. However, he was not 
at all heroic when it came to “facing the dictators”. After he took over the F.O., he, 
like Hoare, accommodated the French and likewise hesitated to impose an oil 
embargo on Italy.
Furthermore, the British policy-makers failed to learn their lesson correctly. On
June 10, 1936 Chamberlain spoke to the 1900 Club “to draw what lessons and
conclusion” they could from the crisis:
I see, for instance, the other day that the President of the League of 
Nations Union issued a circular to its members in which he ... urged 
them to commence a campaign of pressure ... with the idea that, if we 
were to pursue the policy of sanctions, and even to intensify it, it is still 
possible to preserve the independence of Abyssinia. That seems to me 
the very midsummer of madness.... Is it not apparent that the policy of 
sanctions involves, I do not say war, but a risk of war? ... is it not also 
apparent from what has happened that, in the presence of such a risk, 
nations cannot be relied upon to proceed to the last extremity unless 
their vital interests are threatened?
Earlier than that, Chamberlain had already pointed out, in view of the failure of
collective security.
My proposal was that we should abandon the idea that the League 
could at present use force. ... It should be kept in being as a moral force 
and focus, but for peace we should depend on a system of regional 
pacts, to be registered and approved by the League,
Therefore, he urged Eden to reform the League.
Appeasement in the Abyssinian crisis once again strengthened the aggressors and 
weakened the Western Powers themselves. After Italy conquered Abyssinia, Britain 
faced a much more grave situation: apart from the chronic Far East crisis and the 
isolation of the United States, she had to face the collapse of the League and the 
intertwinement of the Italian problem and German expansion, which made it more 
difficult for her to formulate a firm line. A direct consequence of the Abyssinian 
crisis was, however, that it indicated clearly to Hitler that his Rhineland campaign 
would not have to contend with intervention by the Western Powers.
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Chapter 3 HITLER’S FIRST COUP
L IMMINENCE OF THE GERMAN THREAT
While the situation in the Far East and in the Mediterranean was grave, the 
German threat emerged in Europe. In 1933, the same year Hitler came to power, 
Germany announced its withdrawal from the Disarmament Conference as well as 
from the League. A year later, it leaked out that the German first-line aircraft would 
increase to 1,300 by October 1936 instead of the anticipated 1,000 by April 1939.  ^
Moreover, Hitler openly breached the Versailles Treaty on March 16, 1935 by 
reintroducing conscription — the German peace army would consist of 500,000 men.  ^
In addition, by the Anglo-German Naval Agreement, which was signed in June, 
Germany was allowed to build her navy up to 35% of British naval strength.
As soon as the Franco-Russian Pact was signed on May 2, Hitler lost no time in 
making use of this, implying in his speech of May 21 that France had already violated 
Locarno.^ However, at that time, Neurath, the German Foreign Minister, denied that 
the Fulirer's speech was an indication that Germany would withdraw from Locarno 
owing to the Franco-Russian Pact. He said, “Such plans are far from our thoughts.”'^  
It appeared that until October, Germany had not yet made up its mind.^
It was apparent that in mid-February of 1936 Hitler began to consider what would 
be a right moment for the reoccupation of the Rhineland, and discussed this with his 
close subordinates.^ Although he was previously in favour of taking action in the 
spring of 1937, he realised the postponement would make things uncertain. Since 
“England was in a bad state militarily, and much hampered by other problems”, and 
“France was distracted by internal politics”, he did not think that his Rhineland coup 
would be answered by military action. In his eyes, the Powers advocating economic 
sanctions seemed “whipping boys”. In addition the Japanese Ambassador had twice 
encouraged Germany to take “some kind of action... in order to be able to pounce 
on” the Russian Pact.^ Moreover, Mussolini had confirmed with Hassel, the German 
Ambassador, on various occasions, that Italy would not interfere, no matter how 
Germany reacted to the ratification of the Franco-Russian Pact. Hitler learned from 
the Abyssinian crisis that since the Western Powers did not defend the Covenant by
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war, they would not prevent Germany from reoccupying the Rhineland either. In
spite of this. Hitler was “fully aware of the risk.”^
In another discussion with Neurath, Ribbentrop and Hassel on February 19, the
Führer’s analysis was that
(1) There was a danger that the demilitarized zone would gradually 
become a sort of inviolable institution which it would then become 
increasingly difficult to touch. (2) ...the Italian successes would be 
more likely to stiffen the British than the reverse. (3) ... it would be 
psychologically wrong to believe that, success once achieved, a man 
like Mussolini would be more inclined to compromise; on the contrary, 
he would really go all out. (4) Situated as were the two 
Fascist/National Socialist States, surrounded by democracies tainted by 
Bolshevism, passivity was, in the long run, no policy.
Therefore, he concluded that the Franco-Russian Pact should be used as a pretext for 
the Rhineland coup, which would be carried out “as soon as the ratification was 
approved by the Chambef\^
However, his intention met with strong disagreement from the German Foreign 
Office and Chiefs of Staff, the latter of whom warned that they “thought and still 
think the risk was too great” on the grounds that France would demand the 
withdrawal of German troops, failing which she might attempt to drive them out by 
force. It is obvious that if Britain and France had stood firmly, the Führer would 
not only have been set back in the Rhineland, but his position would also have been 
weakened at home or perhaps he would have been overthrown by his opposition. In 
that case, history might have been different. In the face of a double risk. Hitler took 
the final decision to occupy the zone two days after the French Chamber approved of 
the Pact on February 27. On March 2, in obedience to his master, Blomberg, the 
Reich War Minister, issued the Z-Day order for the occupation of the Rhineland with 
the idea in mind that if the French fought back, the Commander in Chief had the right 
to decide on “a hasty retreat”. His executive order was given on March 5, fixing Z- 
Day as March 7.“ On the same day, the decision was conveyed to the German 
Ambassadors in the Locarno States.
The reaction of the Western Powers proved the Führer’s estimate correct. 
Although France wanted to take action, Great Britain refused to cooperate, which 
increased French hesitation. The Locarno Powers’ failure to act brought Hitler 
success. This can best be seen in Hitler’s own words:
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The forty-eight hours after the march into the Rhineland were the most 
nerve-racking in my life. ... If the French had then marched into the 
Rhineland, we would have had to withdraw with our tails between our 
legs, for the military resources at our disposal would have been wholly 
inadequate for even a moderate resistance.
n . TWO FOUNDERS OF APPEASEMENT TOWARDS GERMANY
It was during the period of the Rhineland crisis that the policy of appeasement
towards Germany was hatched. There was already a strong tendency among the chief
advisers of the F.O. that was prepared to come to terms with Germany, allowing her
to expand in Central and Eastern Europe. Van. was the most important official in a
position to sum up the proposals made by his colleagues in the F.O.^  ^ Having
proposed appeasement toward the Japanese and Italians in the Manchurian and
Abyssinian crises, he now formulated the policy that the Government ought to come
to terms with Germany by paying the price, and at the same time speed up
rearmament aiming at strengthening their bargaining position. After Hitler’s seizure
of the Rhineland, although he no longer trusted the signatures of Germany, Italy and
Japan, although he criticised the Government’s policy that was partly based on his
advice, he did not suggest that Britain should abandon appeasement, nor did he
formulate any alternative course that might be followed. In his proposal of December
31, 1936 he wrote:
If... we utilise our assets, we have much in our favour. Friendship with 
this country is still the official German policy, and Hitler still puts 
colonial after European expansion. Indeed the colonial agitation, 
though widespread and tenacious, it largely artificial. Moreover, the 
Nazi party, if only it were wisely calculating, it not really in a position 
to embark on great adventure.
A stage has now been reached, however, when we might be well 
advised to keep this door ajar in the event of complete success,...
As Foreign Secretary, Eden was an ambitious and vigorous politician, having built 
his reputation both in Geneva and Westminster. “His youth, his charm, his good- 
looks all worked to his advantage.” Being confident in his own knowledge of foreign 
affairs, he was very sensitive to any disagreement and guarded against any 
intervention particularly from former foreign secretaries (MacDonald, Simon and
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Hoare) in the Cabinet, with whom he had a delicate relationship. However, his 
personal relationship with Halifax and Chamberlain (the latter before 1938) was quite 
harmonious.
In spite of devaluing Van. in his Memoirs, Eden, as documents show, relied on 
his Pei*manent-Under Secretary very much for policy-making in the F.O. Although 
the Chiefs of Staff warned before the crisis that loss of the demilitarised zone meant 
the disappearance of a weakness in German defences on their Western frontier, which 
would result in serious consequences for the security of Central and Eastern Europe, 
the Foreign Secretaiy insisted that the Rhineland could be used as a bargaining 
counter to exchange in a general settlement with Germany. During the Rhineland 
episode, he first used the term “appeasement” in the debates on the German 
occupation. Since then, appeasement “had been freely accepted into the reputable 
currency of political discussion.” After Hitler’s coup, he was still under the illusion 
that the Führer wanted a deal. While discouraging France which was inclined to take 
forceful action, he advised that the Government should continue to search for a 
general settlement with Germany by offering an Air Pact, colonies etc., and by 
acquiescing in German expansion in Central and Eastern Europe.
Because of Van’s anti-German attitude and Eden’s resignation in 1938, both of 
them were generally considered as anti-appeasers.^® However, there is little evidence 
to support this identification. Since 1931, Van, as the Permanent Under Secretary, 
had been in a key position to lay down the basis for policy-making towards Japan, 
Italy, and now Germany. The policy he suggested was nothing but appeasement. As 
for Eden, despite his disagreement with Chamberlain over the methods to deal with 
Italy, he was completely in accord with the latter on appeasement towards Germany. 
What is more, since Baldwin was not very much interested in diplomacy, the conduct 
of foreign affairs largely depended on Eden.^  ^ The process of appeasement-making in 
this period was that it was first discussed among the chief advisers of the F.O , 
summed up by Van, and decided by Eden. And then Eden recommended the 
proposed policy to the Cabinet, which usually approved of it. It could be said that 
without Eden and Van, appeasement would not have been successfiilly formulated. 
Therefore, none of them was an anti-appeaser. On the contrary, they were arch- 
appeasers, who were the most important founders of appeasement, particularly
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towards Germany. Of the two, Eden was, at ministerial level, a more influential 
policy-maker who induced the Government to choose appeasement in the mid-193Os. 
It was a futile effort for liim to disguise himself in his memoir as a hero, “facing the 
dictators”.
in . BEFORE THE CRISIS: PREPARING FOR BARGAINING
As early as the autumn of 1933, the British policy-makers started to worry about 
“German menace” together with their consideration of Far Eastern policy. Based on 
the first DRC report of 1934, the Cabinet decided to continue appeasing Japan so as 
to concentrate on Europe. However, although they did not figure out how to 
concentrate, there was some discernible clues to be seen in their proposals. Van 
released in his memo of April 7, 1934, “There is probably no immediate danger. ... 
We have time, though not too much time, to make defensive preparations,” 
Personally he doubted “whether anything much would be gained by a weakening of 
Hitler — on the contrary. Chamberlain told his colleagues at the beginning of 
September, when they were considering a bilateral pact with Japan, that “all our 
evidence indicates that it would be easier and simpler to come to an agreement with 
Japan than with Germany.However, at that time, it seemed that they believed, as 
Eden told Mussolini in their interview of February 28, 1934 that the Germans 
“appeared genuinely to desire peace in order to push on with the fifteen years’ 
internal programme”.^ ^
It was one year before the Rhineland coup that the Western Powers had been 
suspicious of Hitler's intention of expansion. Being more sensitive, the French press 
had suspected since Hitler's speech of May 21, 1935 that Germany would abandon 
the Locarno Pact by using the ratification of the Franco-Russian Pact.^  ^ On the 
British side, having carefully compared the speeches given by the German leaders 
from May 1934 to January 1936, Eden concluded that “after the decree of March 
1935 reintroducing Conscription the German leaders began to speak somewhat 
differently.” Hitler’s words “scarcely leave us room to doubt that the rearmament of 
Germany is not being carried out for nothing or without a purpose.”^^
In November of 1935, Phipps, the British Ambassador in Berlin, warned the 
Government that German ambitious attempts could “only end in war and in a war
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waged by Germany”, and “the present Ethiopian embroglio is mere child's play
compared to the problem that will in some not very distant future confront His
Majesty's Government.” *^ According to his observation, German expansion would be
in a colony and in Eastern Europe, but Hitler would not commit himself definitely
until the Abyssinian problem was settled. Since “colonial expansion will not
necessarily prevent subsequent efforts for expansion in the East”, he opposed offering
back to Germany her former colonies. While emphasising the importance of speed in
British rearmament, he held that the best way to prevent Hitler coming to terms with
Russia was for Britain to come to terms with Germany.^^
The Ambassador's warning was received with great attention.The majority of
the senior officials in the F.O. overwhelmingly advocated a policy of searching for
settlement with Germany, which was best represented by the joint memo of Sargent
and Wigram on the 21st. These two advisers laid down the three policy alternatives:
the first was “a policy of drift” that the Government might simply allow the situation
to develop and wait to see whether the Western Powers would come to some
compromise with Germany or “keep the German claims in bounds” by strength. A
second policy was “that of the encirclement of Germany”, i.e. Britain, as the central
force, might form a counter block to German expansion by uniting herself with
France, Russia, Belgium, Italy and countries in Eastern Europe such as
Czechoslovakia, Roumania, Poland, Austria, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Hungary.
However, they rejected the above alternatives on the grounds that these courses were
“avowedly policies of negation and despair.” In particular, it was doubtful in their
view that the encirclement of Germany would be successful from the military point of
view. What they suggested, however, was the third policy of “coming to terms with
Germany” which was, they said, “the only constructive policy open to Europe”:
The fundamental idea is of course that the ex-Allied Powers should 
come to terms with Germany in order to remove grievances by friendly 
arrangement and by the process of give and take, before Germany once 
again takes the law into her own hands.
This was the basic theory for appeasement towards Germany. They went on to argue 
why they must pursue this appeasement: since Great Britain had no “practical means 
entirely to counter German expansionist policy” in Central and Easter Europe, it 
would be unwise to devise a policy “which we cannot enforce”, i.e. protecting the
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countries in this region from German invasion. By coming to terms with Germany, 
they "might hope to keep within reasonable bounds her Eastern and Central European 
policy.” Not only did they not rule out the possibility of making concessions to 
Germany on the colonial issue, but they also considered that “the strength and 
weakness of the German economic position” could be used in coming to terms with 
Germany. As for the Rhineland, although they realised that “defensively also it 
undoubtedly constitutes a definite and important counterweight against Germany and 
a check on any plans which she may entertain in Central and Eastern Europe”, they 
suggested,
an early attempt to come to terms with Germany can only work 
towards rendering it less likely that this dangerous question — i f ... it is 
raised by Germany, will be raised in an aggressive and threatening 
manner.
However, they confessed that their policy would “undoubtedly involve the sacrifice of
certain vested interests and the abandonment of many a point of national prestige.”
But they thought that Britain as well as Europe would benefit from the success of
adopting this course. Therefore, they urged,
we lost one opportunity after another of coming to terms with Germany 
in the past, when conditions were far more favourable than they are at 
present. ...the longer we wait the more probable it becomes that 
German demands, at present fluid, will have become crystallised into 
certain definite forms which will not allow of any compromise or 
bargaining.^^
However, Mr L. Collier, Counsellor at the F. O , had a different view that the 
Government
should consider the grounds for attempting no general settlement with 
Germany in the present circumstances.
He pointed out that German ambition in Central and Eastern Europe would meet with
firm resistance from Eastern European countries, and to let the Germans expand there
was “even worse than giving Mussolini a free hand in Abyssinia.” He also criticised
the authors of the above Memorandum for their conciliatory attitude towards the
German demand for colonies. He advised:
It is therefore better to let sleeping dogs lie, and... not to discourage 
those Powers who are building barriers against the ‘racial doctrine’ by 
means of Pacts and alliances. ...
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that our only wise and safe course is to continue that policy by 
discussing specific matters such as the Air Pact with Germany, but 
firmly refusing to be drawn into any discussion either on the Colonial 
claims, ... or on German ambitions in Eastern Europe. Above all, I 
would urge that there should be no attempt to tinker with the Covenant 
of the League of Nations, in order to provide the Nazi regime in 
Germany with facilities for raising the question of territorial revision at 
the expense of other Powers, including ourselves.
His proposal was called “a combination” of a policy of encirclement and a policy 
of drift, stressing on the latter, however, he failed to offer a plan as to how to 
organise “barriers” to deter German expansion.
Having examined these different views “in great detail”, Van, found them very 
interesting. His anti-German attitude did not bother him at all when he outlined the 
basis for appeasement towards Germany. As for the above proposals, he said he 
stood somewhat between the two, but in fact he took the proposal of Sargent and 
Wigram as a line of policy-making, whereas Collier’s suggestion with some anti­
appeasement characteristics had been put aside in the first stage of policy-making in 
the F.O. In his memo of December 1, Van decided to recommend to the Cabinet the 
course of appeasement as the future Government’s policy towards Germany,
You can only come to terms with Germany at a price. Even so I would 
be glad to come to terms with Germany. I reject of course the policy 
of drift; but we must be careful not to describe or consider as a policy 
of encirclement anything that puts us in a stronger bargaining position.
On the other hand,
We ought not to try a bargain with Germany until we have at least 
made a beginning on the requirements of the new D.R.C. report ... We 
need not of course wait till the D.R.C. requirements are completed.
That would take far too long... If we try, we must be prepared for 
possible failure; and for that we must be already strong or running into 
strength.
Van. hoped that he would have an opportunity to discuss those matters with Eden 
and Hoare. In fact, all these documents had already been drawn Hoare's attention to 
such an extent that he hoped to take them away to read during his holiday in early 
December.^^
Meanwhile, Germany had become more and more lukewarm towards the idea of 
negotiating with the Western Powers. '^  ^ In the interview of December 13, although
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Pliipps was at pains to explain that the Anglo-German Air Pact should be 
contemplated, Hitler maintained “the strongest objection”. He condemned the 
Franco-Russian Pact in a “violent outburst” and said that he regretted that he had 
failed to reoccupy the Rhineland on March 16 the previous year. Neurath also 
emphasised that the air pact should be accompanied by “the abandonment of the 
demilitarized zone”. As to the colonial problem, the Führer expressed the view that 
“he was only demanding the return of what really and truly was Germany's 
property.”^^
In his despatch, Phipps warned the F. O., “I fear that the zone will be re-occupied
whenever a favourable excuse presents itself.” ®^ The Ambassador's reports met with
general agreement. Eden, who was now Foreign Secretary, thought them “a valuable
and penetrating analysis, admirably timed”.H a v in g  carefully considered those
reports, Wigram pointed out in his memo of December 16,
It now seems most unlikely that any air negotiation could be carried 
through without the question of the demilitarised zone being raised. ...
But no consideration has been given to the matter: nor, I imagine, has 
anyone, either in Paris or in London, any clear idea as to what attitude 
ought to be taken if we were suddenly presented (...) with a serious 
infringement.^*
He analysed in another memo a month later, after talking with M. de Margerie, First 
Secretary in the French Embassy in London:
Not that I think the French will fight for the zone;...
Personally, I find it difficult to believe that our interests would not best 
be served by the maintenance of the zone. But I regard its maintenance 
over anything but a very restricted future as quite impracticable; and 
therefore ... what all of us had best be thinking about now is the means 
of securing its peaceful disappearance.
If we could get some little benefit in return for its disappearance, I 
believe we would be wise to take it.^ ^
With Van.'s agreement, Sargent also urged “to lose no time in getting clear in our 
own minds what we want and what we are prepared to do” and that the C.I.D. should 
speedily submit their reports, which had been required by Eden in early January, as to 
the value of the zone from the military and air points of view.^ ^
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In late January, he and Mr Collier had an inter-departmental meeting with
representatives of the Air Ministry and War Office, and they came to the general
agreement that “an Air Pact would be valuable from the political rather than the
militaiy point of view” and it might provide “a useful bargaining counter”, e.g. an Air
Pact might be obtained from Germany in return for the abolition of the zone."^  ^ Their
conclusion was completely in accordance with the Foreign Secretary’s."^ ^
Although he was disturbed by a “doubtful factor in Germany's plans for the
future”, Eden, depending on the observations of the British Ambassadors in Berlin
from 1933 to 1935, suggested to the Cabinet in his memo of January 17,
The first... is that it is vital to hasten and complete our own 
rearmament. ... My second conclusion is that,... it will be well to 
consider whether it is still possible to come to some modus vivendi... 
with Hitler's Germany
When the Cabinet considered his memo on the 29th, he informed the Ministers
that, according to his understanding, France was unlikely to take action “except
where her own frontier was in danger”. In addition, the Ministers had a discussion on
the Report of January 17 by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, in which, their
attention was drawn to the formidable situation in the Far East and the possible
“combination of Germany and Japan.” The military experts quoted the observation in
the third Report of the DRC dated November 21, 1935,
We consider it to be a cardinal requirement of our national and imperial 
security that our foreign policy should be so conducted as to avoid the 
possible development of a situation in which we might be confronted 
simultaneously with the hostility, open or veiled, of Japan in the Far 
East, Germany in the West, and any Power on the main line of 
communication between the two. So far as Japan is concerned,... we 
emphasised strongly the importance of an ultimate policy of 
accommodation and neighbourliness with that country. Recent events 
accentuate the desirability of that policy, difficult though it may be to 
carry out.
The Chief of Staff strongly echoed the DRC conclusion of making every effort to 
improve Anglo-Japanese relations and suggested that “only Anglo-Japanese 
friendship seems likely to deter Japan from entering into closer relations with 
Germany.” In the course of a short discussion, the First Lord of the Admiralty 
pointed out that
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The real danger was lest Germany and Japan should be driven together.
... If Germany were to move in Eastern Europe there was the danger 
that Japan might move in the Far East.
He had informed the French that the British Government thought
that such a move on the part of Japan would be of greater concern to 
this country with its vast interests in the Far East than German action in 
Eastern Europe.
In the end, in the face of the Italian danger in the Mediterranean and the German 
menace in Europe, the Cabinet instructed the F.O. and the Chiefs of Staff to discuss 
the possibility of improving Anglo-Japanese relations further. As for policy towards 
Germany, the Ministers agreed that the question should be taken up as soon as Eden 
was ready."^ "^
In the mean time, the shape of the policy had been developing in the hands of 
Van., Sargent and the Department.In this process, both Van. and Eden often 
consulted Phipps."*^  On February 3, Van. completed his memo, which was an all­
sided analysis of the German problem.
Absorbing the main ideas ft"om the proposals of Sargent, Wigram and Phipps,
Van. once again emphasised the necessity of coming to terms with Germany on the
grounds that since the Versailles system had broken down something must be put in
its place to avoid “consequent tension”. In other words, appeasement would replace
Versailles as a new basis for international affairs. Not only did he criticise those “who
feel their very existence dependent on the uncompromising defence of an inelastic
status qud\ but he also thought that a waiting policy was dangerous, on the grounds
that it was an advantage to Germany, because an armed Germany, seeking the
satisfaction of its ambitions, would choose her own time for asserting each of her
claims, and Europe would be forced to deal with each one separately. Therefore he
proposed that the British Government should seek for a broad basis for negotiations
that “must not be a temporary and local détente but a lasting and comprehensive
settlement.” He went on;
these changes should be made, if possible, as part of an agreed 
settlement and not as a result of demands formulated under the threat 
of military pressure.
this settlement must take the form of a bargain. A bargain can only be 
achieved at a price.... we have got to pay for it.
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He told the British leaders that Germany aimed at the demilitarisation of the
Rhineland, expansion in Central and Eastern Europe, and return of the colonies, etc.
He estimated that
the demilitarised Rhineland is not likely to persist indefinitely; ... an 
early attempt to come to terms with Germany can only render it less 
likely that this dangerous question will be thrust forward in an 
aggressive and dangerous manner.
As to German expansion in Europe, although he was opposed to making “any
statements of renunciation in Central Europe”, he suggested that “the problem may be
solved by the creation and recognition of some kind of ‘special area’ for German
economic expansion in Central Europe”. In addition to the possibility of moderating
and canalising Germany’s non-military influence in Central and Eastern Europe, “an
Anglo-French settlement with Germany would be a more effective guarantee against
the dangers of Russo-German co-operation”.
In the light of the fact that the British Government was not prepared to consider
or discuss the cession of the colonies to Germany, he thought that in this case “there
is no prospect of reaching any real agreement with Germany.” He proposed that “we
could meet the German claim by the retrocession of some or all of the former German
colonies” as part of a general settlement." ’^
Eden recommended Van.’s memo to the Cabinet as “the outcome of prolonged
and anxious study in the Foreign Office of the situation”. A week later, in his paper
attached with Van.'s memo, Eden approached the necessity of appeasement from
another angle as he analysed.
The poverty of Nazi Germany, measured in the country’s dwindling export 
trade and increase of unemployment, may be expected to have the same effect 
as in Italy, and to encourage a Dictator to launch his people on some foreign 
venture as the only means that remain to him to distract their attention from 
the failure of his policy at home.
One of his suggestions for avoiding this consequence was to adopt measures of
economic appeasement:
Our purpose being to avoid war, it should follow that we should be 
wise to do everything in our power to assist Germany’s economic 
recovery, thereby easing the strain upon the German rulers, and 
making an outbreak less likely.
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He made himself clear,
I am in favour of making some attempt to come to terms with Germany...
We should be prepared to make concessions to Germany,... but these 
concessions must only be offered as part of a final settlement which 
includes some fijrther arms limitation and Germany's return to the League.
What is more, he did not stop at the point of only formulating the basis for 
appeasement, but he went further to urge the Government to examine “what it is 
possible to offer to Germany” as “the first step” to carry out appeasement."^* 
According to his suggestion, Baldwin appointed a Committee on February 14 to 
consider policy towards Germany, consisting of himself, MacDonald, Chamberlain, 
Eden, Halifax, and three other Ministers, all of whom would hold a meeting on the 
17th."^ ^
For this Committee meeting, Mr Sargent prepared the memo on the Rhineland,
for the Foreign Secretary, who admired it as “an excellent statement and exactly what
was needed” . In the document, Eden conveyed the view of Chiefs of Staff about
the value of the Rhineland,
the Zone has, even in the air, a certain value; whilst as regards land 
warfare it is a weakness and thus a disadvantage to Germany in the 
event of her becoming engaged in war in Central or Eastern Europe. ...
At present France, by invading the Zone, could with ease come to their 
assistance if attacked, but once the Zone is fortified France will find it 
much more difficult to launch a direct land attack on Germany, and the 
value of the French alliances will be proportionately reduced... In this 
way the disappeai ance of the Demilitarized Zone will not merely 
change local military values, but is likely to lead to far-reaching political 
repercussions of a kind which will further weaken France's influence in 
Eastern and Central Europe, leaving a gap which may eventually be 
filled either by Germany or by Russia.
But this correct conclusion did not persuade the Foreign Secretary from abandoning 
the idea of bargaining, and he advised that.
taking one thing with another, it seems undesirable to adopt an attitude 
where we would either have to fight for the Zone or abandon it in the 
face of a German reoccupation. It would be preferable for Great 
Britain and France to enter betimes into negotiations with the German 
Government for the surrender on conditions of our rights in the Zone 
while such surrender still has got a bargaining value.^^
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On the 17th, the Committee members held their first meeting to discuss possible 
concessions to Germany, for example, the return of one or more of the former 
German Colonies, an agreement on raw materials, and the abandonment of the 
demilitarised zone. Since the German economic crisis might result in the Nazi 
Government attempting a foreign adventure as a means of distracting attention, they 
thought it was “an additional reason for coming to terms quickly”.
In the course of discussion, supported by Simon, Eden suggested that a short­
term policy towards Germany would be required first; whereas Halifax advised that 
“it would be necessary first to go some way towards clearing our minds on long-term 
policy.” Differing from Eden, who thought it no use discussing an Air pact while the 
Abyssinian wai* lasted, MacDonald thought
we should choose the Air Pact as our opening. ... the colonial raw 
materials suggestion would be a new opening,,.. We must be prepared 
to pay a heavy price, if we were to buy Germany's return to Geneva...
But Chamberlain agreed with Eden's view on the colonial question that “the transfer 
of Tanganyika would be worth while if a really permanent settlement could be 
achieved.” However, their divergence was not fundamental because it focused 
merely on how to appease Hitler rather than whether they should abandon 
appeasement. In the end, the Committee agreed to give further consideration when 
the additional information had been prepared.
After the meeting, Eden instructed Phipps to use the Air Pact as the means of the 
first move towards Germany. If Hitler raised the issue of the Zone, Phipps should 
reply that Britain would also like to talk about the situation in Central and Eastern 
Europe, and armament limitations.^ "^
Early in March, the F. O. communicated with the French and Belgian 
Governments on their attitude towards the German problem. M. Flandin, the French 
Foreign Minister, informed the British Government that if Germany reoccupied the 
Rhineland, France would consider taking “any preparatory measures including 
measures of a military character”; but she would not act alone. In addition, Flandin 
had reason to believe that “Germany intends to reoccupy the zone in the very near 
future.”^^
In the Cabinet meeting on March 5 — the last meeting before Hitler's seizure of 
the Rhineland, Eden told his colleagues that if Germany violated the demilitarised
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zone, “the French Government would not proceed to isolated action, and would only 
act in agreement with the co-signatories of Locarno whom they would consult.” 
Considering German immediate violation of Versailles unlikely, the Ministers 
discussed what would be the effect on other signatories if Germany denounced 
Locarno, using as an excuse the ratification of the Russian Pact.^  ^ They thought that 
the possible reoccupation of the Zone by Germany “was directed against all the 
signatories of the Treaty other than the aggressor.” Eden, MacDonald and Simon all 
agreed to declare that at any rate, “we were not absolved from our obligations.” 
However, MacDonald added, “we should avoid being driven back on the legal issue 
and keep the road open for diplomatic arrangement.” With others' agreement, both 
Baldwin and Chamberlain pointed out that “neither France nor England was really in 
a position to take effective military action.” Based on Eden's suggestion, the Cabinet 
concluded that the way to get round the difficulty was to take up the question of an 
Air Pact with Germany. They also authorised Eden to discuss with the French Prime 
Minister what to do in the changed situation.^’
Next day, Eden called in the German Ambassador and asked him to refer again to 
Hitler “the possibility of opening of serious discussion on the Air Pact” between the 
Locarno Powers. But the Ambassador confined himself “mainly to listening to Eden's 
remarks,” and told the Foreign Secretary that there would be “an important 
declaration” of the Führer to be delivered on the next morning.^* In fact, Eden had 
learned fi*om Phipps on the same day that “some action is on the point of being taken 
by the German Government in regard to Locarno.
IV. DURING THE CRISIS: THE BARGAIN LOST
At noon on March 7, Hitler addressed the Reichstag, announcing reoccupation of 
the Rhineland together with the Declaration, in which he appealed for a 
demilitarisation on both sides of the Rhine Frontier, a twenty-five-year non­
aggression pact between Germany, France and Belgium, a similar pact between 
Germany and Eastern European Powers and an air pact etc. °^
The German action raised confusion and conflicting views from public opinion. 
There were “many gratifying indications of sympathy for the German point of view, 
and in general, of a tendency towards objective assessment and calm reflection” in the
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Press. On the other hand, “sharp criticism” of German violation was to be found in
many newspapers.^  ^ The Times, the Observer, the Daily Mail and the Daily Express
etc. were enthusiastic about Hitler’s peace offer, and the Observer appealed for
Britain to consider Hitler’s proposals “in a spirit of sympathy and goodwill”. The
Daily Express put forward a question: “The Germans have reoccupied the Rhineland.
What does that mean to US? ... The question WILL BRITAIN BE INVOLVED IN
WAR? The answer is NO.” T\iQ Manchester Guardian, however, released more
controversy: although its leader articles were pro-German, Mr F. A. Voigt, its leader
writer, held a hard line. Differing from his own paper, he wrote on March 9, that
unless Britain supported the French in opposing reoccupation, “the Germans will
have attained what Hitler has in his book Mam Kampf declared to be one of the chief
aims of German foreign policy— namely, ‘the possibility of achieving the overthrow of
France’ ” In addition, the Daily Telegraph appealed that Britain should meet
Hitler’s challenge and expose his hypocritical peace offer:
Hitler’s action and his speech have created a new and most difficult 
situation in Europe, and on the British Government’s next step — 
carefully considered and, whatever it may be, we hope it will be firm 
and unmistakable — the course of future events must largely depend.*’^
The House, however, was “more critical and nervous” than the Press. Harold
Nicolson described, “General mood of the House is one of fear. Anything to keep
out of war.” In mid-March, an M. P. told the German Ambassador, “A pro-French
policy hasn’t a hope. The whole country is pro-German.” Sir Arthur Sinclair, the
leader of the Liberal Party, gave a speech on March 9:
Let us remember that we, the States Members of the League, for too 
long failed to fulfil one of our obligations, our obligation to disarm. For 
too long we refused to recognise the equality of Germany ... Nor, while 
we must condemn any violation of treaties, can we regard the 
occupation of German territory by German troops as so clearly 
indefensible, as an aggression against the territory of a member of the 
League. Let us then give calm and dispassionate study to these detailed 
constructive proposals for the removal of Germany’s grievances and for 
securing European peace which Germany has at last tabled.
On the other hand, “criticism of the German action is very marked” as the
German Ambassador in London reported to Berlin,
Indignation at Germany’s alleged treaty violation is profound. This is 
adversely influencing the effect made by the German proposals, since
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doubts are felt as to the value of any future German promises and, 
indeed, as to whether there is any point in making fresh agreements 
with Germany.
The House had already known that “Hitler gambled on this coup” against the
warnings of the German Foreign Office and Chiefs of Staff. It was widely accepted
even by the MPs, who did not agree with intervention, that if Britain and France acted
together, Germany had no chance of resistance, and that if war occurred, the Western
Powers would win.^ ®
On the 12th, a meeting of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Commons took
place. Sir Austen (the Chair) strongly recommended that “Britain was in duty bound
to support France unreservedly.” If France took immediate coercive measures
against Germany, Britain should aid France with full force. He was supported by Mr.
Churchill, who warned the House later about the grave consequences that would be
caused by the reoccupation of the Rhineland:
The violation of the Rhineland is serious because of the menace to 
which it exposes Holland, Belgium and France. ...It will be a barrier 
across Germany's front door which will leave her fi^ee to sally out 
eastwards and southwards by the other doors.
That is to us a less direct danger, but it is a more imminent danger. ... 
the whole aspect of middle Europe is changed.
That day, these two “influential personages succeeded by their joint action in winning 
over to their side about three-quarters of the members of the Committee present”.^ ’ 
The German Ambassador assumed that if the Foreign Secretary had been Sir Austen 
instead of Eden, and the Minister for Defence had been Churchill instead of Inskip, 
“Britain would cooperate, would have yielded to the impulse to take ultimative and, 
possibly, forcible action against Germany.” *^
This evidence is fatal to the appeasers’ repeated argument, voiced by Eden, that 
“there is little dispute that Hitler should have been called to order, if need be forcibly, 
at his first breach of an accepted international engagement. But nobody was prepared 
to do it, in this country literally n o b o d y . T h e  fact was that in March 1936 there 
was not only favourable condition for the British Government to take joint action 
with the French so as to check Hitler, but also there existed a loud voice within and 
outside of the House to press them do so.
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However, critical opinion did not influence the Government’s line at all. On the 
contrary, the Government employed various methods to “mould” public opinion. For 
example, in February 1935, Rex Leeper, Head of the News Department in the F.O , 
suggested, “We really must find some way of guiding the BBC’s foreign comment 
more than we do.” During the Rhineland episode (on March 30, 1936), a special 
Cabinet Committee investigated the BBC’s programmes on European affairs and 
decided to “ask the BBC to refrain from arranging for independent expressions of 
views on the situation.” The Government successfully put censorship on the BBC, 
which has to rely on them for the renewal of its Charter and licence. Therefore, 
British radio was, as an American commentator observed, a “constant flow of reports 
from the government departments” tantamount to “gentle propaganda in favour of 
things as they are.”’*^ In the House Eden misled the audience on March 9 by saying, 
“There is ,... no reason to suppose that the present German action implies a threat of 
hostilities”.
Historical fact has proved that the policy-makers did not consult the public at all 
when they worked on policy-making because policy towards Germany had been 
already formulated before the public had a voice on it. They would not change their 
policy even though the outside opinion demanded they should face the German 
challenge.
On the same day (March 7) that he learned of Hitler’s coup against the Rhineland, 
Eden drove down to Chequers to discuss the dangerous situation with Baldwin. He 
reported to the Prime Minister that both France and Belgium would wish to condemn 
Germany for a breach of the Versailles Treaty and that the former might not take 
military action immediately but would lay the case before the Council, asking for an 
early meeting of the Locarno Powers. Baldwin “said little”. However, based on 
Eden’s view, he set the tone for policy-making, saying that “there would be no 
support in Britain for any military action by the French”. Eden agreed. The basis for 
foreign policy was thus settled between the Prime Minister and the Foreign 
Secretary.’^
As soon as he returned to the F. O., Eden received the report from Clerk, the 
British Ambassador in Paris, which confirmed his assumption ab ov e . I n  addition.
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the Belgians held similar views as the French, showing that they would follow the
lead of the British Government.’"^ Italy, however, gave no indication.’^
Based on the information from his Ambassadors, Eden set down his views for the
Cabinet on the 8th,
by reoccupying the Rhineland he (Hitler -  Author) has deprived us of 
the possibility of making to him a concession which might otherwise 
have been a useful bargaining counter in our hands in the general 
negotiations with Germany... Such negotiations are now inevitable, but 
we shall enter them at a disadvantage, for we have lost the bargaining 
counter...
He warned his colleagues, “We must be prepared for him to repudiate any treaty even
if freely negotiated”; on the other hand he believed that
it is in our interest to conclude with her (Germany — Author) as far- 
reaching and enduring a settlement as possible whilst Herr Hitler is still 
in the mood to do so.
For a possible solution, he suggested entering into negotiations with Germany with 
the object of
(a) establishing a new 'Locarno* on the lines suggested by Herr Hitler;
(b) concluding an air pact on the lines suggested by us; (c) bringing 
about some sort of settlement in Eastern and Central Europe (...) on the 
basis of the bilateral non-aggression pacts offered by Herr Hitler; (d) 
arranging for Germany's unconditional return to the League.
In order to achieve those purposes, he thought that “the essential thing will be to 
induce or cajole France to accept this mandate.” Therefore, they “must discourage 
any military action by France against Germany.”’^
When he consulted Van., the latter “approved it enthusiastically”, but suggested 
that “our guarantee was to France and Belgium alone”.”  Next day, the Cabinet, 
based on Van.'s suggestion, redrafted the last paragraph of Eden’s memo and inserted 
it into a statement, which Eden was authorised to give in the House on the same 
evening. It says,
In case there should be any misunderstanding about our position as a 
signatoiy of the Locarno Treaty, His Majesty's Government think it 
necessary to say that, should there take place ... any actual attack upon 
France or Belgium which would constitute a violation of Article 2 of 
Locarno, His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom, 
notwithstanding the German repudiation of the Treaty, would regard 
themselves as in honour bound to come, in the manner provided in the 
Treaty, to the assistance of the country attacked.’*
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After the Parliamentary debate, Eden, with Halifax, went to Paris for the meeting 
of the Locarno Powers without Germany.”  In their conversations on the 10th, 
Flandin told Eden that France had brought the case to the Council of the League and 
that, once the Council declared German action as a breach of treaty, the French 
Government would use “all their moral and material resources (including military, 
naval and air forces) in order to repress what they regarded as an attempt upon 
international peace.” The French would not pursue negotiation with Germany unless 
“international law had been re-established in its full value”. He made the stand point 
quite clear that the French Government stressed that the Locarno Powers must take 
up “a common position at the Council”, and he even contemplated the Locarno 
Powers alone taking military action. The Belgians held a similar position. 
Discouraging the French by implication of the British different stand point, Eden tried 
to convince his Locarno partners that this was an opportunity of “reaching a 
settlement with Germany”, several of which, in his opinion, “had been missed” 
before.*® Eden and Halifax insisted that their policy of “trying for a negotiation was 
still a right one” because “the alternative proposed by the French Government for 
forcing the Germans out of the Rhineland would not produce a satisfactory 
settlement,”*^
Next evening, right after their return to London , Baldwin called a special Cabinet 
meeting to contemplate how best to proceed. Eden reported to his colleagues of the 
French and Belgians’ firm stand point, namely, that if Germany refused to withdraw 
from the Rhineland, they would proceed to military measures and asked Britain to do 
the same. He foresaw that “we should be in an impossible position if we refused.” 
Halifax said that “the French and Belgians sincerely believed that the Germans would 
not fight if they took action.” As to what proposal the Government should adopt, 
Eden suggested informing the German Ambassador immediately that despite the 
grave situation created by the German action, the British Government were still 
“anxious to obtain a peaceful settlement”. But they needed Hitler to make some 
reasonable contribution, e.g. he should state “that he wanted to negotiate a series of 
new pacts as a basis for peace in Europe, and would, as a proof of his intentions, 
withdraw all his forces from the Rhineland over and above the troops necessary for a 
symbolic occupation.” In addition. Hitler would not “build fortifications in the
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demilitarised zone.” The problem was, as some Ministers pointed out, that the 
French and Belgians “might object to it” if they were informed. It was generally 
accepted that
it was worth taking almost any risk in order to escape from that 
situation. Admittedly the suggestion of the Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs involved some risks from the point of view of the 
attitude of Germany on the one hand, and France and Belgium on the 
other, but we could hardly be left in a more embarrassing position than 
we were in already.
They agreed that they would calm the French down by telling the latter that due to
the British military disadvantage and public opinion, the Government could not take
any military action. Baldwin thought that it seemed “very unfriendly” of the French
“to put us in the present dilemma.” He emphasised that
it would be necessary to point out to the French that the action they 
proposed would not result only in letting loose another great war in 
Europe. They might succeed in crushing Germany with the aid of 
Russia, but it would probably only result in Germany going Bolshevik.
In the course of discussion, there was a suggestion of imposing financial and 
economic sanctions against Germany. But Eden rejected this by saying that the 
“proposal had been for the imposition of sanctions by successive stages culminating in 
militaiy action.” The Cabinet finally came to the conclusion that Eden should tell the 
German Ambassador about the British proposal and “do it well.”.*^
That very evening, without informing the French, Eden told Hoesch, the German 
Ambassador about the British proposal, but the latter replied on the following day 
that Hitler agreed only not to increase troops, not to alter their geographical 
position.*^
On the night of March 11, Flandin arrived in London for the Locarno
conversations. In the following days, apart from official meetings, he had a series of
private communication with influential British statesmen and addressed the House,
aiming at gaining British support. His subject was summed up as follows:
If England will act now she can lead Europe. ... It is your last chance.
If you do not stop Germany now, all is over. France cannot guarantee 
Czechoslovakia any more because that will become geographically 
impossible. ... If you do not stop Germany by force to-day, war is 
inevitable, even if you make a temporary friendship with Germany .*"*
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Having heard his exhortations, Churchill urged him to see Baldwin. On the 12th,
Flandin had interviews separately with Baldwin and Chamberlain. He told the British
Prime Minister that
France had no wish to drag Great Britain into war; she asked for no 
practical aid, and she would herself undertake what would be a simple 
police operation, as, according to French information, the German 
troops in the Rhineland had orders to withdraw if opposed in a forcible 
manner.
But Baldwin turned down his suggestion by saying, “You may be right, but if 
there is even one chance in a hundred that war would follow from your police 
operation, I have not the right to commit England.”*^ Chamberlain did not do 
anything more to encourage the French Foreign Minister either according to his diary 
of March 12:
talked to Flandin, emphasising that public opinion would not support us 
in sanctions of any kind. His view is that if a firm front is maintained 
Germany will yield without war. We cannot accept this as a reliable 
estimate of a mad dictator’s reaction.*^
At the official meetings, Flandin told Eden again of the French stand point. In
reply, Eden asserted that
We were convinced that it would not be possible to secure a German 
withdrawal from the Rhineland, and that to make an attempt to do so 
was to court certain failure and a grave risk of war. In these 
circumstances was it not better to see whether there were not some 
other way out of our present difficulty?
He warned his French partners:
we feared that were we to do this our two projects might be found to 
diverge at almost every point. This would be a misfortune.*’
Since all official and private conversations led nowhere, Flandin was “in a very 
depressed mood” and felt that “his mission to London had been a failure.”**
Based on the latest conversations of the Locarno Powers, Eden described the 
resolution in his memo for the Cabinet dated March 15, which included 1) 
condemnation of Germany's action; 2) invitation to France and Germany to refer to 
the Hague Court the question of the compatibility of the Franco-Soviet Pact with 
Locarno; 3) stationing of an international force, including British troops, on either 
side of the frontiers between France, Belgium and Germany.*^
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Next day, the Cabinet, after discussion, approved his proposal and authorised him 
to communicate with the French.^ ® Chamberlain also reported on another talk with 
Flandin. Having heard his report, Baldvrin said that he was strongly in favour of 
sending the British troops to form part of an international force in the Rhineland.^* 
However, when the Ministers met on the evening of March 18, they found the 
problems far fi*om being solved. Eden summed up the difficulties occurring in the 
Locarno Powers' conversation the same day; 1) as to an International Force on both 
sides of the frontier, Flandin could accept either a Franco-Italian force in France, or 
an International Force in the Zone only; 2) the French and Belgian Governments 
wished the British Government to address a letter to them as to the steps which the 
British would take, including economic, financial and military sanctions, in the event 
of Germany's refusal to accept the terms; 3) as to laying the case before the Hague 
Court, they insisted that if the judgement went against France, the Franco-Soviet Pact 
must be annulled; but in the event of it going against Germany, Locarno must come 
into force; 4) they insisted that military talks should take place between Britain, 
France and Belgium. In the course of discussion, Eden suggested that “the situation 
would be eased if we could agree to military conversations”, relating to the 
obligations of the Powers concerned under the Locarno Treaty if the negotiations 
with the Germans failed. But some Ministers reminded the Cabinet “that military 
conversations on that basis would be very unacceptable to public opinion in this 
country which was strongly opposed to any forcible action to compel the Germans to 
evacuate the Demilitarised Zone.” They argued that they “were not in a position to 
give effective military support in any such operation as the French were well aware.” 
They believed that “there was no question of immediate action as contemplated in the 
Treaty since the time for that had already passed.” The general tenor of the Cabinet's 
views on the points of difference came to be as follows;
(a) The Lord Privy Seal's proposal for the stationing of an 
International Force, including British troops, in the Demilitarised 
Zone and for British and Italian forces on the French side of the 
frontier, was welcomed.
(b) The proposed letter to the French and Belgian Governments as to 
our action in the event of Germany's refusal to accept the terms 
offered to her was rejected ...
(c) The difficulty as to the attitude of the French and Belgian 
Government to the suggestion that Germany should go to the 
Hague Court had been solved by M. Van. Zeeland's (the Belgian
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Prime Minister — Author) latest communication.^^
(d) Military conversations must be strictly limited to mutual 
arrangements for defence in the event of German aggression 
against France or Belgium...^*
After the Cabinet meeting, the Locarno Ministers resumed their difficult 
conversation again Jftom 10:00 that evening until 2:00 next morning, when they finally 
come to an agreement, which included the stationing of an international force in the 
Rhineland; asking the German Government to lay their case before the Hague Court 
and to refi-ain from fortifying the Zone during the period of negotiations. "^* When 
Eden informed Ribbentrop, the German Delegate to the Locarno meeting about these 
Resolutions, the latter answered at once that it seemed to him that certain points of 
the proposals were apparently “unacceptable”. Eden was at pains to make plain to 
him how difficult it had been to persuade the French to agree to a kind of temporary 
compromise solution, and urged the German Government “to make some 
contribution on their side”, and emphasised the importance of not returning a flat 
negative to the proposals.®^
Following the preliminary note of March 24,®® Hitler's answer was finally 
announced on March 31, in which he made his own “contribution to the 
reconstruction of a new Europe” by refusing all three requirements of the Locarno 
Powers and by offering a nineteen-point “peace plan”.®’
Right after receiving this on April 1, the Cabinet members got together to discuss 
the matter. They thought that “what we wanted first was to obtain some action of a 
re-assuring character by Germany to restore confidence in some degree.” But the 
German memo did not meet the suggestions by the Locarno Powers in the Resolution 
of March 19. On the other hand, they agreed that “the French Government must not 
be given any encouragement by the attitude of the British Press to reject the 
proposals altogether” because some points of Hitler's plan “were interesting”.®*
On the French side, the French Government regarded the German reply as a 
refusal to the Resolution of March 19, and showed no confidence in the Hitler peace 
plan.®® M. van. Zeeland, the Belgian Prime Minister also suggested that the Locarno 
Powers meeting and staff talks should be resumed as soon as possible.*®® In his 
telegram from Paris, Eden reported to his colleagues about the Locarno Powers 
conversation:
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French Government will concentrate on securing our support for 
refusal to allow zone to be fortified. They may well ask us to join in 
making clear to German Government that if demand is refused 
sanctions by Locarno Powers will follow.
In the course of discussion, the Ministers felt that “the essence of sanctions was 
that they must be collective and effective. Neither of these conditions would apply to 
sanctions imposed as proposed by the French.” So they suggested that Eden should 
tell the French “that sanctions could not be imposed by the Locarno Powers”. They 
decided,
if the question of the French refusal to allow the Demilitarised Zone to be 
fortified were raised, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs would be 
justified in refusing to admit that conciliation had failed. ... if and when the 
point was reached where conciliation had failed... our first action would be 
consultation with the French and Belgian Governments as to the steps to be 
taken to meet the new situation.
On that very evening, Halifax left for Paris, bringing this Cabinet conclusion to 
Eden.^ ®^  At the same time, the Cabinet approved a proposal that the General Staff 
conversations between Britain, France and Belgium should open on April 15.^ ®^
When Halifax joined Eden, the two Ministers, following the line above, “strongly 
resisted the French view” that the attempt at conciliation had failed and that it was 
time to begin the study of sanctions. Taking advantage of the indication that the 
French were looking for “compensation” for the fortification of the Rhineland, they 
pointed out that
the German proposals were far from clear on a number of points; that 
some of those points, if explained in a satisfactory way, might give the 
French the very ‘compensation’ they were looking for; and that 
therefore the first step was to clear up these doubtfiil points with the 
Germans.
They promised to get into touch with the Germans to clear up these points. At last 
the French yielded.
V. AFTERMATH: THE BLLUSION OF SEARCHING FOR A 
SETTLEMENT
As early as after his interviewing of the German Ambassador on March 11,^ °'* 
Eden realised that “we should not get much further in the vital conversation”. Halifax
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and Van. were in agreement. Even so, discussion in the F. O. had showed mixed
points of view with a tendency to appease Germany ftirther instead of changing
policy. On March 17, Lord Cranborne, the Under Secretary, proposed stabilising the
situation in Western Europe, and giving Germany a free hand in the east, to a certain
extent. In order to acliieve a limitation of German armaments, they should give her,
economically, a free hand in Central Europe, “by a loan, or in other ways.” “The
question of the colonies, too, might be brought up in this discussion.” He warned
Do not let us, at any rate, in order to find a way out of the present 
emergency, put ourselves under definite obligations of which we do not 
know the final implications.
Sargent had independently written his memo on the same line. After rejecting
several alternatives, he proposed that the policy should be
to offer Germany economic and financial help in return for, and 
subsequent to, a general political settlement.
it certainly would seem to be the most farsighted and statesmanlike, but 
only on condition that we do not delay too long, for German economics 
will increasingly react on, and may soon dominate, German foreign 
politics, with quite incalculable results.
Disbelieving any German assurances at their face value due to the latest incident. 
Van. at first had some different views on the long term policy from Lord Cranborne; 
but after their discussion, the divergence vanished. Eden remarked, “There is 
much force” in Cranborne’s view but he did not think “it tells quite the whole story”. 
As to Sargent’s view, Eden minuted, “I a g r e e . H e  did not think that the crisis had 
“made any difference to our intention to probe and explore Herr Hitler's offers” and 
to construct “something reliable out of them”."^
Late in April, according to Eden’s instmction, the F. O. drafted the questionnaire 
to Germany, which summed up the unclear points in the German proposals.E den 
and Lord Cranborne carefully examined it when they spent a weekend in Dorset in 
late April. On the 27th, Eden showed the document to Baldwin and Chamberlain, 
and the Chancellor had no objection. The Foreign Secretary asked his colleagues 
“whether it would be advisable for a Cabinet Minister, but not himself, to discuss the 
questions in Berlin with the German Government.”^^^
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At the Cabinet meeting on the 29th, he wanted this despatch sent to Germany 
soon, but he doubted “whether there was a possibility of a détente between this 
country and Germany.” Postponing the consideration of the questionnaire until next 
day, “the Cabinet entered on a preliminary review of their general policy in the new 
situation that was developing.” Baldwin was, with the support of Simon, inclined to 
send the questions to the Germans by a Minister “for the reason that the ordinary 
diplomatic channels hardly seemed to function in dealing with dictators.” But some 
other Cabinet members took a different view on the grounds that it was to lower the 
prestige of the Diplomatic Service as a whole. Furthermore, it “would encourage the 
Germans as to our attitude, and re-awaken French suspicions and lack of confidence 
that was so important a feature in the present situation.” Several Ministers suggested 
that the discussion on this should be left until after the general policy had been settled. 
They emphasised the necessity and importance both in rearmament and in 
appeasement:
Time was vital for the completion of our defensive security. ... There 
was every advantage,...in coming to terms with Hitler and fastening him 
down to keep the peace in the west. ... In the long run French interests 
were bound up with our own, so our line should be to try and obtain 
détente with Germany.
Being disturbed by the urgency and difficulty of the Defence programmes, Inskip, the 
Minister for Co-ordination of Defence, requested the Government to give priority to 
the Defence programmes rather than commercial business. However, this proposal 
was not favourably echoed by Chamberlain, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who 
advocated “cheap defence” and usually kept the budget tight for all three services.
He shelved the proposal, but avoided giving an immediate answer by saying that this 
question “should be reserved until after decisions had been reached on the major 
policy of the Government,” In the end, the Cabinet took the Chancellor's proposal as 
their conclusion and appointed a Committee”  ^ to consider the immediate policy.
The following day, the Cabinet members continued to consider the draft of a
questionnaire. Eden told his partners
that the difficulty in drafting the questions had been not to give offence 
to the Germans and not to encourage them to make fresh claims. The 
paragraph relating to colonies, for example, had been re-drafted several 
times so as to avoid inviting the Gennans to raise their maximum 
demands.
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It was true that when the P.O. prepared this cowardly and humiliating document, they 
not only avoided condemning Hitler’s violation of the Treaty, but also used language 
that was as mild as possible. However, when they went through the draft paragraph 
by paragraph, the Ministers still thought some paragraphs to be “somewhat 
provocative” or “of rather a pin-pricking character”, which “might lead the Germans 
to give a reply which would increase our difficulties in bringing about the desired 
negotiation.” They agreed to a number of modifications, with the general aim of 
making the language even milder without losing the essential purpose. They asked 
the F. O. to make firrther revisions according to the more conciliatory tone, and the 
re-draft would be discussed again by the Cabinet on May 4.^ ^^
The Cabinet's amendments were not at all popular in the F. O. When the
members of the staff (Wigram, Strang and Malkin) redrafted the document, Wigram
complained to Van.,
The real difficulty arises out of the Cabinet dissatisfaction with 
paragraphs 7 and 8 of the original draft. ... I find it quite impossible to 
work in the Secretary of State's idea ... 1 must re-emphasise the 
importance of our Questions being adequate. We are pledged to the 
French on the matter. (...) I think there would be a breach of faith with 
the French if the Questions were not adequate...
Nevertheless, they had to, with a long discussion, make revision again and again in 
obedience to their masters' instructions.
But at the Cabinet meeting on May 4, according to the minute, “Doubts were 
raised once more as to the wisdom of including Paragraph 8, which asked for an 
explanation of the distinction between the Reich and the German nation”. Eden 
explained that this “was a matter in which every nation in Europe was intensely 
interested”, and “all his advisers at the Foreign Office, whatever their general attitude 
towards Germany, were in favour of including Paragraph 8.” He warned that “if the 
Cabinet insisted on omitting it they would be closing their eyes to a matter of great 
importance.” Simon and Chamberlain separately put forward their amendments for 
that paragraph and the latter's revision was taken into the final form of the 
document.
On the 6th, Phipps was authorised to present the questionnaire to the Germans.
In his interview with Hitler a week later, the Führer told him that the German reply
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would not be given until after the new French Government had been in the saddle, i.e. 
the middle of June. He also discouraged the British desire to send a Minister to 
Berlin. Subsequently, the Germans kept delaying an answer no matter how hard 
Phipps urged them.^ '^^  The Ambassador reported on the 15th that Hitler declared 
openly that he would build fortifications on the Rhineland, which in fact had 
already begun. According to his observation. Hitler had been “gradually moving 
away from the idea of a conference or any form of general settlement.” The 
German Chancellor was “in great form” and had “no intention of replying seriously to 
our questions.”^^* Mr Kirkpatrick, the Ambassador's subordinate, told Wigram on 
June 8,
what in his opinion we ought to realise was that in a year's time it 
would not be we who would be addressing questions to Germany 
designed to ascertain whether it was worth negotiating with her, but the 
Germans who would be considering whether we were worth 
negotiating with, or whether they would simply dictate their desires to 
u&^^
The information from the Berlin Embassy aroused “a continuation of the mood of
disillusionment”. Wigram was very pessimistic:
In Eastern Europe I cannot see that we have anything much to gain 
either by agreement with Germany. ... as we have nothing to give her, 
she will not give us much in exchange.
(it was) disturbing to think that British public opinion has been so 
misled by all these years of unreality that, lest it should misunderstand, 
we are now obliged to run after the Germans and expose ourselves to 
what are almost impertinences.
Van. showed his distrust in Hitler and his criticism in his minute: “Hitler has never 
meant business in our sense of the word. The sooner the Cabinet realise that the 
better for this long misguided country. (It has received little chance of 
comprehension, and for this the first National Government must bear a very heavy 
responsibility).” However, he still insisted on his former policy, namely, bargaining 
with Germany by supporting rearmament. This diplomatic setback did not discourage 
Eden either. Based on Sargent’s suggestion, he instructed the F.O. that “we must 
continue to aim at the general agreement... It may be that it is unattainable, but it is 
we who must prove this, by making every effort to attain it...” Showing much more 
enthusiasm than his colleagues for the settlement, he suggested again “the offer of a
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visit of a Minister, if only because this would make it more difficult for Herr Hitler to 
take refuge in evasion, & would show our public our determination to get on if we 
can But the Cabinet generally inclined to the view “that it would be mistaken
to press Herr Hitler to receive a British Minister”. On the other hand, it was 
impossible “to let the matter drift for long”. In the course of discussion at the 
Cabinet meeting on May 20, they came to the conclusion that they should attempt to 
obtain a meeting of all the interested powers, at which, the Germans could be present 
to give their answer rather than to press them to reply immediately. However, it was 
pointed out that Britain wanted a settlement and knew that a Conference was the only 
hope. If the French and Belgian Governments learned that Hitler intended to re- 
fortify the Zone, all hope of a negotiation would disappear. Eden said that the last 
French Government would never have come to a Conference on those conditions, but 
the new French Government might be different.
On July 1, Eden had supper with M. Blum, the new French Prime Minister, and 
M. Zeeland in Geneva. The two Prime Ministers expressed a desire for a meeting of 
the Locarno Powers. The Locarno Ministers later came to a decision that the three 
powers would prepare a meeting probably inviting Italy but not Germany. After 
receiving Eden's telegram, Baldwin summoned the Ministers including Lord 
Cranborne and Van. to discuss the position. They agreed that it was “as good an 
arrangement as could be hoped for in all the circumstances”. The Prime Minister said 
that Hitler would think that “this was another attempt to annoy Germany.
On the 6th, the Cabinet members had a meeting to consider the possible terms of 
an agreement with Germany at the proposed meeting of Locarno Powers. They 
found themselves having to handle three difficulties at the same time: 1) the future of 
the League, 2) the British policy in Eastern Europe, 3) the German colonies.
As to 1), Eden turned down the proposal of going back to the policy of the
Geneva Protocol, which Churchill and the Labour Party supported, and chose the
policy “to work for a new Locarno Treaty and at the same time to declare a situation
in which Articles 10 and 16 of the (League) Covenant would disappear”. He said,
The object was to get Germany into conference, relinquishing the 
British questionnaire and asking them to come practically without 
conditions. If this was not done there was the risk that after the 
Olympic Games (August — Author) the Powers would get further 
demands from Germany.
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He then came to point 2) by summarising Phipps' observation;
it might be possible to get Germany to enter into a new Locarno 
Treaty, but it would be at the expense of Eastern and South-Eastern 
Europe, as Herr Hitler would never commit himself as regards Eastern 
Europe.... If we tried to get the German Chancellor to commit himself 
to a settlement for Europe as a whole Herr Hitler would be sure to 
refuse.
Some Ministers added, “while the Government should make up its own mind to
reduce its commitments in Eastern Europe we should not announce that we were
unwilling or unable to help in Eastern Europe.”
Impressed by Eden's description, his colleagues decided the general policy, which
resulted in a series of crises in the future:
our policy ought to be framed on the basis that we could not help 
Easter Europe. We ought, however, to resist by force any attempt 
against our own Empire or Flanders. If these were our basis,... our 
policy towards the future of the League ought to be somewhat on 
French lines: that is to say of regional pacts.
Regarding the colonial issue, they decided that “if Germany raised it we should make 
it quite clear that we would give up nothing.” In the end, they accepted the proposal 
that the Locarno Power meeting should be held in Brussels on July 22.^ ^^
As to the prospective meeting of Locarno Powers, Neurath, German Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, told Newton, H.M. Minister in Berlin, that Germany thought this 
meeting would be “premature” and would welcome a conference not earlier than 
September. The reply to the British questionnaire “when made might, however, throw 
some further light on prospects of a successfijl meeting.”^^  ^ That is to say that the 
Germans would not give any reply until autumn, or more exactly that there might not 
be any German reply. On November 19, the British Government made its request 
once more, by sending a note to the Germans asking for the Agenda of the Five- 
Power Conference. It took another four months waiting on this information. At 
last, the reply came on March 12, 1937 ~ one year after the Rhineland coup — in 
which the Germans actually refused the meeting by saying that they still accepted the 
invitation in principle but they “felt that ground had not yet been sufficiently 
prepared.”^^^
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VI. COMMENT
Compared with policy towards Japan and Italy, conciliatory policy towards 
Germany formed a major part of general appeasement. It was during the Rhineland 
crisis that appeasement towards Germany had been developed and formed. From 
then on, this policy had been carried out right down to the outbreak of the Second 
World War. As a result, not only was the Rhineland lost, but also the fate of Austria, 
Czechoslovakia and Poland was doomed.
In March 1936, the Western Powers had every possibility of checking Hitler. 
Militarily, until the end of 1935 the British still had a prospective 50 per cent 
superiority to the Germans in air force. In addition, excluding the Belgian troops, 
France, without mobilisation, had a 60,000 army ready against about 20,000 Geiman 
soldiers in the Rhineland. It is widely accepted, as Churchill said, that if the 
Western Powers had taken action, “Hitler would have been compelled by his own 
General Staff to withdraw, and a check would have been given to his pretensions 
which might well have proved fatal to his rule.” Failure to do so “lost iiTetrievably 
the last chance of arresting Hitler’s ambitions without a serious war.” "^^^
However, some historians follow the appeasers’ argument that public opinion did 
not allow Britain and France to be involved in war with Germany over the 
Rhineland. This argument, which exaggerates unduly the view of non-intervention, 
aims to shift off*the responsibility on to the public and helps appeasers evade the 
blame. In fact, not only did many newspapers demand to meet the German challenge, 
but also the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House strongly recommended support 
for the French. According to the view of the German Ambassador in London, if Sir 
Austen had been the Foreign Secretary and Churchill Defence Minister, the British 
Government might have taken joint action with France. In other words, it was the 
Government not the public that remained inactive. In addition, without consulting the 
public, appeasement towards Germany had been completed before the public was 
alarmed by the crisis. The British leaders not only ignored outside opinion, but also 
moulded it by using various means so as to create atmosphere which seemed 
overwhelmingly favourable to the Government’s policy. Therefore, instead of 
influencing the Government, public opinion, as Wigram confessed, had been misled 
by the British leaders for their own purpose.
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The policy-making in this period represented its general characteristics: the 
majority of senior officials, in particular Sargent, Wigram and Van, intended to come 
to terms with Germany. Even after the Rhineland was lost they insisted on continuing 
the proposed policy to appease the Germans further and more quickly rather than 
choosing the alternative to appeasement. The appeasers urged speedy rearmament 
with the purpose of obtaining a stronger position to make a deal with Germany 
instead of preparing to fight. The only proposal with some anti-appeasement 
characteristics by Mr Collier was killed at the first stage of policy-making. On the 
other hand, the advisers in the F.O. and Chiefs of Staff had to find a basis for policy 
according to their bosses’ views, otherwise, their advice would be either amended or 
ignored.
At ministerial level, Eden, as arch-appeaser, should bear most responsibility for 
wrong guidance of British foreign policy at that time. Since Baldwin had little 
interest in foreign policy, the Foreign Secretary was the key member in the Cabinet 
when it came to concluding policy. His youth and his vigorous character increased 
his determination and power in pursuing this policy. His “appeasement”, although he 
denied it was the same as Chamberlain’s, was proved to be no different from the 
latter’s. Appeasement, after being shaped by his hand, remained as a fundamental 
policy towards Germany in the remaining years of the 1930s.
In addition, attention should be drawn to another two factors which led to British 
lack of action: firstly, the grave situation in the Far East as well as in the 
Mediterranean made it difficult for the appeasers to choose a firm line against 
Germany. When they set up Far Eastern appeasement, the original scheme was that 
accommodation with Japan would allow Britain to concentrate on the German 
menace. Now in the fact of Hitler’s adventure, they believed that if Britain was 
involved in any trouble with Germany or Italy, Japan would take the opportunity to 
harm British interests in the Far East. Their logic had thus become: continuing to 
appease Japan in order to concentrate on Europe, on the other hand, appeasing 
Germany and Italy in order to rob Japan of any chance of destroying British interests 
in the Far East. Therefore, the appeasers would not fight anywhere.
Secondly, the British leaders were inferior to Hitler in playing a game of this kind. 
The German Chancellor knew them better than they did him. He foresaw correctly
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that his coup against the Zone would not be answered by military action. Baldwin, 
however, simply did not understand the dictator at all as he said, “We none of us 
know what is going on in that strange man's mind.” “He had never been able to find 
anyone who could give him really reliable information about Hitler's character and 
designs”.B e f o r e  the crisis, they did not believe the French information that Hitler 
would strike soon; during the crisis, they turned a deaf ear to the estimate that the 
German troops would withdraw if other Locarno Powers interfered; and after the 
crisis, they were still under the illusion that Hitler was in the mood to make a deal in 
spite of information that showed the reverse. Their decision based on 
misunderstanding, therefore, could not be correct.
What is worse, the lessons drawn from the crisis show that the appeasers would 
continue their hopeless and powerless policy. The Chiefs of Staff reported that 
bound by collective security, Britain might suddenly be involved in war without full 
preparation due to her would-wide interests. Therefore, they advised the Cabinet to 
abandon the collective security rather than strengthen it.^ '*^  Confronted with “the 
downfall of the League, the resurrection and consequent rivalry of Germany”, 
Chamberlain affirmed in July 1936, “we have no policy”.
After the Rhineland episode, the world situation was graver: the aggressive 
powers came closer and finally formed the Berlin-Rome-Tokyo Axis. In contrast, the 
Western Powers found themselves divergent in interests and strategic positions, 
facing possible aggression: Belgium broke away fi*om the collective security of 
Locarno. Appeasement, with its original scheme of avoiding any risk of war, put 
Britain in a revised position, in which she had to face three enemies at the same time. 
It could be said that if Manchuria and Abyssinia made the Second World War 
possible, the Rhineland made it almost inevitable. Moreover, the loss of the 
Rhineland offered Hitler a favourable situation for beginning his next adventure — the 
Anschluss.
154
10
14
18
Gibbs, N. H., Grand Strategy (I), London 1976, p. 135.
Baynes, N. H. (ed.). The Speeches o f Adolf Hitler April 1922 - August 1939, London 1942, 
ipç.\20^-\2\\. Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919 - 1939, 2nd-XII, N570. 
Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918 - 1945, C-IV, pp. 171-178. 
ibid, N107.
On August 7, Neurath, the German Foreign Minister wrote to State Secretary Bulow that it 
was undesirable and premature to discuss the Pact questions with Britain and France at tliat 
stage. He would not advise Hitler to make a definitive statement and “no German views 
can be expected before October.” [ibid, N252.]
Hitler had only spoken his consideration to Herr von Neurath, the Foreign Minister; Herr 
von Blomberg, Colonel General and War Minister; Herr von Fritsch, General and 
Commander in Chief of the Army; Herr von Ribbentrop, Ambassador Extraordinary; Herr 
Goering, General and President of the Reich; von Bulow, State Secretary; Hassell, Germany 
Ambassador in Italy; and Dr. Forster, Counselor at the German Embassy in France on 
several occasions, [ibid, N564 & note 3, N575; Haraszti, E. H., The Invaders: Hitler 
Occupies the Rhineland, Budapest 1983, Appendix VIII: Forester, Details o f The Rhineland 
Occupation.]
DGFP C-IV, N564.
ibid, N579; Haraszti, Appendix VIII; Nicolson, N. (ed.), Harold Nicolson: Diaries and 
Letters 1930-1939, London 1966, p.247.
DGFP C-IV, N575.
Harold Nicolson’s Diaries, p.249. Phipps heard privately that “tlie Army Chiefs have 
advised against any military action in the matter.” A German General Staff officer also 
confirmed to the British Military Attaché that “tlie Chancellor’s decision to enter into 
demilitarised zone was taken ... against the advice of General Staff who thought and still 
tliink the risk was too great” on the groimds that France would demand withdrawal of the 
German troops, failing which she might attempt to drive them out by force. [DBFP 2nd- 
XVI, Nos. 27, 52 note 2.]
Shirer, W. L., The Rise and Fall o f The Third Reich, London 1961, p.291; DGFP C-IV,
p.1218.
DGFP C-V, N3.
Schmidt, P., Hitler's Interpreter, London 1950, p.41.
For example, apart from Eden and Van., many otlier staff such as Mr Carr; Mr Wigram, 
Head of the Central Department; Sargent, Counselor at the F.O.; Mr W. Strang, Counsellor 
at tlie F.O.; Lord Stanhope, Parliamentary Under Secretary; and Lord Cranborne, Under 
Secretary held this point of view. [DBFP 2nd-XV, N490 & notes 2, 3, N493.]
Van also had a strong influence on his bosses. He was Baldwin’s private secretary before 
he became Permanent Under-Secretary. He was close to MacDonald and his advice had 
great weight in the latter’s decision and latter’s cabinet. Being a long time in his post as 
PUS, he worked witli three Foreign Secretaries. Simon quite relied on him. Hoare was 
perhaps tlie Foreign Secretary whom Van had most influence on. It was generally accepted 
in the Cabinet that Hoare had been misled by his official Van dining the Hoare-Laval affair. 
Eden usually took Van’s suggestion too although their personal relationship was poor. 
Chamberlain disliked this and said, “Van had the effect of multiplying the extent of 
Anthony’s natural vibrations...” [DBFP 2nd-XV, Appendix II (b); Rose, Vansittart: Study 
o f a Diplomat, London 1978, pp. 63-64, 109, 164, 165, 167, 168; Avon, Facing The 
Dictators, London 1962, pp. 187, 521; Colvin, Vansittart in Office, London 1965, pp. 21, 
148; Simon, Retrospect, London 1952, p. 177; Jones, T., A Diary with Letters 1931-1950, 
London 1954, pp. 158-160; Middlemas, Diplomacy o f Illusion, London 1972, p. 78.]
DBFP 2nd-XVII, Appendix II, pp.794, 796.
Templewood, Nine Troubled Years, London 1954, pp. 136, 202, 256-257; Dutton, D., 
“Simon and Eden at the Foreign Office 1931-1935”, Review o f International Studies (1994) 
Vol. 20, pp.42-43; Halifax, Fulness o f Days, London 1957, pp. 194-195; Avon, pp. 319,
383, 445.
‘ Avon., p.242.
155
30
Templewood, p.373.
Gilbert & Gott, The Appeasers, London 1963, p. 11; Rose, p. vii.
Simon, p. 178.
See Chapter 1, p. 59 above.
DBFP 2nd-VI, Appendix III.
DBFP 2nd-XIII, N14.
DBFP 2nd-Vl, N322.
DGFP C-IV, N107.
DBFP 2nd-XV, N507. 
ibid, N213. 
ibid, N271 & note 3.
A collection of Phipps’ despatches from 1933 to 1935 was circulated to the Cabinet as an 
important reference for the German problem, [ibid, N460.] 
ibid. Appendix I (a), 
ibid. Appendix I (b). 
ibid, Appendix I (c) & note 16. 
ibid, N241.
ibid, N383; DGFP C-IV, Nos. 460, 462.
DBFP 2nd-XV, N383 note 7, N404. 
ibid, N404 note 5. 
ibid, N382. 
ibid, N455.
ibid, N455 note 3, N476; Gibbs, p.230. Among the Cabinet members, there used to exist 
different opinions towards the zone. Baldwin said to the House on July 30, 1934, “When 
you think of the defence of England, you no longer think of the chalk cliffs of Dover; you 
think of the Rhine”. Simon also suggested to the Cabinet in early 1935 that the 
demilitarisation of the Rhineland should still be considered “a vital British interest.” But 
after discussion, the Cabinet drew the opposite conclusion. [Gibbs, pp. 107,228.]
DBFP 2nd-XV, N476. 
ibid, N521 & note 1. 
ibid, N460.
Cab23/83 3(36); DBFP 2nd-XV, N460 note 3, N460 note 3; DBFP 2nd-XX, Nos. 450, 457; 
also see Chapter 2, pp. 105-106 above, 
ibid, N382.
ibid, N471, N493 note 7, N497, Appendix IV (b). 
ibid. Appendix IV (b). 
ibid, N509. 
ibid, N509 note 3. 
ibid, N521 note 1. 
ibid. Nos. 482, 483. 
ibid, N521. 
ibid, N524. 
ibid, N541.
DBFP 2nd-XVI, Nos. 9, 10, 12.
The Franco-Russian Pact was ratified by 353 votes to 164 in the French Chamber on 
February 27,1936. The British Government had much reservation over this Pact. In the 
Cabinet meeting of February 12, Eden said that “we had not been consulted before tlie 
signature of the pact and there appeared no reason why we should express any opinion.” It 
was suggested that they should tell Germany that “we had had nothing to do with the 
matter.” [Cab23/83 6(36).]
Cab23/83 15(36).
DBFP 2nd-XVI, N29 & note 5; DGFP C-V, N8.
DBFP 2nd-XVI, N24.
Baynes, pp. 1271-1302.
DGFP C-V, N66.
Gannon, F. R., The British Press and Germany 1936 - 1939, Oxford 1971, pp.93-99.
41
44
156
72
73
74
76
80
81
86
93
94
95
96
97
98
101
102
Harold Nicolson's Diaries, p.248; DGFP C-V, Nos. 66, 178.
H.C. Debs. 5s Vol. 309, col. 1863.
DGFP C-V, Nos. 66, 178.
Harold Nicolson’s Diaries, pp.249-250.
Churchill, The Gathering Storm, London 1948, pp. 159-160; DGFP C-V,. N178.
DGFP C-V, N178. It was generally accepted that Churchill would be appointed as Minister 
of Co-ordinate Defence. However, to everyone’s surprise. Inskip, instead, was announced 
as Defence Minister on March 13 by the Cabinet, who thought that appointment of 
Churchill would be "provocative” to Hitler, [ibid, N178 note 9; Middlemas and Barnes, 
Baldwin, London 1969, pp.916-917.]
Avon, p.367.
Adamthwaite, A., “The British Government and the Media, 1937-1938”, Journal o f 
Contemporary History, Vol. 18 (1983), pp.282-283.
H. C. Debs. 5s. Vol. 309, col. 1812 
Avon., p.343.
ibid, p.344; DBFP 2nd-XVI, N39. 
ibid. Nos. 40, 47.
ibid, N48. At the Locarno Power meeting of March 10, Italy declared that being “a State 
subject to sanctions” due to the Abyssinian problem, she “could not agree in advance to any 
action of political, economic, or military character”, [ibid, N63.] 
ibid, N48.
Avon., p.346.
H. C. Debs. 5s. Vol.309, cols. 1808-1813.
DBFP 2nd-XVl, N49 & note 3; Avon, p.347. 
ibid, N63.
ibid, N70 note 1; Cab23/83 18(36).
Cab23/83 18(36).
DBFP 2nd-XVI, Nos. 70, 74, 78 note 7; DGFP C-V, N85.
Churchill, p.l53; Harold Nicolson's Diaries, pp.250-25I.
Churchill, p. 154; also see the possible record of this conversation in DBFP 2nd-XVI, N78. 
Felling, Life o f Neville Chamberlain, London 1946, p.279.
DBFP 2nd-XVI, N109; also see Nos. 82, 91.
ibid, N119.
ibid, N110.
ibid, NllO note 5.
ibid, N115 & note 2.
In the final Resolution of March 19, it says, “decide to invite the German Government to 
lay before the Permanent Court of International Justice at the Hague the argument wliich it 
claims to draw from the incompatibility between the Franco-Soviet Pact of Mutual 
Assistance and the Treaty of Locarno, and to undertake to accept as final the decision of the 
said court, without prejudice to the operation of paragraph 7(2) below, (i.e. revision of the 
status of the Rliineland.)” [ibid, N144.]
Cab23/83 21(36).
DBFP 2nd-XVI, N132 note 5, N144; Avon., p.360.
DBFP 2nd-XVI, N145; DGFP C-V, N162.
DBFP 2nd-XVI, N163; DGFP C-V, N207.
DBFP 2nd-XVI, N193; DGFP C-V, N242.
Cab23/83 26(36).
DBFP 2nd-XVI, p.228. Nos. 222, 223. 
ibid, N202.
Cab23/83 28(36).
DBFP2nd-XVI,N219. 
ibid, Nos. 234, 277.
See p. 140 above.
DBFP 2nd-XVI, N74; DGFP C-V, N85.
DBFP 2nd-XVI, N122.
157
113
114
l i s
117
ibid, N135.
ibid, N121, N122 note 4. 
ibid, N122 note 4, N135 note 5. 
ibid, N272. 
ibid, N277.
Avon., p.371.
DBFP 2nd-XVI, N277 note 10.
Duff Cooper said at the Cabinet meeting of March 11 that “in three years’ time, though we 
should have reconditioned at any rate to some extent our small forces, yet by tliat time 
Germany would have 100 divisions and a powerful fleet. We should not relatively, 
therefore, be in a better position.” [See Cab23/83 18(36).] As to the policy of rearmament, 
please see Chapter 1, pp.60-61; Chapter 5, pp. 235-239; Chapter 6, pp.257-258.
The Cabinet Committee was composed of Baldwin (in the chair), MacDonald,
Chamberlain, Lord Hailsham, Simon, Eden, Halifax and Inskip.
DBFP 2nd-XVI, Appendix I (a) Exti^act from Cabinet Minutes o f April 29, 1936. 
ibid. Appendix I (b) Extract from Cabinet Minutes o f April 30, 1936. 
ibid, N283.
ibid. Nos. 283, 304, 306. 
ibid, N304 note 2. 
ibid, N304 & notes 2, 3; N307. 
ibid. Nos. 277 note 10, 310. 
ibid, N324.
ibid. Nos. 340, 369, 374, 394. On June 16, Neurath told Phipps that he had drafted the 
reply some time ago and submitted it to the Fulurer. It should have been handed to the 
British Ambassador on June 19, but Hitler held on to the document “in view of the 
impending meeting of remaining Locarno Powers.” [ibid, Nos. 374, 369; DGFP C-V, 
N466.]
DBFP 2nd-XVI, N328. 
ibid. Nos. 320, 414. 
ibid, N339. 
ibid, N371. 
ibid, N356.
ibid, N328 note 3; N339 note 2.
Cab23/83 38(36).
DBFP 2nd-XVI, N393. 
ibid, N404. 
ibid, N407 note 4.
ibid, Appendix II Extract from Cabinet Minutes o f July 6, 1936. The Three Power meeting 
was held in London on July 23 according to the British Government’s suggestion. Italy 
refused the invitation with some reluctance, [ibid, Nos. 420, 429, 432, 436 ] 
ibid, N417.
Toynbee (ed.), Sttr\>ey o f International Affairs 1936, p.341.
138 DBFP 2nd-XVII, N389.
DBFP 2nd-XVin, N274.
Gibbs, pp. 139-140; DBFP 2nd-XVII, N386 & notes 1, 4.
DBFP 2nd-XVI, Nos.82, 112.
Churchill, p. 152.
Eubank, The Origins o f World War II, Illinois 1969, pp.56-57; Bell, The Origins o f the 
Second World War in Europe, London 1986, p.211; Adams, British Politics and Foreign 
Policy in the Age o f Appeasement 1935-39, London 1993, p. 47; Avon, p.376. 
ibid, pp.324, 366-367.
Middlemas & Barnes, pp. 947, 950.
Gibbs, p.252.
Feiling, p.295.
Sw^fey 1936, pp. 351-360
125
126
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
143
144
145
146
147
148
158
Chapter 4 THE ANSCHLUSS
1. THE ANSCHLUSS AND ITS PREPARATION
The Austro-German union was forbidden by the Versailles Treaty. However, it 
was one of the principal aims that Hitler had declared in Mein Kampf. As soon as he 
came to power, his policy towards Austria was the Gleichschallung that preceded the 
Anschluss, namely, working for the collapse of the Austrian Government and 
replacing it by the Austrian Nazi Party, which offered a basis for the Austro-German 
union. ^
On July 25,1934, the Austrian Nazis attacked the Federal Chancellery and killed 
Chancellor Dollfliss, declaring the formation of a new government; but the Putsch 
was immediately put down by the Federal Army and police.  ^ Learning from this 
failure, Hitler adopted Papen’s proposal that the problem of Austrian union with 
Germany could only be resolved by “evolutionary methods”, namely, by creating a 
proper international situation and by pressure from outside.^ He appointed Papen as 
Ambassador in Vienna on a special mission to be in charge of the Austrian affairs. On 
the other hand, he and Goering personally enforced control of the Austrian Nazi 
Party.
On July 11, 1936, Papen, representing the German Government, signed an 
agreement with Schuschnigg, the Austria Chancellor. By this agreement, the 
Austrian Government had to associate with the Nazi Opposition and to pursue a 
common foreign policy with Germany. The possible Austro-German Union had 
become “family affairs” between the two German States."^  At the same time, Hitler 
instructed the General Staff to draw up “Special Operation Otto” — a military plan to 
occupy Austria, which was renewed under his direction on June 24, 1937.^
In the mean time, the European situation was turning more and more favourable 
to Hitler’s adventure. Italy, the main obstacle to the Anschluss, split from the Stresa 
Front due to her quarrel with Britain and France over the Abyssinian business. 
Mussolini had realised as early as April 1935 that he had to give up Austria so as to 
complete his ambition in Africa.  ^ Early in 1936, the Duce on various occasions told 
Hassell, German Ambassador in Italy, that the Stresa Front had died and Locarno
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would cease/ As to Austria, he had a long conversation with the Ambassador on 
January 6, in which he said,
If Austria, as a formally quite independent State, were thus in practice 
to become a German satellite, he would have no objection/
It was apparent that Mussolini had left Austria to Hitler. Late in October, the 
Berlin-Rome axis was formed,^ and the possibility of Italian interference had been 
completely dismissed.
On the British side, Simon (Foreign Secretary) and Eden (Parliamentary Under­
secretary) had showed British understanding to the Führer’s desire during their visit 
to Berlin in March 1935. Simon told Hitler,
Britain had not the same interest in Austria, as, for example, in 
Belgium. She had never interfered in Austrian affairs and was still 
confining herself to the hope that the problems there would be solved.
Halifax conveyed clearer information to the Führer in November 1937. In their
conversation, the main problems discussed were disarmament, colonies, Austria,
Czechoslovakia, Danzig and the League of Nations. The British Minister implied
acquiescence in the German reoccupation of the Rhineland and went on to state on
behalf of H.M.G that
possibility of change of the existing situation was not excluded, but that 
changes should only take place upon the basis of reasonable agreements 
reasonably reached. ... Amongst these questions were Danzig, Austria, 
and Czechoslovakia.^^
He particularly emphasised “that also applies to Austria”. When he heard this, “Hitler 
again became excited.”
Soon after Halifax’s visit, Eden gave confirmation to Ribbentrop, the German
Ambassador in London,
He had told the French that the question of Austria was of much 
greater interest to Italy than to England. Furthermore, people in 
England recognized that a closer connection between Germany and 
Austria would have to come about sometime.
England and France agreed that in Central Europe (Austria and 
Czechoslovakia) certain changes could be made, provided, however, 
that the status quo was not changed by force.
]
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Time seemed ripe for the Führer to consider the final solution. On November 5, 
1937, he summoned his subordinates (three commanders-in-chief^ war minister and 
foreign minister) to decide the plan of German expansion. In his opinion, England 
would never give up her colonies, so Germany could only seek for this space in 
Europe. He analysed that Britain was not able to defend her Empire by her own 
power, “but only by in alliance with other states.” France, in spite of her greater 
military strength, was confronted with internal political difficulties. He believed that 
“Germany’s problem could only be solved by means of force and this was never 
without attendant risk.” He estimated that action should have been taken by 1943-45 
because the rest of the world not have completed its counter-measures against 
German invasion by that time. Therefore Germany “were obliged to take the 
offensive.” The Führer considered that there were two cases in which there was the 
necessity for action — either France was involved in serious domestic crisis or she was 
embroiled by a war with another country, tor example with Italy. Hitler “was 
convinced of Britain’s nonparticipation, and therefore he did not believe in the 
probability of belligerent action by France against Germany.” Hitler concluded that 
the time for a German attack on the Czechs and Austria “must be made dependent on 
the course of the Anglo-French-Italian war”, which, he foresaw, would come nearer, 
probably in the summer of 1938.
However, the situation in Austria did not amuse Berlin very much. Schuschnigg, 
despite conceding to German pressure, insisted on the importance of Austrian 
independence and hesitated to absorb the Austrian Nazi leaders into his cabinet. 
Neurath, the German Foreign Minister strongly condenmed him by asking, did 
Schuschnigg “really think that he can proceed with ruthless measures against National 
Socialism in Austria and still steer a common course with the Reich in matters 
affecting the German peoples?” Papen warned the Austrian Chancellor on December 
21, “the Agreement of July 11 was not functioning satisfactorily, ... Germany had to 
demand more than mere passive assistance from Austria.” With Hitler’s approval, 
he arranged a conference of the German and Austrian Chancellors with the purpose 
of clarifying “the controversial issues” between them.^^
The meeting was held at Berchtesgaden on February 12, 1938. During the 
stormy interview, Hitler threatened Schuschnigg by saying that if his guest did not
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meet his demands, he would immediately order the Aimy to march across the border. 
In order to destroy Schuschnigg’s idea of turning to the Western Powers, he side, 
“Halifax had completely approved of German’s attitude towards Austria and 
Czechoslovakia.” In the end, Schuschnigg yielded. Seyss-Inquast, the Austrian Nazi 
leader, was to be offered a post in Schuschnigg’s cabinet as Minister of the Interior.
However, the Austrians did not want to surrender completely. After he failed to 
gain support from the Western Powers, Schuschingg took a final measure to defend 
the independence of his Motherland, calling a plebiscite on March 13.^  ^ This 
provoked the Führer, who was considering a final solution of the Austrian problem 
either by evolutionary means or by force if necessary. Information from Paris 
showed that France would not interfere due to her internal problems although 
Flandin, the French Foreign Minister, said, “a formal ‘Anschluss’ had to be avoided.” 
Britain held a more conciliatory attitude on the eve of the Anschluss as Halifax, the 
successor of Eden, emphasised when he told Ribbentrop, who was visiting London 
that “England had no attention of ‘blocking up Austria’. England admitted that this 
was a problem which primarily concerned Germany.” According to the record, 
Henderson, the new Ambassador in Berlin, even told Hitler on March 3 that he 
himself “often advocated the Anschluss.” ®^
The Führer decided to act. He first sent Keppler, his right-hand man, to Vienna 
“to prevent the plebiscite”, and then gave the order to execute “Operation Otto” on 
March 11.^  ^ On the morning of the 12th, the German troops rolled across the border. 
Austria had become province “Ostmark” in the Third Reich,
11. IMPORTANT PERSONNEL CHANGES BN CHAMBERLAIN'S
GOVERNMENT
In 1936, Baldwin’s health, which had not been very good before, was worsening. 
It made his retirement “both desirable and impossible” because he could hardly deal 
with successive crises with his disability. It was widely thought that Chamberlain 
would take over.^^
In May 1937 Chamberlain replaced Baldwin, forming “a one-man Government”. 
With a nature made up of alertness, fixed opinions, self-confidence and intolerance, 
he immediately gave his colleagues the impression that he was a more powerful Prime
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Minister than his predecessor. “His mind, once made up, hard to change.”^^  He ran
the Cabinet with an iron hand: his “remarkable strength of character and single-
minded determination” kept the majority of his colleagues at his side. He was close
to Hoare, Simon and Halifax, and often consulted them about foreign policy.^^
However, his interfering in the conduct of foreign policy annoyed Eden very much,
who believed that the Prime Minister knew nothing about diplomacy.This was
perhaps one of the reasons that led to the breakdown of their relationship.
Chamberlain had previously made his impact on foreign policy making as the
Chancellor of the Exchequer, mainly by cutting expenditure on rearmament, which
had the effect of pushing foreign policy to the direction of conceding to the
aggressors. Now as the Prime Minister, he was over-confident in reaching “a
reasonable understanding with both Germany and Italy”, as he said.
The dictators are too often regarded as though they were entirely 
inhuman. I believe this idea to be quite erroneous. ... they can be 
approached with the greatest hope of successftil issue.
Although historical fact had proved his Munich policy was wrong, he never doubted 
the rightness of what he had done at Munich until his death.^  ^ During his long 
premiership, the British foreign policy was unfortunately pulled further and further 
into a disastrous abyss under his dictatorial instruction.
The first personnel change after Chamberlain took office was announced at the 
beginning of 1938 that Van. was moved fi'om the post of Permanent Under Secretary 
to Chief Diplomatic Adviser. The new appointment was aimed at reducing his effect 
on policy making because he was more and more at odds with his colleagues.^* From 
then on, he advised and functioned “ONLY IF AND WHEN ASKED.”^
Van.’s successor was Sir Alexander Cadogan, who was “an individual of great 
discretion, serving men of very different stamp with apparently complete composure.” 
He was favoured by Ministers because he held “a less black view of German 
intentions” and was able to take a line which they “naturally found more palatable 
than Vansittant’s incessant admonitions.”^^  As for Central and Eastern Europe, the 
new Permanent Under Secretary explored his idea in his Diaries that German 
expansion in that area was inevitable and Britain could not stop it.^ ^
During this period, Sir Horace Wilson “gained in influence”. A graduate of the 
London School of Economics, he had been Chief Industrial Adviser to the
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Government since 1930. He was an “invaluable” civil servant to Chamberlain 
because he could, “with his knowledge and his understanding”, share Chamberlain’s 
loneliness, which was inevitably resulted from the Prime Minister’s position. It was 
not certain whether he “shared Chamberlain’s ideas, or shaped them”, but it was 
certain that he “promulgated them”. Becoming Chamberlain’s confidential adviser, 
he was “a power unequalled by any member of the Cabinet except the Prime 
Minister.” Not only did Chamberlain tmst him, but also Halifax and Hoare admired 
him. His role, as the German Embassy commented, was “the Prime Minister’s closest 
adviser. It is well known that Sir Horace Wilson is decidedly pro-German, but he 
keeps himself completely in the background.”^^
However, the greatest change was that Eden resigned on February 20, 1938 due 
to a divergence in outlook between him and Chamberlain over the issue of the de jure 
recognition of the Italian conquest of Abyssinia. The Prime Minister wanted to buy 
off Mussolini unconditionally by offering him this recognition so as to “bring 
appeasement in the Mediterranean.”^^  Eden, however, proposed that Anglo-Italian 
rapprochement could only be reached on the condition that Italy withdrew her 
volunteers from Spain and ceased anti-British propaganda. However, until the 
beginning of 1938, he, in spite of some reservations, accommodated himself to 
Chamberlain’s desire regarding appeasement with Italy.
This was the apparent reason that led his resignation. However, it was difficult to 
find any principal divergence between the courses that they wanted to pursue. Some 
of his colleagues simply could not understand why he decided to resign. The 
underlying reason perhaps was, as Halifax analysed, that Eden could not tolerate 
Chamberlain’s interference in foreign policy any longer. His resignation was “a result 
of difference of temperament and training” and a point that “had been reached where 
the Prime Minister and Eden no longer saw eye to eye over the methods” that were 
“desirable to use in furtherance of their common object.”^^  Therefore, it is a common 
misunderstanding among many statesmen and scholars to say that his resignation 
reflected his rift with Chamberlain over general appeasement including policy towards 
Germany.^  ^ Whereas, in fact, his policy toward Germany was completely in 
accordance with Chamberlain’s, as we will discuss in this chapter. **
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After Eden resigned, Halifax, whom Chamberlain thought the only suitable 
candidate, was appointed as Foreign Secretary. Halifax was “a man of simplicity and 
humility.” Unlike his predecessor, he preferred to follow Chamberlain rather than to 
initiate foreign policy. Sometimes he did voice his different views, but without 
insisting on them, he could cooperate very well with the Prime Minister. Chamberlain 
always admired him as “a Cabinet mind”, and relied very much on his judgement.
In addition, according to Van’s recommendation, Eden appointed Sir Nevile 
Henderson, from three candidates, to be the British Ambassador in Berlin in April 
1 9 3 7  40 Henderson’s pro-German attitude was very well known as his colleagues 
critically noted:
Sir N, Henderson had by now created for himself such an entirely Nazi 
reputation everywhere that much of what he says is discounted.
Van later was very angry with Henderson’s behaviour in Berlin and said, “Henderson 
is a complete Nazi,” and “the Foreign Office do not trust him to represent their real 
point of view.”'^  ^ Even so, Henderson was admired as usual by Chamberlain, who 
even turned down ministers’ proposals on the strength of the Ambassador’s 
suggestions."^  ^ We will see how British foreign policy in forthcoming crises was 
misled by his Excellency.
Until the outbreak of war, although the F.O. was still a part of the policy-making 
machinery, more important procedures had been shifting to the Foreign Policy 
Committee of the Cabinet (FPC),"^  ^ particularly in the hands of “the Big Four”, 
referring to Chamberlain, Halifax, Simon and Hoare. Whatever decision was reached, 
it would be the product of their complete agreement."*"^  It was widely recognised that 
the foreign policy was “run by the P.M. and a small committee”. Some F.O. staff 
“discussed frankly the P.M.’s dictatorship in the Cabinet.” Chamberlain, in Harvey’s 
words, “likes his present Cabinet of yes-men”, in which he could dictate and cany out 
his policy with (and sometimes without) co-operation of his team."^ ^
To sum up, all these resignations and appointments meant, as Butler, 
Parliamentary Under Secretary, remarked, the decline of the old pro-French foreign 
service and the ascendancy of pro-German diplomats in the Chamberlain 
Government."^  ^ It had completed the personnel changes that paved the way for 
pushing appeasement further.
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m . BRITISH POLICY-MAKING BEFORE THE ANSCHLUSS
1. A Policy of “Keeping Germany Guessing"
When Chamberlain was to take over, apart from the Far East, the British 
Government faced two troublesome factors, wliich were linked to each other —
Italy’s disturbance in the Mediterranean and Germany’s expansion in Europe. 
Britain’s acquiescence in Italian success in Abyssinia did not constitute a split in the 
Stresa Front/^ however, by comparison with the German danger, the Italian problem 
was of only secondary importance. Although there existed controversy in policy 
towards Italy, the F.O. were unanimous in conclusion about the German issue under 
the guideline of Eden’s speeches at Leamington and Bradford."^ *
On May 4, 1937, Mr O’Malley, Counsellor and Head of Southern Department, 
minuted, that
if it became practicable to improve our relations with Germany, the 
Italians would be given much wholesome food for thought and might 
be expected to become more tractable.
He reminded the Government that he had suggested before that Britain should be 
“ready to sell the lumber of Versailles.” Now he asked whether it was “a vital British 
interest that Austria and Czechoslovakia should not (whatever the territorial and 
constitutional position be) fall under German domination.” One month later, he put 
forward another memo on the same line."^  ^ In the mean time, Henderson expressed a 
more radical view in his memo of May 10 that none of the German aims — the 
absorption of Austria and part of Czechoslovakia, expansion in the east and recovery 
of colonies — “need injure purely British national interests.” Following the line in 
Eden’s speeches, which, to his understanding, showed that Britain was only prepared 
to defend Western Europe, he suggested that it was unwise to oppose German 
“peaceful expansion” in Central and Eastern Europe, and “Germany might well be 
given some colonies.” If Anglo-German understanding could be achieved by offering 
the above terms;
British friendship with Germany could and would serve British national 
policy by restraining both Russian intrigues and ambitions, as well as 
Italian aspiration in the Mediterranean.
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The above proposals raised intensive discussion in the F.O. Minuting on
O’Malley’s paper. Van. said, “honour, moral principles & utility all dictate that we
shd. not compromise or bargain with their independence.” But he explained, “1 don’t
suppose it is really intended that we should assist at destruction of the independence
of smaller European countries.” Sargent, Assistant Under-Secretary, despite
divergence on some points in O’Malley’s proposal about Italy, confessed that he did
not think there was any disagreement as regards the desirability of reaching an
understanding with Germany:
it is of vital importance that any agreement with Germany should be 
reached at once, even at a considerable cost.
Both Eden and Van supported his conclusion and the former summed up, 
“Nothing could be more beneficial for the interests of H.M.G. than an improvement 
of Anglo-Geiman relations even if it only proved temporary”.
Nevertheless, the F.O. were not very happy with Henderson’s proposal because,
as Van criticised, it was a “full acceptance of the German attitude.”^^  However, Mr
Strang, Head of the Central Department, thought that this was “not necessarily a
decisive objection” to it although it represented “a very considerable departure” from
Government’s policy. The main difference between the Ambassador’s policy and the
Government’s lay:
in the terms of the intimation which he proposes to make to the 
German Government of our acquiescence in German expansion in 
Central and Eastern Europe, provided certain conditions are fulfilled.
Whether or not we believe that territorial expansion by Germany is in 
any event inevitable, we should, by making any such intimation to the 
German Government, run the gravest risks of disturbing the stability of 
Europe.
The position so far as we are concerned is as follows: (1) any territorial 
change in Central and Eastern Europe, even if it comes slowly and in 
good order, is certain to have political effects in Europe,... (2) we are 
not (though we do not publicly say so) prepared to intervene by force 
of arms to prevent it; (3) the object of our policy is to keep the 
situation as steady as we can, without bringing ourselves face to face 
with war.
Therefore, he opposed “making too plain an intimation to Germany of our 
acquiescence in her expansion.” Van and Sargent warmly admired this commentary 
and the former recommended it to Eden. The Foreign Secretary sent this
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commentary together with Henderson’s paper to Halifax while the Lord President
was visiting Germany in mid-November/^
At the Imperial Conference on May 19, Eden explained in further detail the
policy as set out in the Leamington-Bradford speeches:
We might disinterest ourselves altogether in Central Europe and 
confine ourselves strictly to our vital interests in the Low Countries and 
Northern France. Such a policy would be unwise and would most 
certainly invite aggression. Alternatively, we might declare our 
readiness to fight for Czecho-Slovakia or Austria if they became the 
victims of aggression. That would mean going far beyond our 
obligations under the C ovenant and far bey ond what the people of this 
country were prepared to go. ... There remained the third possibility, 
namely, that without undertaking any military commitment we should 
make it clear that we were interested in events in Central Europe.
This was the policy of “keep Germany guessing”, and so-called.
The Ministers including Chamberlain were completely in accordance with this
line. From the very beginning, the new Prime Minister had been “trying to improve
relations with the 2 storm centres Berlin and Rome.” The reason was that he did not
believe that France was “in a very strong position to give us much help” because of
her serious domestic problems. America was not reliable either owing to her
isolation. Moreover, at least £1,500 million must be spent on rearmament, which
“seemed likely to be more than we could find without heavily increased taxation for
an indefinite period.” In the face of the Far East and Europe, he was an unequivocal
advocate of pursuing appeasement towards Japan with the purpose of allowing
Britain to concentrate on Europe. Following this logic, he argued that “if we were
involved in a war with Japan or Germany, Italy might join in.” He pointed out.
The ideal, no doubt, was to be prepared to fight Germany or Italy or 
Japan, either separately or in combination. That, however, was a 
counsel of perfection which it was impossible to follow. There were 
limits to our resources, both physical and financial, and it was vain to 
contemplate fighting single-handed the three strongest Powers in 
combination.
His recipe was, as he told his colleagues at the meeting of the Committee of the 
Imperial Defence on July 5, that “defensive preparations against Germany received 
first consideration.” However, “the best insurance” against possible aggression from 
Italy “would be a friendly Germany.”
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Therefore, he was eager to make a friendly approach towards the dictator powers, 
particularly Germany. His general scheme included two aspects: Britain could offer 
Italy de jure recognition in order to restore the Stresa Front. Italy would again be a 
deterrent to German expansion in Central Europe. On the other hand, he believed 
that,
we ought so to direct our foreign policy that we did not quarrel with 
Germany. If we could do that he did not feel that we need fear any 
sudden attack by Italy.
His conclusion, which was as same as the F.O.’s, was generally shared by his 
colleagues.^^
2. Looking for an Opportunity of Rapprochement
In mid-June the British Government invited the German Foreign Minister,
Neurath, to visit London “to discuss openly all questions affecting Anglo-German
relations”.^ '’ Eden told his colleagues that this visit “ought to be useful”. M r  Strang
prepared a proposal for the forthcoming conference:
Germany is in favour of change, and of drastic change. She has 
strengthened herself in order to secure that changes should take place 
to her advantage, by peaceful means if possible, but by war if necessary.
We... have not reached any clear conclusion in our own minds as to 
what changes we should regard as tolerable.
Based on the policy of “keeping Germany guessing”, he suggested,
that we cannot make any promise that we shall intervene by force of 
arms in any part of Europe other than Western Europe. As regards 
this, we do not say ‘Yes’, and we do not say ‘No’.
The proposal was discussed in the F.O/* Sargent, however, supplemented later that 
they should discourage Germany’s ambition in Central and Eastern Europe by telling 
her that “The annexation of Austria by Germany, or even a proposal to that effect, 
would produce in Europe a highly dangerous political crisis, and as such would at 
once come before the League Council.” Eden admired this suggestion.Indeed, like 
Chamberlain, he did not think that Britain was able to undertake a military 
commitment to Austria or Czechoslovakia.^®
However, Neurath’s visit was first postponed and then cancelled, using the 
excuses of the Deutschland and Leipzig incidents,®^  but in fact the real reason was
169
that Hitler did not approve of it.^  ^ This disappointed the British leaders very much, 
but did not exhaust their wish for a rapprochement with Germany.
Chamberlain took “the opportunity of making friendly references to Germany in 2
speeches but though these seemed to be appreciated they elicited no corresponding
response”. He regretted to say, “the way to Berlin was blocked.”^^  Eden found the
same. In this period, the Foreign Secretary presided over four meetings of the
respective Ambassadors from Germany, Italy and France, aiming to save the Non-
Intervention Committee from complete collapse due to the Leipzig incident.^ "^  In
addition, he persuaded Mr Dawson, the Editor of The Times, to hold back some
articles by Lord Lothian, which he assumed might damage the possibility of an
impending agreement with Germany.However, his efforts, like Chamberlain’s,
were to no avail as he told his colleagues in September:
Hitherto all attempts to get to closer quarter with Germany have failed 
and for the moment nothing more can be done in that quarter.
A chance seemed to come in mid-October: Halifax received the invitation to the
hunting exhibition of November in Berlin. It was, in Henderson’s words, another
chance “to break the ice of bad relations with the Nazi Government”.^  ^ Halifax wrote
in his memoir that when he told Eden of this news, the latter said quite seriously,
that he was not sure whether it might not be of some advantage for me 
to go to Germany under this cover.^ ®
Eden himself confessed that he “was not eager, but saw no sufficient reason to
oppose it.”^^  On the 22nd, he informed the British Embassy in Berlin that
It would clearly be undesirable that Lord Halifax should accept this 
invitation unless we could be reasonably sure that he would see some 
persons in authority.^^
However, in the F.O., Sargent analysed some disadvantages of the proposed visit 
on the 27th, observing that it seemed to put Halifax on “a special mission” but in fact 
his intention was “merely to make a tour d'horizon on the lines of those which have 
taken place in the past.” In addition, Henderson was to be instmcted to have 
conversations either with Goering or Neurath about “some very definite statements 
and proposals” from Goering, which should not be allowed to “pass unanswered”.
On the other hand, Eden would probably meet Neurath at the Brussels Conference.
It might lead to the misunderstanding that Halifax was sent to Berlin to continue the
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conversation initiated in Brussels. Van. was worried about this too and even
suggested that “it is also probable that Lord Halifax wd. not have gone to Berlin.”
But Cadogan thought that as Halifax had already accepted the invitation, it was
“undesirable to cancel it” though there was some inconvenience.^^
In the mean time, Henderson reported that it was quite unlikely that Hitler would
meet the British minister in Berlin during the exhibition: Halifax had either to wait in
Berlin until after the exhibition or propose himself to Berchtesgaden without
encouragement. But even so, the Ambassador strongly recommended that the
“present opportunity is one which we should not allow to pass.”^^
On November 10, Cranborne, Under-Secretary, told Chamberlain that, according
to Eden’s telephone instruction from Brussels,
there was no great enthusiasm on the part of Herr Hitler for such a 
visit. This did not perhaps so much matter if the plan was to fit in a 
conversation merely as a side product of visit by Lord Halifax ...
Moreover, we might appear in the role of suppliant, which would be 
most undesirable. Under such circumstances you (Eden — Author) 
were of the view that the visit would hardly be justified.
Chamberlain replied that he fully agreed that if it became necessary for Lord 
Halifax to ask for an interview, the effect which would be produced would be 
deplorable. But he did not see that tliis should be necessary. If Halifax were to 
receive an invitation to go to Berchestgarden, he would be glad to accept.^^
As soon as he returned from Brussels on November 14, Eden had a meeting with 
Chamberlain, Halifax and Van. He “by this time had come to regard Halifax’s visit as 
not necessarily a bad thing as H. would impress Hitler, provided the visit was always 
kept informal and no negotiations were started”.
The guideline for Halifax’s visit was, as Eden told Halifax and Henderson on 
October 27:
The former (Halifax — Author) will listen and confine himself to 
warning comment on Austria and Czecho-slovakia. ... I have impressed 
on Sir N. Henderson the need for doing all we can to discourage 
German initiative in these two states. We must keep Germany guessing 
as to our attitude.^^
Chamberlain took a similar point of view that “It was no part of my plan that we 
should make or receive any offer. What I wanted H[alifax] to do was to convince 
Hitler of our sincerity and to ascertain what objectives he had in mind.” He instmcted
.1
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Halifax that “he would be well content to see things move slowly and that they could
not be expected to do otherwise.”^^
During his visit (the 17th - 21st), Halifax had an interview with the Fuhi er and
other top German leaders such as Goering, Blomberg and Goebbels/^ When he came
back to London on the 22nd, he gave Eden and Chamberlain an account of the visit.^ ^
Two days later, he reported to the Cabinet his general impression. According to his
observation, the Colonies were the only outstanding issue between the two countries,
but it would not lead to war. As for Central and Eastern Europe, Hitler had
expressed satisfaction with the Austro-German Agreement of July 1936 and he had
said that Czecho-Slovakia “only needed to treat the Germans living within her
borders well and they would be entirely happy”. Halifax’s conclusion, therefore, was
“that the Germans had no policy of immediate adventure.”
Chamberlain “expressed warm appreciation of Lord Halifax’ effort.”^^  He
remarked that the visit was “a great success”.Differing from the description in his
memoirs, Eden in fact “expressed great satisfaction with the way the Lord President
had dealt with each point in his conversations with the Chancellor. He thought that
the visit was carried out completely in accordance with the line of the Government.
Halifax’s report offered a basis for the F.O.’s study and Eden summed up the
result of their research.
Hitler had now adopted the theme that a general settlement was not 
practical politics, that immediate negotiations between Great Britain 
and Germany were unnecessary, but that if Britain really wanted to 
improve relations, she could do so by satisfying German colonial 
claims. It was noticeable that Hitler had offered no guarantees about his 
policy in Central Europe.*^
Chamberlain had a similar estimate as he told his sister that “1 see clearly enough 
the lines on which we should aim at progress but the time required to arrive at 
satisfactory conclusions will be long and we must expect setbacks.” "^^ According to 
Oliver Harvey’s Diaries, he and Eden “were in absolute agreement about Germany — 
viz. no settlement except a general European settlement.”^^
In the mean time, Henderson sent back a series of telegrams, in which he advised 
that the Government should make an offer on the subject of colonies in order to start 
discussion with the Germans, and he had already told Dr Schmidt, Hitler’s interpreter, 
that Halifax’s visit constituted “a turning point from the old course on to a new one.”
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He conveyed the Germans’ idea to the F.O. that “the next move must come from 
us.”“
These despatches were received in the F.O. with furious criticism. Van. minuted,
“We made this last move. ... they also expect us to make the next.”®^ Another minute
reads more sharply.
Again and again Sir N. Henderson exceeds his functions and 
misunderstands the business of an Ambassador.^*
Eden agreed to these criticisms and said, “1 am inclined to think we might perhaps
repeat our warning.”*^  After Sargent sent a critical letter to Berlin, Eden himself
warned Henderson in mid-December that the Ambassador must strictly follow the
Government’s policy, which had been described by Halifax to Hitler and by
Chamberlain and himself to the French Ministers. Halifax’s foregoing visit did not
mean “a change in direction of the policy” towards Germany, and
It would be a mistake, therefore, to give the German Government the 
impression that His Majesty’s Government are impatient for some new 
initiative at this moment...
3. Anglo-French Ministerial Conversations
Being interested in the information about Halifax’s visit, the French showed their
desire to meet the British Ministers.^  ^On November 23, Eden had a talk with
Chamberlain and both agreed to invite Delbos, French Foreign Minister, and
Chautemps, Minister of France, to London.^^
Conversations between British and French Ministers were held on the 29th - 30th.
Halifax first told the French of his visit to Germany, and then Chamberlain
supplemented that
the Germans wanted two things, ... first, colonies; secondly, assurances 
about Central and Eastern Europe. If they could get what they 
required without giving anything for it, that would be for them the best 
solution. On the other hand, His Majesty’s Government were not 
prepared to open discussions unless the Germans were prepared to 
discuss the things that His Majesty’s Government wanted.
The French Ministers held the same attitude towards colonies and European 
appeasement.
As far as Central and Eastern Europe was concerned, Eden drew attention to the 
point that “neither France nor Great Britain had treaty engagements as regards
.. 7k. . t Z  . t . l
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Austria.” Chamberlain asked Delbos whether the treaty between France and 
Czechoslovakia would be brought into operation if Germany invaded Czechoslovakia. 
The French Foreign Minister replied that “if there were armed intervention by 
Germany, it was evident that the treaty would apply.” He also emphasised that 
although there were no treaty engagements with Austria, “there were certain 
declarations such as that made at Stresa by which Great Britain and France and Italy 
asserted that the maintenance of the integrity and independence of Austria was a 
necessary element for European peace.” Since the Italian attitude had changed, 
“France and Britain might manifest a certain solicitude”. However, Eden pointed out 
that the Austrian question should not be dealt with in the same way as the Czech 
problem. The Prime Minister went further to stress that the British public opinion 
would not approve of Britain becoming “entangled in a war on account of 
Czechoslovakia”. He agreed with Chautemps that they “could not request 
Czechoslovakia to grant autonomy to the Siidetendeiitsche. He did not, in fact, 
believe that the Germans would go so far in their demands as that.” Eden added with 
sympathy that “Sudeten Germans had certain grievances... the right course would be 
to impress upon the Czech Government the need for doing something... to meet the 
grievances of the Sudeten Germans”. I n  short, the French Ministers wanted to 
“press the British Ministers to adopt some more forthcoming attitude in Central 
Europe”, but “No encouragement had been given to them”.
In the end, both sides agreed that the right course in dealing with Central and 
Eastern Europe was “to interest ourselves in a spirit of conciliation”; and that that 
appropriate concessions might be made by Czecho-slovakia and that an attempt 
should be made to reach a general settlement with Germany.” In addition, the better 
relations with Mussolini might have the effect of reviving his interest in Austria.^ '*
On December 1, Eden informed the German Ambassador of the Anglo-French
conversations, telling him that
As regards Austria ... It had always been my view that Austria was 
even more an Italian interest than a French or British interest.^^
4. Preparing The Formula for a Settlement
Although they decided not to rush into a general settlement with Germany, the 
British Government had never given up their efforts to work towards that end. In
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late December, when the Cabinet discussed the Interim Report on Defence
Expenditure on Future Years, Halifax said,
that brought out clearly how the limitation imposed on defence by 
finance threw a heavy burden on to diplomacy. ... we were faced with 
the possibility of three enemies at once. ... we ought to make every 
possible effort to get on good terms with Germany. ... it was of great 
importance to make further progress in improving relations with 
Germany.
Being in accordance with Halifax, Eden thought that the first task was for the 
French Government and themselves to decide what could be done in the colonial 
sphere. Chamberlain agreed that “no further move could be made with Germany until 
after further explorations.” He recalled that the preliminaiy consideration of the 
German contribution to a settlement “might take the form of some measure of 
disarmament.”^^
At Chamberlain’s request/^ the F.O. studied the colonial issue, and the report
under Eden’s name came to the same conclusion as Henderson had done. It says.
The conversation between Lord Halifax and Herr Hitler showed that, if 
we wish for a general settlement with Germany, it will be for us, and 
not for the German Government, to take the next step by putting 
forward some concrete proposals ... It is important, if we are really 
anxious to prevent the hopes created by the recent conversations from 
evaporating, that there should be no long delay. We must keep 
moving; and we must try to make some further communication on the 
subject not only to the French Government, but also to the Germans, as 
soon as we possibly can.
Eden implied that the British Government could make a concession on the 
colonial issue, and in return, requested a general settlement with Germany. He 
advised the Committee to consider 1) what British colonial territories could be 
transferred to Germany, 2) what the term “general settlement” really meant.^*
On January 8, Chamberlain met Joseph Avenol, the Secretary-General of the
League at Hever Castle. The interview inspired the Prime Minister with “an idea” for
further conversations with Germany:
The notion which had been developing in his mind was the possibility of 
a solution by the adoption of an entirely new method of presenting the 
problem. His suggestion was that the matter should not be treated as a 
restoration to Germany of territory of which she had been deprived, but 
the opening of an entirely new chapter in the history of African colonial 
development to be introduced and accepted by the general agreement
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of the Powers interested in Africa. The new conception would be 
based on the complete equality of the Powers concerned and of their all 
being subjected to certain limitations in regard to the African territories 
to be administered by them under the scheme. Germany would be 
brought in to the arrangement by becoming one of the African Colonial 
Powers in question and by being given certain territories to administer.
If this scheme could be put forward it would not be necessary, in the 
first instance, to discuss and settle what particular territories should be 
assigned to Germany, or what compensation (if any) should be given 
to those Powers which assigned territory to Germany.
He did not reveal the idea, which would “open up a hopeful prospect,” to his 
colleagues until the 24th when the Committee meeting was held.^ ^
On the 13th, with Wilson’s participation, he worked out a principle for the F.O,
to study further on the colonial issue:
His Majesty’s Government have realised that if such appeasement is to 
be achieved it will not be upon the basis of bargaining in which each 
side seeks to weigh up what it will get against what it will be asked to 
give. Our plan (both as regards Germany and Italy) rests upon the view 
that we and they are in a position each to make a contribution towards 
an objective we both desire to obtain. There would be no need to 
discuss whether our contribution were greater or less than theirs. What 
is needed is to ensure that the contribution of each will, taken with the 
contribution of the other, make up an agreement which will bring 
appeasement.
By this principle, if Britain contributed a concession of colonies, they would ask 
Germany to offer the assurances about the Western frontier and about Belgian 
neutrality; and no use of force against Austria or Czechoslovakia.
On the 24th, the Cabinet Committee considered Eden’s memo of January 1. 
Chamberlain admired it. He thought that a rapprochement with Germany was urgent 
because some time had elapsed since Halifax’s visit and Germany might think that 
Britain had abandoned their original intention. Another reason was that before the 
opening of the Anglo-Italian conversations, the British Government needed to show 
their efforts to secure a general appeasement by conversations not with Italy alone 
but also with Germany. He then told the Committee of his “new method” concerning 
the colonial issue, which was “promptly & even enthusiastically” accepted.
In the course of discussion, Ormsby-Gore, Colonies Secretary, said that “the 
longer we waited the higher was the price that we should have to pay and that the
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granting to Germany of some concessions now in West Africa would heal a running 
sore and effect a permanent settlement.” Chamberlain concluded that “time should 
not be lost... the Germans could be told we were ready to discuss.” Based on his 
instruction, the Cabinet Committee decided that Eden should consult Henderson 
about the ffirmula.^ ^^  The telegram to Henderson was drafted by Cadogan and 
approved both by Eden and Chamberlain.
On the following day, Eden prepared a memo, according to the principle 
formulated by Chamberlain, to estimate what offer might come from Germany for 
“general appeasement”. As to Central and East Europe, he thought that no further 
consideration had been given to the suggestion that Germany might renew to Britain 
and France the undertaking she had given as regards Austria in the German-Austrian 
Agreement of July 1936. In addition, “some lesser form of autonomy should be 
granted to the Siideiendeutschf and “in return Czech independence should be 
guaranteed by one or more of the great Powers”. On the same day, he went to
Geneva.
Meanwhile, Chamberlain summoned Henderson back to London for consultation, 
and asked the Ambassador to tell the Germans that “he returned to take part in work 
engaged for following up Halifax’s conversation.”’*^'^  On February 3, Henderson 
attended the meeting of the Cabinet Committee and gave the Ministers his forecast of 
Nazi reaction to the British formula. He informed them that the German Government 
would certainly not be satisfied unless they were granted some territory over which 
they could exercise full sovereign rights and call their own colonies. Germany would 
agree to “some form of limitation of armaments”, but she would not return to the 
League until the Covenant had been modified. He told the Ministers that the problem 
of Czechoslovakia might be solved if Germany made a long-term agreement with her, 
while the Geiman Government refused to give any promise to Austria. After the 
meeting, instructions to the Ambassador were drafted and circulated to the 
Committee members. Simon and Halifax put forward some revising points, and the 
final draft was sent by Eden to Henderson on February 12. The Foreign Secretary 
instructed that the Ambassador should inform the Germans that the British 
Government were ready to discuss with the German Government on all issues which 
had been referred to during Halifax’s visit to Germany. “Mention should be made of
177
Czecho-slovakia and Austria as illustrative of the general principle of 
collaboration.”^^^
Meanwhile, however, due to personnel changes in the German Govemment^ *^ * and 
Hitler’s forthcoming speech on the 20th, Henderson suggested on February 7 that it 
would be a mistake to make an approach until things had settled down “after recent 
convulsions”/*^  ^It seemed that Eden was at first inclined to agree, but other senior 
officials such as Van. Cadogan, Sargent and Strang were in favour of making a 
communication to Hitler before his forthcoming speech on the grounds that during 
the period in which Hitler was preparing his speech he should know what H.M.G. 
were prepared to offer. Eden then took their view. At the Cabinet meeting of 
February 9, he explained to his colleagues “that it would be inadvisable to wait, as, if 
no further approach were made, Herr Hitler might express disappointment that 
nothing had been done to follow up the Lord President’s visit.” Chamberlain’s view, 
however, was closer to Henderson’s. Halifax draw up a compromise plan that 
Henderson should consult Ribbentrop, the new Foreign Minister, first as to whether it 
would be advisable for him to ask for an interview with Hitler before the 20th. If the 
reply was negative, the Ambassador might ask Ribbentrop to tell Hitler that H.M.G 
were ready to take the next step as soon as the Chancellor was ready to receive him. 
This proposal met with considerable support, while Eden seemed very impatient and 
insisted on “the minimum that the Ambassador ought to say was that he was available 
for a further conversations.”^^
IV. BRITISH POLICY-MAKING DURING THE ANSCHLUSS
1. Repercussions of the Hitler-Schuschnigg Meeting at Berchtesgaden
It was apparent that without consultation of the House the Government had 
completed policy-making long before public opinion focused on the Austrian problem 
owing to Hitler’s stormy interview with Schuschnigg on February 12. The disturbing 
news about the Berchtesgaden meeting was not revealed until the 15th. When the 
story emerged that day, the News Chronicle described, “from the very start of the 
interview Chancellor Schuschnigg found himself subjected to great pressure. ... At 
times the discussion was extremely blunt.” Whereas The Times carefully avoided 
strong wording and reported, “Hitler used the plainest language in stating his
J
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demands and it is understood that he indicated grave consequences if they were not
accepted. ... It is understood that he recommended compliance to Herr von
Schuschnigg in the most emphatic terms, and expressed the view that the Austrian
Government had no backing to hope for in any third quarter if they were obdurate.”
Gedye, Vienna Correspondent of the Daily Telegraph gave more details,
The Führer went so far — and I can assert this positively, in the face of 
any subsequent denials — as to thi eaten that in the case of disorders in 
Austria, he would ‘march’, being unable to resist any longer the pleas 
of the ‘downtrodden German population in Austria’. ... Actually — as I 
am able again to assert without fear of contradiction — Herr Hitler 
delivered an ultimatum.
Whatever the extent of the criticism, the general tone of the Press showed that
Austria was a closed case, and that it was impossible for the Western Powers to
declare war on Germany over this.“ ^
In the House, however, the Opposition “tried to make a major issue out of British
policy towards Austria”, and Attlee led a move to “jog the Government into
action.”^ O n  the 16th, Mr Arthur Henderson, Labour MP, asked, “Will His
Majesty’s Government stand by the joint declaration of February 1934 to the effect
that they reaffirmed the interest of this country in the integrity and independence of
Austria?” Eden, who was still Foreign Secretary, did not answer the question
directly, only saying that the Stresa Powers needed to consult each other, they were
waiting for Italian consultation.
On the following day, the Foreign Affairs Committee in the House discussed the
situation with the attendance of one hundred MPs. Opening the discussion, Harold
Nicolson, National Labour Member tor West Leicester, appealed to the Committee to
“face the fact that adventurism is now in the ascendant in Germany, and the cautious
people have been proved to have been wrong.” Churchill, in support of his argument,
took a firmer attitude and declai ed, “we must call a halt.” The whole feeling of the
meeting, as Nicolson observed, “is very different from that of a year ago. They no
longer believe that we can buy Germany off with concessions.” This accorded with
the report of Franckenstein, the Austrian Minister in Britain, in which he wrote that
a number of Members of Parliament have reexamined their views on 
Central Europe and found that England could not only not keep aloof 
from the impending chaos, but would even have to collaborate 
vigorously in the solution of this problem. People have come to
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understand that England is bound to intervene not only in the case of an 
unprovoked attack upon Austria or Czechoslovakia, but also in case 
revolts should be engineered by the N.S.D.A.P. in these two 
countries/
However, official reaction to public opinion was very ambivalent. Before the
story of Berchtesgaden broke, Eden addressed the Foreign Affairs Committee in the
House on December 9, 1937,
His general line is that there is no imminent likelihood of war and a far 
better prospect of appeasement than ever before. He draws attention 
to several favourable factors, such as the progress of our rearmament, 
the fact that Spain has ceased to be a real source of danger, ...
As regards Central Europe, he prevaricated, saying, “we cannot disinterest ourselves 
and will enter into commitments”. From Nicolson’s Diary, we know that Eden 
successfully deceived his audience by misleading them.“ ^
In fact, as early as during Halifax’s visit to Germany, a new initiative was
arranged to curb the press. In their interview of November 21, Goebbels complained
that the British press attacked Hitler. Halifax promised him that he would consult
Chamberlain and Eden “with a view to seeing what could be done to secure the
cooperation of the British Press particularly with regard to the question of personal
attacks on Herr Hitler.” He told the German Propaganda Minister that it was
necessary “for the Press to create the right atmosphere”. As soon as he came back
he took a series of steps, as he wrote to Henderson:
I have seen Steward, the Prime Minister’s Press Adviser at No. 10, and 
discussed ways and means with him, and have also had a personal talk 
on the subject with Lord Southwood (of Odhams Press -  Author) who 
controls the Daily Herald and Sir Walter Layton of the News 
Chronicle. The Daily Herald had a very objectionable cartoon on 
Wednesday and I immediately wrote to Southwood following our 
interview and have had a reply of a character which gives one to hope 
that we shall not have reason to complain again of this sort of thing/^^
However, in the face of the public being alarmed by the news about the 
Berchtesgaden meeting. Oliver Harvey recorded, “the Government... took every 
possible step to secure the London papers. ... The B B C, was told to say nothing that 
night about Germany and Italy.” On February 28, Halifax (now the Foreign 
Secretary) saw Reith, Director of the BBC, and asked him “not to proceed with a 
series of talks on ... the German Colonies.” Reith asked Halifax “pointblank whether
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H.M.G. wished him to stop them”. Halifax replied, “that was so but he would deny it
if challenged in public Chamberlain tried to cool the public by telling the House
on the eve of the Anschluss (March 2),
it hardly seems possible to maintain from the juridical point of view that 
because these two statesmen agreed that certain changes were desirable 
in the interests of the relations between their two countries, the one 
country had alienated its independence to the other country.
In fact, information received in the F.O. was far from reassuring. On Febmary 
15, the Austrian Chancellor told Palairet, the British Ambassador in Vienna, that “he 
had been met by threats” in his interview with Hitler, but “had yielded the minimum.” 
Schuschnigg hoped that the Western Powers would make Germany know that 
Austria had gone to “the limits of conciliation.” He was convinced that “absorption 
of Austria by Germany must lead to war.” ’^^  ^ In Paris, Delbos summoned up Phipps, 
the British Ambassador, and said, the French Government “strongly favour making 
some communication to German Government showing interest that the British and 
French Governments take in events in Austria and in the maintenance of peace and 
tranquillity in Central Europe.” Two days later, he told the Ambassador that he 
greatly feared that sounding on the colonial question at this moment “would give the 
impression to Germany that both Great Britain and France were unduly weak and 
unduly impressed by German violence.”^^
When the Vienna telegrams were considered at a meeting of the 15th in the F.O. 
Cadogan, Oliver Harvey, Eden’s Private Secretary, and others thought that the 
Anschluss was sooner or later inevitable and they could not help. Cadogan personally 
wished “Germany would swallow Austria and get it over.” Van., however, advised 
that Henderson should ask Hitler that the British Government “wanted to know what 
was going on about Austria”. Cadogan got his suggestion “watered down to ‘include 
Austria’” Chamberlain “watered it down further” because, as Cadogan described, 
“what is the good of brandishing Austria under Hitler’s nose when we can’t do 
anything about it?”^^  ^ Eden, in Harvey’s words, was “determined not to get into the 
false position of giving the Austrians advice and then being saddled with the 
responsibility if they accept advice and the situation gets worse. We cannot fight for 
Austria and we must be careful not to raise false hopes in Vienna.” Strang,
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however, was veiy angry that Hitler said Halifax had approved of Germany’s attitude
towards Austria, and suggested
that we should warn Herr Hitler that he must not quote H.M.G., in the 
person of Lord Halifax, as approving of his designs on Austria.
But Halifax was reluctant to make a complaint because he did not want to spoil the
attempt to approach Germany:
We clearly have every right to make our position plain — provided 
Schuschnigg agrees — & will stick to his guns above having said it. 1 
obviously couldn’t approve Germany’s attitude when I did not know 
what it was. But if the matter is taken up, I hope it may be so handled 
as not to prejudice the other side of our policy — i.e. the broad question 
of getting onto closer terms with the gangsters.
After further discussion, the decision says, “No action was taken on this.”^^** The 
instruction to Vienna was drafted with the approval of Eden and Chamberlain as 
follows:
we should not put ourselves into the position of making suggestions 
which, if accepted or rejected, produced a major crisis of which we 
could be accused of being the authors.
As to the French suggestion, Eden was “extremely doubtful of the wisdom of any 
separate or joint communication to the German Government by the British and 
French Ambassadors in Berlin” because Henderson was authorised to inform Hitler 
that “His Majesty’s Government were considering what steps might be taken to bring 
about a measure of appeasement which would include inter alia Austria.” The 
Foreign Secretary therefore instructed Phipps on the 16th, “we do not intend 
ourselves to go further than this, and we should deprecate any Anglo-French warning 
or protest in Berlin.”
On the same day, the Cabinet assembled to discuss the Austrian situation. Halifax 
recalled that his general impression had been that the Führer would continue his 
activities with regard to Austria, but in a manner which did not enable any other 
country to interfere. Chamberlain thought that “Hitler wanted peace but at his own 
price.” Eden told the Minister that “he did not want to put himself in a position of 
suggesting a resistance which he could not, in fact, fiimish.^ ^^
Just two days before Eden’s resignation, the French again delivered messages 
suggesting that it was “illogical and even dangerous” at that moment to start
-A#
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conversation with Germany. They wanted a joint demarche of protest against the 
German Government on the following line:
(1) that the legitimate anxiety of Doctor Schuschnigg to safeguard 
Austrian independence will not, in the opinion of Great Britain and 
France, allow him to go any further;
(2) that the real and not merely verbal independence of Austria 
constitutes one of the major interests of European peace, and that 
the British and French Governments could not be indifferent 
spectators of any new attempts destined to destroy it.
(3) that in general we cannot tolerate any coup de main or act of war 
likely to bring into question the territorial status quo in Central 
Europe, and that in that case these events would meet with 
opposition on the part of the Western Powers/^*^
Tense minutes in the F.O. led to the conclusion that the reaction to the French
proposal must be negative. Strang said, the French “put up proposals which go well
beyond what they themselves are willing (or in a position) to perform, and will place
the responsibility for inaction upon us. ... neither we nor the French possess the
offensive power sufficient to prevent Germany from working her will in Central
Europe”. Sargent and Cadogan agreed. The latter summed up, “the time for talking
about Austria has gone by.” A reply was discussed at a meeting between Halifax,
Cadogan, Plymouth (Parliamentary Under-Secretary) and Ingram (Counsellor in the
F.O.) on Februaiy 22, and examined by the Cabinet on the 25th. Based on the
Cabinet conclusion, the F.O. prepared a memo to tell the French that their suggestion
if held in Berlin, might, if it became known in Vienna, only mislead the 
Austrian Chancellor by encouraging his hopes tor military support from 
France and Gi eat Britain, which is unlikely to be forthcoming.
The language suggested by the French Government implies a readiness 
on the part of the French and British Governments to have recourse to 
war in order to assert their will.... His Majesty’s Government have 
refused to undertake a decision which in present circumstances they are 
unable to reverse.
They made their adversion plain to their French colleagues;
His Majesty’s Government contemplate following up Lord Halifax’s 
visit by initiating further conversations through the diplomatic channel 
with the German Chancellor, in the course of which it is hoped to 
ascertain how far the German Government are prepared to go in 
making a concrete contribution in respect of Central Europe and 
disarmament. These conversations would make it clear to the German 
Government that in the view of His Majesty’s Government recent
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events have aroused apprehensions in many quarters which must 
inevitably render more difficult the negotiation of a general settlement, 
and that a general appeasement depends on the restoration and 
maintenance of confidence and stability in Austria and 
Czechoslovakia.
At the same time, the Cabinet instructed Henderson to carry out the proposal put 
forward before Eden’s resignation.Some telegrams even repeated Eden’s 
instructions.
On March 3, Henderson had a conversation with the Führer. Hitler turned down 
immediate Anglo-German conversations by saying that the colonial question was not 
ripe for settlement and “it would be better to wait for a tew years.” His remarks on 
Austria were that he proposed to “proceed with his declared policy regardless of 
consequences.” As regards the Czechs, his view was that present situation was 
“intolerable and must be modified by negotiation or by dictation”. I n  the 
Ambassador’s opinion, it was very difficult “finding a common basis for reasonable 
discussion.” However, he did not believe “that at this stage Hitler is thinking in terms 
of the Anschluss”. Despite warning Germany, he told Hitler that he personally 
advocated the Anschluss.^ ^*’ Following the line set by Eden but continued by Halifax, 
Henderson let the Germans know that “we had, in short, washed our hands of 
Austria, except to express a wish for ‘reasonable solutions reasonably achieved’
2. The Anschluss
Although Hitler did not want to come to terms immediately, the British
Government was still prepared to push things further during the forthcoming visit of
JRibbentrop to London. At the Cabinet meeting of March 9, Halifax (now Foreign
Secretary) suggested, as to the line to be adopted for the future interview, that, since
the Germans did not want to tie their hands by talks, he should show the German
Foreign Minister “a mixture of disappointment, reproach and warning.” In spite of
this, he would say,
that the Government would at any time be ready to join the German 
Government in an attempt to realise an understanding. ... We had no 
desire to block any peaceful agreements arrived at by peaceful means.
We had not tried to block the German policy in Austria, ... His general 
line, therefore, was not to give the Germans the impression that we 
were running but to show that we were not shutting the door.
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In the course of discussion, admiring Halifax’s suggestion, Chamberlain pointed 
out that “it was not proposed to say that this was the last opportunity.” As to the 
German threat to Austria and Czechoslovakia, Maugham, the Lord Chancellor, said 
that they should remind the Germans that “the German nation was pledged by the 
Treaty of Paris”. Hoare supplemented that “if Germany invaded Austria or Czecho­
slovakia they raised dangers in Europe of which the end could not be foreseen.”^^* 
That very day, news came from Vienna that Schuschnigg had decided, as the last 
measure to maintain the independence of Austria, to hold a plebiscite on the 13th,^ ^^  
which caused a “storm” in Germany.Halifax warned Ribbentrop, who was now in 
London, that “if once war should start in Central Europe, it was quite impossible to 
say where it might not end, or who might not become in v o lv e d .H e  also instructed 
Henderson to speak to Hitler on the same lines.
On March 11, German troops were moving towards the Austrian border. Due 
to pressure from ultimatums both by Austrian Nazi leader and by Germany, 
Schuschnigg had to cancel the plebiscite and consider resignation. He asked 
immediate advice of H.M.G. because “if he yields, any semblance of Austrian 
independence is gone.” '^^ '^  After receiving this information, Cadogan showed the 
details to Chamberlain at a luncheon-party for Ribbentrop. The Prime Minister urged 
Ribbentrop to repeat to Hitler the serious view the British Government took of these 
latest developments in Austria. But in fact, nobody wanted to fight for Austria.
Based on the result of discussions in the F.O. that day, Halifax telegraphed 
Vienna in the afternoon that he could not advise Schuschnigg to “take any action 
which might expose his countiy to dangers against which His Majesty’s Government 
are unable to guarantee protection”.R e g a rd in g  the French enquiry on March 12 
that if the Western Powers should bring the Austrian question before the League, 
Halifax instructed Phipps to give them a negative answer.^ "**
On the other hand, Vienna’s appeal to France and Italy failed too because the 
French Government had just resigned on March 10; Italy, however, did not even want 
to communicate with the Western Powers over the Austrian problem.Since the 
Austrian President refused to accept the German ultimatum, German troops moved 
into Austria on the night of the 1 Ith -I2th.’*^*^
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World opinion was profoundly shocked by the lightning Anschluss. In Britain, 
most newspapers including Ihe Times seriously condemned the German action. 
Although it agreed that the Anschluss should be accepted with acquiescence. The 
Times was dismayed by Hitler’s surprise. The leading articles, keeping the same line 
as the Government, pointed out that “the indignation of the world is not at the thing 
he has done, but at the manner of the doing.” Hitler’s violation was not compatible 
with the policy of appeasement. The News Chromcle put forward the alternative to 
appeasement, namely, to restore the collapsed collective security system around 
Czechoslovakia. Germany must be told that further aggression would be met with an 
overwhelming solidarity of resistance. The New Statesman also agreed that the
best hope of checking Germany lay in Churchill’s proposal of a Grand Alliance.
The Press had a tendency to emphasise the future danger, particularly the case of 
Czechoslovakia rather than that of Austria, which seemed too late to fight for.
On March 14, the Cabinet received a note from the Opposition, which demanded
a debate. In order to cope with public opinion and to discuss the situation,
Chamberlain summoned the Cabinet meeting twice on the 12th and 14th. At the first
meeting, Halifax suggested that there were two points, which must be considered: 1)
what steps should be taken to guide public opinion, 2) how they were to prevent
similar action being taken in Czechoslovakia. Chamberlain pointed out that
The manner in which the German action in Austria had been brought 
about was most distressing and shocking to the world and as a typical 
illustration of power politics. ... There was little doubt that Hitler 
would represent it as another illustration of peaceful methods. ... he 
believed that what had happened was inevitable unless the Powers had 
been able to say Tf you make war on Austria you will have to deal with 
us’.
But he thought that “at any rate the question was now out of the way.” He told his 
colleagues that “there was probably not very much that could be done.”^^  ^ However, 
they all realised that the Government must make its stand point clear to the public 
when the Prime Minister spoke in the House on the 14th. At the second meeting, 
describing to his colleagues the general lines of a statement, Halifax consulted them 
on “how far it would be wise to include in the statement on policy a condemnation of 
the German attitude”. In favour of the stronger language the Cabinet were reminded 
that they “had already made a protest” to the Germans, and it seemed proper “to
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express strong views”, reflecting the deep concern of public opinion; and also “if this 
was not done it would facilitate the adoption by the Germans of similar forcible action 
towards Czechoslovakia.” On the other hand, in favour of the milder language it was 
pointed out that “it was important to avoid giving the impression that we were on the 
brink of war. It was equally important to avoid exacerbating the situation or giving 
an impression of threats which we were not in a position to carry out; and that the 
general public would be much more concerned with what action the Government 
proposed to take to develop our own defences than in verbal condemnation of Herr 
Hitler.” Chamberlain suggested that “the condemnation should be applied to the 
methods used by Herr Hitler and the shock that had been given to world confidence 
by those methods.” This met the general agreement and the draft statement was 
prepared by Chamberlain and Halifax.
When the debate took place on the 14th, Mr Attlee pointed out that “tliis event
knocks down the house of cards which the Prime Minister has been building.” He
asked the Government, “What is your policy now?” He warned.
What we need to-day is not an attempt to build peace by separate 
bargainings with separate dictators, separate attempts to buy off 
aggression. We need a return to League principles and League policy.
... our Government should take the lead in proposing means for 
preventing a further descent into lawlessness.
Araery, however, did not appeal to save Austria because that country “was not
prepared to fight” for her independence, but he demanded a definite answer fi*om the
Government on the Czechoslovakia problem, which was to be a major concern of the
future/^^ Mr Churchill delivered a powerfiil speech:
We await the further statement of the Government, but it is quite clear 
that we cannot accept as a final solution of the problem of Central 
Europe the event which occurred on 11th March. ... We cannot say 
‘The past is the past’ without surrendering the future.
In support of the Opposition leaders’ view, he put forward his plan for a “Grand 
Alliance”:
If a number of States were assembled around Great Britain and France 
in a solemn treaty for mutual defence against aggression; if they had 
their forces marshalled in what you may call a grand alliance; if they 
had their staff arrangements concerted; if all this rested, as it can 
honourably rest, upon the Covenant of the League of Nations, 
agreeable with all the purposes and ideals of the League of Nations; if
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that were sustained, as it would be, by the moral sense of the world; 
and if it were done in the year 1938 — and, believe me, it may be the 
last chance there will be for doing it — then 1 say that you might even 
now arrest this approaching war/^^
The critics could never change Chamberlain’s mind. In his statement, the Prime
Minister tried to blind the public to what the proposed line might be. He condemned
the German “violent methods” on one hand, and refused to “take action vis-a-vis
Austria” on the other. He did not make it clear whether liis policy had been dashed
by Hitler’s action:
While the policy of appeasement would lead to a relaxation of the 
economic pressure ... what has just occurred must inevitably retard 
economic recovery and, indeed, increased care will be required to 
ensure that marked deterioration does not set in.
As to preventing future aggression against Czechoslovakia, he avoided giving a direct 
answer, but only quoted Goering’s assurance to that countiy, which stated that “it 
would be the earnest endeavour of the German Government to improve German- 
Czech relations.”^^*
The Prime Minister’s statement did not quell criticism. Harold Nicolson wrote in
his Diary of March 15,
that the Government have betrayed the country and that the Tories 
think only of the Red danger and let the Empire slide. 1 am in grave 
doubts as to my own position. How can I continue to support a 
Government like this?^ *^^
However, Chamberlain did not want to change his policy in spite of criticism. On 
the contrary, he told his colleagues at FPC meeting on the same day that “recent 
events had confirmed him in his opinion that the policy was the right one and he only 
regretted that it had not been adopted earlier”.
V. COMMENT
Austria had in fact been doomed when the appeasers abandoned the Rhineland. 
Appeasement helped Hitler to realise his aggressive plan much earlier than he 
estimated (by 1943-45). Contemporary politicians and scholars comment on the 
Anschluss unanimously as an upset of the balance of power in Europe and the first 
step of Hitler’s serious invasion.However, Hoare argues, “there was no chance of
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Stopping Hitler except by war or a threat of war, and neither we nor the French were 
prepared to fight against what was claimed to be the unification of the German 
people.”
It was perhaps true that stopping Hitler from annexing Austria was much more 
difficult than driving him out of the Rhineland. But it was not a case of “no chance”. 
If the British Government had followed the French suggestion of manifesting a 
“solicitude” from the very beginning, and made a joint protest to Germany for 
Austria’s independence before the Anschluss, the situation might have been different 
because the firm attitude of the Western Powers would have strengthened the 
position of Hitler’s opposing generals, who warned the Führer that “Germany was 
not in a position to undertake the risk of a major conflict.” This would have 
certainly discouraged Hitler, or at least made it not so easy for him to win.
The British leaders’ mistake over the loss of Austria was two-fold: firstly, after 
the Rhineland episode, the British questionnaire was shelved by Hitler and his appeal 
of a twenty-five-year non-aggression pact and air pact was obviously a empty 
promise. All this did not open the appeasers’ eyes to Hitler’s real ambitions. They 
tried to fool themselves into believing that Hitler would not strike in Austria 
immediately and would not go so far as to demand autonomy for the 
Sudelendentsche. Without any assurance of future settlement from Hitler after his 
violation of Lorcarno, and without any knowledge of the dictator’s real intentions in 
Central and Eastern Europe, they were under the illusion that general agreement 
would be reached by offering Germany some colonies. In order to attract Hitler’s 
interest in a general settlement, Halifax and Henderson had revealed to the Führer in 
their interviews that Britain would acquiesce in the change in Central and Eastern 
Europe as long as it took place “upon the basis of reasonable agreements reasonably 
reached”. They failed to give any definition about what “reasonable” really meant, 
nor did they dare to answer what they should do if Hitler made changes by 
unreasonable means. Historical fact demonstrates that it was the British leaders, not 
Hitler, who were always guessing what would happen next, because the Führer was 
quite sure that whatever he did, Britain would not interfere.
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Secondly, although they realised from the Anschluss that Hitler would practise 
the same method in the future, they summed up the lessons wrongly. Cadogan wrote 
on March 16,
I shall be called ‘cowardly’ but after days and nights of thinking, I have 
come to the conclusion that is the least bad. We must not precipitate a 
conflict now — we shall be smashed. It may not be better later,.,.
Chamberlain told his colleagues that the present incident had confirmed him in his 
belief that appeasement was right and he only regretted that it had not been adopted 
earlier. Therefore, if the Rhineland caused the ripening of appeasement towards 
Germany, the Anschluss hastened and extended this process.
In this period, the Far Eastern pin-prick still diverted the policy-makers’ attention 
while they wanted to concentrate on the dangers nearer home. In Europe, facing the 
two “storm centres” of Berlin and Rome, Chamberlain followed a very peculiar 
course; if he could make friends with Italy, the Stresa Front would be restored to 
deter German adventures in Central Europe; on the other hand, if he could buy Hitler 
off, Mussolini would not dare to attack Britain single-handedly. As the result of this 
logic, instead of fighting against the aggressive powers, Britain tried to rope them in. 
His proposal was based on an assumption that the French strength and American 
support were not reliable, and that successful appeasement would reduce expenditure 
on rearmament.
Under Chamberlain’s leadership, Eden formulated the policy of “keeping 
Germany guessing” to hold the situation while preparation for negotiation with 
Germany was under process. It is true that he declared that “we were interested in 
events in Central Europe” rather than that Britain disinterested herself in that area 
as Henderson suggested. However, the two intimations were no different from each 
other in the face of Hitler’s strike. The British Government did not do anything at all 
for Austria except that they discouraged the French ft-om taking any joint action. In 
spite of their conflicting ideas over the Italian problem, Eden and Chamberlain were 
completely in accord over policy towards Germany. If Eden had not resigned, he 
would not have favoured British action to help Austria either. Therefore, their 
divergence was a difference between appeasers rather than between appeaser and 
anti-appeaser. Although he resigned before the Anschluss, Eden should bear an equal 
responsibility with Chamberlain for misleading British foreign policy.
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Policy-makers made every effort to deceive and “guide” public opinion rather 
than listen to it. Without consulting the public, they had hatched policy long before 
the public discussed the Austria crisis intensively. Public opinion was misled by the 
Government’s promise that Britain never disinterested herself from Central and 
Eastern Europe without exploring the implications. However, the event of the 
Anschluss alarmed the public. Although it perhaps did not demand war on Germany, 
public opinion generally hardened towards Hitler’s expansion, particularly his possible 
invasion of Czechoslovakia in the future. MPs like Harold Nicolson, who had held a 
conciliatoiy attitude a year before, no longer believed that Hitler could be bought off. 
The opposition not only criticised the Government’s appeasement, but they also put 
forward their alternative proposals such as a suggestion of “return to League 
principles” and Churchill’s “Grand Alliance”. All this showed that public opinion had 
been more mature than before due to the experience of a series of events. It 
demonstrated a great moral and social strength, which could be used to enforce the 
peace front. However, the policy-makers’ determination for appeasement made it 
impossible.
After the Anschluss, the appeasers had no card left to play when they found that 
Hitler did not even play the same game. Condemning the means used by the Germans 
to annex Austria, Chamberlain in fact acquiesced in the Anschluss. This was 
tantamount to implying that Hitler could do whatever he wanted towards the Czechs 
in the future. Indeed, success of the Anschluss encouraged the Sudeten Germans to 
press for Hitler’s forthcoming annexation of Czechoslovakia. That country had 
now been surrounded by Germany on three sides, which made it militarily impossible, 
in the appeasers’ view, to save her. The unhappy consequence of appeasement 
convinced them that they had to appease Hitler continuously, quickly and thoroughly, 
and this paved the way for German invasion of Czechoslovakia.
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Chapters MUNICH
I. OPERATION GREEN AND HITLER’S GAMBLE
The decision to attack Czechoslovakia was taken at the same time as the 
Anschluss/ The plan entitled “Operation Green”, was first formulated by Field 
Marshal Blombert on June 24, 1937/ However, after the Anschluss Germany needed 
some time to digest the fruits of its victory. Goering assured M. Mastny, the Czech 
Minister in Berlin, on March 11 and 12, that the developments in Austria would “in 
no way have a detrimental influence on the relations between the German Reich and 
Czechoslovakia,” and emphasised “the continued earnest endeavour on the part of 
Germany to improve those mutual relations.”  ^ However, a few weeks later Hitler and 
General Keitel had a further conversation to discuss Operation Green. They agreed 
the following:
Idea of strategic attack out of the blue without cause or possibility of 
justification is rejected.
Action after a period of diplomatic discussions which gradually lead to 
a crisis and to war.'*
In the meantime, the Nazi regime instigated Konrad Henlein,  ^ the leader of the 
Sudeten Nazi Party, to stir up trouble. Owing to the rumour of German intervention, 
the Czech Government ordered mobilisation on May 21, which made Hitler feel 
furious. On the 30th, the Führer took his “unalterable decision to smash 
Czechoslovakia by military action”. Operation Green was to be carried out by 
October 1 at the latest. In his opinion, it would be best, if possible, to avoid the 
Western Powers’ intervention, which he thought most unlikely. However, if 
intervention was provoked, he would take the risk of war.*’
His view of risking war with the Western Powers met with strong disagreement 
among his subordinate oflhcials. Unlike Hitler, they thought that France and Russia 
would take the Czech side and Britain would not stand by if Germany attacked 
Czechoslovakia. They had no way to win the war even taking into account Italian 
and Japanese help.  ^ In order to save the country from plunging into a hopeless war, 
the opposing generals created a plot by which they would first force Hitler to 
abandon his idea and then remove him from office.*
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In mid-August, they sent to London their representative Herr von Kleist, who had
a series of interviews with Van., Churchill and other important persons in the political
circle. His mission was “to obtain material with which to convince the Chancellor of
the strong probability of Great Britain intervening should Germany take violent action
against Czechoslovakia.”^
On September 27, since war seemed unavoidable, the opposing officers fixed a
date for the execution of their plot: the 29th. General Haider, their leader, confessed
after the Second World War (1946) that “we were firmly convinced that we would be
successful” if the plot had been carried out. However, when he was to give the order
of execution on the 28th, the news arrived that Chamberlain would come for further
talks so as to save a peaceful settlement. The General said,
I therefore took back the order of execution because, owing to this 
fact, the entire basis for the action had been taken away.
n . POLICY-FORMULATING BEFORE MUNICH
1. Czechoslovakia Doomed in March
When the Cabinet summoned the emergency meeting to discuss the Anschluss on
March 12, the Prime Minister instructed that with consultation of the French, Halifax
should consider what measures could be taken to avert the similar threat that
Germany might create in Czechoslovakia.**
Policy towards Czechoslovakia began to be formulated in the light of this
instruction. Mr. Newton in Prague analysed the situation in his dispatch of March 15,
[The Czechoslovak Government] still believe they can continue with 
their present policy so long as they can count on France as an ally, and 
so long as France in her turn counts on ... British support if she 
involves herself in hostilities with Germany over Czechoslovakia.
He warned.
Should war come, nothing that we or France could do would save 
Czechoslovakia... Should France, nevertheless, think it worth while to 
try to perpetuate the stattis quo in her own interests, I submit that she 
should do so with her own strength, and His Majesty’s Government are 
entitled to decline the risk of involving Great Britain in a fresh war...
The Ambassador then suggested
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We should rather make it as easy for her [Czechoslovakia] as possible 
to adjust her position to the circumstance of post-war Europe while she 
can still do so in more favourable conditions than will obtain later.
He implied that it was quite impossible to adopt a policy of maintaining
Czechoslovak independence without any impairment. This opinion was shared
“unreservedly and in all respects” by Henderson.*^ The document was submitted to
the FPC for their information, obtaining much attention there. However, not
everyone was happy with the Ambassador’s telegram. Van. was furious and said that
he “cannot accept” Newton’s suggestion.*'*
Within the F.O. Sargent, Assistant Under-Secretary, in favour of backing the
Franco-Czech alliance,*  ^offered his proposals, which were quite similar to that of the
“Grand Alliance” by Churchill.*® Considering the Anschluss benefited Germany very
much and worsened the European situation, he suggested that there were two points
that the Government should bear in mind; firstly, to “organise and strengthen the
diplomatic resources of this country, not only in order to help prevent by these means
a catastrophe fi'om occurring, but also to have these resources in readiness for
immediate use if a catastrophe does occur”. To do so, “We must”, he said,
expect that the French Government will insist, with increasing 
persistence and vigour, that His Majesty’s Government should now 
declare themselves more definitely than hitherto as to the policy they 
intend to adopt in the face of the altered balance of power in Europe 
and as to the measures they propose to take to give effect to it.
In addition, he urged the British Government to open staff talks with France and 
Belgium immediately. Britain should also strengthen ties with Greece, Turkey, 
Poland, Russia and so on. Secondly, he asked the Government to “consider whether, 
for the sake of ultimate peace. His Majesty’s Government are prepared now to defend 
one or other position in Europe if and when it is attacked by Germany.” He warned, 
“if we and the French do nothing, not only is Czechoslovakia likely to be 
dismembered for the benefit of Germany, but the whole of Central Europe will be lost 
to us and to France. In any future war not only will they not be allies but they won’t 
even be neutrals.”*^
Another typical point of view was indicated by Gladwyn Jebb, Private Secretary 
to the Permanent Under-Secretary. In spite of thinking that Sargent’s proposal was 
“logical”, he pointed out that
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there is an obvious risk that it may lead to a war for which we are not, 
as yet, prepared, and in which we might consequently be defeated. ...
As evidence of our ability to do so, we shall attempt to organise a 
“Grand Alliance,” and presumably put the economy of this country on 
to a war footing at once. The trouble is that, once having committed 
ourselves to this attitude, the Dictators may “get their blow in first.”
He laid down his alternative course that was to restore the “Stresa Front” by taking 
“immediate steps to come to a real understanding with Mussolini”, although he knew 
very well that “Mussolini has now gone too far in his dealings with Hitler to join in an 
anti-German combination”. The essential point in his alternative course was “a tacit 
understanding that we would not support Czechoslovakia.”**
The third opinion was represented by Strang, Head of Central Department, who
was authorised to prepare a memo for the F.O. according to the Cabinet decision of
March 12. He reminded the Government of Hitler’s words about Czechoslovakia
that if “internal explosions took place, Germany would not remain neutral, but would
act like lightning.” Neither the German Government nor Henlein had stated with any
precision what was meant by autonomy. Therefore, it should be assumed that not
only was Sudetenland to be autonomous and self-governing but also was to be
involved into the incorporation of the German districts in the Reich. He said.
It has been the policy of His Majesty’s Government to advise the 
Czechoslovak Government to make all possible concessions to the 
Sudetic Germans,... as a means of depriving the German Government 
of any reasonable pretext for complaint or intervention.
Then, from the legal point of view, he pointed out that a treaty existed between
France and Czechoslovakia. Britain, however, had no obligations to Czechoslovakia
except those of the League. Although Britain had obligations to France as a
signatory to the Locarno in addition to those of the League,
If Germany were to attack Czechoslovakia, and France came to the 
assistance of the latter, ... Germany, for her part, would not, by 
becoming engaged in hostilities with France in the circumstances 
postulated, be committing an act of unprovoked aggression against 
France, and, consequently, Great Britain would be under no obligation 
under the Locarno Treaty to go to the assistance of France...
In his opinion, a new commitment to Czechoslovakia by Britain, whether 
undertaken directly or indirectly “might considerably reduce the chances of war, in 
that it might prove to be an effective deterrent.” On the other hand, “it might
201
increase our chance of being involved in war earlier rather than later, since the 
possession of an undertaking from us might encourage France to take action in 
defence of Czechoslovakia”. If Britain were prepared to undertake a new 
commitment, he suggested his preferable alternative,
(I) Action at Prague to the end that the Czechoslovak Government 
should satisfy both Great Britain and France that she has done all that 
she reasonably can to remove the grievances of the 
Sudetendeutschen....
(II) An undertaking by Great Britain to France, in declaratory form, 
that if in the event of a German attack on Czechoslovakia, France came 
the assistance of Czechoslovakia after consulting with and securing the 
approval of His Majesty’s Government, His Majesty’s Government 
would view France’s intervention with benevolent sympathy, and if in 
the ensuing war French territory were threatened or attacked by 
Germany, either by land, sea or air, then His Majesty’s Government 
would give immediate support to France in defence of her territory.*^
Having read all these papers, Cadogan commented that “Sargent paints a gloomy 
picture”:
Germany might be able to establish an economic domination of that part of the 
world. ... I do not see how we can stop her. ... why should we (who have 
others) try to prevent her?^ ®
After nights of thinking, he “toned down Sargent’s picture and came out against a 
guarantee to Cz[echoslovakia].” *^
As regards Jebb’s proposals, the Permanent Under-Secretary said that it was “the 
best hope that I can see”, but he scarcely thought they could do it by the method Jebb 
had suggested on the grounds that “It is too crude, both for our own people here, and 
for Italy.”
So he finally came to the conclusion that Strang’s paper was “the best course” by
comparison with the other proposals. However, he could not conceal his hesitation:
Much will depend on the report of the Chiefs of Staff. Such a course 
obviously involves an enormous risk: it is calling a halt to Hitler at a 
moment when he is an exalted mood. It might precipitate the conflict 
that we all fear. Shall we risk a war now, when our prospects are not 
too bad, or shall we put it off till our prospects, maybe, will be worse, 
but with the hope that in the meanwhile “something will turn up”?
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But one thing was certain, as he wrote, “unless the Chiefs of Staff can give us a 
much more reassuring report than I expect, we should undertake no fresh 
commitment in regard to Czechoslovakia.”
Synthesising different views in the F.O., Cadogan made a collection of all these 
documents together with his own comments. ^
Halifax also studied these papers.^ Based on Strang’s paper, he submitted his 
revised memo for the FPC, in which the most important supplement was that he 
added another alternative, namely, “no new commitment to France”. Of this choice, 
he said,
[It] is advanced not on its own positive merits, but rather on the 
strength of the objections to other alternative courses. It is briefly, that 
we should decline to undertake any fresh commitment in regard to 
Czechoslovakia; that we should, on the contrary, try to persuade 
France and Czechoslovakia that the best course would be for the latter 
to make the best terms she can with Germany... since in that event 
Germany would have less reason to risk the hazards of war in order to 
obtain what she could have some hope of obtaining by peaceful 
negotiation.
Despite the wide acknowledgement that Germany’s superiority in arms might be
greater a year or two hence than this time, this policy alternative did not consider it “a
good argument for risking disaster now.” '^*
In these few days, Chamberlain, Halifax and Cadogan discussed a guarantee to
Czechoslovakia and some related points on a number of occasions.^® They
considered 1) that the Chiefs of Staff should estimate the military aspect of giving a
guarantee to France if she was involved in war with Germany over Czechoslovakia;
2) Churchill’s proposal of the Grand Alliance; 3) the F.O. should advise the Cabinet
as to whether, on the political aspect, Czechoslovakia should allow an Anglo-French
or a purely British Commission of Inquiry to visit that country and report on the
Sudeten position. The Prime Minister’s observations were “apparently moving on
these lines’’.^ ® For a while, both he and Halifax were “rather on the line of Winston’s
‘Grand Alliance’ ” as he wrote,
it is perfectly evident, surely, now that force is the only argument 
Germany understands, and that collective security cannot offer any 
prospect of preventing such events, until it can show a visible force of 
overwhelming strength, backed by determination to use it. And if that 
is so, is it not obvious that such force and determination are most 
effectively mobilised by alliances,... I don’t want to get back to
203
alliances but if Germany continues to behave as she has done lately, she 
may drive us to it.
However, this was not what he really wanted, because he continued:
If we can avoid another violent coup in Czechoslovakia, which ought 
to be feasible, it may be possible for Europe to settle down again, and 
some day for us to start peace talks again with the Germans.^^
With some influence fi-om Cadogan, Chamberlain finally abandoned the idea of a
Grand Alliance as well as backing up France in connection with her obligations to
Czechoslovakia on the grounds that
nothing that France or we could do could possibly save Czechoslovakia 
from being overrun by the Germans,... The Austrian frontier is 
practically open; the great Skoda munition works are within easy 
bombing distance of the German aerodromes, the railways all pass 
through German territory, Russia is 100 miles away. Therefore we 
could not help Czechoslovakia — she would simply be a pretext for 
going to war with Germany.
Halifax independently came to the same conclusion. He also thought that the Grand
Alliance “would be a long and complicated matter.” It “would afford both a
provocation and an opportunity to Germany to dispose of Czechoslovakia before the
grand alliance had been organised.” *^
At the FPC meeting of March 15, Chamberlain reaffirmed the policy of getting on
terms with the dictators by saying that “he did not think anything that had happened
should cause the government to alter their present policy; on the contrary, recent
events had confirmed him in his opinion that the policy was the right one and he only
regretted that it had not been adopted earlier.”^^
Three days later, the FPC held a meeting again, which finally decided the Czechs’
doom. Halifax submitted his memo as a basis for discussion and for the statement that
the Prime Minister would make in the House in a few days.
The question raised was whether Hitler wanted only the Sudeten or the whole of
Czechoslovakia. Chamberlain obviously agreed with Newton’s assumption that
the seizure of the whole Czechoslovakia would not be in accordance 
with Herr Hitler’s policy, which was to included all Germans in the 
Reich but not to include other nationalities. It seemed most likely... 
that Germany would absorb the Sudeten German territory and reduce 
the rest of Czechoslovakia to a condition of dependent neutrality.
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He went on to suggest that “we should ask the German Government to give us an 
assurance that pending the investigation and report by the Commission of Enquiry, 
the German Government would not resort to force against Czechoslovakia.”
Then the Cabinet started to discuss Halifax’ memo paragraph by paragraph, and 
were more and more inclined towards the alternative course of “no new 
commitment”. Only Oliver Stanley, President of the Board of Trade, wanted to 
propose a simple declaration that Britain would come to France’s aid if she was 
involved in war with Germany due to Czechoslovakia, but his proposal met with 
strong disagreement from others. Inskip, Minister of Co-ordination Defence said 
straightway that “he could see no reason why we should take any steps to maintain 
such ... a highly artificial state.” Simon also thought, if war against Germany “was 
successful, when it was over what should the victors do? ... Czechoslovakia was a 
modern and very artificial creation with no real roots in the past.” Other Ministers 
such as Ormsby-Gore (Secretary for the Colonies) and Malcolm MacDonald 
(Dominion Secretary) spoke openly against any new commitment.
When he made a comment on the memo, Chamberlain said that he was disturbed 
by the course of new commitment too because, not only might it strengthen the 
French argument that “whatever might be the position under the Locarno Treaty, we 
in fact could not afford to see France destroyed, and we must therefore always come 
to her aid”; but it also “might cause Germany to fear that France would be more 
ready and willing to implement her treaty undertaking to Czechoslovakia.”
Therefore, rather than backing up France, he suggested that the British Government 
should require the French to give them “whole-hearted support in any attempt to find 
a peaceful solution to avoid any risk of an outbreak of war.” He wondered “whether 
it would not be possible to make some arrangement which would prove more 
acceptable to Germany. ... this would have the advantage that it would be more likely 
to secure permanency.” He tended to believe Hitler’s words that Germany only 
wanted some measure of local autonomy for the Sudeten territory. If this could be 
done, Germany would be prepared to guarantee the independence of Czechoslovakia. 
Therefore, he thought that “at all events the possibility of some arrangement of this 
kind might be worth exploring.”
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Following him, The Foreign Secretary analysed that, firstly, the theory of a fresh
commitment “rested on the assumption that when Germany secured hegemony over
Central Europe she would then pick a quarrel with France and ourselves.” But he
“did not agree with this argument.” Secondly, the more the Western Powers were
plotting to encircle Germany, the more difficult it would be to make any real
settlement with Germany. If the Government had decided on a policy of no further
commitments, he suggested.
We still... retained full liberty of action, and we could in any particular 
case say whether or not we would or would not come to France’s 
assistance. This had the great advantage that we were able to keep 
both France and Germany guessing.
Towards the end of the meeting, although they still requested Chiefs of Staff to
submit their report for further consideration, the FPC had in fact come to the
conclusion, as Halifax said, that
we must decline to undertake any fresh commitment in regard to 
Czechoslovakia and that we must try and persuade Dr. Benes and also 
the French Government that the best course would be for 
Czechoslovakia to make the best terms she could with Germany.^ ®
At a full Cabinet meeting of March 22, the report of the Chiefs of Staff was ready
to be circulated to the Ministers. Strictly guided by the no-new-commitment idea of
the Prime Minister, the military advisers based their report on two hypothetical
alternatives: 1) Britain would cooperate with France, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia,
Romania, Hungary, Turkey and Greece or any of them to resist German invasion of
Czechoslovakia; 2) Britain would make a guarantee to France were the latter
compelled to aid Czechoslovakia by her obligations. The Chiefs of Staff could not
foresee “our defence forces will be strong enough to safeguard our territory, trade
and vital interests against Germany, Italy and Japan simultaneously” at the time when
it happened, but they were certain that Britain was not ready for war in 1938. Many
of the possible allies above, in their opinion, were of doubtful military value in such a
war. Therefore, they concluded
that no pressure that we and our possible allies can bring to bear, either 
by sea, on land or in the air, could prevent Germany from invading and 
overrunning Bohemia and from inflicting a decisive defeat on the 
Czecho-Slovakian Army. We should then be faced with the necessity of 
undertaking a war against Germany for the purpose of restoring
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Czecho-Slovakia’S lost integrity and this object would only be achieved 
by the defeat of Germany and as the outcome of a prolonged struggle/*
Halifax thought the Report “an extremely melancholy document,” but “no
Government could afford to overlook it.” He told the Cabinet the proposed line,
which was said to be based on this Report, but in fact had been decided by the FPC a
few days before. He said that he was not in a position
to recommend a policy involving a risk of war. Consequently, he had 
to consider the alternatives. His suggestion was that we should 
endeavour to induce the Government of Czecho-Slovakia to apply 
themselves to producing a direct settlement with the Sudeten-Deutsch.
We should also persuade the French to use their influence to obtain 
such a settlement. ... it might be possible for the British and French 
Governments to approach the German Government with a view to 
acceptance of the settlement in Czecho- Slovakia.
However upset the French Government might be with the above course, the Foreign 
Secretary said that he did not see what alternative was open to them other than to 
acquiesce. Moreover, he supplemented, “we could not accept new commitments 
withdrawing the decision on peace and war from our Government and leaving it in 
the hands of the French Government.”
The Prime Minister explained that “they had approached the question with a bias 
in favour of some kind of guarantee to Czecho-Slovakia,” but the FPC had changed 
their views because the Foreign Secretary’s proposal had been accepted “more 
generally and increasingly”.
The Cabinet minutes showed that the Ministers thought that “even if we had the 
strength, we could not protect a country in the geographical position of Czecho­
slovakia.”^^
At the end of meeting, the Cabinet generally agreed to the policy proposed by the 
Foreign Secretary and supported by the Prime Minister. They instructed Halifax, 
with the help of Chamberlain, Simon, Hoare and Stanley, to draft the statement on 
the above lines for the Prime Minister, who would speak in the House on March 24. 
In addition, Halifax should inform the French Government of the policy that the 
British Government had decided.^^
On the 24th, full debates in the House on the Czechoslovak problem took place. 
Chamberlain again tried to confuse the public. He first reminded the House that
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Britain was bound by the Covenant and the Locarno Treaty towards France, and the
Covenant towards Czechoslovakia, which “might lead to the use of our arms for
purpose other than our own defence.” The Government would “stand by these
declarations.” Then he said that he could not go further and give an assurance to
France in the event of her being involved in war with Germany over Czechoslovakia,
nor could he agree a guarantee to the independence and integrity of Czechoslovakia
because this automatic pledge might take the right of decision on peace or war away
from the British Government’s hand. His policy therefore was to ask the Czech
Government “to meet the reasonable wishes of the German minority.” '^*
This speech was very unsatisfactory to the Opposition critics. Attlee, Archibald
Sinclair (the Liberal Leader) and Churchill voiced sharp criticism. Attlee pointed out
that Chamberlain “yields to force all the time.” The Prime Minister was proceeding
on “a policy of negotiation with persons who have shown their belief in force and
who exercise force even while he is negotiating with them.” The proposal which the
Labour Leader put forward was that the Government should organise collective
security in the League and “be prepared to deal with the utmost generosity with other
countries”, including Russia, to prevent war. Churchill, while urging the Government
to take up his proposal of a “Grand Alliance”, pin-pricked the ambivalence in
Chamberlain’s statement about guarantees to France and Czechoslovakia by saying:
with the rape of Austria before our eyes. Great Britain should have 
said, and should still say, “If the German march in upon this State of 
Czechoslovakia without even waiting for an impartial examination, 
perhaps by a commission of the League of Nations, or some other body 
into the position of the Sudeten Deutch and the remedies offered for 
their grievances ... then we should feel, on this occasion, and in this 
emergency, bound to act with France in resisting it.^ ®
However, all these arguments could not move the policy-makers an inch. In 
defence of the Government policy, Simon indicated that the Prime Minister’s 
reaffirmation of the existing commitments was clear enough and good enough to deal 
with the present problem. He rejected the idea of a Grand Alliance by saying that it 
was “contrary to” the conception of the League and would lead to “disaster”.^ ® 
Halifax later explained that it should not “give too broad an interpretation” to 
Chamberlain’s statement of using British arms to defend the victims of aggression 
because it was “in the nature of a probability” but not “in the nature of a certainty.
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2. Anglo-French Communication in April
Shortly after the Anschluss, the French Ambassador told Halifax that France 
would take immediate action in the event of any aggression being perpetrated on 
Czechoslovakia/* In addition, on March 17 information from the Soviet side showed 
that Russia also declared that they would intervene in defence of Czechoslovakia if 
France did/^ Chamberlain disliked the Soviet declaration because he thought that 
Russia “stealthily and cunningly” pulled “all the strings behind the scenes to get us 
involved in war with Germany ” So he immediately turned down the Soviet proposal 
by telling the House that the Russian intention would spoil the establishment of 
European peace/**
As for the French enquiry, Strang drafted the answer based on the line of “no new 
commitment”. Sargent then made some amendments so as “to remove all possible 
ambiguity”. After being submitted to Cadogan and Halifax, these papers were sent to 
Paris on March 22 and 23. While vetoing the French suggestion that both 
Governments should utter a joint warning to Germany, they informed them of the no- 
new-commitment decision made by the British Government, which required that 
Britain and France impose joint pressure on Czechoslovakia to obtain a peaceful 
settlement with Germany. This disappointed the French very much."** They looked 
forward to exchanging views with their British partners.'*^
On April 27, the Ministers discussed the policy for the impending meeting with 
the French. Chamberlain told his colleagues that although the War Office thought the 
staff talks would “come as a severe shock” when it became clear how very limited an 
amount of military assistance — two divisions — Britain could send to France at the 
outset of war, he thought it would be difficult to refuse if the French wanted to hold 
such conversations. Otherwise, that would seem “rather churlish”. In the course of 
discussion, Simon said, “the risk of coming so near to the point of a commitment to 
send two divisions was that it would be assumed by the French as a definite 
understanding”. Halifax pointed out that they should let the French know frankly that 
they could not commit themselves by sending troops to France. “But it was also 
important not to say that in no circumstance would Britain ever send any troops.”
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The Prime Minister then concluded that if in no circumstance would they allow any 
staff talks, “there might be an uncomfortable jar” in Anglo-French relations. The 
Cabinet agreed that the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary should have 
discretion to decide whether the Army staff talks took place separate from the current 
Air staff conversations.'*^
At the imitation of the British Government, the Daladier-Bonnet team'*'* came to 
London on the 28th and spent two days in talks with their British partners. Both 
sides soon found they were at odds.
Halifax, on behalf of the British Government, told the French at the beginning that 
it was not necessary to hold naval staff talks. As to the Air Staff talks, however, he 
said that they could be held within a certain scope. Then he explained that the 
greatest help which the French could hope for from Britain at the beginning of war, 
would be two divisions.
On the French side, Daladier tried to persuade the British leaders to open the
naval staff talks but in vain. He, however, felt quite satisfied with the British approval
of the Air staff talks and the decision of sending two divisions to France. But his
satisfaction was certainly set back by Chamberlain’s words:
His Majesty’s Government found it difficult to commit themselves at 
this stage to sending even such a comparatively small force to the 
Continent in certain eventualities. He could only say that the 
Government of the day might decide to do so, or they might not.
On the second day, talk concentrated on Czechoslovakia. Halifax, at the very
beginning, pointed out that Britain was different from France in the position that the
latter was bound by very precise engagements towards Czechoslovakia, but the
former was not. The British Government felt
that every step that was possible must be taken to avoid an outbreak 
which, as things now stood, might carry with it a very considerable risk 
for both France and Great Britain.
Therefore, he thought that the pressure should be put on Benes to make a supreme 
effort to reach a settlement with Germany.
Although he agreed that the Czechoslovak Government should go further to meet 
the demands of the Sudeten Germans, Daladier warned that Henlein “was not, in fact, 
seeking any concessions, and his real object was the destruction of the present
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Czechoslovak State.” He implied the criticism that when Hitler took the Rhineland
and Austria, Britain talked a great deal, “but nothing had been done”. Now “we were
faced with the question of Czechoslovakia.” He believed that “war could only be
avoided if Great Britain and France made their determination quite clear to maintain
the peace of Europe by respecting the liberties and the rights of independent people”.
He disagreed with the British view of military weakness, he estimated that the
Czechoslovak army numbered 180,000 men on a peace footing, and on mobilisation it
could enlarged to 500,000, well trained, well equipped, and animated by public spirit.
If Britain and France took action, he believed Roumania, Yugoslavia and perhaps
even Poland, would change their views and take the Czechoslovak side.
Furthermore, Russia still possessed the strongest air force (5,000 aeroplanes) in
Europe, her potential war resources were extremely great and could easily be brought
into play. Therefore he suggested that when they asked Czechoslovakia to make
reasonable concessions, if the two Powers should declare at the same time that “they
could not permit the destruction of the Czechoslovak State, then the peace of Europe
might be saved.” Bonnet supplemented,
if France remained alone, the situation must be uncertain; but if 
solidarity existed between France and Great Britain they could ensure 
the success of their views. ... i f ... there were no solidarity between the 
French and British Governments in support of Czechoslovakia, then he 
was convinced that Germany would be in a position to remove 
Czechoslovakia from the map ...
After hearing the French arguments, Chamberlain said that the French proposal
was a “bluff” because Czechoslovakia was surrounded by German territory on three
sides. He warned that the French “sentimental considerations” were dangerous. He
doubted “whether the picture was really so black as M. Daladier had painted it”, and
“whether Herr Hitler really desired to destroy the Czechoslovak State or rather a
Czechoslovak State.” In conclusion, he told his French friends that
He had himself seen war and had seen how impossible it was for 
anyone engaging in any war like the last war to come out of it stronger 
or happier. Therefore only dire necessity would ever persuade him to 
wage a preventive war. He was against preventive war.
However, in spite of the British argument, the French still insisted that pressing 
Czechoslovakia to make further concessions would cause the result that “after such
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concessions had been offered the road would be open to Germany, who would be
given a free hand to act as she wished, then we should only have precipitated a
catastrophe instead of preventing it.”
With the adjournment of the meeting at noon, no agreement had been reached
between the two sides.^ ^
During lunch time, Cadogan took the chance to have a talk with Chamberlain and
Halifax. He regarded the French proposal as “awful rubbish”, and offered his
suggestion, “of asking Germans what it is they wanf\ to persuade the French. In
the afternoon meeting, Halifax took this line in conversation, which was effective.
Finally, both sides reached agreement as follows:
both Governments were agreed that there should be a demarche by His 
Majesty’s Government alone in Berlin. They would explain to the 
German Government that they were doing their best to find a peaceful 
solution of the Sudeten difficulty and had asked Dr. Benes to make his 
contributions, but it took two to reach an agreement, and they therefore 
wished to know what was the position of the German Government.
They wished to impress on the German Government that, in the 
meantime, and in view of their intervention at Prague, there was no 
need, nor indeed any reason, for action on the part of the German 
Government. Simultaneously, a demarche would be made at Prague by 
both the French and the British Governments to secure the maximum 
concessions fi'om Dr. Benes.'*^
3. The Runciman Mission
Four days after the Anglo-French talks, Halifax instructed Henderson to inform 
the German Government of the demarche made by Britain and France. He appealed 
the Germans to “use their influence with Henlein in the direction of moderation”, 
while the British Government put their pressure on Prague.'** At the same time, he 
authorised Newton both to inform the Czechs of the Anglo-French demarche, and to 
press them to “make a supreme effort” to meet Henlein’s demands.'*** On the other 
hand, in an instruction to the British Ambassador in Paris on May 22, Halifax warned 
the French Government that they “should not be under any illusion as to attitude” of 
Britain. If France was “the victim of unprovoked aggression by German,” Britain 
would come to her assistance. “If, however, the French Government were to assume 
that His Majesty’s Government would at once take joint action with them to preserve 
Czechoslovakia against German aggression, it is only fair to warn them that our
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Runciman would not be “an arbitrator”, as Chamberlain declared on July 26, “but 
investigator and mediator.”^^  From early August to early September, Runciman 
worked very hard to keep the two parties together, particularly to press Benes go 
further and further to meet the SdP’s demands. Under this pressure, the Czech 
Government offered the “Third Plan”®** in late August to satisfy the SdP’s points for 
equality and autonomy, but the SdP rejected it.®* At the end of that month, Benes put 
forward the “Fourth Plan” based on the “Third”, on which Runciman commented that 
“This plan embodied almost all of the requirements” of the SdP’s demands.®^  
However, when both parties discussed the Plan on September 7, the SdP 
representatives used the incident at Moravska Ostrava to break off the negotiations 
for good.®^
In this period, the press, under the influence of the Government, remained quite 
optimistic. It generally welcomed the announcement of the Runciman mission on one 
hand, while being concerned about the likelihood of failure in mediation on the other. 
The Daily Telegraph appealed for compromise fl om both sides. ThQ Manchester 
Guardian proposed that Runciman should stand by the Czechs while he looked for 
justice. The Times, however, revealed a tendency to suggest that the Czech problem 
stood in the way of Anglo-German understanding. The F.O. kept the muzzle on the 
media to avoid its alarming the public. On September 5, they informed the BBC that 
no commentary should be given on the international crisis. Although they denied this 
was “an instruction”, they insisted that it was a “very strong” recommendation.
Under this pressure, Harold Nicolson’s script, which discussed the Czechoslovak 
crisis, had to be re-written twice, and finally its subject became something dealing 
with the rise in milk prices to seven pence a quart.®'* On the very day when the 
negotiations broke off, a leading article of The Times contained the following 
passage:
It might be worth while for the Czechoslovak Government to consider 
whether they should exclude altogether the project, which has found 
favor in some quarters, of making Czechoslovakia a more 
homogeneous State by the secession of the fringe of alien populations 
who are contiguous to the nation with which they are united by race.
The phrase “project, which has found favor in some quarters” could be suspected of 
referring either to the Cabinet or the F.O. Although the Foreign Secretary
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statements do not warrant any such assumption.” Because of this fatal 
discouragement, the French abandoned the idea to fulfil their obligations to 
Czechoslovakia.®'*
However, the negotiations between the Czech Government and Henlein were not 
promising in the forthcoming months. In mid-July, Halifax obtained the information 
that “Henlein took an extremely pessimistic view of the situation”, and he no longer 
trusted the Czechoslovak Government. Halifax foresaw if the deadlock was not 
broken, Henlein would ask for a plebiscite.®*
In this period, the F.O. had been considering sending a conciliator to bridge the
gap between the two parties. Halifax thought on May 8 that it was worth keeping in
mind, but the move was “premature”.®^ Nevertheless, he worried that negotiations
might break down. He instructed Phipps to consult the French Government over the
idea that the two Governments would send “an international commission” to
investigate the cause of deadlock and “bring the two parties together again.”**® On
June 21, Newton suggested appointing “an outstanding figure” as a mediator.®'* This
suggestion met with great attention in the F.O. Mallet, First Secretary, agreed with
Newton and pointed out that “it would be better not to sound the Czechoslovak
Government at present” on the grounds that it would make the Czechs less ready to
reach agreement, because they would feel able to get better terms through the British
mediation than they would in direct negotiation with the Nazis, and that it would also
give the Sudetens the impression that Britain expected negotiations to fail and
therefore discouraged them from seeking to make them succeed. He went on to say,
“in any ‘compromise’ that we are to find we shall have to induce the Czechs to make
further concessions” on all or some of the Sudetens’ demands. If Britain were to
intervene with an offer of mediation in order to forestall a plebiscite,
we must (1) be ready not only to mediate on internal affairs, but also to 
put forward a scheme for changing the international status of 
Czechoslovakia; and (2) to have our mediator ready. *®
His proposal was generally agreed by Van. and Sargent. Halifax and Cadogan 
initialled the document.®® On June 16, the FPC discussed the names of candidates, 
but no decision was taken®^  until one month later when Halifax “sounded Lord 
Runciman as to his willingness”.®^
214
immediately denied that The Times represented Government policy, Kordt, the
German Charge d’ Affairs in London, estimated that this article possibly derived
“from a suggestion which reached The Times editorial staff from the Prime Minister’s
entourage.” A solid support to this view was the fact that Halifax told Corbin, the
French Ambassador, two days later that “from a purely tactical point of view, he was
of the same opinion” as the leading article ®®
The opposition was agitated by the Government’s ambiguous attitude towards the
Czechoslovak problem. On the 8th, National Labour Executives held a joint meeting,
issuing “The Blackpool Declaration”, which was approved by the Trade Union
Congress the same day. It says;
If mediation is not now successful, a relentless and inevitable chain of 
events will drag the whole world into war. France and the Soviet 
Union are bound by Treaty to support Czechoslovakia if it is attacked.
They have announced that they will at once honour their engagements,
... The British Government must leave no doubt in the mind of the 
German Government that they will unite with the French and Soviet 
Governments to resist an attack on Czechoslovakia.
Their slogan was “Stand by the Czechs!”.
As Parliament was not in session, Attlee requested that the House be summoned 
for debate, but twice met with Chamberlain’s refusal. Hugh Dalton, Labour 
Executive, commented, “Had such a discussion taken place a fortnight earlier, the 
Munich surrender could not have been made.”®®
However, Churchill and Eden were luckier than their Labour friends. These two 
Conservative bank-benchers took advantage of their prestige in approaching 
Ministers and delivered their advice. Churchill wrote several letters to Halifax, in 
which he suggested that Britain, France and Russia should send a joint note to 
Germany, warning that the use of force would raise a “capital issue” for the three 
Powers. He believed that America “would give moral support to such a declaration.” 
In addition, partial Fleet mobilisation was necessary.®^  Eden went to the F.O. on 
September 9 to bring Halifax the similar suggestion in more moderate language. The 
Foreign Secretary comforted his predecessor by saying “Great minds are thinking 
alike, for my mind is moving on just such a project and indeed I was going to speak 
to Neville about a draft today.”®^ The Prime Minister, consulting with the Opposition 
leaders and with Churchill and Eden, declared on the 11th that “Germany cannot with
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impunity carry out a rapid and successful military campaign against Czechoslovakia 
without fear of intervention by France and by Great Britain.”®^ However, this 
warning was soon proved to be a sham due to the fact that before this declaration 
Chamberlain had decided to go to see Hitler in person so as to buy peace at any price.
111. POLICY-MAKING DURING MUNICH PERIOD
1. Plan Z
As the Runciman mission was likely to fail, the Government were still in the dark 
about Hitler’s real intentions. There were two different views mentioned at Cabinet 
meetings. The first view, with a great deal of evidence to support it, was that Hitler 
was determined to intervene by force. The second one was that while Hitler was 
determined to get the Sudeten German question settled this year, he had not yet made 
up his mind to use force for this purpose. Halifax felt “the conflict of evidence was 
such that it was impossible to say which view was correct.”*"* However, he was soon 
inclined to believe the first view. In that case he said, “nothing which we could do 
would stop him.”
The Foreign Secretary met Churchill on September 11. The latter expressed his
proposition as follows,
we should tell Gennany that if she set foot in Czechoslovakia, we 
should at once be at war with her. ... he thought that by taking it we 
should incur no added risk.
But Halifax commented that this opinion was “at the best a very doubtflil view.”*^* He 
suggested.
He was not prepared to say that we would go to war on the issue of 
Czechoslovakia alone, since it was impossible to say in what form that 
issue might arise. To say without qualification that we were prepared 
to go to war to defend Czechoslovakia would, in fact, put the decision 
of peace or war in the hands of others than ourselves.
Chamberlain fully supported his suggestion although he realised that “if we were 
right up against war, public opinion might well change suddenly”. In addition, he 
thought that although an ultimatum “might avert war, it was not certain that it would 
do so.” If Hitler regarded it as a “bluff”, Britain had to choose between being shown 
up as bluffing and going to war. Moreover,
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supposing the threat was made and had the desired results on this occasion; 
would that be the end of the story? The steps taken on the 21st May had not 
proved the end of the story, and people were now saying that it had produced 
in Herr Hitler a feeling of being thwarted.
Therefore, he reached the same conclusion as Halifax, “we should not utter a threat 
to Herr Hitler, that if he went into Czechoslovakia we should declare war upon 
him,””
But the problem was still there. During this period, Chamberlain kept racking 
his brain “to try and devise some means of averting a catastrophe”.^ '* Towards the 
end of August, he had a new idea that he would go to see Hitler himself so as to save 
peace. He first discussed the idea with only Wilson, Henderson (he was back for 
consultation of the policy).^ ® The crucial point was that if Hitler had decided to 
invade Czechoslovakia, “this new idea might cause him to cancel that intention.” 
Henderson agreed, “it might save the situation at the 11th hour.” Chamberlain then 
consulted Halifax, Simon and Hoare in the following days. It “rather took Halifax’s 
breath away.” However, all of them agreed to the proposal, which was now called 
“Plan Z”/®
Chamberlain thought that this plan might be put into effect about the 17th^  ^on 
the grounds that
If adopted too soon it would be asked why this action had been taken 
before Lord Runciman had finished his task. On the other hand, if we 
waited too long, Herr Hitler might have taken some irrevocable action.
However, the Plan was brought forward due to the two factors on the 13th. The first 
was the information from Paris: Daladier said that at all costs Germany must be 
prevented fi*om invading Czechoslovakia because in that case France would be faced 
with her obligations. The second was that the SdP delivered the ultimatum to the 
Czech Government. Faced with this situation, Chamberlain, with support of his 
closest colleagues, decided to put the Plan into operation at once.^* He drafted a 
message that indicated the Prime Minister was ready to visit Hitler and asked the 
Germans to reply as soon as possible. When it had been put into a simple form, 
Halifax sent it to Henderson late on the night of the 13 th.****
After all this had been done, Chamberlain informed the Cabinet of his 
surprise on the 14th. He explained why he had kept them unaware of the Plan
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until then by saying that due to the fear of it leaking out, he had thought it
better to delay mentioning it “until the last moment”. He hoped that
the Cabinet would feel that he had not gone beyond his proper duty in taking 
this action on the advice of those of the colleagues..., but without consulting 
the full Cabinet.
He outlined the original scheme that, since Hitler liked to see Head of State, “it 
might be agreeable to his vanity that the British Prime Minister should take so 
unprecedented a step.” This procedure could prevent the Führer from finding an 
excuse for declining. In addition, Chamberlain felt that he had the advantage of 
saying more to Hitler face to face than he could put in a letter.
Then he went on to describe the Plan in detail. He would appeal to Hitler, saying
that the latter “had a great chance of obtaining fame for himself by making peace in
Europe and thereafter by establishing good relations with this country.” This could
be achieved by finding “a just and equitable settlement.” If Hitler showed no
confidence that Benes would carry out his promises, the Prime Minister would
suggest that “some international body should be set up to supervise the fulfillment of
any agreement reached.” If Hitler retorted that no agreement had yet been reached,
Chamberlain would propose as a solution that the two parties should agree to put
their views before Lord Runciman and to accept Runciman as the final arbitrator.
Hitler might say that nothing could now settle the matter except a “Plebiscite”. On
this issue, Chamberlain would take up Simon’s suggestion as the answer:
the Sudeten Germans should at the outset be given a wide measure of 
autonomy in specified areas, with the option of a Plebiscite after a 
given period.®** This ... would relate the Plebiscite to specified areas.
As regards mixed areas, the only satisfactory solution seemed to be 
transfer.
For the rest of Czechoslovakia, Britain should join in guaranteeing its integrity 
together with France, Russia and Germany.
The Prime Minister thought that the proposed negotiations offered the chance of 
“securing better relations between Germany and England.” This chance would be lost 
if Hitler “had recourse to force now.” He believed what Goering had told Henderson, 
namely, that after solving the problem of Czechoslovakia, Germany “would finally 
become a territorially satisfied country.”®*
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In the course of discussion, there were no contradictory arguments brought
forward. Ministers discussed the Plan along the lines that the Prime Minister had
drawn. However Morrison, the Minister of Agriculture, said that
public opinion had greatly changed in the last few years, and the people 
who had then been loudest in opposing rearmament were now loudest 
in demanding that his country should take a firm line.
Halifax emphasised the guidance for the media, and pointed out
that it was of the utmost importance that steps should be taken to 
ensure that the Press received the news of plan “Z” correctly, and 
suggested that it might be necessary that the newspaper proprietors and 
editors should be seen instead of the Lobby and Diplomatic 
Correspondents.
Duff Cooper, the Admiralty, pointed out that he was quite confident that if they 
went to war they should win. What was really influencing them was “hatred of war” 
rather than “fear of German arms.”
Simon thought
we must be careful that it did not lead us further along the road to 
complete surrender. It was important to make it plain that the decision 
taken was not only conciliatory but was also a firm step.
In the end, the Cabinet showed “their whole-hearted approval” of the Plan made 
by Chamberlain.®  ^ On the same day, Ribbentrop informed Henderson that “the Führer 
would naturally be pleased to receive Chamberlain” on the next day, but at 
Berchtesgaden instead of Berlin.®®
Based on Halifax’s suggestion of guiding the press at the Cabinet meeting, Hoare 
took action immediately. He organised daily meetings to have interviews with the 
editor of the Daily Herald and chairman of the News Chronicle, and persuaded them 
to hold their papers “on the side of peace”. Because of his effective work, the Press 
generally held a positive attitude towards Chamberlain’s visit to Germany. The Times 
admired this “bold move.” The Daily Herald commented that it was “not only the 
bold but the supremely wise course.” However, the News Chronicle approved it on 
the grounds that it was the best way for the Prime Minister to tell Hitler in person that 
Britain would cooperate with France and Russia in order to prevent German demands 
exceeding reasonable scope.®'* Duff Cooper commented that the press reaction
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towards Chamberlain’s visit was “mainly favourable, including rather surprisingly that 
of the Daily Herald
Before he left, Chamberlain had a very brief meeting with Attlee, telling the latter 
“there was a chance of doing something,” The Labour Leader said that nobody was 
against the Prime Minister’s attempt to save peace, but “we mustn’t give way to 
threats, we had a duty to the Czechs, and principles which all parties in Britain now 
adhered to must not be compromised.” The Prime Minister “had very little to say; 
nothing really.”^
2. Berchtesgadeii
Having never been in an aeroplane before, poor old Chamberlain, like a pilgrim, 
went on a bumpy journey to see Hitler first by plane and then by train. At the 
beginning of the meeting, he opened the talk along the proposed lines. When they 
came to the problem of Sudetenland, Chamberlain asked “whether this was all that 
Germany was demanding, or whether she was not aiming over and above this at the 
dismemberment of the Czechoslovak State.” Hitler replied that the demands of the 
Sudeten Germans alone were what he was interested in, and the Czechoslovak 
question would be “the last major problem” to be solved. However, he exclaimed, “1 
shall not put up with this any longer. I shall settle this question in one way or 
another.” To achieve this end, he “would face any war, and even the risk of a world 
war.” Hearing this, Chamberlain became “indignant” and said with serious calm, “If 
...you are determined to proceed against Czecho-Slovakia in any case, ... why did you 
let me come to Berchtesgaden?” “It is best for me return at once. Anything else now 
seems pointless.” It was obvious that Hitler did not want to break off the 
conversation, he quietened down immediately, but requested that the British Prime 
Minister “must first of all state whether he could accept this basis or not, namely, the 
secession of the Sudeten German region by virtue of the right of self-determination.” 
If so, conversation could continue. Chamberlain said that although he “personally” 
recognised the principle of the detachment of the Sudeten areas, he “could give no 
assurance” without consultation of his Cabinet. He suggested they break off the 
conversation at this point and he would come back to meet the Führer again after 
consultation. The words “breaking off’ made Hitler very uneasy, “but when he 
understood that Chamberlain would meet him again, he agreed with obvious relief.”
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At the end, both sides agreed that “in a few days a new conversation will take 
place.”"
After the interview, Chamberlain believed that
1 had established a certain confidence, which was my aim, and on my 
side,... 1 got the impression that here was a man who could be relied 
upon when he had given his word.*^
The Prime Minister landed at Heston in the late afternoon of the 16th.
Immediately he summoned the Ministers to a meeting, Halifax, Simon, Hoare, 
Cadogan, Wilson, Van. and Runciman being present. He told them that Hitler 
wanted self-determination, and he thought it would be wrong to go to war to prevent 
it. However, the meeting broke up without a definite decision being taken.Next  
day, the Cabinet met in full. Chamberlain first gave an account of his conversation 
with the Führer. When he came to the principle of self-determination, he said that he 
did not think that was a matter of whether it was accepted or not, rather “now the 
principle had been agreed, it remained to examine how it should be carried out.” If 
they wanted to reach a settlement with Germany, they could only make pi ogress 
along these lines. He hoped “his colleagues were prepared to express their general 
agreement with the proposition that we should accept the principle of self- 
determination.”
In the course of the discussion, Halifax, Simon and most other Ministers
completely supported the Prime Minister. However, Oliver Stanley felt that it was a
little difficult to reach a decision on such a vital issue. Duff Cooper worried that if
this principle were accepted, “we might be led into a complete surrender.” He
implied a criticism that the Prime Minister should have put forward to Hitler “a
number of reasonable propositions” such as Simon’s plan for autonomy for a period,
to be followed by a plebiscite. He believed that Hitler “was not prepared to leave any
independence to Czechoslovakia.” He went on to point out,
it was a primary interest of this country to prevent any single power 
dominating Europe. We are now faced with the most formidable 
power for a century. ... He found it difficult to believe that the self- 
determination of the Sudeten Germans was Hitler’s last aim. ... even if 
a solution of the present problem was found, it would not be the end of 
our troubles, and that there was no chance of peace in Europe so long 
as there was a Nazi regime in Germany.
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He drew attention to the fact that Britain “was singularly united”, and that the 
Dominions supported the democratic countries in “a fight against dictators” more 
than in 1914, However, he finally came over to Chamberlain’s side and agreed that 
the forthcoming negotiation could be based on the principle of self-determination.
Lord De La Warr, Lord Privy Seal, also had some different views. His main point 
was that if they accepted Hitler’s terms without obtaining “a quid pro qud’\  that 
would represent an abject surrender. He suggested that “we should accept the 
position laid down by the Prime Minister, that we should try to negotiate the best 
terms obtainable”, for example, demobilisation of the German Army.
After listening to all these arguments, Chamberlain explained and justified himself 
by saying,
in certain circumstances we should have to fight, even if our armaments 
were weaker than they were. But in modern circumstances war was 
very different from what it was in 1914. To-day war affected the whole 
population. ... The alternatives to-day were not between abject 
surrender and war. Acceptance of the principle of self-determination 
was not an abject surrender.
Nor did he think that it was a good idea to use the acceptance of self-determination as 
bargain counter to ask Hitler to demobilise his army, on the grounds that “the only 
result would be that Herr Hitler would order his troops to march straight into 
Czechoslovakia.”
After further discussion, the Cabinet generally agreed with the views expressed by 
the Prime Minister. However, it was decided that the final conclusion be postponed 
until after conversation with the French Government.
On the same day, Chamberlain repeated the account of his visit to three Labour
Council Executives Citrine, Morrison and Dalton. The Opposition frankly pointed
out that “British prestige had been gravely lowered by Chamberlain going to see
Hitler.” They insisted on standing by their Blackpool Declaration. Towards end of
meeting, Dalton addressed the Prime Minister on behalf of Labour Party;
1 don’t believe that this will be the last of Hitler’s demands. 1 believe 
that he intends to go on and on, until he dominates first all Central and 
South-eastern Europe, then all Europe, and then all the world. And at 
every future stage this situation may be repeated. When the next crisis 
comes, you or your successor will once again fly over to see him. Y ou 
will return and say that the situation is “desperately critical” — and it 
will be true. You will say that the German military machine is very
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formidable — and that will be still more true then than now. You will 
say that there is no time to lose, that the French, or whoever it may be, 
are weak and irresolute, and that therefore we must give in. For some 
time you will give in at the expense of other people, but sooner or later 
you will have to give in at the expense of British interests, and the end 
of the whole process may well be the liquidation both of the British 
Empire and of our British liberties. And at each stage you will have 
fewer friends and weaker allies to join you in any stand you may, at 
some late hour, decide to make.
He said to the Prime Minister, “These opinions are not held only in the Labour Party. 
They are shared by a large number of your own supporters in Parliament.” Listening 
to his words, Chamberlain shuffled a little on his seat and said, “1 freely admit that we 
are often haunted by fears like these, but we do not believe that such a course of 
things is inevitable. If we can avert war now, we are not certain that it will come 
later.” *^
On September 18, the Inner Cabinet members and their important advisers had
three meetings at 10 Downing Street with the French statesmen. Although the
French at the beginning worried about the loss of Czechoslovakia as a military ally in
the East if the principle of self-determination were to be accepted, Chamberlain and
Halifax succeeded in getting them back to the position that pressure should be put on
Benes so as to save the peace. As the result of the conversations both sides agreed
on a joint message to the Czech Government on the 19th, informing them that
both Governments have been compelled to the conclusion that the 
maintenance of peace and the safety of Czechoslovakia’s vital interests 
cannot effectively be assured unless these areas (Sudetenland—Author) 
are now transferred to the Reich.
Naturally, this memo was rejected by the Czechs.^  ^ On receiving the Czech
rejection, Newton warned Krofta, the Czech Foreign Minister, that “refusal or
evasion at this moment meant the destruction of his beautiful country.” Halifax
instructed Newton on the 21st
You should urge the Czech Government to withdraw this reply and 
urgently consider an alternative that takes account of realities.^ '^
Under such great pressure, Benes saw Newton and the French Ambassador that 
evening, and told them that he had accepted the Anglo-French proposal and left the 
Czech fate in the hands of Britain and France. Meanwhile, Henderson and
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Ribbentrop arranged Chamberlain’s next journey, and it was decided that the Prime 
Minister would fix the time with the Führer on the 22nd at Godesberg.^*’
During three days before that date, Chamberlain summoned the full Cabinet
meetings twice to have further discussion on the guarantee and method of transferring
the Sudetenland. It was generally agreed that the guarantee to Czechoslovakia was a
key step to prevent further aggression. However, as to the type of guarantee,
Halifax raised the question.
If, ... it was decided to have a joint guarantee, and Germany, being one 
of the guarantor countries, committed an act of aggression, would the 
other guarantor countries be excused from coming to Czechoslovakia’s 
help? If, however, the guarantee was several, and other countries failed 
to fulfill their obligations, this country might find itself alone in 
supporting Czechoslovakia.
Chamberlain analysed,
it was not right to assume that the guarantee committed us to 
maintaining the existing boundaries of Czechoslovakia. The guarantee 
merely related to unprovoked aggression. ... Its main value would lie in 
its deterrent effect.
the right plan was to have a joint guarantee, and to provide for a 
meeting of the guarantors to decide in any particular case whether 
“unprovoked aggression” had taken place.
He then suggested that the guarantor countries should be Britain, France and 
Russia, probably including Italy; and they should invite Germany to sign a separate 
pact of non-aggression with Czechoslovakia. The Ministers generally agreed with the 
Prime Minister. As to transferring an area with over 50% German inhabitants, the 
Cabinet came to the conclusion that “German troops should not be allowed to cross 
the frontier until an international force had reached Czechoslovak territory.”
In addition, Chamberlain was quite optimistic over obtaining some concessions 
from Hitler such as the demobilisation of the German Army and Herr Henlein’s 
Freikorps, and even, “to get Hitler to repeat his declaration that if he obtained 
incorporation of the Sudeten Germans in the Reich he would be satisfied.
Public opinion varied on the Anglo-French proposal of September 18 with 
growing dislike of it. The Times and the Sunday Times held the standpoint close to 
the Government’s; The Times demonstrated in its leading article on the 20th that.
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based on this proposal, “the ultimate gain will be more real than the immediate 
sacrifice” to the Czechs. Whereas the Manchester Guardian and the News Chronicle 
were critical of the plan, and the Diplomatic Correspondent of XhQ Manchester 
Guardian wrote that the Anglo-French proposal was an “ultimatum, with a short 
time-limit”
On the afternoon of the 21 st, after a ftill meeting of Labour Executives, it was 
decided that Attlee and Greenwood should see the Prime Minister with the purpose 
of examining the Anglo-French plan of the 18th in detail because it seemed to them 
no details had been settled. The two Labour Leaders had “a disagreeable interview” 
with Chamberlain. Attlee said to him, “You have abandoned these people (the 
Czechs — Author) completely. You have made an absolute surrender. All Eastern 
Europe will now fall under Hitler’s sway. We are full of the most profound disgust. 
This is one of the greatest disasters in British history.” But Chamberlain “had become 
steelier and steelier, smiling less and snarling more.”^^
The next day Chamberlain had left for Germany. When Churchill went to 10 
Downing Street, the Cabinet told him that the Prime Minister would put to Hitler the 
terms discussed in the Cabinet meeting, including demobilisation. After his return, 
Winston told his friends and supporters, that if Hitler refused the terms, “we shall 
have war.” However, on the very moment, while he was laying his proposal before 
Hitler at Godesberg Chamberlain said nothing about demobilisation.
3. Godesberg
On the afternoon of September 22, Hitler met Chamberlain in Godesberg. When 
the Prime Minister told the Chancellor that he had successfully induced his Cabinet, 
and the French and Czech Governments to agree to the principle of self- 
determination, and that the Sudetenland would be transferred to the Reich by an 
orderly operation involving the intervention of an international commission. Hitler 
replied that these proposals were out of date. He insisted on two new points, which 
had not been discussed at Berchtesgaden. One was that he must support, due to 
German friendship with Poland and Hungary, the demands on Czech territory from 
these two countries. The other was that due to the urgency of the Sudeten problem, 
he declared that the problem should be settled “definitely and completely” by October 
1. If he failed to do this, he would, instead of a “peaceful solution”, pursue a
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“military solution”, namely, to establish a frontier “not on a national but on a strategic 
basis”. As regards the suggestion of a nonaggression pact between Germany and 
Czechoslovakia, the Chancellor replied that he could only conclude such a pact when 
all problems including Polish and Hungarian demands had been settled.
Shocked by the German fresh demands, Chamberlain felt “both disappointed and 
puzzled.” He reminded Hitler of what the latter had stated at Berchtesgaden. In 
order to help Germany, he “had risked his whole political career.” Now these 
unexpected new demands would put him in most embarrassing position. He begged 
the Führer to moderate the terms, but Hitler did not budge an inch. The first 
interview broke up “without any reference to a subsequent meeting.” ®^^
In their phone conversation that evening, Chamberlain told Halifax that the 
interview with Hitler was “most unsatisfactory”.^ ®^ However, he was not really 
prepared to shut the door, nor was Hitler. In his letter to Hitler that evening, 
Chamberlain said that he would communicate the Chancellor’s proposal to the Czech 
Government, who in his opinion would refuse to accept these terms. He appealed to 
the Führer once again that “there must surely be alternatives to your proposal...
Hitler’s reply came the next afternoon, in which the Führer, in spite of using some 
moderate language, insisted on all the demands that he had put forward the previous 
day.'®'"
Nevertheless Chamberlain’s “patience” was “not yet finally exhausted”. D u r i n g  
the adjournment, he wrote to Hitler again, proving conciliatory, and asked the latter 
to make these proposals in the form of memo, which he would pass to Czech 
Government. When the letter was handed to Ribbentrop by Wilson and 
Henderson, both sides agreed that Chamberlain should come to see Hitler again that 
evening so as to discuss the memo.^ ®^
At the evening meeting, when he read the German memo attached with an 
illustrated map, which showed that the operation of evacuation and handing over of 
Sudetenland should be completed by September 28, the Prime Minister was outraged 
by its language and manner more than by its content. “That’s an ultimatum”, he 
exclaimed to Hitler, “you have made no effort to assist my attempts to secure peace.” 
However, he told Hitler that he could not either accept or reject the memo. The only 
thing he could do was to transfer it to the Czech Government. ^ ®^ After a long and
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hard discussion, the Chancellor at last agreed to postpone the operation until
October 1. “You are the only man,” he said to Chamberlain, “to whom I have ever
made a concession.” ®^®
In a private talk after the interview. Hitler assured Chamberlain that Sudetenland
was his last tenitorial ambition in Europe. In addition, he wanted very earnestly to be
friends with England. ^ ®^
As soon as he returned on the 24th, the Prime Minister summoned a Ministers’
meeting at 3 and then a Cabinet meeting at 5.30 in the same afternoon. He reported
to his colleagues what the Führer had newly demanded, including their private talk.
Although Hitler’s behaviour at Godesberg was obviously untrustworthy in other’s
eyes, Chamberlain “was satisfied that Hitler was speaking the truth.” He thought that
“he had now established an influence over Herr Hitler, and that the latter trusted him
and was willing to work with him.” In the face of disagreement fi'om most
Ministers including Hoare, the Prime Minister tried to persuade the Cabinet that
it was a wonderful opportunity to put an end to the horrible nightmare 
of the present armament race. That seemed to him to be the big thing in 
the present issue.
He continued,
the Cabinet would examine very carefully the differences between the 
proposals made last Sunday and the present proposals, and would 
consider whether those differences justified us in going to war.
He justified his proposal of surrender by reminding his colleagues of the terrible 
picture of war — particularly modern war, which should be avoided at any price at the 
moment.
However, his persuasion seemed not as effective as usual. In the course of the 
discussion, foreseeing that Benes would definitely refuse Hitler’s proposal. Duff' 
Cooper said that if Germany attacked Czechoslovakia, “public opinion would bring 
about a position in which we should have to intervene in the war.” He warned that 
intervention might come “too late” unless Britain took action promptly. He believed 
that if the Government made this clear to the Germans, it “might yet result in 
deterring them from war.” In addition, he did not have any confidence in the 
promises that Hitler had made to the Prime Minister. Hore-Belisha, War Secretary, 
reminded the Cabinet that the Chiefs of Staff “urged the importance of early
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mobilisation ” Hoare also proposed that if Hitler attacked Czechoslovakia, “France,
Russia and ourselves would at once make war on him.”
It was obvious that Chamberlain was very isolated in the Cabinet this time
because it appeared that there was only Halifax who shared the Prime Minister’s view
by saying that “notwithstanding political difficulties, he doubted whether the
disadvantages of accepting Hitler’s proposals were so great as to justify us in going
to war.” In order to break the deadlock, he suggested that mobilisation should wait
until a general policy had been decided. With Chamberlain’s support, this suggestion
was generally agreed to by the Cabinet.
That day Cadogan “was completely horrified” by the calmness of Chamberlain
and Halifax towards “total surrender”. He wrote Halifax a note to indicate his
opposite opinion, but this had “no effect” at first. However, it gave Halifax “a
sleepless night”. Restlessly shuffling ideas from late night to dawn, the Foreign
Secretaiy completely changed his mind.^ '^^  Next morning when the Cabinet met again
Halifax, in spite of feeling “a brute”, s a i d  that his opinion was “changing”.
What made him hesitate was that it might be held that there was a 
distinction in principle between orderly and disorderly transfer with all 
that the latter implied for the minorities in the transferred areas.
He was not at all satisfied with the fact that
Hitler had given us nothing and that he was dictating terms, just as 
though he had won a war but without having had to fight. ... he did not 
feel that it would be right to put pressure on Czechoslovakia to accept.
We should lay the case before them. If they rejected it he imagined that 
France would join in, and if France went in we should join with them.
He concluded that working most closely with the Prime Minister throughout the
long crisis, “he was not quite sure that their minds were still altogether at one.”“ ®
His change of view was “a horrible blow” to Chamberlain, who blamed his Foreign
Secretary, “Night conclusions are seldom taken in the right perspective.”^^
In addition, Halifax informed the Cabinet of Amery’s letter to the Prime Minister,
in which the Labour Leader said that they were bound to tell Hitler:
that the demand is in our opinion um easonable, that we cannot blame 
the Czechs for rejecting it, and that it^  instead of considering reasonable 
alternatives, he invades Czechoslovakia, he must realize the 
consequences...
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We all applauded your first going to Berchtesgaden. Many of us were 
greatly perturbed by what we understood to be the proposals forced 
upon the Czechs — going far beyond what 1 suggested to you earlier — 
and immensely relieved to hear that you were standing up to Hitler 
once you realized that even such a settlement, which gave him more 
than he could ever have expected, was not enough for him. But if the 
country and the House should once suppose that you were prepared to 
acquiesce in or even endorse this last demands, there would be a 
tremendous revulsion of feeling against you.
This view was agreed by Duff Cooper and Hore-Belisha. Hoare did not entirely 
stand by the Prime Minister either, suggesting the “counter proposals” that the 
transfer of the Sudetenland should be “in an orderly fashion.” He went on to propose 
that Britain, France and Russia should open joint militaiy conversations.^^® It was 
obvious as Cadogan recorded that “Cabinet anyhow wouldn’t allow P.M. to make 
any further concessions (and I’m sure country wouldn’t).”^^® In the face of strong 
disagreement, Chamberlain did not want to give up. He summed up by saying that 
“he did not think that it was necessary to take any immediate decision” because he 
thought that they should consult with the French first before a decision was made. 
This was generally accepted by the Ministers.
In the evening, the British statesmen met the Daladier-Bonnet team, which came 
to London again for the consultation. Daladier thought Hitler’s proposal was 
unacceptable and France would fight if Germany attacked Czechoslovakia. 
Chamberlain tried to move the French in the direction of concession. He explained 
Hitler’s plan again and again in detail, so as to show there was no great difference 
between it and the Anglo-French proposal of September 18. Simon, who was not at 
all an unequivocal opponent against Chamberlain, now helped the Prime Minister to 
discourage the French by drawing attention to France’s military inferiority vis-a-vis 
Germany if war broke out. Hoare also emphasised his disagreement with Daladier by 
saying that even if Britain and France were engaged in war with Germany there was 
no way to prevent Czechoslovakia being oven un. Realising Daladier did not think 
there was any other proposal to make for concession except the original Anglo- 
French plan, Chamberlain continued to search for another way out. The meeting was 
adjourned at night without any encouraging result.
After the Anglo-French meeting. Cabinet members met for the third time within 
24 hours at 11.30 that night. Hailsham, Lord Chancellor, pointed out that the French
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seemed not to have decided “what they would do.” They wanted “to keep Germany
guessing, in the hope that Europe would take the view that France was fulfilling her
obligations.” The Prime Minister took the chance to put forward his new idea that he
should write a personal letter^^ to the Führer and made one last appeal to him. He
proposed to ask the Führer
to agree to the appointment of a Joint Commission, with German and 
Czech members and a British representative. This Commission would 
not start de novo, but would consider how the proposals accepted by 
the present Czech Government could be put into effect in an orderly 
manner and as quickly as possible, and without shocking public 
opinion.
His purpose was “unwilling to leave unexplored any possible chance of avoiding
war”. He told his colleagues that he would authorise Wilson as “Confidential
Adviser” to see the Führer and deliver the letter in person. In this way, if the letter
failed to secure any response from Hitler, Wilson should be authorised to give a
warning as follows.
The French Government have informed us that, if the Czechs reject the 
Memorandum and Germany attacks Czechoslovakia, they will fulfil 
their obligations to Czechoslovakia. Should the forces of France in 
consequence become engaged in active hostilities against Germany, we 
shall feel obliged to support them.
Chamberlain thought it was a desperate try and even he himself was not optimistic as 
to the result. Simon again came to Chamberlain’s aid and appealed to his colleagues 
that, knowing Hitler as he did, the Prime Minister thought that “this course was a 
useful one,” so “the Cabinet should act on it.” Duff Cooper, who objected to any 
further concession though, did not want to lose this last slice of hope either. In the 
end, the Cabinet accepted Chamberlain’s proposal.
Next morning (the 26th), the Prime Minister first had an interview with General 
Gamelin, who came to London for consultation. The General estimated that if war 
broke out, the Czech Army “would continue to exist as a fighting force” although it 
would not hold out against the Germans veiy^  long — probably for two weeks.
Then the British Ministers had another meeting with the French statesmen. 
Chamberlain informed Daladier of his plan for a last attempt. The latter appreciated 
the action that the Prime Minister had taken.
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It was not unexpected that Wilson reported in the evening from Berlin that he had 
a “very violent hour” with Hitler, who even did not want to listen to Chamberlain’s 
letter. There was no indication for “compromise or even modification”. The German 
Chancellor fixed September 28, 2 p.m. as the deadline for the Czech acceptance of his 
demand.This  being so, the Confidential Adviser had read Chamberlain’s warning 
to the Führer before he returned.
Meanwhile, the Godesberg terms became known to the public, Being agitated, 
most newspapers hardened their attitude towards Germany. The article by the 
Diplomatic Correspondent of the Daily Telegraph says, “The demands are as 
peremptory and uncompromising as if they represented, not as the basis of 
negotiation for a peaceful settlement, but a dictation to an enemy beaten in the field — 
which Czechoslovakia is not yet.” The Times issued a warning the same as Wilson 
had read to Hitler; on the other hand, its leading article appealed that “it is still not 
too late to stop this great tragedy, and for the peoples of all nations to insist on 
settlement by free negotiation.”^^®
On the same day (the 26th), a group of politicians gathered first in General 
Spears’ office and then in Churchill’s fiat in the evening, including Churchill, Amery, 
Lord Cecil, George Lloyd, Lord Lloyd, Sir Edward Grigg, Sir Robert Horne, 
Boothing, Bracken, Law, Aichie Sinclair, Lytton, Spears and one or two others, most 
of whom were Conservatives and others who were either Opposition leaders or 
prominent League of Nations figures. “The feeling was passionate” as Churchill 
recorded. They all agreed, “We must get Russia in.” Churchill told them that he had 
just seen the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary, suggesting again that the 
Government should make a joint declaration with France and Russia showing “the 
unity of sentiment and purpose” against Hitler’s aggression. He also urged the Prime 
Minister to mobilise the Fleet at once. It seemed to have a temporary effect on 
policy-making because that very evening being approved by Halifax the Press 
Department of the F.O. issued a communiqué, which was similar to Wilson’s warning 
to Hitler. Chamberlain also agreed to mobilise the Fleet on the same night. In the 
end, these politicians decided that “If Chamberlain rats again we shall form a united 
block against him.” But they did not think that he would rat, and therefore they 
should “rally behind him.”^^®
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However, the critics were too optimistic. Chamberlain’s consideration of 
mobilisation was delayed until the next day. While a small meeting of Ministers was 
held, Chiefs of Staff were called in. The Ministers agreed with their advice that “it 
was important to impress on the French Government that they should not take any 
offensive action until they had consulted with the British Government.” As to their 
suggestion of mobilising the Navy, the Prime Minister approved with hesitation. 
However, he did not mention a word about this decision in his broadcast of the same 
evening as he had promised to do.^ ^^
Before his broadcast, Chamberlain had a discussion with Halifax, Cadogan and 
Wilson. Chamberlain instructed Wilson to draft a telegram, telling the Czechs to 
accept Hitler’s memo. Although Halifax and Cadogan showed their disagreement, 
the former sent the document separately to Prague, Paris and Berlin. However, 
even in the face of this appeal, the German attitude was negative on the grounds that 
the Czechs must accept German plan “at once”.^ "^*
All hope seemed gone. In his broadcast a few minutes after 8, the Prime Minister 
addressed,
How horrible, fantastic, incredible it is that we should be digging 
trenches and trying on gas-masks here because of a quarrel in a far­
away country between people of whom we know nothing. ... at this 
moment, I see nothing further that I can usefully do in the way of 
mediation.”^^^
Cooper criticised this broadcast which did not mention France or offer a word of 
sympathy for Czechoslovakia. The only sympathy expressed was for Hitler. After 
listening to it, Churchill felt “most indignant”, and rang the Admiralty up to say that 
“we’re preparing to scuttle.”
4. Mimicli
Shortly after his broadcast, the Prime Minister received Hitler’s reply to his 
private letter of the 26th. While insisting on his demand, the Führer however pointed 
out that German Army would not march beyond the region which the Czech 
Government had agreed to cede, and that the plebiscite would be caiTied out by free 
vote, and that Germany would participate a joint guarantee to Czechoslovakia. 
Reading this letter, Chamberlain reflected that differences and obscurities “had been 
narrowed down still further to a point where really it was inconceivable that they
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could not be settled by negot i a t ions .He  immediately summoned the Cabinet 
meeting and told the Ministers that Hitler’s letter might “afford some ground on 
which a further proposal for a peacehil settlement could be based.”
On the morning of the 28th, without consultation of any member of the Cabinet, 
not even of Halifax, the Prime Minister made the decision alone to send Hitler a “last 
last” appeal, after discussing with Wilson and his another intimate adviser.^ '*® In this 
“last last” appeal, Chamberlain assured Hitler that he could get everything without 
fighting. At the same time, he sent a personal message to Mussolini, asking the 
Duce to urge Hitler to agree to his proposal. After receiving his letter, Mussolini 
immediately instructed the Italian Ambassador in Berlin to see Ribbentrop and to say 
that, Italy would certainly “stand by Germany” yet in view of Chamberlain’s 
proposal, Mussolini hoped that Hitler would postpone military action for 24 hours. 
France also agreed to cooperate with Britain on the same lines.
That morning, as Wheeler-Bennett described, men and women waking “with an 
eerie feeling” that it was “the last day” of peace. However, there is little evidence 
to suggest that the public opposed facing war. In the afternoon, the House was 
summoned to debate, but actually only listen to the Prime Minister’s speech. 
Chamberlain gave account of his visit to Germany and said that the Führer was 
prepared “to risk a world war” for Sudeten Germans. Haiold Nicolson noticed, “as 
he said these words a shudder of horror passed though the House of Commons.” 
Chamberlain then told the MPs that Hitler had just accepted his last last appeal and 
invited him, Daladier and Mussolini to Munich, to settle the Sudeten problem. “For 
a second,” Harold Nicolson wrote, “the House was hushed in absolute silence. And 
then the whole House burst into a roar of cheering, since they knew that this might 
mean peace.” The whole House rose to applaud to their Prime Minister except a few 
MPs such as Churchill, Amery, Eden and Harold Nicolson who remained seated.^ '*® 
Like the House, the Press approved the announcement with enthusiasm except a few 
papers such as the Daily Telegraph, the Daily Herald and the News Chronicle, which 
held reservations.Harold Nicolson described the situation as “mass hysteria”.
On the 29th, at Churchill’s suggestion, the critics wanted to send a telegram to 
the Prime Minister in Munich, asking him “not to betray the Czechs.” The telegram 
was to be signed by Churchill, Lord Cecil, Attlee, Eden, Archie Sinclair and Lloyd.
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But Eden reiused to sign because he thought “it would be interpreted as a vendetta
against Chamberlain.” Attlee refused too without the approval of his Party. The
Oppositions failed to act at this juncture.^ '*®
At midday on the 29th, the four heads of the Munich Powers met. After long
discussion, an agreement was signed at midnight. The Czech evacuation of
Sudetenland would begin on October 1 and be complete by the lOth.*^ ® While they
were waiting for the draftsmen, Chamberlain asked Hitler whether they could have a
private talk. The Führer “jumped at the idea.” With only the interpreter present, they
talked about the issues of Spain, economic relations and disarmament. Finally,
Chamberlain succeeded in inviting Hitler to sign a joint agreement, which he had
prepared and brought with him. It said
the German Führer and Chancellor and the British Prime Minister,... are 
agreed in recognising that the question of Anglo-German relations is of 
the first importance for the two countries and for Europe.
We regard the agreement signed last night and the Anglo-German 
Naval Agreement as symbolic of the desire of our two people never to 
go to war with one another again.
Then, Chamberlain and Daladier called for the Czech representatives, who were 
waiting for the result, and handed them the Munich Agreement. With this 
arrangement, the Czech Government announced their acceptance of the terms on 
September 30, 5 p.m/^^
IV. GOLDEN AGE OF APPEASEMENT
1. ChainberlaiiPs Confidence in Appeasement and Policy of Rearmament
Stepping down from the aeroplane at Heston on the afternoon of the 30th,
Chamberlain waved the joint agreement — the receipt of selling Czechoslovakia — to
the cheering c rowds .When  he spoke at 10 Downing Street, he said.
This is the second time in our history that there has come back from 
Germany to Downing Street peace with honour. I believe it is peace 
for our time.^ ^^
The BBC created an overwhelming support for the Prime Minister “by 
broadcasting in numerous news bulletins information about the tremendous fan mail
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received by the Premier”, giving the impression that ail these letters were letters of
praise. However, the fact was that, of these letters, many were letters of protest,
which were not divulged to the public. Madge and Harrison investigated that
Yet from one public meeting alone, in a provincial town where an 
observer happened to be present, 800 letters of protest to the Premier 
were actually written, paid for and posted by members of the 
audience.
Oliver Harvey’s diaries gave another evidence, as he wrote on September 30, “Vast 
crowds in the streets — hysterical cheers and enthusiasm, P.M. on balcony at 
Buckingham Palace. But many feel it to be a great humiliation.”^^^
The general feelings both in the Press and in the House were, as Eden summed up 
later, that some hoped that “we were at the beginning of the better things”, the 
others, however, “very reluctantly were convinced that we had gained nothing but 
brief respite at the end of which more demands would be imposed by similar 
methods,”^^^
From October 3, the House held four days of debates. The Labour and Liberal
dissenters were little different from the Government supporters on the point that they
felt “relief that war has not come this time” due to the Prime Minister’s attempt.
However, they condemned Chamberlain for abjectly surrendering to the threat of
force. Attlee pointed out.
The events of these last few days constitute one of the greatest 
diplomatic defeats that this country and France have ever sustained.
There can be no doubt that it is a tremendous victory for Herr Hitler.
Without firing a shot, by the mere display of military force, he has 
achieved a dominating position in Europe which Germany failed to win 
after four years of war. He has overturned the balance of power in 
Europe. He has destroyed the last fortress of democracy in Eastern 
Europe which stood in the way of his ambition. He has opened his way 
to the food, the oil and the resources which he requires in order to 
consolidate his military power,
Dalton asked, “is it peace now, or is it only a short breathing space and a fatal 
worsening of strategical and economic condition ... before an inevitable war?” He 
foresaw, “we shall not have to wait very long before Herr Hitler will dictate, first to 
his immediate neighbours and later to all Europe, and in the end to the British Empire 
and the world at large.”^^  ^ Unlike other speakers, Churchill did not start his address 
with “tributes” to the Prime Minister. He said, “Do not suppose that this is the end.
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This is only the beginning of the reckoning. This is only the first sip, the first 
foretaste of a bitter cup which will be proffered to us ...” He thought that “in fiiture 
the Czechoslovak State cannot be maintained as an independent entity.”
Meanwhile, the Opposition group including Churchill, Eden, Cooper, Amery, 
Harold Nicolson and six or seven other MPs decided that they preferred to “abstain” 
rather than that some should abstain and some vote against the Government.
Although he asked the House not to read too much into liis words that he had 
spoken at 10 Downing Street, Chamberlain, no doubt, believed, as he wrote to the 
Archbishop of Canterbury on October 2, that “we have at last opened the way to that 
general appeasement which alone can save the world from chaos.” ®^"^
At the first Cabinet meeting (October 3) affer he returned, the Prime Minister was 
asked of his view about the argument that was strongly held within and outside of the 
Government:
we must never again allow ourselves to get into the position in which 
we had been in the last few weeks, and that every effort should be 
made to intensify our rearmament programme.
In reply, Chamberlain said he “would like to make his own position in the matter
clear.” He analysed the relationship between appeasement and rearmament:
Ever since he had been Chancellor of the Exchequer, he had been 
oppressed with the sense that the burden of armaments might break our 
backs. This had been one of the factors which had led him to the view 
that it was necessary to try and resolve the causes which were 
responsible for the armament race.
He thought that we were now in a more hopeful position, and that the 
contacts which had been established with the Dictator Powers opened 
up the possibility that we might be able to reach some agreement with 
them which would stop the armament race.
On the other hand, he did not think it was right “to stop rearming until we were 
convinced that other countries would act in the same way.” Nor did he agree that 
“we should at once embark on a great increase in our armaments programme.” ®^® A 
few weeks later (on October 31), when the Minister had another discussion on the 
issue of rearmament, the Secretary for Air warned that even from the defensive point 
of view, “at the present time we were seriously deficient as compared with Germany. 
Indeed our weakness might be said to be likely to provoke aggression by others.”
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The Prime Minister once again retorted the argument that proposed acceleration of 
rearmament,
Our Foreign policy was one of appeasement: We must aim at 
establishing relations with the Dictator Powers which will lead to a 
settlement in Europe and to a sense of stability.
There had been a good deal of talk in the country and in the Press 
about the need for rearmament by this country. In Germany and Italy it 
was suspected that this rearmament was directed against them, and it 
was important that we should not encourage these suspicions.
our rearmament was directed to securing our own safety and not for 
purposes of aggression against other countries.
He emphasised that the purpose of the Munich Agreement was not to gain time for 
rearmament,
A good deal of false emphasis had been placed on rearmament, as 
though one result of the Munich Agreement had been that it would be 
necessaiy for us to add to our rearmament programmes. Acceleration 
of existing programmes was one thing, but increases in the scope of our 
programme which would lead to a new arms race was a different 
proposition.
It might be possible to take active steps and to follow up the Munich 
Agreement by other measures, aimed at securing better relations. The 
putting into effect of the Anglo-Italian Agreement would be one step in 
this direction. He also hoped that some day we should be able to 
secure a measure of limitation of armaments, but it was too soon to say 
when this would prove possible. An improvement in confidence was 
first necessaty.^ ®^
The above evidence demonstrates that Chamberlain’s effect at Munich was not 
aimed to buy time for military preparation against the dictators. What he proposed 
was that with rearmament to a certain extent that was merely sufficient for the 
Britain’s own safety, he was waiting for the right moment to slow it down, and enjoy 
the fruits of Munich. British rearmament after Munich did not slow down because 
this right moment never appeared. In the winter of 1938 - 39, there emerged a false 
alarm that Germany might invade Holland, and then instead Hitler raped Prague in the 
coming March.
Some review may bring a Ifesh light to the picture of rearmament. Since 
Chamberlain cut one third of expenditure on the DRC four-year rearmament
237
programme in 1934, British rearmament had followed his policy of “cheapest
defence”. Immediately after the Anschluss, Chamberlain told liis colleagues at the
Cabinet meeting of March 22 that
there was an underlying resentment at the idea of constantly having to 
knuckle under to the Dictators for lack of sufficient strength. The best 
way to meet this view was to announce an acceleration of re-armament 
and opportunities for personnel service.
Although rearmament had been again put on the agenda, there was little vigour 
and determination to carry it out. Chamberlain and Simon were “against thorough­
going rearmament because of its effect on our foreign trade.” They were very 
optimistic about “the good behaviour of the Dictators.” ®^® Halifax was also very 
ambivalent as he said to the FPC members on March 21 that he was “in favour of a 
more vigorous line in rearmament but feared that it should not expose ourselves to 
rebuffs from Germany and so lose all hope of improving relations with her.”^^®
In 1937, the Cabinet approved the total cost of the defence programme during the
next five years (1937-41) as £1,500 million. But the three Defence Departments
estimated that the programme would require at least £2,000 million. Simon, the
Chancellor of the Exchequer, kept demanding that the Defence Services reduce their
budget. Dufif Cooper felt that any discussion with Simon for increasing expenditure
on the rearmament programme was “pure waste of time.” It was hardly surprising to
find in the Cabinet document of that time that “the Defence Services were working
under instructions to cut down estimates”, and that “this was hardly consistent with
an announcement that we were accelerating our armament.” General Sir Henry
Pownall, revealed the resentment of the Chiefs of Staff in his Diary of March 21,
At the Cabinet this week there was much talk of speeding up and W.O. 
could do this and that.... But when the Cabinet minutes came out it 
appeared that all this wonderful business was to be done ‘within the 
amount of money available for the Army’ — and as that has not been 
settled — it has been indeterminable for months and is likely to remain 
so — it simply means that the Treasury have a complete free hand, at 
any point and on any project, to say it can’t be done.^ ^^
Even after the Rhineland crisis, the policy of rearmament was “business as usual”, 
which indicated that rearmament should not be put in the position where it was more 
important than the normal industrial and commercial life. The rule lasted until the 
spring of 1938.^ '^^  This certainly explains why the phrase, “Britain was not ready for
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war” had been repeatedly heard since 1931, and why British rearmament had always 
lagged far behind Germany’s.
On the other hand, Germany spent about three times as much on armament as 
Britain in the years 1933-38.^^  ^ As he started the second phase of rearmament in the 
summer of 1936 under the Second Four-Year Plan, Hitler gave two principles to 
Goering, who was appointed as Plenipotentiary of the Plan:
I. The German Army must be ready for commitment in four years.
II. The Geiman economy must be ready for war in four years.
The following tabular forms explore approximately the gap between the two sides 
in the years 1936-38:
Table I. Rearmament expenditure (£ million)
UK Germany
1936 £186 £ 500 (RM 6 billion)
1937 £265 £ 667 (RM 8 billion)
1938 £400 £1,500 (RM 18 billion)
Table II. Percentage of G.N.P. devoted to military expenditure^^^
UK Gemiany
1936 4 13
1937 6 13
1938 7 17
The peace-time strength of the German Ai my in August 1939 was approximately 
equal to the total of the British, French and Polish armies. Although it was much 
stronger than that of Germany, the British Navy had to defend the whole Empire. In 
addition, a sea blockade could not bring Germany to her knees in a short period if 
war broke out.
As regards the air force, German first line aircraft had exceeded in number to 
Britain’s by the end of 1936.^ ^® Although rearmament in the air took an almost 
leading share among those of the three Services, the programme was not promising. 
From 1936-39, Air Staff worked out several Schemes to improve the Air strength. 
Immediately after Munich, “Scheme M” was formulated, which was the last one 
before the outbreak of war, showing as follows:
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Table ÏIL Aircraft total comparison between Britain and Germany
Oct. 1938 Apr. 1, 1939 Aug. 1, 1939
First-line Reserve First-line Reserve First-line Reserve
UK 1,606 412 1,782 977 1,890 1,502
Germany 3,200 2,400 3,680 2,700 4,030 3,000
According to tliis Scheme, the total aircraft of the RAF would only reach less than
1/2 of Germany’s by August 1, 1939 — one month before the war. Even so, when the
Cabinet discussed the Scheme, Simon pointed out that this programme was “so costly
as to raise serious doubts whether it can be financed... without the gravest danger to
the country’s stability.” He suggested that only the fighters should have priority in
being increased, which was supported by Chamberlain and other Ministers. In
addition to financial stringency, the programme suffered from the problem that only
50% Reserve aircraft in Scheme M could be produced due to the industrial
situation. Under these circumstances, at the outbreak of war the RAF had only a
total of 3,860 aircraft against that of Germany’s 9,220. The inferior margin had not
been much narrowed down in the post-Munich period.
2. Failure of The Guarantee to Czechoslovakia
When Chamberlain sold the Sudetenland at the Munich conference, the only
reward he obtained from Hitler was that Germany promised to join in guaranteeing
the remnant of Czech territory after the Polish and Hungarian minorities had been
settled. Sir Thomas Inskip, Defence Secretary, said on behalf of the Government
in the House on October 4 that although a guarantee would not be technically in force
until settlement between Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary had been achieved,
Czechoslovakia to treat the guarantee as being now in force. In the 
event, therefore, of an act of unprovoked aggression against 
Czechoslovakia, His Majesty’s Government, however, feel under a 
moral obligation to Majesty’s Government would certainly feel bound 
to take all steps in their power to see that the integrity of 
Czechoslovakia is preserved.
In fact. Hitler did not at all want to guarantee the new boundaries of the Czech 
State. A few days after Munich, he consulted with General Keitel on the plan of 
destroying the whole of Czechoslovakia. On October 21, he issued the directive
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under the title “Liquidation of the Remainder of the Czech State” Within two 
months, an additional order to this directive was circulated to the Army Chiefs of 
Staff. It reads,
To the outside world also it must be made clear that this is merely an 
act of pacification and not an operation of war.
For the same reason provision for the exercise of executive power by 
the Commander-in-Chief of the Army is confined to the newly occupied 
territory and limited to a short period.
Since frontier rectifications between Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary had 
been completed in November, the British Government sent a note to the German 
Government on Februaiy 8 of 1939, concerning the matter of the joint guarantee to 
Czechoslovakia. In the German reply, which was received in March 3, Hitler 
considered it necessary “to await firstly a clarification of internal development of 
Czecho-Slovakia.”^^®
The British policy-makers were not alerted by Hitler’s delay in guarantee. In spite 
of the growing German threat to Czechoslovak independence, Henderson reported on 
February 18, “My definite impression ... is that Hen Hitler does not contemplate any 
adventures at the moment and all stories and rumours to the contrary are completely 
without real foundation.” He urged the Government “publicly both in press and 
speeches” to stress “our full reliance on Herr Hitler’s peaceful intentions as it is 
harmful to show suspicion of them.” ®^® Following him, Chamberlain, who had 
realised that “British public opinion was now violently anti-dictator”/®^  tried to 
soothe the public by telling the press on March 10 that “Europe was settling down to 
a period of tranquillity.” Hoare also talked about the hopes of a “Five Year Peace 
Plan” leading to a “Golden Age of Prosperity. ” ®^^
Only five days later. Hitler ordered the German troops across the German-Czech 
frontier on the early morning of March 15 before he forced Hacha, the new President 
of Czechoslovakia, to sign an agreement that Hacha agreed to leave the Czech people 
and country “under the protection of the German Reich.” ®^^
The rape of Prague was a nasty shock to the British Government. On the very 
morning after the F.O. received Henderson’s report,^ ®"* the Cabinet was summoned.
It was very important and urgent to discuss the guidelines for the statement that the
J
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Prime Minister would make in the House that afternoon, in which he would try to get
rid of the responsibility of the guarantee to Czechoslovakia. Simon said openly that
the statement should make it clear that the Government no longer had 
any obligation, legal or moral, under the guarantee to Czechoslovakia.
Halifax held the same ground. Chamberlain tried to find excuses by saying
he thought the fundamental fact was that the State whose frontiers we 
had undertaken to guarantee against unprovoked aggression had now 
completely broken up.
It might, no doubt, be true that the disruption of Czechoslovakia had 
been largely engineered by Germany, but our guarantee was not a 
guarantee against the exercise of moral pressure.
His argument was supported by the Ministers present. In the end, the Cabinet 
decided to postpone the visit of the President of the Board of Trade to Berlin and 
authorised Chamberlain and Halifax to draft the statement along the lines that had 
been discussed.
The public unanimously showed anger against Hitler’s elimination of Czecho­
slovakia with the view that appeasement was no longer suitable towards Germany. 
The Times and the Daily Telegraph held a similar ground, in which they condemned 
Germany on one hand and disapproved of British military intervention on the other. 
The Daily Herald, however, criticised Chamberlain for his policy encouraging 
German invasion. Many newspapers appealed tor cooperation with France and 
Russia against further aggression.^ ®®
On the opposition side, Churchill’s and Eden’s groups had been working, since 
Munich, for enlarging basis of Government — joining a National Government. Eden 
and his supporters decided that “we must support the Government, and that Anthony 
should speak. ... The rest to keep silent,” Churchill, “perhaps hoping for office if he 
did not embarrass his leaders at this point, left the attack to Anthony Eden and his 
fbllowers.” ®^^
In the debates on the afternoon of March 15, Chamberlain’s policy was criticised 
from many quarters. Sinclair condemned Chamberlain for “deliberately postponing 
Debates in this House until they could have no further influence on the course of 
events.” He urged the Prime Minister “to gather our friends to us,” particularly to 
gather France, Russia and America, and Britain should “take the initiative in the
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world in the direction of basing policy on the principles of law” Eden, however, 
spoke in a quite mild language. He agreed with the Government’s decision to 
postpone the Minister’s visit to Berlin and appealed that “the situation was so serious 
that the time for party controversy had gone/®®
Based on the line proposed by the Cabinet in the morning, the Prime Minister told
the House that the Government could not “accordingly hold themselves any longer”
bound by guarantee because Czecho-Slovakia “had now ceased to exist.” Although
he “bitterly” regretted “the manner and the method” of the German action, he was
determined to continue appeasement;
do not let us on that account be deflected from our course. Let us 
remember that the desire of all the peoples of the world still remains 
concentrated and good will which has so often been disturbed. The aim 
of this Government is now, as it has always been, to promote that 
desire and to substitute the method of discussion for the method of 
force in the settlement of differences.
His statement left a very unsatisfactory impression. Cadogan commented, the 
Prime Minister “would go on with his ‘policy’ (?’appeasement’). Fatal
V. COMMENT
Munich was the inevitably disastrous effect of pursuing appeasement for a long
time, and it was not only the climax of appeasement, but also exceeded the scope of
this policy, becoming a complete surrender. It is so notorious that it has been
accompanied with condemnation since its birth. Apart from attacks from
contemporary politicians that have been seen above, scholars’ criticisms are no less
than as sharp. Carr comments that Munich was a shame for Great Britain, “whose
reputation had ... been lowered by a cowaidly and unworthy act.” Thorne cites a
message from the British Ambassador in Tokyo of that time, as evidence of the world
opinion on Munich;
The effect of Munich accord on foreign opinion as seen from here is 
that perfidious Albion has been true to form and let her friends down 
again. ... The Japanese reaction ... is that we are prepared to put up j
with almost any indignity rather than fight, the result is that, all in all, j
our prestige is at a low ebb in the east... i
Even the appeasers and their supporters dare not justify it fully. Although he 
admires Munich as “a triumph”, A. J. P. Taylor utters that “this was a triumph with
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bitter fruits. ... Appeasement had lost its moral strength.” Gilbert says with regret, 
“Munich was not appeasement’s finest hour, but its most perverted. It was a 
distortion of all that appeasement stood for.” Even Chamberlain had to confess in his 
Birmingham speech of March 17, 1939 that “I have never denied that the terms which 
I was able to secure at Munich were not those that I myself would have desired. 
However, appeasers are rarely willing to bow to the criticisms and often try to find 
excuses for evading the responsibility. It is, therefore, necessary to investigate some 
of their arguments in order to explore further the nature and consequences of 
Munich.
The most frequently heard clichés are, as Henderson wrote in his memoirs, that “it 
was solely thanks to Mr. Chamberlain’s courage and pertinacity that a futile and 
senseless war was a v e r t e d . B u t  then, did Munich really avert or postpone war?
According to German documents, Hitler had previously planned the war against 
the Western Powers over Austria and Czechoslovakia by 1943-45. Munich had 
offered him what he wanted without costing him a single shot. This not only 
nourished his ambitions, but also provided him with more favourable conditions to 
carry out his plan. He instructed the German press secretly after Munich (November 
10),
That we took advantage of the prevailing circumstances was, finally, 
perhaps the most decisive factor to bring about these achievements.
The world situation in general appeared to me more than ever 
favourable to asserting our demands.^ ®®
His demands finally caused the Second World War in September 1939, which was 3 - 
5 years earlier than he had planned.
Although the inevitability of war had been increased by the Czechoslovak crisis, it 
was still possible for the Western Powers to keep Hitler in check without war. At the 
Nuremberg trials, German Marshal von Keitel was asked that had the Western 
Powers stood by the Czechs, “would the Reich have attacked Czechoslovakia?” He 
answered, “Certainly not. We were not strong enough militarily. The object of 
Munich [...] was to get Russia out Europe, to gain time, and to complete the German 
armament.” ®^^ General Haider also confessed that without Munich the opposing 
generals would have overtlu own the Führer if he had taken the risk of war against the 
West.^ ®^  In that case, there might have been no World War Two.
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Suppose war had occurred in 1938 instead of 1939, it could have only been a 
limited war rather than a general war because German armament had not yet reached 
the level of a total war. There was a serious lack of trained reserves and of essential 
resources. The West Wall had not been completed. The German Air Force, which 
relied on close ground support, was not able to execute a “knock-out blow’' to 
Britain without bases in the Low Countries. Hitler knew very well at that moment 
that he could only afford a short and limited war (ideally for a few weeks and in no 
circumstances longer than a year) as told his Chief Commanders and Commanding 
Generals that “we cannot conduct a long war”. In addition, he doubted that the 
Japanese and Italians would follow him unconditionally.^”^  On the other hand, 
although British military preparation was deficient, the combination of British and 
French forces was by no means inferior to Germany’s. In addition, Russia would 
have certainly come to the aid of the Czechs because of the Franco-Soviet Pact. 
Roumania, Yugoslavia and perhaps even Poland would also take the Czech side. The 
Czechoslovak army could mobilise up to 500,000, well trained and well equipped.
An attack on Czechoslovakia would have meant a great loss of German forces. The 
Western Powers would have had the advantage if war had started in 1938. Duff 
Cooper had full confidence that they would win.
Therefore, the conclusion must be one of the following two; either Munich 
brought forward the Second World War instead of postponing it, or Munich did avert 
a short and limited war but paved the way for a long and general one.
Another typical argument is that Chamberlain’s objective at Munich was to “gain 
time” for rearmament. This argument is nullified by Chamberlain’s own words at 
the Cabinet meetings of October 3 and 31. The Prime Minister strongly opposed the 
view that during the time gained by Munich, “it would be necessary for us to add to 
our rearmament programmes.” He emphasised that Munich was “aimed at securing 
better relations” with the Dictator Powers. Allowing rearmament to go on for some 
time, he would reduce it if settlement could be achieved. He even dreamed that 
“some day we should be able to secure a measure of limitation of armaments” 
because rearmament nearly broke Britain’s back.^ ^^  The British rearmament was not 
slowed down after Munich because Hitler struck again too soon. If the appeasers and
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their followers want to be really loyal to Chamberlain, they should interpret his 
Munich doctrine correctly.
The third argument is similar to that in the previous crises, namely, Britain was 
not able to save Czechoslovakia due to her own military weakness. Halifax wrote in 
him memoirs,
No one who had the misfortune to preside over the Foreign Office at 
that time could ever ... forget that he had little or nothing in his hands 
with wliich to support his diplomatic efforts. ... thus the Foreign 
Secretary was like a player invited to stake, when he knew that if the 
fortune of the game turned against him he had nothing with which to 
redeem his pledge.^^^
He told the Cabinet members on March 22, 1938 that FPC had decided on no new 
commitment to Czechoslovakia based on the Report of Chiefs of Staff, which was “an 
extremely melancholy document.” However, the fact was that, in spite of being a 
background for appeasement, the military weakness, in a strict sense, was not the 
cause of Munich because the FPC had decided the Czech fate before they read that 
Report. It was a fundamental belief among many FPC members that Czechoslovakia 
was “an artificial country”, which was not worth fighting for even if Britain had the 
strength. It was a tactic shared by Chiefs of Staff that Central and Eastern Europe 
were not directly Britain’s concern. They abandoned Churchill’s proposal of “Grand 
Alliances” not because of military weakness, but because “this would be a long and 
complicated matter”
The fourth argument was that Munich was supported by the people. Feiling 
quotes a number of people’s letters to Chamberlain in order to show how much they 
thanked him for his bringing them peace, in which “they would not see their children 
killed, crippled, blinded, made imbecile”. I t  was true that many people admired 
their Prime Minister because they believed his words that he had brought home 
“peace for our time” and “peace with honour”. If they had known that this “peace” in 
fact was a silent gathering of a world war, in which more of their children would be 
killed, crippled and blinded, and in particular if they had known that this war could 
have been prevented during the Rhineland period if the Government had taken proper 
action to support France, it was very doubtful that they would have written these 
letters of praise. Indeed, the many letters of protest against the Prime Minister’s 
behaviour at Munich were never broadcast on the air. As has been pointed out in the
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previous chapters, the public was kept in the dark about policy-making. The 
atmosphere, which favoured Munich, was largely man-made by curbing the media and 
by misleading the people.
In fact, the public did not want to shrink from war. From September 27 to 28, 
war seemed inevitable and imminent. There was no evidence to suggest that the 
public was not prepared to face the war against Hitler’s aggression. After Munich, 
many people felt humiliated. Even Chamberlain found out, as he said on October 22, 
that “a lot of people seem to me to be losing their heads and talking and thinking as 
though Munich had made war more instead of less imminent.”^^ ^
There is a one-sided argument sympathetic to Chamberlain, that the Prime 
Minister’s first motive at Munich was “simply the rightness of peace and the 
wrongness of war.”^^  ^ Attention should be drawn to the fact that Chamberlain, like 
many statesmen of his generation, had a fear of war. They were afraid of taking the 
risk of fighting against the aggressive powers because they worried that modem war 
would destroy civilisation. However, in spite of great loss of life, the Second World 
War did not ruin the world but the aggressive powers instead. Prevention of war 
requires a strategist’s clear-sightedness and the courage of facing war rather than a 
fear of risk. It might be tme that his hope for peace was one of the reasons that 
Chamberlain pursued a policy of surrender at Munich. However, historical comment 
does not weigh personal motive very much, but considers the effects and results more 
when it looks at policy. Therefore, no matter how genuine his motive was, 
Chamberlain followed a policy which plunged the country (and in a certain sense, 
Europe and the world) into catastrophe. In other words, his policy led history in a 
direction which was opposite to his motive even if it was really sincere.
It is often suggested that Chamberlain played according to the German tune 
because he was cheated by Hitler. Halifax argued that “no one can fairly charge him 
(Chamberlain — Author) with lack of frankness.However,  even through the 
surface phenomena it is not difficult to find out that Chamberlain knew very well, 
after the Anschluss, that “force is the only argument Germany understands.” At 
Godesberg, he was very “disappointed” by Hitler’s behaviour. Nevertheless, he 
regarded himself as a man who was able to set up “a reasonable understanding” with 
dictators, and he still maintained that he had established an influence over Hitler in
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Spite of all evidence that Hitler was untrustworthy. Even when later events severely 
overturned his belief Chamberlain said before his death that he had “never tor one 
single instant” doubted “the rightness” of what he had done at Munich although he 
had lost all faith in Hitler.^^  ^ Therefore, the conclusion can only be that Chamberlain 
was cheated not by Hitler, but by himself, by his own self-confidence in dealing with 
the Dictators and by his own delusion over appeasement. Because of this delusion, 
he had to believe whatever Hitler said, and turned a deaf ear to the information he did 
not want to hear.^^^  Otherwise, he would lose the basis for his policy. This was the 
most fundamental reason for not possibly penetrating Hitler’s intention, and because 
of it, Chamberlain and his supporters always made strategic mistakes.
Although appeasement was not a personal policy, Chamberlain should bear the 
personal responsibility for Munich more than any one else because it was he who, 
owing to his stubbornness and his faith in the dictators, insisted on compromising to 
Hitler further and further even beyond what the Cabinet could accept. His hope for 
peace was at best a delusion, which blinded him to the inevitability of war. Because 
of this, he was not able to understand the dialectical relationship between peace and 
war. If he had realised that war was inevitable, and had stood firm even by taking the 
risk of war, Hitler might have shrunk. The hope of peace would be increased. 
However, denying the inevitability of war, he ruled out using force to defend peace, 
which, as a consequence, not only made war inevitable, but also brought it forward.
Apart from all the disastrous effects above, Munich started the process of Russo- 
German rapprochement. Being excluded from the Munich affair, Moscow began to 
look for Geiman friendship for her own safety. On the other hand. Hitler needed 
Stalin’s cooperation so that he could avoid war on two fronts and obtain Russian raw 
materials.^^” This cast a shadow on the forthcoming Anglo-Franco-Russian talks, 
which aimed to build up the last possible deterrence against Hitler’s aggression.
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Chapter 6 THE LAST FUTILE EFFORT
1. GUARANTEE TO POLAND
Until early March 1939, the British policy-makers had spread the illusion that a
European settlement was coming/ Hitler’s sudden coup against Prague on March
15 shook the Prime Minister’s authority because the event had proved that his policy
was wrong.^ Harold Nicolson, the National Labour Member for West Leicester,
described the debates in the House on the 17th,
the feeling in the lobbies is that Chamberlain will either have to go or 
completely reverse his policy Unless in his speech tonight he admits 
that he was wrong, they feel that resignation is the only alternative. All 
the tadpoles are beginning to swim into the other camp ... The 
Opposition refuse absolutely to serve under him. The idea is that 
Halifax should become Prime Minister and Eden Leader of the House.^
The Press such as The Manchester Guardian held the view that if they changed
the policy the Government would absorb some dissenters, for example, Churchill,
Eden, and Duff Cooper into Cabinet. This was, in the public eye, a test of whether
the appeasement had been abandoned."  ^ After Munich, Halifax also gave
Chamberlain a similar suggestion including the appointment of some Labour leaders.
Being reluctant to enlarge the Government, the Prime Minister turned a deaf ear to
all this. He believed, in Harvey’s words, that he could best handle any situation
“with the existing Cabinet”.^  He particularly disliked the idea of including Churchill
in Cabinet because as he said.
The nearer we get to war, the more his chances improve, and vice 
versa. If there is any possibility of easing the tension and getting back 
to normal relations with the dictators, I wouldn’t risk it by what would 
certainly be regarded by them as a challenge.^
In fact, faced with the German violation of the Munich Agreement, the British 
policy-makers felt lost. When the Prime Minister discussed the situation with 
Halifax, Cadogan and other Ministers, they found that owing to the imperfect 
information and the time limit they could hardly “give the matter proper 
consideration, or to decide how far the situation had changed.” Nor could the 
Chiefs of Staff offer their advice on the whole question because “the question 
involved so many considerations”, and they had to wait until “the main lines of our
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policy had been determined.” Cadogan wrote in his diaries, we “don’t know where 
we are. We ought perhaps to take a stand (whatever that may mean) ... can we?”^
In the end, the Prague coup forced them to open their eyes to Hitler’s real ambition. 
The Prime Minister almost made a confession at the Cabinet meeting that he had 
been wrong:
up till a week ago we had proceeded on the assumption that we should 
be able to continue with our policy of getting on to better terms with 
the Dictator Powers, and that although those powers had aims, those 
aims were limited. We had all along had at the back of our minds the 
reservation that this might not prove to be the case but we had felt that 
it was right to try out the possibilities of this course.
He had now come definitely to the conclusion that Herr Hitler’s 
attitude made it impossible to continue to negotiate on the old basis 
with the Nazi regime. This did not mean that negotiations with the 
German people were impossible. No reliance could be placed on any of 
the assurances given by the Nazi leaders.^
Based on the above idea which was supported by his colleagues he gave an 
address at Birmingham on March 17, in which he justified his Munich policy on one 
hand, and to make a gesture that Britain would face the German challenge on the 
other:
Germany, under her present regime, has sprung a series of unpleasant 
surprises upon the world. ... they must cause us all to be asking 
ourselves: Ts this the end of an old adventure, or is it the beginning of a 
new? Is this the last attack upon a small State, or is it to be followed 
by others? Is this, in fact, a step in the direction of an attempt to 
dominate the world by force?’ ... with the lessons of history for all to 
read, it seems incredible that we should see such a challenge.
However, he emphasised that he was not prepared to engage Britain by “new 
unspecified commitments”.^
That day, Tilea, the Roumanian Minister in London, asked to see Halifax 
urgently. In the interview Tilea informed him that his Government had received 
German demands of a monopoly of their exports and to accept measures of 
industrial restriction inside Roumania in German interests, which was, in his opinion, 
“in nature of ultimatum”.^ ” In addition, according to the information ft-om France 
the next German victim could also be Poland, Memel or Hungary.
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On the weekend of the 18th, the Prime Minister summoned the Cabinet meeting
to discuss the Roumanian emergency. He gave an account of his idea of changing
policy, which has been mentioned above and said that since Germany intended to
obtain domination over the whole of South Eastern Europe, “we had no alternative
but to take up the challenge.” “On this basis,” he continued, “our next course was to
ascertain what friends we had who would join with us in resisting aggression,” He
asked the Cabinet whether they agreed generally with the change of policy.
Halifax said that if Germany committed aggression against Roumania, “it would
be very difficult for this country not to take all the action in her power to rally
resistance against that aggression”. Lord Chatfield, Secretary of Defence, told the
Ministers that the Chiefs of Staff could only offer some preliminary observations
before the general policy had been decided. Their diagnosis was
if Germany could dominate Roumania economically, political 
domination of that country would almost certainly follow. This would 
have even more serious consequences, since there would be nothing to 
prevent Germany from marching straight through to the 
Mediterranean...
They did not think there was anything they could do to save Roumania from German
domination and the situation was “very similar to that which had faced us in
September in regard to Czechoslovakia.” They suggested.
If, however, the support of Poland and Russia could be secured the 
position would be entirely changed. ... if  Poland and Russia would be 
prepared to help us, we should join with them in resisting German 
aggiession.
Lord Stanhope, the new Admiralty Minister, also emphasised that “provided we
could ensure Germany having to face war on two fronts, there was much less
likelihood of war and we should be more likely to win if war came about.”
After discussion, the change of policy proposed by the Prime Minister was
agreed by all the Ministers present. Chamberlain concluded that
the real point at issue was whether we could obtain sufficient 
assurances from other countries to justify us in a public pronouncement 
that we should resist any iurther act of aggression on the part of 
Germany. ...Poland was very likely the key to the situation, ... our 
communication to Poland should probably be to go somewhat further 
than our communications to other countries.
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The Cabinet then decided to make approaches to Russia, Poland, Yugoslavia, 
Turkey, Greece and Roumania about joint assistance against further German 
aggression/^
Next day, a ministerial meeting was held to examine the Cabinet conclusion with 
the attendance of Chamberlain, Halifax, Simon, Stanley, Cadogan and Wilson. The 
Ministers came to a unanimous agreement that, “while it was important that some 
action should be taken quickly, if we attempted too much, we might end by 
achieving no positive result for a long time.” The Prime Minister wanted “to gain 
time”, for he could “never accept the view that war is inevitable.” He realised that 
“it was impossible to deal with Hitler after he had thrown all his own assurances to 
the winds.” They agreed and concluded that “a pronouncement of this character 
would by itself have a steadying effect” to deter German further aggression.
Now by setting a deterrent, Chamberlain intended to “gain time”. But for what?
For preparation for war against Hitler or for a new chance of searching for a
settlement with him? With the time he gained, he hoped that Britain would be in a
stronger position due to the following factors; improvement of British rearmament,
new guarantees to small states, Mussolini’s help in the direction of peace, and a
more fantastic possibility that Hitler might die or be overthrown by his opposing
generals. With the stronger position, he believed that he could convince Germany,
as he wrote on July 30, 1939,
that the chances of winning a war without getting thoroughly exhausted 
in the process are too remote to make it worth while. But the corollary 
to that must be that she has a chance of getting fair and reasonable 
consideration and treatment from us and others, if she will give up the 
idea that she can force it from us, and convince us that she has given it 
up.
In other words, with the time he gained by setting a deterrent, he could, rather than 
actually fight war, convince Hitler that if he continued abuse of force, he would be 
resisted, but if he raised his demand by peaceful means, he could still get the best 
offer. In order to meet this aim, Britain needed to increase her rearmament to a 
certain level, which was sufficient to defend her own safety and to warn Germany, 
but not necessary to fight a real war. From 1938 to 1939, although defence 
expenditure, compared to that of previous years, had considerably increased, the 
total cost amounted to no more than seven per cent of the national income.
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However, German armament spending during the same period was nearly five times 
as much as Britain’s/"^  The Treasury, in close consultation with Chamberlain, 
worked consistently to limit the defence budget until the outbreak of war/^ All of 
this demonstrated that the deterrent was designed for a new settlement instead of 
war. Feiling remarks, in commenting on Chamberlain’s effort, “if then his weapons 
had changed, his purpose had not.”^^  The evidence came immediately.
On March 20, Chamberlain sent a letter to Mussolini, asking the Duce to use his
influence on Hitler towards the direction of peace. Cadogan thought that it “looked
much too much like asking for another Munich.” However, even another Munich
would not relax Chamberlain as he explained later (in mid-July),
That is not good enough. This is just what we tried at Munich, but 
Hitler broke it up when it suited him. I doubted if any solution, short 
of war, is practicable at present...
But he believed the moment for settlement would come again as he continued;
if dictators would have a modicum of patience, I can imagine that a 
way could be found of meeting German claims while safeguarding 
Poland’s independence and economic security.
On the same day (March 20), when the Cabinet members discussed the draft of
the Four Power (Britain, France, Russia and Poland) Declaration, Chamberlain made
it clear that this Declaration “aimed at avoiding specific commitments”;
Although, therefore, the pronouncement did not involve us in any 
actual new commitment, public opinion would certainly attach 
significance to such a declaration signed by the Four Powers...
the declaration did not constitute a guarantee of the existing firontiers 
and of the indefinite maintenance of the status quo. The declaration 
was concerned with a far wider issue, namely, security and political 
independence of European States against German domination.^®
This policy, as Oliver Harvey, the Private Secretary to the Foreign Secretary, 
remarked, was “no more than reaffirmation of our existing League of Nations 
obligation to consult together”. The Government was “still doubtful how far we will 
commit ourselves to action
After the meeting, Cadogan got the draft into shape and with Chamberlain’s 
approval the telegrams were sent to the countries concerned.^” During the next few 
days, information from France showed that the French Government accepted the
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Declaration, and Russia, in spite of some reservations, also accepted on the
condition that both France and Poland would act accordingly/^ However, Beck, the
Polish Foreign Minister, was reluctant to agree with such a Declaration on the
grounds that it would “ place Poland in the Soviet camp”, which would cause
German unprovoked invasion. On the other hand, he implied that Poland might
associate with England and France if Russia were omitted. A secret agreement
could be signed between Britain and Poland.^^
On March 25 and 26, the F.O. held departmental meetings to discuss the next
step with attendance of Halifax, Cadogan, Van., Sargent, Strang and Butler
(Parliamentary Under-Secretary). Cadogan, for the first time, confessed that the
situation was “murky” as “Van predicted & as I never believed it would.” He
thought “we must try to build a dam” to stem German expansion although he
realised that “chances of that are rather slight.” The Foreign Secretary had a view
that the “adherence of Poland is essential”, and “we cannot have Russia in the
forefront picture.” They intended to approach a sort of guarantee to Poland and
Roumania, which Chamberlain agreed with in principle.^  ^ Being full of misgivings
over Russia, the Prime Minister did not want to associate with that country either as
he wrote on the 26th:
1 must confess to the most profound distrust of Russia. I have no belief 
whatever in her ability to maintain an effective offensive, even if she 
wanted to. And 1 distrust her motives, which seem to me to have little 
connection with our ideas of liberty, and to be concerned only with 
getting every one else by the ears. Moreover, she is both hated and 
suspected by many of the smaller States, notably by Poland, Roumania, 
and Finland
Owing to this prejudice, he told his colleagues at the FPC meeting next day that 
he would like to choose Poland rather than Russia as an ally on the East firont 
because Poland was unwilling to associate with Russia publicly. In his opinion, the 
dilemma was that a front against German aggression was likely to be frustrated if 
Russia was closely associated, but a failure to associate with the Soviets would give 
rise to suspicion and difficulty with the Left at home. He suggested that they had to 
abandon the policy of the Four Power Declaration, and an alternative course was 
that if Poland or Roumania were attacked and they were prepared to resist, Britain 
and France would support them. Moreover, it should be ascertained that Poland
260
would come to their aid if Britain, France and Roumania were involved in war with
Germany. He said,
this plan left Soviet Russia out of the picture ... It would seem 
imprudent to attempt to bring Russia into the plan publicly. ... The 
Franco-Soviet Pact might possibly offer the means by which Russia 
might be indirectly and secretly brought into the scheme.
The Foreign Secretary was completely in accordance with the Prime Minister in 
pointing out that “if we had to make a choice between Poland and Soviet Russia, it 
seemed clear that Poland would give the greater value.” He quoted from the report 
by the British Embassy in Moscow^  ^ to prove that the Russian Army was greatly 
weakened by recent purges, its offensive value was small and their planes were out 
of date.
However, Hoare and Oliver Stanley (the President of the Board of Trade)
thought that Russia constituted the greatest deterrent in the East against German
aggression. The exclusion of Russia was bound to have serious consequences. With
a similar idea, Chatfield warned the Cabinet of the danger that “the worst that could
happen would be for us to get involved in war without any allies on the Eastern
Front.” Therefore, he advised that
it should be our objective to endeavour to obtain the maximum possible 
of support in Eastern Europe. ... Poland was, from the military point of 
view, probably the best of potential eastern allies, bu t... Soviet Russia 
would act as a greater deterrent so far as Germany was concerned.
On the other hand, he was afraid that they should not get drawn into any 
commitments with Russia which might involve them in hostilities with Japan.
At the end, the Cabinet agreed the alternative course proposed by the Prime 
Minister. Halifax and Simon settled the final form of telegrams to Warsaw and 
Bucharest. As to the issue of association with Russia, the Prime Minister said that it 
would depend on the reply from Poland.^*’
The Cabinet had not made up their minds yet about a guarantee to Poland until 
the 28th.^  ^ However, this issue was urgently put on the agenda due to the two 
pieces of information received on the following day. The first one was that the 
American Ambassador had informed the F.O. that his colleague in Warsaw had 
information of a possible German intention to execute a coup against Poland. The 
second one was that Ian Colvin, the Correspondent of the ffews Chronicle in Berlin,
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reported to Simon, Halifax, Cadogan and Chamberlain in person that he had received
information from various contacts in Germany, which indicated that Poland was
Hitler’s next victim and an attack to her could be made very quickly, perhaps around
the end of March.^ ® Although Cadogan was not “entirely convinced”, it left deep
impression on Chamberlain and Halifax, the latter of whom thought that “these
sources of information had been pretty accurate in the previous autumn, when we
had not always been prepared to rely upon them.” Both of them agreed to give an
immediate declaration of support of Poland even without waiting for Beck’s reply.
At an emergency meeting of the 30th, reporting the information above to the
Cabinet, Halifax pointed out that Hitler might strike before Britain had made
arrangements. He suggested that “we should consider whether we could take some
prior action as to forestall Herr Hitler’s next step”, namely, to “make a clear
declaration of our intention to support Poland if Poland was attacked by Germany.”
This proposal included two objectives: firstly, it might cause Hitler’s plan to be
suspended and would thus react to his discredit within the German Army; secondly,
it would “educate” German public opinion that Hitler’s ambition would result in
Germany becoming engaged in war on two fronts/”
The Prime Minister supplemented that they should learn from the lesson of
Czechoslovakia that
instead of the Czech army being on our side, Czech resources were 
now available to Germany. It would be a very serious matter if Poland, 
instead of being a potential ally, also became added to the resources of 
Germany. If, therefore, we took no action, there was a risk that, in a 
short time, we should find that Poland had been over-run and that we 
had missed an opportunity. On the other hand, if we uttered a warning 
such as was now proposed, we should be committed to intervention if 
Germany persisted in aggression.
As a serious step of “the actual crossing of the stream”, this proposal indicated a 
new commitment under certain circumstances. But the Prime Minister strictly 
limited the responsibility that “would not bring us up against a tremendous decision 
on some point which did not aftect the independence of Poland.”
In the course of discussion, Lord Maugham, the Lord Chancellor, emphasised 
that “we must support Poland if her independence was threatened” on one hand, and 
“ we should not encourage Poland to go to war with Germany about Danzig” on the
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Other. Chatfield passed on the view of the Chiefs of Staff that if Germany were to 
attack Poland, “we should declare war on Germany.” In the end, the Cabinet agreed 
that the Prime Minister would declare in House on the 31st on the following line that 
if
any action was taken which clearly threatened the independence of 
Poland so that Poland felt bound to resist with her national forces. His 
Majesty’s Government would at once lend them all the support in their 
power.^ ^
Within two weeks, Britain also gave a similar guarantee to Greece and Roumania/^
The guarantee to Poland, like the proposal of Four Power declaration, was not 
aimed towards war as Chamberlain explained in the period when the guarantee was 
given, “1 am no more a man of war to-day than I was in September”; “I trust that our 
actions, begun but not concluded, will prove to be the turning-point not towards 
war, which winds nothing, cures nothing, ends nothing, but towards a more 
wholesome era, when reason will take the place of force.
11. THE ANGLO-FRANCO-SOVIET CONVERSATIONS 
1. The Reluctant Decision on An Alliance with Russia: April - May
The exclusion of Russia from the alliance raised a great uneasiness from the
Opposition. A day before the Declaration of the Guarantee to Poland, three Labour
leaders: Mr Greenwood, Dr Dalton and Mr Alexander saw the Prime Minister,
showing their “strong objections to any action being taken which would imply that
Russia was being left on one side”. They were critical that “the Government were
prejudiced against Russia and were neglecting a possible source of help.Churchil l
and Eden also pushed the Government in the direction of allying itself with Russia on
the need to build up a “Peace Front”, Churchill warning in the House on May 19:
none of these States in Eastern Europe can maintain themselves for, 
say, a year’s war unless they have behind them the massive, solid 
backing of a friendly Russia, ... Without any effective Eastern front, 
there can be no satisfactory defence of our interests in the West, and 
without Russia there can be no effective Eastern front.
Under such a pressure, Chamberlain, hiding his own dislike of Russia, explained 
to the Opposition that the Government were not “cold-shouldering Russia — it was 
the misgiving of Poland and Others.” ”^ In the end, the position of Russia in the
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“Peace Front” was an issue which could not be got around. On April 10, the F.O.
received the report from Kennard, H.M.G Ambassador in Warsaw, which was based
on the memo by his Military Attaché about the main military considerations in
Poland. After analysing Polish weakness from a military aspect, the local production
of armaments and the raw material supplies, the report concluded:
It seems therefore unlikely that Poland can hope to defend the Corridor 
or her western frontier, but that she might be compelled eventually to 
tall back on the Vistula. ... The importance for Poland of a friendly 
Russia is thus of paramount importance.^^
Meanwhile, Seeds, the British Ambassador in Moscow, warned the Government that 
he could not see how Russia was able to contribute her military assistance effectively 
towards Poland and Roumania if these two countries refused to consider co­
operation with Russia. He urged the Government to find some way “to prevail on 
Poland and Roumania to accept the idea of some form of Soviet military assistance.” 
His French colleague in Moscow was “in complete agreement” with him.^ ®
In mid-April, the subject was discussed both in Cabinet and in the F.O. In spite 
of distrust of Russia, Halifax was “reluctant” to abandon his efforts to obtain some 
sort of assistance from Russia.^” He tried to “find a way round Russian difficulty” by 
proposing to the Russian Government that they should make a unilateral declaration 
to support any particular State against aggression, if she desired. He told the Cabinet 
on the 13th that “he found it difficult to see on what grounds Russia could refuse to 
make a statement on these lines.
Next day when he discussed this new approach with Cadogan and other F.O. 
staff such as Oliphant, Maurice Ingram and Strang, he did “not wish to proceed, at 
present, with his suggestion that we should invite the Polish and Roumanian Govts 
to give favourable considerations to any unilateral declaration that Russia might 
make in favourable of Poland and Roumania.” Cadogan thought that this proposal 
was made “in order to placate our left wing in England, rather than to obtain any 
solid military advantage”. Then they worked on the draft telegram that was sent to 
Seeds late at night."^  ^ At the same time, they informed the French Government of the 
British proposal. In the reply, the French said that they would work on the same 
lines.'""
II I
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When Seeds had interviews with Litvinov, the Soviet Commissar for Foreign 
Affairs, the latter said that, on considering the British proposal, his Government 
“wanted to know how far Great Britain and other countries were prepared to go.”
He asked, “how do we know that Great Britain will declare war in the event of 
armed aggression? Will she only lodge a protest or not even that?” Besides this, he 
would also like to know the attitude of Poland and Roumania.'"  ^ A few days later 
(on the 18th), Litvinov handed Seeds the Soviet reply. Regarding the British 
proposal acceptable in principle, the Soviet offered their counter-move that 
emphasised reciprocity, namely, Britain, France and Russia should make an 
agreement for mutual assistance; offer all help to states lying between the Baltic and 
Black Seas and bordering on Russia; discuss promptly the means of giving such help; 
sign conventions on the military and political aspects simultaneously; and agree not 
to conclude a separate peace.'"'"
As soon as they received the Soviet proposal on the same day, Cadogan had a
discussion with Halifax, and then he wrote a memo for the use of Mr Butler and
himself in the FPC the next day. In his memo, Cadogan weighed “the advantage of a
paper commitment by Russia ... against the disadvantage of associating ourselves
openly with Russia.” Based on the information available, he believed that Russia
was unlikely, even if she wanted, to give effective assistance outside her borders.
Therefore in his opinion the disadvantage was out-weighed on the grounds that the
association with Russia would lose much sympathy from Poland, Roumania,
Portugal, Spain and Yugoslavia. On the other hand, he realised that “there is great
difficulty in refusing the Soviet offer” because “the Left in this country may be
counted on to make the most of this.” Moreover, he feared that “if we turn down
this proposal, the Soviet might make some ‘non-intervention’ agreement with the
German Government.” Despite this, he concluded,
it seems, on balance, better to refuse an offer that may alienate our 
friends and reinforce the propaganda of our enemies without bringing in 
exchange any real material contribution to the strength of our Front'"^
His memo was much in line with Chamberlain and was agreed by the FPC on the 
19th.'"” At that meeting, Chatfield again mentioned the Report of the Chiefs of Staff 
on March 18:
265
If the U.S.S.R were on our side and Poland neutral, the position would 
alter in our favour. It should however be noted that the USSR has 
today militarily an uncertain quality. ... They do not think that she 
would take any military action outside her borders but she would 
strongly resist a direct invasion of her territory,... With Russia as an 
ally Germany’s position in the Baltic would be difficult and it would be 
possible to exercise considerable interference with that part of her iron 
ore supplies from Sweden...
He agreed with the British Embassy in Moscow, who had estimated Russia’s military 
quality as being uncertain.
In the course of the discussion, Hoare expressed:
Poland would be able to offer little military resistance to a German 
invasion,... it seemed as if Russia was the only possible source of 
munitions for Poland and the other countries of Eastern Europe.
He suggested that the Chiefs of Staff should be required to produce another report 
on the military value of Russian assistance. Inskip, Dominion Secretary, put forward 
the similar view that as a large power, Russia, if she meant business, “would be of 
some considerable military value.” The Prime Minister, however, summed up that 
all the information suggested that Russia was of “little military value for offensive 
purpose.” He did not agree that due to the need for munitions of smaller Eastern 
European states it was necessary to sign a definite military alliance between Britain, 
France and Russia. Not only did an alliance with Russia raise difficulty in Poland, 
but it might be also an unnecessary provocation to offer to Germany, which ought to 
be avoided. With this strong current of appeasement at the back of his mind, he 
suggested that in “not turning down the Russian proposal we should endeavour to 
convey the impression that the time for a military alliance was not yet ripe.” In 
conclusion, the FPC approved Chamberlain’s lines and instructed the Chiefs of Staff 
to submit an appreciation of Russia’s military strength.'""
In the next few days, the British and French Governments communicated with 
each other about their replies to the Soviet proposal. Cadogan saw the French 
Ambassador and required that France should hold on their reply until they had 
consulted the British Government. Halifax asked Phipps on the 21st to transfer to 
the French the draft of the British reply, which turned down the Soviet proposal on 
the grounds that “it takes too little account of practical difficulties,” particularly that 
Poland would object to a tripartite agreement providing for Soviet assistance to her
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whether or not she wanted it. The British Government, therefore, insisted on their 
own original proposal of April 14, namely, the suggestion of Russian unilateral 
declaration/® The French reaction was somewhat confusing to the British policy­
makers, because it “entirely” agreed with the British criticism against the Soviet 
proposal on one hand, and supported a tripartite agreement on the other.'"”
Meanwhile, the Chiefs of Staff worked on the report under the guideline of the 
FPC, which had simply asked them to estimate the Soviet military value without 
discussing the question of a guarantee since political arguments against an alliance 
with Russia had already outweighed possible military advantages in ministers’ eyes.^” 
Their conclusion showed, as Chatfield passed on to the FPC and Cabinet: Russia 
could actively assist France and Britain in war, which would, apart from giving 
military aid to their allies on the Eastern Front, be by naval action in the Baltic. In 
theory, she could involve 130 divisions, but in practice, she could only mobilise 
about 30 divisions. The Chiefs of Staff therefore advised:
the militaiy assistance which Russia could bring to bear was not nearly 
as great as certain quarters represented it to be. ..
We should not act in such a way as to forgo the chance of Russian help 
in war: we should not jeopardise the common iront with Poland, and 
we should not jeopardise the cause of peace.
This certainly met the Ministers’ desire and strengthened their arguments against an 
alliance with Russia.
When they considered the French proposal along with the British reply to Russia 
at the meetings on the 25th and 26th, neither Chamberlain nor Halifax liked the 
French idea. The Foreign Secretary remarked that it “would certainly involve very 
great discouragement of all our potential friends,” because “a tripartite Agreement 
must involve at least indirect Soviet assistance to Poland.” The French proposal 
“was therefore open to the objection which they had themselves argued.” 
Chamberlain agreed that the French proposal was unacceptable, and emphasised that 
the British proposals had been that Russia “should limit its assistance to those 
countries which desired it, and that the desired assistance should be given in such 
manner as would be found most convenient.” Halifax concluded that the time was 
not ripe for a tripartite agreement and they proposed to ask the Soviet Government 
to give further consideration to the British proposal of April 14. “It was most
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needed and did not ask the Soviet Government to do more than to come in when we 
were already involved.” Although he realised that this policy “would be violently 
attacked”, he thought that with the latest Report of Chiefs of Staff they had “a good 
case to defend.” "^
Two days later, he informed the French Government that their proposal would
“raise serious difficulty”, and asked them to support the British line. On May 3,
France agreed to the British proposal without much enthusiasm/"
In the meantime, he had discussions with Churchill, who “was entirely in favour
of the proposed tri-partite pact.” But Halifax told his colleague that he worried that
a tripartite pact “would make war inevitable.” On the other hand, he was also
disturbed by the danger that “a refusal of Russia’s offer might even throw her into
Germany’s arms.”^^
On the 5th, the FPC considered the final draft of reply to the Soviet proposal.
The Foreign Secretary repeated his warning to the Ministers that “it was most
important that the negotiation should not be broken off at this juncture.” However,
he insisted on the foregoing lines on the grounds that
If to the somewhat loose and indefinite unilateral declaration we joined 
a firm and definite “no separate peace” tripartite agreement we should 
be changing the whole basis of our policy and risking the alienation of 
our friends. ... If war was certain he would not care who helped him: 
but if there were a 5 per cent chance of peace, he did not wish to 
jeopardise it by associating with a country in whom he had no 
confidence.
Chamberlain agreed with Halifax and suggested that before submitting the reply 
to the Soviet Government, Seeds should be asked to make sure whether Soviet 
foreign policy had changed due to the replacement of Litvinov by Molotov. '^"
On the 9th, Seeds obtained assurance from Molotov, the new Soviet Commissar 
of Foreign Affairs that the Soviet policy was unchanged and the Soviet proposal 
“still held good” while the Ambassador handed over the British proposal.
In this period, the F.O. received some information of a German-Russian 
rapprochement.^” Halifax “found it difficult to attach much credence” to these 
reports. He judged that it “might be spread by persons who desired to drive us into 
making a pact with Russia.” Although he realised that the time might soon come for 
Staff talks with Russia, “he would prefer to postpone this as long as possible.”
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At the same time, Chatfield asked the Chiefs of Staff to report on the balance of
strategic value to Britain in war of having Spain as an enemy or Russia as an ally.
The military experts gave their observations as following;
The active enmity of Spain would greatly weaken our position in the 
Western Mediterranean and would threaten our Atlantic 
communications. On the other hand, Spain was suffering from war­
weariness, and a blockade of her coasts would, in the long run, bring 
her to a stand-still.
If Russia were an active and whole-hearted ally, she would be of great 
assistance, particularly in containing substantial enemy forces and in 
supplying war material to our other allies in Eastern Europe. But, on 
the assumption that if Russia was not with us, she was at least neutral,
... the advantages of an alliance with Russia would not offset the 
disadvantages of the open hostility of Spain. On the other hand, the 
greatest danger we had to face would be a combination of Russia and 
the Axis Powers.^"
The Soviet reply arrived within a week (on May 15). The Soviet Government
concluded that the British proposal “cannot serve as a basis” for negotiations on the
grounds that it lacked reciprocity. They required that Britmn and France should join
Russia in guaranteeing the Baltic States — Finland, Estonia and Latvia as Russia
joined them in guaranteeing Poland and Roumania.^ ®
Before the Soviet proposal was considered by the FPC, the F.O. prepared a new
draft agreement which suggested future or immediate military consultations with
Russia. On the morning of the 16th, Sargent, authorised by Halifax, asked Minister
of Defence about the view of the Chiefs of Staff on the new draft. This consultation
give the military experts a chance to make a comprehensive observation on the
situation. They were now moving over to the view that Soviet aid would be more
effective than they had previously thought.^” At the FPC meeting of the same day,
Chatfield told Ministers the new observations of military experts:
We should enter into an agreement with Russia on a reciprocal basis for 
mutual support. ... Great Britain could be attached in many ways 
directly or indirectly, but apart from Poland and Roumania, Soviet 
Russia could only be attacked on the Baltic. ... Such an attack would be 
most difficult to undertake with any hope of success. ... In these 
circumstances we had much to gain and very little to lose...
The Chiefs of Staff warned.
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Failure to reach agreement with Russia might result in Russia standing 
aside in a future European war and hoping thereby to secure 
advantages from the exhaustion of the Western Powers.
They emphasised that Russia should not, in any circumstances become allied with 
Germany. Chatheld drew attention to “the weak strategical position of Poland” and 
“the unlikelihood of Poland being able to put up any serious resistance to a German 
invasion”.
However, neither Chamberlain nor Halifax admired the view of military experts 
this time. The Prime Minister doubted whether their conclusion was based on an 
assumption that “we were unlikely to get any agreement with Russia unless the 
agreement took the form of full pact such as Russia was demanding.” He criticised 
that their “advice differed from the advice previously given.” Nor did the Foreign 
Secretary believe that Russia could give much help to the Western Powers. 
Moreover, he felt an alliance with Russia would offend Poland and Roumania. In 
this case, “wliile the military arguments for a pact were sound the political arguments 
against a pact were more formidable.” In addition, he did not want to fight for 
Russia over the Baltic States by arguing that these States did not want Russian 
assistance.
Nevertheless, many Ministers such as Chatheld, Hoare, Stanley and Cadogan 
fully realised the importance of an alliance with Russia and insisted on going further 
to meet her demands.*"® In spite of this strong opposite view, the Prime Minister still 
“wished to limit our commitments to attacks through Poland and Roumania ... rather 
than consent to a triple alliance to include Russia.” He, however, agreed to give a 
further consideration to the issue.^  ^ Halifax held the same ground. Based on the 
record of conversation between Van. and Maisky, the Soviet Ambassador, on May 
16, he suggested that Van. should have another talk with Maisky on the lines as 
follows; a) the British Government objected to including the four Baltic States 
within the scope of arrangement, but b) they undertook to institute staff talks.*"^
According to these lines, the F.O. drew up a formula on the 17th for Van.’s use 
in his further talk with Maisky on the same day. At that meeting, the Soviet 
Ambassador’s reaction was “not too unfriendly” and he promised to submit this 
formula to Moscow at once.®^  However, two days later Maisky informed Halifax 
that the new formula was not acceptable to his Government on the grounds that the
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only basis on which Russia were prepared to proceed was that of a triple pact
between three Powers.®"^
On the same day (the 19th), Halifax give the FPC account of the Van.-Maisky
conversation and informed them of the Russian refusal of the new formula.
Obviously it was high time that they chose between alliance with Russia and a
breakdown of negotiations. The FPC were now divided into two sides: those for
alliance included Hoare, Stanley, M. MacDonald, Inskip, Chatfield and Burgin
(Minister of Supply) while those against were Chamberlain, Halifax, Simon,
Morrison (Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster). The Prime Minister even said that
he “will resign rather than sign alliance with Soviet.”®^ Despite distrusting Russia,
Halifax was more moderate than Chamberlain and took the view that “we had gone
so far that the little more would not make much difference in its effect on Hitler.”
Like him, Cadogan wrote, “My opinion (much against my will) is hardening in
favour of former.”®*^
In the F.O. Malkin (Legal Adviser) tried to draft a formula closer to Russian
demands “without being an alliance” but it was not very successful.^^
Communicating with Halifax, Cadogan started to prepare a memo on May 20 for the
FPC to weigh up again “the pros & cons” of proposed Anglo-Soviet Pact.®* This
time, he knew better about the importance of Russia than he had in April:
there is no alternative between agreeing to a three-Power pact... and 
allowing the present negotiations to fail.
... to build up a peace ft'ont to the East and South-east of Germany ...
Poland was the key, and Poland’s position would be precarious in face 
of a hostile or perhaps even of a neutral Soviet Union. Our only 
practicable lines of communication with Poland in case of war would lie 
through Russian territory.
We therefore wished to be assured of at least the benevolent neutrality 
of the Soviet Union, and better still of the probability of assistance 
being afforded by that country to Poland and Roumania in case of 
attack.
The disadvantages were, as he pointed out, that tripartite alliance with Russia might
“mark a definite change of policy”:
His Majesty’s Government had finally given up all hope of arriving at a 
settlement with Germany and that accordingly they had reached the 
conclusion that war was inevitable and were therefore marshalling their
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forces. ... it might be assumed that our association with the Soviet 
Government would still further infuriate him (Hitler — Author) and 
impel him to aggressive action.
However, he concluded that alliance with Russia might
be the only way to avert war. Germany is impressed only by a show of 
strength, and Italian policy has always been to reinsure with the 
stronger side.
Therefore,... a tripartite pact with the Soviet Union, if that is the only 
means by which we can be assured of the latter’s support, is a 
necessary condition for the consolidation of the front which we have 
been trying to create.
If the negotiations break down,... the German Government may be 
encouraged to think that they are free to embark on adventures in 
Danzig or elsewhere in Eastern Europe.
The proposal he formulated was to meet the Soviet requirements in principle,®®
On the 22nd, he showed the draft to Chamberlain, The latter had now come,
“very reluctantly”, to accept the idea of a triple pact. However, he would rather put
this alliance under a “League umbrella” suggested by Hoare so that it “might later be
modified” and “Britain would not be tied up for all time with the Soviet
Government,” Although he did not think the idea would help very much, Cadogan
promised Chamberlain that he would draft something on these lines.™
On the 24th the Cabinet attended in lull to consider the F.O.’s memo and to
make a final decision on the reply to Russia. Halifax diagnosed that “reciprocity” in
the Russian demands meant
first, they were not prepared to be put in a position of inequality as 
compared with the British, French and Polish Governments, which had 
concluded agreements on a reciprocal basis; secondly Russia feared that 
Roumania and Poland might collapse and that, if this happened, the 
condition which we made that these countries should resist German 
aggression would not be fulfilled. Russian would thus be left face to 
face with Germany without any assurance of support from us.
He told the Ministers that “having gone so far in the negotiations, a breakdown now 
would have a definitely unfavourable eflfect.” Although he disliked Russia, he had to 
contemplate that “we should be prepared to enter into a direct mutual guarantee 
agreement with the Soviet Government” because “Hitler was more likely to be 
provoked into starting a war if we failed, as a result of a breakdown with Russia.”
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As to some information of rapprochement between Germany and Russia, he thought 
this time that it “was not one which could be altogether disregarded.”^^
Supporting Halifax’s view, Chamberlain argued for himself that he had adopted 
the negative attitude in alliance with Russia due to “considerable misgiving” from 
Poland, Roumania and Dominions. He “now favoured, in substance, the conclusion 
of an agreement with Russia on the lines of her proposals.” But he supplemented 
that the triple pact should be put under the principles of the Covenant.
However, although they had decided to ally with Russia, it did not mean that
they were to abandon appeasement. Before the meeting was over, the ministers
considered the suggestion:
when we had strengthened our position by making an agreement with 
the Russian Government, we should take the initiative in a renewal of 
the search for appeasement. When we had so strengthened our 
position as to have constituted the greatest practicable deterrent against 
aggression, we should be in a position to make such an approach from 
strength, and there was more likelihood that Germany would be willing 
to listen to us in such circumstances. Our approach might take the 
form of indicating that we had no intention to encircle Germany 
economically and that we were ready at any time to discuss any matters 
in dispute. ... if it was accepted it would constitute an important step 
towards appeasement.
Halifax thought that Germany should take the initiative this time. However, 
Inskip doubted whether Hitler could do so. He suggested that “we could afford to 
take the initiative ourselves.”^^
The next day, the new British proposal drafted on the proposed lines was sent to 
Moscow. Although they put the triple agreement on the basis of reciprocity, the 
British Government refused to name either Poland and Roumania or the Baltic States 
in the Treaty.™
2. Conversations Dragged Out: June - July
When he studied the British proposal of May 25, Molotov thought it 
unacceptable on the grounds that the proposal left him with the impression that co­
operation depending on the League of Nations implied that the Western Powers 
“were not interested in obtaining concrete results”. Although Seeds explained again 
and again that that only meant “the spirit” and “principles” of the Covenant, the 
Soviet Leader simply did not listen.™ On June 2, Molotov handed the British and
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French Ambassadors the Soviet counter-proposal, in which the Russians modified
the principle to the end that the mutual assistance should be immediate. They
insisted that the Western Powers should not only extend their guarantee to Latvia,
Estonia and Finland, but also the three Powers should name all guaranteed States
(i.e. Belgium, Greece, Turkey, Roumania, Poland and the three Baltic States) in the
Treaty. In addition they demanded no separate peace and conclusion of both a
political and a military agreement simultaneously.^^
At the meeting of the FPC on the 5th, Halifax pointed out that if Britain and
France offered a guarantee to the Baltic States, Russia should guarantee Holland and
Switzerland, who were vital to the security of the Western Powers. Chamberlain
thought that “we ought to refuse” the Russian demand because the Baltic States did
not desire a guarantee either from the Western Powers or from Russia.™
Before the meeting, the Foreign Secretary had an idea to ask Russia to send a
representative to Paris or London so as to discuss matter directly. Corbin, the
French Ambassador, suggested that the better course might be give their own
representatives in Moscow “precise instructions”, on which they could push the
negotiation more quickly.™ Halifax took his idea and suggested to the FPC 1) to
send some kind of mission to Moscow; 2) to recall Seeds to London for
consultation. At the Cabinet meeting of the 7th, the Ministers first chose Sir William
Malkin, Legal Adviser at F.O. as representative to Moscow. However, the Foreign
Secretary told the Prime Minister that since his chief legal assistant was ill, Malkin
could not be spared from London. Therefore both of them agreed to recall Seeds
back to receive flirther instruction.^* Unfortunately, Seeds telegraphed back and said
that he had succumbed to influenza and was not able to return.^ ®
In the meantime, Eden went to see Halifax and suggested that the latter should
go himself. Since Halifax declined the idea, Eden volunteered to see Stalin. The
Foreign Secretary “seemed to like it”, but after consultation with Chamberlain, the
Prime Minister rejected the suggestion.*® The top British leaders were insistent that
they wished to appoint a junior official to Moscow because they thought that
it would give the impression that no great political difficulties were 
outstanding but that agreement in substance hand been reached and that 
it only remained to draft the agreement and settle the detail.
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Halifax said that “this kind of business was better handled by Ambassadors In
spite of the French disagreement and Churchill’s criticism, they decided not to send a
Minister but sent Strang, the Head of Central Department, instead.*^
Before he left, Strang attended the FPC meeting on June 9, at which the
Ministers equipped him with various memos and instructions. The British
representatives should tell Russia clearly of their standpoint towards the outstanding
problems between the two sides; 1) Britain and France did not agree to guarantee
the Baltic States, nor did they agree to enumerate names of all guaranteed countries
in the Treaty; 2) if Russia insisted on 1), the Western Powers would tiy to bargain
that Russia should offer guarantee to Holland and Switzerland; 3) the Western
Powers suggested that the political agreement would be signed before a military
agreement; 4) they rejected the Russian proposal with regard to no separate peace.
The key instruction given to Strang was:
The draft treaty should be as short and simple in its terms as possible.
It is better that agreement should be quickly reached than that time 
should be spent in trying to cover every contingency. ... this may leave 
loopholes in the tex t... but those disadvantages are ... less serious than 
the elaboration of detailed provisions which, if the treaty ever came to 
be executed, might be found, in practice, to bind His Majesty’s 
Government more effectively than the Soviet Government.
The Prime Minister exhorted that
unless we showed that we were prepared to drive a hard bargain, we 
should necessarily get the worst of the bargain. He did not think that 
Russia could now afford to break off negotiation, and we could 
therefore afford to take a fairly stiff line.
Strang arrived in Moscow on June 14 and the new round of negotiations started 
on the following day. The British representatives supported by their French 
colleagues indicated the proposed line to Molotov. The Soviet Foreign Minister, on 
the behalf of his Government, insisted on naming the guaranteed countries and no 
separate peace. He said that Russia “would prefer to postpone the whole question 
of guarantee ... and to confine the Treaty to an arrangement of mutual assistance 
among the three signatories to operate in the event of direct aggression of them” if 
the Western Powers did not agree to name the Baltic States in the Protocol.*^ To 
satisfy Russian’s desire, M. Naggiar, the French Ambassador, suggested whether
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these names could be mentioned in a separate document wliich needed not to be 
published. In his telegram to London on the 17th, Seeds favoured the French view 
that the two Governments had better meet Russia over the Baltic States.*^
In the week from the 20th onward, the FPC and Cabinet met several times to 
consider the Soviet demands. Although they unanimously agreed that a breakdown 
on these problems was not favourable to the British interest, the Ministers had 
various arguments on the signature of a simple triple agreement. Chatfield was for 
such a Treaty on the grounds that it “would at least have the effect that it would 
prevent Soviet Russia fi*om making a Pact with Germany.” Hoare inclined to 
support his idea while Oliver Stanley disagreed to it by pointing out that such a 
Treaty would mean “a complete breakdown of the negotiations”. “If war resulted 
Russia would not be involved.” Therefore, it “was bound to be inoperative, and 
would serve no useful purpose.” Although they thought there was something in the 
view that was in favour of simple triple agreement, the Prime Minister and Foreign 
Secretary gave more weight to Stanley’s argument. Chamberlain told the 
Committee that the disadvantage of a simple triple agreement was “not only that 
public opinion would think that the negotiations had, in fact, failed but that Russia 
would be left in a very dissatisfied and sulky state.” Halifax warned that such a 
Treaty
would satisfy the tests of simplicity and brevity but it was open to the 
serious objection that in certain circumstances it would leave it in the 
hands of Russia to determine whether or not an act of aggression 
bringing the arrangement into operation had taken place.
It seemed that in order to break deadlock they had no choice but to meet the 
Russian demands. After some discussion, they agreed to accept the Russian point of 
view with regard to “no separate peace” provided that a settlement was reached on 
all other issues. As to naming countries concerned in the Treaty, Halifax told the 
Committee that if they did not satisfy Russia on this point, the negotiations were 
bound to break down. In spite of his dislike of the Russian demand, he would take 
Naggiar’s suggestion of including these names in a secret protocol. But he proposed 
to do so on the condition that Russia must agree to guarantee Holland and 
Switzerland. His proposal was generally supported by the Ministers. It was 
however realised that there was little difference between enumerating the guaranteed
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States in the Treaty itself and having them in a secret Protocol on the grounds that 
the contents of the Protocol would soon leak out. Even so, Chamberlain stressed 
that “it was very desirable, if possible, to refrain from including any names in the 
Treaty itself,”®'*
Being informed of the above line, Bonnet, the French Foreign Minister, 
suggested some changes in wording of the proposal and urged that “Agreement with 
Russia should be concluded at once.”*^  On July 1, the British and French 
Ambassadors started to communicate with Molotov again about the latest British 
proposal. Molotov agreed to include the names of countries in a secret Protocol but 
he refused to take any commitment to Holland and Switzerland. In addition, the 
Soviet Foreign Minister raised a new point of “direct or indirect” aggression in the 
Treaty, namely, the guarantee would be applied to the countries concerned “in the 
event either of direct aggression or indirect aggression, under which the latter term is 
to be understood an internal coup d'etat or a reversal of policy in the interest of the 
aggressor.”**
The information from Moscow made the F.O. staff feel Russia had become 
“incredibly tiresome”. In the course of discussion at the department meetings, both 
Halifax and Cadogan were in a bad mood. The Foreign Secretary and his 
subordinators were “mulish” on the British standpoint.*® On July 4, the FPC met. 
Circulating the telegrams from Moscow among the Committee members, Halifax 
made himself clear to the Ministers that he firmly opposed the Russian definition of 
indirect aggression because it “was very dangerous and capable of very wide 
application.” He laid down two alternatives of negotiation before the Committee: to 
break off or to fall back on the limited Tripartite Pact, of which the latter was in his 
favour as “our main object in the negotiations was to prevent Russia from engaging 
herself with Germany.” He criticised those who favoured a continuance of the 
negotiations, saying that they must realise that “this would mean inteiminable 
discussions”, but “throughout the negotiations the attitude of the Soviet Government 
had not been helpful.” He believed that Hitler “rated Russia low from the military 
point of view.” Even without Russian assistance, Germany would still have to face 
Poland, France and Britain. However, he had a tendency to agree with the omission 
of Holland and Switzerland from the list.
.1
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In the course of the discussion, the Ministers generally agreed with the view that
they should ask Russia to abandon her definition of indirect aggression and in return
Britain would exclude Holland and Switzerland in the Treaty. With regard to the
signing of a limited triple agreement, opinions divided. Some Ministers such Oliver
Stanley, MacDonald (Colonies), Morrison (The Chancellor of the Duchy of
Lancaster) worried that “such a pact would be a ridiculously small mouse for the
mountains to have produced.” The Prime Minister however supported his Foreign
Minister and made a conclusion for the Committee,
that the Soviet Government should drop their definition of indirect 
aggression and that we should abandon our insistence on the inclusion 
of Switzerland and the Netherlands... or that there should be a 
Tripartite Pact.®®
After meeting, Cadogan, Sargent and Malkin drafted the telegram to Moscow.
Chamberlain dictated his own definition of aggression, which turned out to be:
the word “aggression” is to be understood as covering action accepted 
by the State in question under threat of force by another Power and 
involving the abandonment by it of its independence or neutrality (list 
of States).
With his approval, the telegrams were sent to Seeds on the 6th.®^
The British and French Ambassadors took action on this instruction on July 8
and 9. In his despatches about interviews with Molotov, Seeds reported that the
Soviet Government not only insisted on the inclusion of indirect aggression, but also
redefined it as follows:
“indirect aggression” covers action accepted by any of the above 
mentioned States under threat of force by another Power, or without 
any such threat, involving the use of territory and forces of the State in 
question for purposes of aggression against that State or against one of 
the contracting parties, and consequently involving the loss of by that 
State, its independence or violation of its neutrality.®^
In addition, Molotov stressed that the political covenant and military agreement 
should be signed simultaneously on the grounds that “without a military Agreement 
the political Agreement would be a mere empty declaration.” For a concession, he 
accepted that the political agreement would be initialled and then the staff talks 
could start. Both Seeds and the French Ambassador observed that the Soviet
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Government would not be prepared to negotiate a limited triple agreement “in the
event of failure to conclude the wider Agreement”.®^
The Soviet proposal met with intensive discussion at the FPC meeting on the
10th. Halifax was completely against the new Soviet definition of indirect
aggression because he thought it gave the Soviet Government “a wide right of
intervention in the internal affairs of another country.” He told his colleagues that
the French “were much more elastic in regard to the question of indirect aggression”,
but they emphasised that if military conversation failed there would be no political
agreement being signed. The Foreign Secretary suggested the possible course was
that the Western Powers would yield to the point that staff talks “should be
concluded before the political agreement was officially signed”, on the condition that
Russia would accept the British definition of aggression. The Ministers agreed
generally and Chamberlain said that “he himself had failed to find any satisfactory
formula based on M. MolotofFs formula.” Despite dislike of staff' talks with Russia,
he approved of it because he “did not attach any very great importance” to such
conversations. He tended to believe Henderson’s latest viewpoint that “it would be
quite impossible in the present circumstances for Germany and Soviet Russia to
come together.” Chatfield warned the Committee that
the conclusion of a military agreement with Russia might be found very 
difficult. Up to the present we had never made a military agreement 
with another country and it was a grave matter to have to decide in 
advance...
He suggested that if staff talks started, they would have to be conducted on “high
Seivice level” (probably the Deputy Chiefs of Staff). Halifax explained the real
purpose of staff talk with Russia that
when the militaiy conversations had begun no great progress would be 
made. The conversations would drag on and ultimately each side 
would accept a general undertaking fiom the other. In this way, we 
should have gained time and made the best of a situation from which 
we could not now escape.
In the end, the Committee decided that they would agree to the Russian proposal 
that the political and military agreements should be executed simultaneously for a 
bargain to ask that Russia must abandon her definition of indirect aggression.®"^
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However, when he informed Seeds of the above line, Halifax instructed the 
Ambassador not to offer this bargain for the time being due to “the strong objections 
of the French”. Nor did the French agree to fall back on a simple triple agreement.®® 
After eliminating divergence between Britain and France, Halifax instructed Seeds 
again on the 15th that the Ambassador should inform Molotov that the Western 
Powers were ready to start military conversations without waiting tor signature of 
the Agreement on the condition that Molotov must abandon his demand for 
simultaneous signature of the political and military Agreements and meet the British 
definition of aggression.®®
Two days later, the two Ambassadors had a negotiation with Molotov. Both 
sides were to persist on their own definitions of aggression. Molotov used the 
collapse of Czechoslovakia as an example to support his argument. He however said 
that the Soviet Government placed an emphasis on a single politico-military 
Agreement, namely, military obligations and contributions should have been clearly 
settled before this agreement was signed. He implied that if this desire was satisfied, 
the definition of indirect aggression was to be “a technical matter of secondaiy 
importance.”®^ The French Government informed their British partners that they 
wanted to accept the Russian proposal tor a single politico-military agreement 
“without further bargaining”. They also suggested that they should go as far as 
possible to meet Russia in a definition of indirect aggression. The most important 
point, they stressed, was to come to agreement with Russia at once.®*
However, at the FPC meeting of the 19th, the Ministers were still stuck on the 
definition of indirect aggression. Due to the pressure fi'om the Opposition, the Prime 
Minister realised that if no decision one way or the other was reached, considerable 
trouble would have to be faced. The Foreign Secretary suggested sending to 
Moscow “someone of Ministerial rank” to speed up the negotiations, but the Prime 
Minister rejected this on the grounds that “not only would this involve a considerable 
delay but it would be humiliating to us.” As for the staff talks, he warned the 
Committee that “the military provisions of a treaty would be bound to cause serious 
trouble,” Chatfield however showed no objection to meeting the Russian demands. 
Finally, the Committee agreed to the suggestion by Chamberlain and Halifax that the
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military conversations with Russia could not start until the agreement on the political
articles had been reached.®®
Nevertheless, in his telegram to Seeds on the 21st, Halifax seemed to exceed the
Committee decision and instructed the Ambassador:
1 would be prepared in the last resort to agree to the immediate 
initiation of military conversations without waiting for final agreement 
on Articles and Protocol now under discussion, 1 do not like this and 
should only wish to advance this suggestion if danger of breakdown 
after you have stated our requirements seems imminent.
He left it to Seeds’ discretion to decide, whereas the Ambassador did not want to 
use “the last resort”.™^ In their interview of the 23 rd, Molotov urged the British 
Government that the Three Powers should open staff talks in Moscow immediately. 
He repeated that as soon as the military conversations began, definition of indirect 
aggression or the other outstanding points would not give rise to insuperable 
difficulties. Under these circumstances Halifax authorised Seeds on the 25th to 
inform the Russians that the British Government agreed to the Soviet suggestion but 
at the same time insisted that the Three Powers should continue to conclude the 
political agreement.
In this period, while conversations with the Soviets were dragging on, the British 
policy-makers tried to warm up the relations with Germany. Various despatches 
from Henderson advised the Government to press the Poles into making a 
concession to Germany over Danzig.™* On July 18, Wilson urged Wohltat, the 
German Commissioner of the Four Year Plan, that Germany should take an initiative 
to restore the friendship between the two countries and explained that the real 
implication in Chamberlain’s and Halifax’ recent speeches was that “there was still 
an opportunity for co-operating ... so soon as conditions had been created that 
would make that co-operation feasible.” This was, according to Wohltat’s 
understanding, approved by Chamberlain.™"^  Meanwhile, Hudson (Secretary of 
Department of Overseas Trade) had an interview with Wohltat, offering a large 
British loan to Germany if she mended her ways.™® But at the same time the British 
Government declined to approve of a loan to Poland which the latter needed to 
equip her forces.™® Moreover, during the communication in July and August, they
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put forward to the German representative a new proposal for an Anglo-German 
settlement,™^
3. The Military Conversations in Moscow: August
Although it was an inevitable consequence that had been long foreseen, staff
talks with Russia had been poorly prepared before they came on the agenda. When
he replied to Halifax’s question about military communications with Russia at the
FPC meeting of July 19, Chamberlain said,
he did not think that Chiefs of Staff Committee need consider the 
question immediately. He understood that the Sub-Committee had 
other and even more urgent important questions before it.™*
A few days later, due to the Russian demand, Halifax communicated with the French
Government with the proposal of embarking on staff talks with Russia. The French
response was positive and they suggested that military officers should depart in next
three or four days.™® At the Cabinet meeting of July 26, the Foreign Secretary said
that since staff talks were regarded by Russia “as a test of our good faith”, he
thought that opening these talks “would have a good effect on world opinion”.
Chamberlain instructed that “negotiations with Russia would continue to drag on
until we made it clear that we were prepared to face the risk of a breakdown.” The
Cabinet generally agreed that
our representatives should be instructed to proceed very slowly with 
the conversations until a political pact had been concluded. In 
particularly, it would be desirable that we should not allow Russia to 
start the conversations by obtaining information as to our own plans, 
but should rather endeavour to secure that the Russians let our 
representatives know what they could do to help e.g. Poland.™®
Based on these lines, the Deputy Chiefs of Staff Committee and the Committee 
of Imperial Defence drew up a lengthy document for the guidance of the Military 
Mission, The formula was that until the political agreement was reached, the 
Delegation should “go very slow with conversations, watching the process of the 
political negotiations”. In addition, they should state policy in “the broadest possible 
terms” although it was realised that the Russians were bound to want details. As for 
the possible question of the Polish and Roumanian unwillingness to have Soviet 
troops in their territory, the Delegation should persuade the Soviet Mission to accept 
the view that an invasion by Germany “would quickly alter their outlook.”™^
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On the 31st, Chamberlain stated in the House that the British and French Military
Missions were going to Moscow as soon as possible. The British Delegation was
headed by Admiral Drax, and the French by General Doumenc.™  ^ The Anglo-
French military team arrived in Moscow on August 11. When military conversations
took place on the next day Marshal Voroshilov, Head of the Soviet Military Mission,
told his Western partners that his Government had empowered him to negotiate and
sign a military agreement with the British and French Delegations, He was
disappointed by the fact that Admiral Drax had no written credentials, nor was he
empowered to sign a military agreement. However, the Soviet negotiators “were
really out for business” in the first tew talks. They gave quite concrete details about
what Russia could contribute in the event of German aggression. Under these
circumstances. Admiral Drax, supported by Seeds, asked for authority to depart
from vague generalities and “go-slowly” policies, and to discuss the British plan
more openly.™* Halifax, with Chatfield’s agreement, sent a despatch to Moscow on
the 15th, cancelling “go-slowly” instructions and allowing the Delegation to explore
the British military plan with certain reservations. This instruction was carried out
on the following day,™"^  but it did not bring a very encouraging result because the
negotiations had in tact come to deadlock two days before — on the 14th when
Voroshilov put forward three questions to the Western Delegations: in the event of
German aggression would the Soviet Forces be allowed to move through Polish
territory, for example a) the Wilno Gap? b) Galicia? c) would they be allowed to
use Roumanian territory? The Soviet Marshal demanded “straightforward answers
to these cardinal questions”. Without an exact unequivocal answer, he thought that
“continuance of the military conversations would be useless.”™®
After discussing with their French colleagues. Seeds and Drax sent telegrams
separately to Halifax and Chatfield on August 15. Seeds suggested that since it was
a “fundamental problem on which military talks will succeed or fail”,
French General Staff' should get in touch with Polish General Staff and 
obtain their consent to the thi ee delegations here working out general 
plans (for eventual action on something like Soviet lines in case of a 
war when Poland would agree to Russian assistance) to which Poles 
would meanwhile turn a blind eye.
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The French Ambassador in Moscow also sent a strong recommendation to his 
Government.™®
When the F.O. received these despatches, Strang consulted with Halifax and
Cadogan. The Foreign Secretary considered that Britain and France “should now
concert in an approach to the Polish and Roumanian Governments and put the
situation frankly to them.” In the Polish case they “should not press M. Beck for an
immediate response”, but the Polish General Staff should consider these questions.
Strang sent the telegram to Warsaw, which instructed the British Ambassador to
support his French colleagues in approaching the Polish Government accordingly.™^
However, the Poles’ reaction was unfavourable although they agreed to have further
considerations.™* On the 21st, M. Cambon, Minister at French Embassy in London,
informed Strang that the French Government decided “not to take literally the
objections of M. Beck”, and instructed General Doumenc to give the Soviet
Delegation “an affirmative answer in principle” to the three questions. The French
thought this was only solution to get around the deadlock and asked the British
Government to give the same instruction to their Delegation.™® In his minute,
Strang pointed out that although they “have gone ahead without consulting us”, “we
cannot disavow the French Government”. He suggested that a similar instruction
should be send to the British Delegation to support the French. Cadogan saw this
minute, but no action was taken on it because Halifax did not feel it right to do so.™®
On the 22nd General Doumenc asked for an interview with Voroshilov. When
the former told the latter that he had received the information from the French
Government that the Polish reply to the passage of Soviet troops was “in the
affirmative”, the Soviet Marshal was not convinced. Voroshilov insisted that the
negotiations could not continue because “the position of Poland, Roumania and
Great Britain is still unknown.”™^ On the same day, the news came out that
Ribbentrop would visit Moscow to sign a Soviet German Non-Aggression Pact,
which completely surprised the Polish Government. Beck told the British and French
Ambassadors in Warsaw on the 23rd that
in the event of common action against German aggression 
collaboration, under technical conditions to be settled subsequently 
between Poland and U S S R., is not excluded.™^
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As for the achievement of Soviet-German rapprochement, Chamberlain seemed 
“quite firm about its not altering things.”™* When the Cabinet discussed the 
situation on the 22nd, Hoare even said, “we might be able to turn the German-Soviet 
Pact to good account in connection with our Far Eastern policy.” Being in 
accordance with him, Halifax thought that “the conclusion of the Pact might also be 
helpfrd to us in our dealings with Spain.” He commented that the Pact “was perhaps 
not of very great importance in itself’, but its moral effect “at the present time would 
be very great.” He however realised that “no useful purpose would be served by 
continuing the military conversation.^™ That evening, Chamberlain wrote to Hitler, 
indicating that Britain would fight for Poland, but he could not see “that there is 
anything in the questions arising between Germany and Poland which could not and 
should not be solved without the use of force.”™®
From the 22nd to 24th, Halifax kept asking Seeds to enquire of the Soviets 
whether they wanted to continue the negotiation. Molotov’s reply which came on 
the next day was negative.™®
A few days after the Three Power negotiations broke oft; the Second World War 
broke out.
m . COMMENT
Both the guarantee to Poland and the Three Power Conversations were aimed at 
setting a deterrent to German further aggression, but neither was successful. 
Contemporary politicians and scholars have made various comments on these events: 
The guarantee to Poland was often described as “a diplomatic revolution”, 
marking the end of appeasement. It was, as Thorne says, “a fundamental change, on 
the surface at least, of British foreign policy.” Eubank thinks that it “was actually 
more a revolution in tactics than in policy.”™^ However, some historians hold a less 
favourable view. As Middlemas points out, the guarantee showed that “unwillingly, 
half-heartedly, the British Government eventually admitted that it could not 
relinquish interest in the balance of power in Europe.” Bell’s observation explores 
the essential meaning of the guarantee: “The guarantee was designed as a deterrent, 
and if the deterrent worked, the guarantee would not have to be carried out.... As it
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was, the guarantee was enough to bring Britain and France into a war over Poland, 
but not enough to deter Hitler from launching one.”™*
As for the question why the British Government had refused to help 
Czechoslovakia in 1938, but declared war in 1939 to guarantee the independence of 
Poland, which “Great Britain had no means of making effective”, the appeasers’ 
answer is that before collapse of Czechoslovakia, “Hitler’s full intentions were still 
unknown” and nobody wanted to fight for Czechoslovakia. But now as “it was clear 
that he intended to dominate the Continent, we took up the challenge.”^^ However, 
the appeasers do not tell the whole truth because although they knew Hitler’s full 
intentions in 1939, they were not determined to fight a war against him.
The evidence shows that the guarantee was a hasty and ill-prepai ed deterrent, 
which aimed to convince Hitler rather than fight against him: If he continued to 
behave as he had previously, his aggression would be resisted, but if he gave up 
abuse of force, his rational demands would still be considered favourably. The 
deteirent lay in its political, moral and psychological value instead of military one. 
That was why in this period of British rearmament, despite a certain increase, it took 
only 7% of the national income, amounting to one fifth of German armament 
spending in the same period. Chamberlain, who had never accepted war as 
inevitable, was unwilling to prepare for something that he had never accepted. He 
believed that the guarantee itself would deter Hitler, so there was no actual need to 
carry it out. As soon as Hitler was convinced, he would go on to find a way of 
“meeting German claims while safeguarding Poland’s independence” as he said, the 
guarantee was “the turning-point not towards war, ... but towards a more 
wholesome era, when reason will take the place of force.”™® Therefore, the 
guarantee to Poland was an attempt to make a certain change within the scope of 
appeasement. By deterring Hitler’s abuse of force and convincing him to use 
peaceful means, it aimed to create a new and safer situation, in which the Western 
Powers could search and reach a settlement with Germany.
The guarantee was a failure because it did not achieve its aim of deterring Hitler. 
Nor did it even convince Hitler that Britain would fight. On August 22, when he 
instructed his generals to launch a war on Poland, the Führer said,
I have but one worry, namely that Chamberlain or some other such pig
of a fellow (‘Saukerl’) will come at the last moment with proposals or
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with ratting (‘UmtaU’). He will fly down the stairs, even if 1 shall 
personally have to trample on his belly in the eyes of the photographers.
No, it is too late for this. The attack upon and the destruction of 
Poland begins Saturday, [26 August] early.
Partly because they did not expect to actually cairy out the guarantee, the British 
Government did not weigh up very much the Soviet military assistance to Poland. It 
was one of the reasons that had caused British hesitation in alliance with Russia.
This hesitation did major harm to the Three Power conversations.
As regards Anglo-Franco-Soviet negotiations, politicians and historians also 
have their views. Churchill thinks that if Chamberlain had accepted the Russian 
proposal earlier and reached agreement with Stalin, “history might have taken a 
different course. At least it could not have taken a w o r s e . I t  is quite agreeable 
that due to the failure of the Three Power conversations. Hitler “was freed from the 
danger of a war on two fronts.” Some historians, in spite of doubt about whether or 
how far the triple pact would work, agree that its failure made the World War Two 
inevitable.™* As always the appeasers tried to shuffle off the responsibility of failure 
upon others. Hoare argues that the principal divergence between the two sides was 
that the British Government did not allow Russia to occupy the Baltic States and 
Poland by using the excuse of offering them a guarantee. The German-Soviet pact 
proved Russia’s double face. “It was Russian duplicity and not British prejudice that 
made these months of baffling discussion end in failure.”™"^
It seems that all charges against Russia were true. However, Churchill, known
for his anti-Communist standpoint, gave a thorough understanding of the Soviet
policy as he wrote in his memoirs.
On the Soviet side it must be said that their vital need was to hold the 
deployment positions of the German armies at far to the West as 
possible so as to give the Russians more time for assembling their 
forces from all parts of their immense empire, ... They must be in 
occupation of the Baltic States and a large part of Poland by force or 
fraud before they were attacked. If their policy was cold-blooded, it 
was also at the moment realistic in a high degree.™®
Indeed, although their definition of indirect aggression was right in theory, it was 
um ealistic in strategy because the Western Powers could not stop Russia, if she
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wanted, from interfering with the independence of the Baltic States in any way. In 
the early stages of the War, they could not save any of these small countries from 
becoming Russian prey by their correct definition. After all, the British Government 
had agreed to include these small states in a secret list of the agreement with Russia 
without asking their permission. In addition, while the Soviets played their game of 
duplicity, Britain also arranged a series of discussions with the Germans about the 
future settlement between the two powers.™® Therefore, the appeasers were not as 
pure, noble and honest as they seemed. Although Russia should be blamed for her 
withdrawal from the negotiations, the British Government must bear a major 
responsibility for the breakdown, which resulted mainly from appeasement.
Since the guarantee to Poland was designed to be a political, moral and 
psychological deterrent, which would lead to the door of new settlement with 
Germany rather than a war against her, British policy-makers neglected the 
importance of Russian military assistance in the East and excluded her completely 
from the picture at early stage. They were never willing to face the inevitability of 
war and worried that an open alliance with the Soviets would raise misgivings from 
Poland, Roumania, the Baltic States and Dominions (this was found to have been 
exaggerated ™^), and above all, irritating Germany. Being blinded by their prejudice 
and contempt of Russia, the British leaders misinterpreted or ignored military advice 
in favour of an alliance. They short-sightedly chose Poland as the key ally in the 
East instead of the Soviet Union although they were well aware that Russia was one 
of the strongest powers and she possessed an important strategic position in the 
Eastern Europe. (In fact, Russia possessed some other advantages such as vast land 
and terrible cold weather in winter which had beaten Napoleon.)
All this caused a British hesitation to ally with the Soviets while the latter still 
considered their cooperation with the West as their first choice. Oliver Harvey 
commented, “What is in the back of P.M.’s mind and especially of Horace Wilson’s 
is that appeasement will be dead” if alliance with Russia were achieved.™* From 
their first approach to Russia (on March 20) to their final decision on alliance with 
her (on May 24), the British Government spent more than two months hesitating. If 
they had not wasted so much time, the Three-Power agreement would have been 
concluded well before Soviet-German Pact,™®
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However, even the decision to ally with Russia did not change their idea of 
appeasement. Their purpose was, as the Cabinet minutes indicate, that “when we 
had strengthened our position by making an agreement with the Russian 
Government, we should take the initiative in a renewal of the search for 
appeasement.”™® They went Anther and Anther to meet Russian demands not 
because they were prepared to set up a whole-hearted co-operation with her against 
aggression but because they were, under pressure from public opinion, afraid of a 
breakdown, which might result in a German-Soviet rapprochement.
The failure was also a serious consequence the pursuit of appeasement in the 
previous years. If the British Government had started to work on the Peace Front 
before Munich, it would have been more likely to succeed. Russia had been more 
ready to join in. They at least had sufficient time to solve their problems. Failure to 
execute the guarantee to Czechoslovakia shook the confidence of other countries 
(including Russia) towards Britain. The unilateral guarantee to Poland weakened 
Britain’s position in negotiations with Russia because the Soviets had more options 
than the Western Powers: they could either join the Peace Front to fight against 
Germany or take the German side or keep themselves out of war. For her own 
security and interest, Russia was in a favourable position to raise her price again and 
again until she felt satisfied. The prolonged process of negotiation made the Soviets 
believe that the Western Powers were unwilling to satisfy Russia completely, but 
Germany would be able to. (Ironically, the Soviet-German honeymoon did not last 
very long, following a lightning attack on Russia from her former partner in 1941.)
In addition, decisions by the British policy-makers also had an unfavourable 
influence on the negotiations: 1) During their negotiation with Poland and 
Roumania, their Ministers for Foreign Affairs were invited to London. However, to 
pursue negotiations with Russia, the FPC sent Strang, a junior official, to Moscow 
rather than a Minister. This put the British representatives in an unfavourable 
position. In their negotiations, as Butler described to the FPC, “Molotov sat aloft 
enthroned with the two Ambassadors on a much lower level. ... whenever the 
Ambassadors attempted to maintain a sustained argument M. Molotov interrupted 
them by saying that the Soviet Government had given their decision and demanding 
that they should pass to the next item on the Agenda,” Although the FPC realised
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that they should have sent a Minister, it was now too late.™^  2) As Head of the 
British Military Mission, Admiral Drax had no written credentials, nor was he 
empowered to sign an agreement. His rank was lower than Marshal Voroshilov, 
who had full power to negotiate and sign an agreement. Being disappointed by this, 
the Soviets could with some reason remain suspicious of the British motives and 
could close down on the negotiation.™  ^ 3) Military conversation was poorly 
prepared. Based on the “go-slowly” policy, the British Delegation were not allowed 
to explore their plans while the Soviets, however, gave their military details. Stalin 
and Molotov commented on the thi ee power negotiations in their interview with 
Ribbentrop on the night of August 23 - 24 that the British Military Mission “had 
never told the Soviet Government what it really wanted.”™* 4) The British leaders 
had got stuck on the definition of indirect aggression for too long. If they had 
turned a blind eye to this definition and used it as a bait to rope Russia in, rather than 
use it as a wedge to push her out, conclusion of the three power agreement might 
have been achieved.
From a strategic point of view, if an alliance with Russia had been successfully 
concluded, it would have increased the military value of a deterrent against 
Germany, which might have caused Hitler to hesitate in launching a war on Poland. 
Even if she overran Poland quickly Germany would have been involved in a two- 
ffont war at the very beginning of War. Failure to build an alliance with Russia was 
a great strategic mistake and loss: without Russian assistance, the Polish defence 
was broken like a paper wall by a German lightning attack. Hitler avoided risking a 
two-front war successfully. On the other hand, according to the secret Protocol 
attached to the Soviet-German Pact,™"*^  Russia joined Germany in the partition of 
Poland and obtained a free hand to deal with the Baltic States on her western border. 
Through Soviet territory, Germany could communicate with Japan in the Far East, 
which made the British sea blockage ineffective. Turning the Eastern front into 
Germany’s rear-area. Hitler was able to concentrate his military forces on attacking 
France and bombing England in 1940.
To summarise, appeasement was a crucial factor which led to the failure of both 
the guarantee to Poland and the Three Power negotiation. These two events were 
unsuccessful attempts of the British Government to make a certain change within the 
scope of appeasement. Their failure indicated that it was impossible for the
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appeasers even to make minor changes of appeasement, needless to say to abandon 
this policy. During the nine years from 1931 to 1939, not only had appeasement 
become the foundation on which foreign policy was based, but also it had served as a 
guideline for many other fields such as the economy, trade and rearmament. 
Furtheimore, appeasement, produced by the appeasers, in return, controlled their 
minds, becoming a crucial part of their diplomatic lives. Therefore, even if they 
realised that they were wrong, it was impossible for them to abandon their own 
policy as it was impossible for them to abandon their own lives and their masterpiece 
which they had worked on for nine years. Not until after the outbreak of War did 
appeasement become bankrupt, because it had lost its entire basis. However, its 
spirit was not completely dead until Churchill took over in May 1940. Study on the 
policy of that period falls beyond the scope of the present thesis, but forms the 
subject of the Author’s Brilain and The Phoney War, September 1939 -May 
79^ 0.™®
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CONCLUSION
It has been fifty years since the end of the Second World War, but arguments 
about appeasement still continue. After the War, historians generally held a critical 
view about appeasement. However, since the late 1950s there has emerged a 
revisionist school  ^who take a radical standpoint in justifying this policy. In addition, 
some historians, despite being critical of appeasement, argue in favour of it to a 
certain extent. It is, therefore, necessary to analyse their arguments so as to see 
whether there is anything in them.
Argument 1 : “The peace of Versailles lacked moral validity from the start.”
A.J.P. Taylor comments, “This was obviously true in regard to the Germans.” Some 
scholars share, or imply agreement with, this view on the grounds that the harshness 
of the Versailles Treaty including “War-Guilt” was unfairly and unequally forced 
upon Germany, which disturbed the conscience of the British politicians and the 
public. They justify appeasement because it “was based nevertheless upon a single 
premise, national self-determination.” Therefore, Versailles had to be revised in 
favour of German side. “If Germany could be appeased by revision, Europe might 
yet avoid the chaos.”  ^ According to this argument, the appeasers seemed to have a 
case for pursuing appeasement because they should be fair and just to their opponent 
who lost in the gambling of the First World War. They should also be fair and just 
to other “have-not” powers like Italy and Japan.
The moral standard seemed so high that nobody could criticise it. But how 
about the Austrians, the Czechs, the Abyssinians and the Chinese? Were they 
entitled to the same rule? Unfortunately, in the appeaser’s dictionary, there was no 
room for the “pig-head” Czechs, “bad-neighbours” Abyssinians and “wretched”, 
“foolish” Chinese  ^to enjoy this treatment. It was very “moral” too for appeasers to 
accept Hitler’s “principle of self-determination” for his annexation of Austria and 
Sudetenland. However, they acquiescenced in Hitler’s violation of this principle 
when the dictator forced Schuschnigg, Austrian Chancellor, to cancel a plebiscite, 
which would decide whether the Austrians wanted a union with Germany on their 
own free will. The British policy-makers abandoned the idea of a plebiscite in the 
Sudetenland too because of Hitler’s demand. At the Cabinet meeting of September
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17, 1938, which discussed Hitler’s “self-determination”, the Secretary for India 
warned that “he was anxious not to say that we were actuated solely by the principle 
of self-determination. Were we to do so the Indian Congress Party would not be 
slow to take advantage of such a declaration on our part.” Halifax agreed with him 
by saying that “it was undesirable to bum too much incense on the altar of self- 
determination.”'^  It was apparent that this fairness and justice was only for the 
aggressors and not applicable to victim nations and colonies. In spite of being 
members of the League, all these victim nations had no will and no rights in 
international affairs. Like stakes on the gambling table, they were in the position of 
being controlled and dealt with by Great Powers. Chamberlain and his kind certainly 
bore in mind this imperialist moral standard when they formulated their policy. It 
should be explored and criticised, but should not be used to justify the policy. In 
fact, in the ambivalent nature of the Versailles that has been discussed at the 
beginning of the thesis, the moral value was laid in the aspect that it offered a 
possibility of being a deterrent against further invasion to weak powers. Appeasing 
“have-not” powers by sacrificing victim nations diminished the moral value of the 
League. On the contrary, preventing Germany from launching war by keeping her in 
a harsh position might be unfair and unjust to her but was fair and just to the 
majority of the countries in the world. After W.W.II, Germany was monitored by 
the Allies and separated for more than forty years; Japan is still dependent on the 
American security umbrella. However, few who underwent disastrous experience in 
the Second World War have felt pity for them. People have learned better about 
what fairness, justice and morality should really mean. But some of the historians 
are still blind to what they should have known.
Argument 2: That Chamberlain pursued appeasement “in radically different, 
unsuitable circumstances, may have been the fault of his judgement, but it was 
certainly not the fault of his intention. His aim was to preserve peace in Europe. It 
was an honourable quest.” “It was Christian to love one’s neighbour, and sound 
business to encourage his prosperity.”  ^ Eubank argued, “For Chamberlain practised 
appeasement, not out of cowardice or fear, but out of a positive belief that 
appeasement would open the way to peace for all.”^
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This is another example that attempts to balance the evil result by good intention.
It is almost unassailable when these laudable words such as “peace”, “hope for
peace” or “love” have been, in the abstract, used to defend appeasement. However,
in concrete, what kind of peace were the appeasers looking for? Their peace
certainly did not include China. They did not mind how many Chinese civilians had
been slaughtered by the Japanese soldiers as long as British interests in Far East
could rely on the Japanese friendship. Their peace did not include Abyssinia either
because they rewarded Mussolini with the Laval-Hoare plan for his launching war on
that country. What they were concerned about was that British colonial interests in
East Africa would not be harmed when Italy took over. Their peace was exactly the
same as Mussolini’s, namely, peace “of Europe”. Perhaps worse than that because
“Europe” here only referred to Western Europe. As to countries in Central and
Eastern Europe, they were, in Chamberlain’s words, the “faraway nations”  ^although
Chamberlain never felt too far away to sell them up to Hitler. Therefore, appeasers’
hope and love for peace were, at best, an illusion of peace in Western Europe,
which, in their view, could be bought at the price of sacrificing peace in the rest of
the world. It was certainly not “peace for all” nor “an honourable quest” or even a
Christian’s love for neighbour. Morrison, Labour leader, criticised on July 9, 1938,
Mr Chamberlain and his colleagues talk peace not because they mean 
[it] but because the language of pacifism is the new political technique 
of the Tory Central Office. On the Prime Minister’s own admission, we 
are living under more disturbed international conditions than at any 
time since the outbreak of the Great War. And I charge that British 
government by its betrayal of the League of Nations, its sabotaging of 
the Disarmament Conference and its rejection of the policy of the 
collective organisation of peace has made a major contribution to the 
wars taking place and to the unsettlement of Europe.*
Therefore, Chamberlain’s motives were as bad as the result.
Even if Chamberlain’s intentions were genuine as some historians believe, his 
good intentions could not be used to balance the evil result of his policy not only 
because historical comment emphases the result instead of motive, but also because 
his motive created disastrous consequences. If Chamberlain could be spared from 
blame because of his motives. Hitler would also be considered innocent because he, 
as well, did not want to fight against the Western Powers if his aggressive plan could 
be realised without war. Indeed, it was the Western Powers that declared war on
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Germany, and not vice versa. In addition, Hitler expressed hope for peace in his 
speeches not the slightest bit less than Chamberlain. However, nobody can reduce 
Hitler’s guilt by pointing out his “hope for peace”, and due to the same reason, 
nobody can justify appeasement by the appeasers’ motives even if these motives 
were well intentioned.
Argument 3: Being at odds with the orthodox view that appeasers and their 
policy were cowardly, stupid, humiliating and short-sighted, some scholars argue 
that Chamberlain “was a cultivated, highly intelligent, hard-working statesman”. 
Appeasement “was never an apologetic, shy or shameful creed.”^
From the process of policy making, it has been seen that most appeasers, like 
Chamberlain, were very shrewd politicians and diplomats. They foresaw many issues 
in international affairs, which turned out to be true later. For example, they 
previewed that the Germans would raise their demands in aggressive manner. Hitler 
would reoccupy the Rhineland, and made troubles for Austria and Sudetenland.
They estimated Japan, Italy and Germany were three potential enemies and tried to 
avoid to facing the three simultaneously. All these had been considered some time 
before they occurred. Chamberlain and his colleagues worked very hard to deal with 
these problems. From looking at proposals of the F.O. and discussion in Cabinet, it 
is not difficult to find that appeasers had the marvellous capability of overcoming or 
getting around obstacles on the road to appeasement. For example, during the 
Manchurian crisis, Simon cleverly “warded off” charges to the Japanese for their 
aggression. They skilfully shuffled off responsibility for failure in Anglo-American 
co-operation upon the United States. During the Italo-Abyssinian dispute, 
Baldwin’s Government attempted to formulate a series of proposals — the Zeila 
Offer, the Peterson Proposal and the Hoare-Laval Plan — to sell Abyssinia without, 
in theory, violation of principle of the Covenant. The policy of “keep the Germans 
guessing” seemed perfect to deal with Hitler. During the Munich period,
Chamberlain inspired Plan Z and carried it out with full courage. In addition, they 
discouraged the French and misled public opinion quite successfially. In this sense, 
the appeasers were really clever, brave and far-sighted. They were gentlemen.
However, the study of policy making also explores the other side of story. In the 
event of a Japanese challenge in Far East, the British policy makers ingratiated
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themselves with the aggressor because they feared that British interests in Far East
would be harmed if Britain offended Japan. Van confessed, “We must live from
hand to mouth — an humiliating process...” During the Abyssinian crisis, they
abandoned oil sanctions because of fear of Mussolini’s “mad dog” action, which was
highly unlikely to be launched. They “cannot afford to quarrel with Italy and drive
her back into German embraces.”^^  Following the same policy, appeasers would
offer Hitler whatever he wanted before he asked for it because they were afraid that
if these dangerous questions were raised by Germans, they would be “raised in an
aggressive and threatening manner. After Hitler militarised the Rhineland without
giving anything in return, the Cabinet even dared not to ask the dictator to explain
“the distinction between the Reich and the German nation” on the grounds that this
question seemed too provocative. Although their questionnaire had been shelved by
Hitler, and although they were not certain whether Hitler’s ambition was limited or
not, the appeasers hurried to offer the new deal by allowing German “peaceful”
expansion in Central and Eastern Europe because they were afraid that Hitler might
be fed up with waiting. Mr Kirkpatrick, on the staff in British Embassy in Berlin
wrote on June 8, 1936,
In a year’s time it would not be we who would be addressing question 
to Germany..., But the Germans who would be considering whether we 
were worth negotiating with, or whether they would simply dictate 
their desires to us.^ '^
This humiliating situation soon came to true. When Cabinet discussed the terms 
laid down by Hitler at Berchtesgaden and Godesberg, the Ministers did not deny that 
acceptance of these terms meant “total surrender”. Even Halifax felt it was too 
much. However, Chamberlain bravely went to Munich and accepted this humiliation 
as a “victory with a honour.”
When they dealt with the Rhineland, they should have, according to the advice of 
the Chiefs of Staff, foreseen that without the demilitarised zone they would lose 
deterrence to Hitler’s expansion in Central and Eastern Europe. When they kept 
inactive during the Anschluss, they should have known if she successfully annexed 
Austria, Germany would surround Czechoslovakia on three sides, which would 
increase the difficulty in offering military assistance to the Czechs if they were 
attacked by the Germans. Although they formulated proposals one after another, the
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British policy-makers failed to work out any effective deteiTent measure to prevent 
things from proceeding from bad to worse, due to their short-sightedness. “Making 
eyes at Japan” did not keep her friendship. Roping Italy in did not result in her 
estrangement from Germany. Hitler was not at all puzzled by the policy of “keep the 
Germans guessing”. On the contrary, it was the appeasers who always had to guess 
what Hitler’s intention was and his next step in expansion. Appeasement finally 
created the situation that Britain wanted to avoid; facing three enemies 
simultaneously. In this sense, the appeasers’ policy was cowardly, stupid, 
humiliating and short-sighted.
From the analysis above, one can deduce that the British policy makers had 
double personalities and capabilities. As individuals, they were shrewd, intelligent, 
capable and courageous; but as representative leaders of Great Britain, they were 
cowardly, stupid, humiliated and short-sighted. The reason for this contradiction in 
their personalities and capabilities was that when they made policy, they were not 
only private individuals, but also representatives of British Empire, which was 
declining. Impact of this decline caused the negative aspect in their personalities and 
capabilities. Since historical comment is made on their role as politicians in public 
life and in history, therefore, it has to emphasise the aspect of their personalities and 
capabilities as representatives of the British Empire.
Argument 4: Appeasement was a “realistic” and “reasonable” policy due to 
“British weakness”. I t  “had never meant peace at any price, but the acceptance of 
limited German advances .Was  that so?
After the First World War, Great Britain, in spite of her decline, was still a first- 
class power in the world. On the contrary, Germany had been terribly weakened by 
the victor powers. Appeasement was not realistic because it was not a policy of 
redressing “British weakness”, but a policy that resulted in this weakness. The 
policy was so reasonable in appeasers’ minds that they hardly believed that Hitler 
“would repudiate it.” However, it was unrealistic and umeasonable because the 
appeasers had formulated this policy on the basis of an unawareness of Hitler’s real 
ambition. In other words, appeasement was realistic and reasonable to appeasers but 
unrealistic and um easonable to deal with Hitler. Furthermore, it was unrealistic and 
um easonable on the grounds that although they were set back time after time, the
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appeasers were still under the illusion that they could come to terms with the 
aggressors by pursuing this policy. It is not an exaggeration to say that Munich was 
a policy to buy peace at any price. The process of policy making indicates that 
before Hitler annexed the whole of Czechoslovakia, appeasers did not set any limit in 
their concessions. As long as it was by peaceful means. Hitler was allowed to take 
the Rhineland, Austria, Sudetenland and Danzig as well as the whole of Central and 
Eastern Europe. Until after the collapse of Czechoslovakia, the British Government 
declared a guarantee to Poland. Even so, Danzig was not unnegotiatable in the 
appeasers’ mind. Nor did they really want to strengthen this deterrence by co­
operating with the Soviets. This vague limit made Hitler misunderstand that Britain 
would not fight for Danzig, which encouraged him to launch war on Poland. 
Therefore, appeasement did not set any limit on concession until its latest stage. 
When appeasers set a limit, it was too late and too vague to limit Hitler.
If the appeasers and their supporters still consider this policy realistic and 
reasonable, one question should be put to them: “will you adopt the same policy in 
similar situation in the future, which would certainly lead to a Third World War?” 
Argument 5: Munich postponed war and gained time for rearmament. It seems 
really a great contribution to the world. However, according to Hitler’s schedule, he 
had previously considered waging war with the Western Powers by 1943-45, and 
Munich created such favourable conditions that he successfully launched war on 
Poland in 1939, about 3 -5  years ahead of schedule. What is more, if Chamberlain 
had taken a hard line during the Munich period. Hitler might have been overthrown 
by his opposition. That meant there would have been no World War Two. Even if 
Hitler had started the war owing to Britain’s firm standpoint, it would have been a 
short and limited war rather than a general one because Hitler had not completed his 
war preparation.^* The Western Powers, allied with Russia and other Eastern 
European countries, possessed strategic and militaiy advantage. Churchill’s 
comment is conclusive: “there is no merit in putting off a war for a year if, when it 
comes, it is a far worse war or one much harder to win.”^^
Regarding the view that Munich was aiming to gain time for rearmament, it is 
nullified because it was opposed by Chamberlain himself. At the Cabinet meetings in 
October 1938, he criticised the misinterpretation of Munich’s aim at gaining time for
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rearmament. He emphasised that the purpose of Munich was to build up good 
relations with the dictator powers, and that rearmament could only make them 
suspicious. He would reduce rearmament in due course when it was more hopefial 
for him to reach settlement with them.^“ If Chamberlain was still alive, he would not 
allow his followers to cause misunderstanding to his Munich doctrine.
Not until after Hitler’s coup of Prague, did Chamberlain began to gain time. 
However, it aimed not at preparing for war, but at enforcing the British position.
This position would put Chamberlain in a better situation in his search for a new 
settlement with Germany. Towards this end, total rearmament spending for 1938- 
39, despite considerable increase, took a small percentage (7%) of the national 
income, only one fifth of German rearmament expenditure during the same period.^^
Argument 6: Related to the arguments above, appeasers and their supporters 
declare that appeasement was supported by majority of people in the 1930s.^ They 
have ignored two important factors; firstly, from the very beginning, there was a 
loud voice in favour of taking a firm stand against aggression, which existed 
throughout the whole of 1930s. Several polls had shown that the public was not in 
agreement with appeasement. Secondly, according to research in this thesis and 
other historians’ observations, appeasers deliberately misled and misinformed the 
public. The atmosphere favourable to appeasement was, to large extent, created by 
the British Government themselves, putting censorship on the media.
At last, we come to Mr A. J. P. Taylor’s admiration of Munich. He declares it as
“a triumph”, which was mentioned in the Introduction. '^  ^ The argument for his view
is, as he admits in his “Second Thought” of The Origins o f the Second World War.
In 1938 Czechoslovakia was betrayed. In 1939 Poland was saved.
Less than one hundred thousand Czechs died during the war. Six and 
half million Poles were killed. Wliich was better — to be a betrayed 
Czech or a saved Pole?^^
Following his argument, the conclusion would naturally be: to be a betrayed 
Czech who survived as a slave under Nazi’s mandate was better than that to be a 
Pole who died for his independence and freedom. He did not suggest that the British 
people should follow that better example so as to avoid the great loss of life during 
the German bombardment of Great Britain during the summer of 1940. If he had, 
even appeasers would not agree with him because they would at least fight for the
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British vital interests, Britain’s own independence and freedom, if and when they 
were forced to. Compared to Taylor’s capitulationism, appeasement should be really 
admired on the grounds that it could not tolerate that Britain would live under the 
Nazis’ protection as a junior partner or semi-colony, even though it might be very 
fortunate in Taylor’s view.
The appeasement-making process was a process that led to the Second World 
War. Offering more and more favourable conditions for the aggressors to realise 
their ambitions, this policy deprived Western Powers of their strategic initiative, 
increasing the danger of war step by step. It was appeasement and the aggressors’ 
ambitions that were two fondamental factors which made the Second World War 
inevitable. Although there have been divergent views on the subject, few, including 
the appeasers, deny that appeasement was a failure. Henderson titled his memoirs 
Failure o f A Mission. Hoare recalled the age of appeasement as “Nine Troubled 
Years”. Therefore, it is right for historians to ask: Could failure possibly have been 
avoided if other alternative courses had been taken? What lessons can be drawn 
from this failure?
After the First World War, although America isolated herself from European 
affairs, although France was politically weak and although the British Empire was 
declining, Germany, as a defeated nation, was much weaker than any one of them.
In addition, the League, in spite of not being a military mechanism, offered principles 
and measures (i.e. Articles 10 -17 of the Covenant) to maintain world peace. In 
general, the anti-fascist countries, if they united, were much stronger than the three 
aggressors. Conditions were favourable for these countries to defend world peace, 
preventing aggression or defeating aggressors in their adventures at an early stage.
Still being a first-class power in a leading position in the League, Britain should 
have organised the Peace Front first rather than searching for a new settlement with 
the aggressors. In fact, the struggle against aggression in the 1930s offered a very 
good chance for anti-fascist countries to unite together. Despite its policy of 
isolationism, America’s national interest was linked with the Western Powers in the 
long run. If the British Government had searched for co-operation with America 
whole-heartedly during the Manchurian crisis, Anglo-American collaboration might
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have been achieved. As for France’s weakness, Britain should have given her more 
support rather than discouraging her from facing the danger from Germany. In the 
Western view, Communist Russia was an enemy. However, it was apparent that the 
Soviet Union had no intention to invade or threaten the Western World at that time. 
On the contrary, it was she who was afraid of subversion and invasion by what she 
perceived as “imperialist” states. If Britain had accepted the Russian proposals, the 
Peace Front would have been built up, and would have been a deterrent to German 
aggression. If the Second World War could have been successfully avoided. Eastern 
Europe would not have been controlled by the Soviets later.
In order to avoid facing three enemies at the same time, Britain should, in co­
operation with America, France, Russia and other powers in the League, have 
checked Japan, Italy and Germany one by one at the beginning of the emerging 
problem rather than wait until these three had achieved their rapprochement. During 
the Manchurian crisis, if Britain had firmly supported the Chinese struggle against a 
Japanese invasion, and had taken a decisive lead in imposing a boycott on Japan and 
whole-heartedly co-operated with America, the Japanese would not have held out 
very long. In the Italo-Abyssinian conflict, the situation was even more favourable 
to the anti-fascist powers in the sense of checking Italian aggression. If the Japanese 
and Italians had been defeated, not only would it have greatly discouraged Hitler, but 
also Great Britain would have been able to concentrate on German problem without 
wonying danger in the Far East and the Mediterranean.
Since the British Government did not want to attend to their military deficiency 
by means of economic sacrifices, they should have tried to prevent Genuany from 
developing her military capabilities for as long as possible instead of appeasing her 
by conceding to her demands. During the Rhineland crisis, if Britain had backed up 
France and forced Germany to withdraw, it would have spoiled all Hitler’s plans and 
prevented Germany from threatening world peace as well as the interests of the 
British Empire. If Britain had responded to France in firmly resisting the Anschluss, 
this would have seriously hindered Hitler’s ambitions in Czechoslovakia. And if 
Chamberlain had taken hard line at Munich, Hitler might have been overthrown by 
his opposition.
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It was less blameworthy that the appeasers did not see tlirough the nature of 
German Nazism, Italian Fascism and Japanese militarism because it was a new 
phenomena in modem history. However, these were very blameworthy that they 
ruled out using force and insisted on concessions before they had foil knowledge of 
the aggressors’ ambitions. Based on their own imagination instead of solid evidence, 
they believed that the Japanese had no territorial ambitions in China, and that 
Mussolini and Hitler could be bought off. They had followed appeasement further 
and forther without any change in direction for nine years even when the policy had 
been set back by one failure after another. One of the reasons that led to this tragedy 
was that the top British leaders had closed their minds from opposing views outside 
as well as from different opinions from the F.O. and the Chiefs of Staff, who should 
have been encouraged to give their observations more openly, more independently, 
and to look at the arguments from every side.
When appeasement is criticised for its unrealistic and unreasonable concessions 
to the aggressors, it does not mean that each and every concession is wrong, nor 
should any policy with conciliatory factors be misnamed “appeasement”. In fact, 
concession and force are two closely related aspects in international affairs. In the 
nuclear age, due to the danger of nuclear war, concession becomes more necessary. 
However, force always plays a more fondamental role than concession even in these 
circumstances because it is a motive for avoiding the use of nuclear force that 
demands concessions from both sides, not vice versa. Generally speaking, in a world 
of great power rivalry and conflict, a negotiator may not get a satisfactory 
concession from his partner unless his diplomacy is backed up with sufficient force.
Or agreement, as a result of concession, may not be properly kept even if it can be 
reached.
It is always safer if concessions can be made from a position of strength. 
Nevertheless, it really depends on the individual case as to how much force or 
concession is required. A policy — no matter whether it is firm or conciliatoiy — can 
be only judged by its result, namely, whether it works. The reason for criticising 
appeasement is that the policy did not work, nor did it achieve its own aims.
Because it failed, the search for a possible alternative course, which might have led 
to success in the 1930s, was necessary. It is true that historians cannot prove
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whether that alternative would have been correct simply by repeating histoiy as 
chemists repeat their experiments. However, the search is still valuable because 
when a doctor cannot save a patient from death he must search for a possible correct 
method to enable him to deal with the next patient with similar symptoms, even 
though he may not be able to prove that this alternative method would have been 
capable of saving the former patient who died.
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